

# **SOUTH ATLANTIC: BRAZIL-AFRICA RELATIONS IN THE FIELD OF SECURITY AND DEFENSE**

Sérgio Luiz Cruz Aguilar<sup>1</sup>

## **Introduction**

While the South Atlantic conditioned the preparation and employment of naval forces in the context of defense of the Americas during the Cold War, today this area is presented to the country's foreign policy as a strategic priority and as a hub for Brazil's international insertion. Consequently, within the framework of the so-called South-South cooperation, which conformed in the 1970s and gained momentum in the post-Cold War, Brazil has been signing a series of agreements with African countries, especially those located on the western coast of the continent. In addition to the economic, political and technological areas, cooperation is also taking place in the field of security and defense.

This paper discusses the actions of South-South cooperation in the field of security and defense between the Brazilian government and the African countries, especially those in Atlantic Africa. Based on the literature on the subject and documentary sources, we begin with some considerations on the South Atlantic in the context of security and defense in the Cold War period. Then we will address the South-South cooperation and the agreements and projects implemented by Brazil with African countries in the post-Cold War era. In conclusion, we discuss the strategic dimensions of this cooperation in

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<sup>1</sup> Professor of the Department of Sociology and Anthropology, Universidade Estadual de São Paulo – Marília Campus. E - m a i l : sergioaguilar@marilia.unesp.br

strengthening Brazil's political relations with these countries and the current reconfiguration of international relations.

### **The South Atlantic in the Cold War Context**

During the Cold War the American continent lived under the strategy of containment as it was practiced by the United States, i.e. to stop the Soviet advance anywhere it manifested. The Inter-American Defense Board (IADB), in charge of making studies, issuing recommendations and preparing plans for common defense, raised three hypotheses for the defense of the continent: the so-called "revolutionary war"; the "limited war or consented military intervention, fostered by Eastern Grouping"; and the "armed attack of the Eastern Grouping to the Continent, under a general war"(Aguilar 2010, 81).

From them, the hypotheses of War that permeated the military planning of Latin American countries in the period derived from a regional conflict against a neighbor; internal, revolutionary war against leftists movements; and an extra continental war participating in the allied force led by the United States against the forces of the Communist bloc led by the Soviet Union (Aguilar 2010, 82).

The third hypothesis of conflict was embedded in the logic of the global confrontation between the two superpowers, according to which the safety of the periphery would be guaranteed by one of them. The preparation for conventional warfare was secured for the Latin American military with through the training in U.S. military schools and the supply of low-cost war material from U.S. aid programs. As the South American forces have a key role in the defense of the South Atlantic and the Pacific, the U.S. conceived and sponsored several joint exercises with the navies of the continent.

Although the U.S. Navy had already conducted smaller exercises with other navies, such as Operation Neptune with the Argentine Navy, the first major joint maneuver with a South American navy was the UNITAS Operation, which started in 1959 and continues to operate until the present days (2010 Aguilar, 83).

In the late 1970s, with the possibility of increasing the presence of the Soviet Navy in the South Atlantic, the idea of creating a collective defense mechanism along the lines of the Organization of the North Atlantic Treaty (NATO) emerged. This organization would include Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay

and South Africa. The presence of Paraguay in such project was also contemplated. However, the South Atlantic was a priority for Brazil because of its extensive coastline and maritime trade routes and the government did not perceive a threat that justified the creation of a so-called South Atlantic Treaty Organization (SATO) (Aguilar 2010, 86).

The Brazilian Navy understood that 1) the Soviet naval presence would not be neutralized by the union of navies of such sizes in the area; 2) such presence would not threaten western maritime traffic; 3) the importance of the route passing the African coast derived from the oil, a route that in case of war would be vulnerable from its origin; 4) there would be political difficulties of composing such a mechanism with South Africa, which was at the time isolated politically as a result of the Apartheid regime. Moreover, if the intention of the proposal was to difficult the communist expansion in Africa, it would have faced the Brazilian refusal inasmuch as the country had at that time good political relations—with Angola and Mozambique. The conclusion was that such a treaty would not add much to the security of the countries involved; it would be ineffective because the naval force of those involved was not compatible with the area to be defended; and, finally, it could even be detrimental to Brazilian national interests in relation to Africa (Aguilar 2010, 86).

