Teorias da identidade mente-cérebro: Ullin T. Place, Herbert Feigl, John J. C. Smart
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2023-11-07
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Universidade Estadual Paulista (Unesp)
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Em filosofia da mente, duas perguntas ontológicas mostram-se tão antigas quanto duradouras e formam o núcleo difícil desse campo, a saber: [1] “o que são os estados mentais?” e [2] “como se dá a interação causal entre os estados mentais e os processos físicos?”. Ambas as indagações derivam daquele que é tradicionalmente conhecido como “problema mente-corpo”, também denominado de “problema mente-cérebro”. Possibilidades de respostas foram dadas e, até o final da década de 1950, haviam-se originado propostas teóricas que passaram a ser conhecidas como dualismo, behaviorismo, pampsiquismo, teoria cibernética, psicologia da Gestalt, psicanálise e, dentre tantas, a teoria da identidade mente-cérebro, a qual, em seu contexto inicial, apresentava divergências entre suas próprias modalidades. Assim, como objetivo geral desta dissertação, propusemo-nos avaliar a resposta fisicalista fornecida em favor da identidade entre os estados mentais e os processos neurofisiológicos. Para tanto, como objetivos específicos, foram assumidas: [1] a análise reconstrutiva; [2] a avaliação crítica e [3] a análise comparativa de autores daquela mesma teoria. Constituiu método de pesquisa a revisão bibliográfica apoiada sobre os textos clássicos da área, os quais foram avaliados por meio do Cálculo Proposicional Clássico (CPC) e Cálculo Quantificacional Clássico (CQC) de 1ª Ordem, no propósito de superar a simples especulação a partir de demonstrações do status semântico de proposições, conjuntos de proposições e argumentos que constituem o corpo teórico da supracitada teoria. Para tanto, foram utilizados os três artigos principais e iniciais da década de 1950, a saber: “Is consciousness a brain process?” (1956) de autoria de Ullin Thomas Place, The “mental” and the “physical” (1958), do filósofo Herbert Feigl, bem como o artigo “Sensations and brain processes” (1959), escrito por John Jamieson Carswell Smart. Os resultados sugerem convergências e divergências entre os autores relativas às quatro propostas de análise do problema mente-cérebro: [1] linguística, [2] epistemológica, [3] lógica e [4] ontológica; bem como a carência de pesquisa empírica que sustente a identidade ontológica entre estados mentais e processos cerebrais. Salientamos o conflito entre [1] a possibilidade lógica da identidade ontológica sintética a posteriori mente-cérebro com [2] a possibilidade epistemológica da ciência dos estados fenomenais (qualitativos) e a ignorância dos processos físicos (quantitativos) a eles correlacionados. Também avaliamos a possibilidade de uma rejeição puramente lógica (a priori) da viabilidade da tese de uma identidade linguística sintética a posteriori dos referentes conceituais de uma linguagem fenomenal com aqueles de uma linguagem neurofisiológica, bem como suas implicações ontológicas.
