O homem justo na ética nicomaquéia de Aristóteles
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2023-02-24
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Universidade Estadual Paulista (Unesp)
Resumo
O problema da justiça (dikaiosunӗ) e do homem justo (dikaion) em Aristóteles é assaz complexo, dado que o Estagirita concebe justiça e injustiça como termos ambíguos e plurívocos, traçando que podem ser ditos de vários modos. Aristóteles concebe a Justiça tanto no plano da lei em sentido amplo, ou, em sua feição política, como um “bem de um outro” (Justiça Completa), e na esfera privada, enquanto a lei em sentido estrito que condiz com a distribuição de bens pessoais ou de grupos (Justiça Particular), esta subdividida em Justiça Distributiva, respeitante a bens de origem pública, e, Justiça Corretiva, respeitante a negócios individuais entre duas partes, e, ainda, a Justiça Retributiva, relacionada aos atos de comércio (trocas). Para cada uma delas Aristóteles estabelece uma noção própria de meio-termo e de homem justo. Aristóteles concebe o homem justo em duas dimensões aparentemente opostas: em sentido completo, como aquele dotado de conhecimento prático que implica a escolha (proairesis) daquilo que é bom para sua comunidade política, e, em sentido particular ou parcial, como o homem que, conforme sua disposição de caráter escolhe o meio-termo em recusa a um excesso e uma falta, de acordo com a regra justa (phrônesis). Neste compasso, o objetivo buscado nesta dissertação será o de estudar o sentido próprio de homem justo tratado nesta arquitetura moral de Aristóteles. Em ambas as espécies de justiça o Estagirita exige a intervenção do caráter normativo da phrônesis ou da experiência prática (praktike), investigada no Livro VI da EN. Procuraremos atender a esse propósito com base nos referenciais teóricos do corpus aristotélico e literatura complementar sobre o tema.
The problem of justice (dikaiosunӗ) and the just man (diakaion) in Aristotle is quite complex, given that the Stagirite conceives justice and injustice as ambiguous and plural terms, tracing that they can be said in several ways. Aristotle conceived Justice both in terms of the law in the broad sense, or, in its political aspect, as a “good of another” (Complete Justice), and in the private sphere, as the law in the strict sense that matches the distribution of rights. personal or group goods (Private Justice), which is subdivided into Distributive Justice, regarding goods of public origin, and, Corrective Justice, regarding individual transactions between two parties, and, also, Retributive Justice, related to acts of commerce (exchanges). For each of them, Aristotle establishes his own notion of the middle ground and the just man. Aristotle conceived the just man in two apparently opposite dimensions: in a complete sense, as the one endowed with practical knowledge that implies the choice (proairesis) of what is good for his political community, and, in a particular or partial sense, as the man who, according to his disposition of character to choose the middle ground in refusing an excess and a lack, according to the just rule (phronesis). In this compass, the objective sought in this dissertation will be to study the proper meaning of the man exactly treated in this moral architecture of Aristotle. In both kinds of justice, the Stagirite requires the intervention of the normative character of phrônesis or practical experience (praktike), investigated in Book VI of the EN. We will try to meet this purpose based on the theoretical references of the aristotelian corpus and complementary literature on the subject.
The problem of justice (dikaiosunӗ) and the just man (diakaion) in Aristotle is quite complex, given that the Stagirite conceives justice and injustice as ambiguous and plural terms, tracing that they can be said in several ways. Aristotle conceived Justice both in terms of the law in the broad sense, or, in its political aspect, as a “good of another” (Complete Justice), and in the private sphere, as the law in the strict sense that matches the distribution of rights. personal or group goods (Private Justice), which is subdivided into Distributive Justice, regarding goods of public origin, and, Corrective Justice, regarding individual transactions between two parties, and, also, Retributive Justice, related to acts of commerce (exchanges). For each of them, Aristotle establishes his own notion of the middle ground and the just man. Aristotle conceived the just man in two apparently opposite dimensions: in a complete sense, as the one endowed with practical knowledge that implies the choice (proairesis) of what is good for his political community, and, in a particular or partial sense, as the man who, according to his disposition of character to choose the middle ground in refusing an excess and a lack, according to the just rule (phronesis). In this compass, the objective sought in this dissertation will be to study the proper meaning of the man exactly treated in this moral architecture of Aristotle. In both kinds of justice, the Stagirite requires the intervention of the normative character of phrônesis or practical experience (praktike), investigated in Book VI of the EN. We will try to meet this purpose based on the theoretical references of the aristotelian corpus and complementary literature on the subject.
Descrição
Palavras-chave
Justiça, Completa, Particular, Meio-termo, Homem justo, Justice, Complete, Mean, Just man
Como citar
QUEIROZ, Oriel da Rocha. O homem justo na ética nicomaquéia de Aristóteles. Universidade Estadual Paulista (Unesp), 2023.