Besides UNITAS, other multilateral exercises were executed by American initiative, and they included the Expanded Sea, the Ocean Ventura and the Export Gold operations (Aguilar 2010, 152). It is worth noting that the Operation Oceanic in the early 1980s involved naval units from South America and South Africa (National Archives 1981a).

The IADB also prepared in the 1960s the Plan for Coordination of Inter-American Maritime Traffic which defined five sea areas – one of them covering the South Atlantic. As a result of this plan, the Maritime Area of the South Atlantic (AMAS) was established in 1967 with the purpose of serving as an instrument of coordination, training, and naval control of maritime traffic. AMAS comprised the maritime coast of Brazil, Uruguay and Argentina and had a Coordinator – CAMAS – a function performed by officers of the three countries on a rotating basis. It also had a Joint Staff comprising officials of these countries and Paraguay, who was also part of the area. Several operations were performed by the United States, or on the initiative of the members of

AMAS, for communications training and dressage of organizations of naval control of maritime traffic (National Archives 1981b, 13).

Besides the exercises sponsored by the United States, in the late 1960s navies of Brazil and Argentina began joint operations such as Atlantis (exercises Joint Staff in surface warfare, anti-submarine, anti-aircraft and electronics) which started to count with the participation of the Uruguayan navy. In the 1970s, the Argentine Navy created Operation Cimarrón with the Navy of Uruguay (Aguilar 2010, 153).

Because the South Atlantic was not at any time considered a priority area under the strategic or geopolitical point of view of the two antagonistic great powers, the Brazilian proposal of establishing a Zone of Peace and Cooperation of the South Atlantic (ZOPACAS) was facilitated.

The resolution establishing the ZOPACAS was approved by the United Nations in October 1986 and this encompassed the three countries of the east coast of South America whose coastlines face the Atlantic (Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay), and 21 countries of the west coast of Africa. Being a forum for collaboration and regional integration, member states began to hold regular meetings for discussion of common problems (Aguilar 2010, 159).

With the end of the Cold War, Brazilian foreign policy sought to adapt to the new global order and, in the words of Bueno and Cervo (2008), adopting an attitude of participation in the formulation and acceptance of the bases and rules of the international order, its general principles, systems and processes, i.e., a model that some authors have called "autonomy through participation." Brazilian diplomacy defined the multilateral space as the best scenario for the performance of the country in the process of adapting to the new order. In this context, South-South cooperation has conformed to one of the axes of Brazilian foreign policy, especially with African countries.

### **South-South Cooperation**

In the contemporary international system, the North-South agenda dominated relations among States and, therefore, the discussions in the United Nations (UN). In the 1960s, however, the newly independent countries began to give more weight to the global forums and to participate in the various bodies of the UN. The creation of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), in the Bandung conference, was an attempt of various countries to influence the global agenda

without being aligned with one of the two great powers of the Cold War period. In the 1970s, these countries sought to develop ties of solidarity among themselves in order to offset or diminish the historic dependence in relation to the old colonial powers, giving rise to the concept of South-South cooperation. Different from the traditional North-South relationship based on the technological backwardness of the latter, efforts were made towards the establishment of cooperation in an egalitarian basis and free of the constraints normally imposed by the North (Nogueira 2010, 1).

But most of these countries lacked strong political institutions, their economic development was low, the incipient and dependent foreign policies of former colonial powers was flagrant – not to mention the violent processes that many had to pass to achieve and consolidate their independence. This made cooperation to have a timid start. With the emergence and improvement of regional integration mechanisms and changes in both the global and the domestic contexts of most countries in the post-Cold War, cooperation began to intensify.

