Publicação: An alternative approach for quasi-truth
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Oxford University Press
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In 1986, Mikenberg et al. introduced the semantic notion of quasi-truth defined by means of partial structures. In such structures, the predicates are seen as triples of pairwise disjoint sets: the set of tuples which satisfies, does not satisfy and can satisfy or not the predicate, respectively. The syntactical counterpart of the logic of partial truth is a rather complicated first-order modal logic. In the present article, the notion of predicates as triples is recursively extended, in a natural way, to any complex formula of the first-order object language. From this, a new definition of quasi-truth is obtained. The proof-theoretic counterpart of the new semantics is a first-order paraconsistent logic whose propositional base is a 3-valued logic belonging to hierarchy of paraconsistent logics known as Logics of Formal Inconsistency, which was proposed by Carnielli and Marcos in 2002.
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Quasi-truth, logics of formal inconsistency, 3-valued paraconsistent logic, first-order paraconsistent logic, 3-valued model logic, paraconsistent model theory
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Inglês
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Logic Journal Of The Igpl. Oxford: Oxford Univ Press, v. 22, n. 2, p. 387-410, 2014.
