Wittgenstein on Dreaming and Skepticism

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dc.contributor.authorSegatto, Antonio Ianni [UNESP]
dc.contributor.institutionUniversidade Estadual Paulista (UNESP)
dc.date.accessioned2023-07-29T13:29:18Z
dc.date.available2023-07-29T13:29:18Z
dc.date.issued2022-11-01
dc.description.abstractIn this paper I aim to elucidate Wittgenstein’s claim that the so-called dream argument is senseless. Unlike other interpreters, who understand the sentence “I am dreaming” as contradictory or self-defeating, I intend to elucidate in what sense one should understand it as senseless or, more precisely, as nonsensical. In this sense, I propose to understand the above-mentioned claim in light of Wittgenstein’s criticism of skepticism from the Tractatus logico-philosophicus to his last writings. I intend to show that the words “I am dreaming” are nonsensical in the same sense as the alleged proposition “There are physical objects” or the expression of doubt about the existence of external objects.en
dc.description.affiliationDepartment of Social Sciences São Paulo State University, Rod. Araraquara-Jau, Km 1, SP
dc.description.affiliationUnespDepartment of Social Sciences São Paulo State University, Rod. Araraquara-Jau, Km 1, SP
dc.description.sponsorshipFundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado de São Paulo (FAPESP)
dc.description.sponsorshipIdFAPESP: 19/02290-2
dc.format.extent1033-1042
dc.identifierhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11245-022-09838-6
dc.identifier.citationTopoi, v. 41, n. 5, p. 1033-1042, 2022.
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s11245-022-09838-6
dc.identifier.issn1572-8749
dc.identifier.issn0167-7411
dc.identifier.scopus2-s2.0-85142214854
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11449/247912
dc.language.isoeng
dc.relation.ispartofTopoi
dc.sourceScopus
dc.subjectDreaming
dc.subjectNonsense
dc.subjectSkepticism
dc.subjectWittgenstein
dc.titleWittgenstein on Dreaming and Skepticismen
dc.typeArtigo
unesp.author.orcid0000-0001-7463-221X[1]

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