In philosophy of mind, two ontological questions prove to be as old as they are enduring and form the difficult core of this field, namely: [1] “what are mental states?” and [2] “how does the causal interaction between mental states and physical processes occur?” Both questions derive from what is traditionally known as the “mind-body problem”, also called the “mind-brain problem”. Possibilities for answers were given and, by the end of the 1950s, theoretical proposals had emerged that came to be known as dualism, behaviorism, panpsychism, cybernetic theory, Gestalt psychology, psychoanalysis and, among many, the mind-brain identity theory, which, in its initial context, presented divergences between its own modalities. Thus, as a general objective of this dissertation, we set out to evaluate the physicalist answer provided in favor of the identity between mental states and neurophysiological processes. To this end, the following were assumed as specific objectives: [1] reconstructive analysis; [2] critical evaluation and [3] comparative analysis of authors of that same theory. The research method was a bibliographical review based on classic texts in the area, which were evaluated using Classical Propositional Calculus (CPC) and First-Order Predicate Calculus (FOPC), with the purpose of overcoming simple speculation based on demonstrations of the semantic status of propositions, sets of propositions and arguments that constitute the theoretical body of the aforementioned theory. To this end, the three main and initial articles from the 1950s were used, namely: “Is consciousness a brain process?” (1956) by Ullin Thomas Place, The “mental” and the “physical” (1958), by philosopher Herbert Feigl, as well as the article “Sensations and brain processes” (1959), written by John Jamieson Carswell Smart. The results suggest convergences and divergences between the authors regarding the four proposals for analyzing the mind-brain problem: [1] linguistic, [2] epistemological, [3] logical and [4] ontological; as well as the lack of empirical research that supports the ontological identity between mental states and brain processes. We highlight the conflict between [1] the logical possibility of synthetic a posteriori mind-brain ontological identity with [2] the epistemological possibility of knowing the phenomenal states (qualitative) and not knowing the physical processes (quantitative) correlated to them. We also evaluate the non-possibility of an (a priori) purely logical rejection of the viability of the thesis of an a posteriori synthetic linguistic identity of the conceptual referents of a phenomenal language with those of a neurophysiological language, as well as its ontological implications.
In philosophy of mind, two ontological questions prove to be as old as they are enduring and form the difficult core of this field, namely: [1] “what are mental states?” and [2] “how does the causal interaction between mental states and physical processes occur?” Both questions derive from what is traditionally known as the “mind-body problem”, also called the “mind-brain problem”. Possibilities for answers were given and, by the end of the 1950s, theoretical proposals had emerged that came to be known as dualism, behaviorism, panpsychism, cybernetic theory, Gestalt psychology, psychoanalysis and, among many, the mind-brain identity theory, which, in its initial context, presented divergences between its own modalities. Thus, as a general objective of this dissertation, we set out to evaluate the physicalist answer provided in favor of the identity between mental states and neurophysiological processes. To this end, the following were assumed as specific objectives: [1] reconstructive analysis; [2] critical evaluation and [3] comparative analysis of authors of that same theory. The research method was a bibliographical review based on classic texts in the area, which were evaluated using Classical Propositional Calculus (CPC) and First-Order Predicate Calculus (FOPC), with the purpose of overcoming simple speculation based on demonstrations of the semantic status of propositions, sets of propositions and arguments that constitute the theoretical body of the aforementioned theory. To this end, the three main and initial articles from the 1950s were used, namely: “Is consciousness a brain process?” (1956) by Ullin Thomas Place, The “mental” and the “physical” (1958), by philosopher Herbert Feigl, as well as the article “Sensations and brain processes” (1959), written by John Jamieson Carswell Smart. The results suggest convergences and divergences between the authors regarding the four proposals for analyzing the mind-brain problem: [1] linguistic, [2] epistemological, [3] logical and [4] ontological; as well as the lack of empirical research that supports the ontological identity between mental states and brain processes. We highlight the conflict between [1] the logical possibility of synthetic a posteriori mind-brain ontological identity with [2] the epistemological possibility of knowing the phenomenal states (qualitative) and not knowing the physical processes (quantitative) correlated to them. We also evaluate the non-possibility of an (a priori) purely logical rejection of the viability of the thesis of an a posteriori synthetic linguistic identity of the conceptual referents of a phenomenal language with those of a neurophysiological language, as well as its ontological implications.
Descrição
Palavras-chave
Cérebro, Identidade, Lógica, Mente, Brain, Identity, Logic, Mind
Como citar
GALVÃO, David Guarniery. Teorias da identidade mente-cérebro: Ullin T. Place, Herbert Feigl, John J. C. Smart. 2024. 215 f. Dissertação (Mestrado em Filosofia) - Faculdade de Filosofia e Ciências, Universidade Estadual Paulista (Unesp), Marília, 2023.