In the case of Brazil, cooperation with countries in the South gained priority in the foreign policy agenda of past governments as a form of international insertion. One of the forms of cooperation employed by Brazil is called "technical cooperation" which consists of technical support, not financial as in traditional cooperation, sending specialized bodies in certain sectors to empower segments of the population in areas of knowledge where there is a lack of technical resources.

The projects are developed by Brazilian institutions or executed in triangulation with other countries or international organizations in various fields such as agriculture, energy, food security, environment, justice, civil defense, combating gender violence, health, education, vocational training, among others. These projects are held by the Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC) of Itamaraty (MRE, ABC 2011). The South-South cooperation is now the essence of ABC, beginning with African countries and extended to Central America, the Caribbean, Asia and, in particular, East Timor. In 2010, ABC was working on 240 projects and activities carried out in 58 developing countries (Nogueira 2010, 2).

In the case of development projects in Brazil, ABC firms partnerships with institutions that are benchmarks in their fields as Senai, SEBRAE, EMBRAPA, FIOCRUZ, among others, and covers financially missions abroad, while the institutions themselves remunerate their technicians available to the projects. The costs are therefore reduced (Nogueira 2010, 3).

Cooperation in triangulation involves other countries or institutions such as the World Bank. An example is the project of satellites development called CBERS, which began in China in the 1980s, which resulted in the construction of remote sensing satellites. The images obtained by these satellites are being shared with no costs with other countries. In 2008, Brazil and China released a project called "CBERS for Africa", with the goal of yielding images to African countries that could be used in areas such as public health, disaster prevention, environment and agriculture (Nogueira 2010, 3).

The South-South cooperation also occurs through forums for consultation and coordination as IBSA (India - Brazil - South Africa) which created a fund managed by the UN Development Programme (UNDP), which funds projects to reduce poverty in several countries, including Guinea Bissau and Cape Verde, Africa. The IBSA's projects targeted for economic development are based on the central idea of the connection between stability and development (IBSA 2012).

Cooperation is implemented also through multilateral mechanisms as the South America - Africa Summit, symbolizing cooperation efforts between blocks of countries wishing to deepen their political relationship and promote actions of social and economic development (Nogueira 2010 6). In this field the Community of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP) is included and its creation and development has made the countries of "Portuguese Africa" – Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau, Sao Tome and Principe and Mozambique – to receive priority in the actions for cooperation promoted by the Brazilian government.

Thus, technical cooperation is currently one of the arms of Brazilian foreign policy, "based on the principles of solidarity and co-responsibility," nonprofits and detached from commercial interests, seeking to share Brazilian successes and best practices "in areas considered most relevant by the recipient countries"(Silveira 2002, 285).

Among the cooperation projects conducted by Brazil, several have been established in the field of security and defense with African countries, especially those of the Atlantic coast.

### **South Atlantic in the Post-Cold War Context**

With the end of the Cold War, the role of the South Atlantic in the context of global security, as part of the defense architecture of the American continent, lost the meaning it had in the previous period. Several joint maneuvers continued to be held, sponsored by the U.S. or created on a bilateral or multilateral agreement between Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay. However, they had more a character of building mutual trust than preparing to fight a common enemy.

The exercises between Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay, facing the South Atlantic gained more strength from the 1990s. The navies of Argentina and Brazil created Operation Araex which included the use of naval aircraft and helicopters in sea wars, based on similar exercise conducted between the Uruguayan and Brazilian navies, called Uruex. Since 2002, the exercises started gathering the navies of the three countries. In 1997, Brazil and Argentina conducted Operation Temperex (anti-submarine and air clarification), the Brazilian aircraft carrier São Paulo leading the Argentine aircraft S-2 T<sup>2</sup>. That same year, the three countries held a naval exercise, type war game, called Transamerica, concerning maritime traffic control from the simulation of a regional crisis in which it would be necessary to adopt measures for the protection of merchant ships traffic<sup>3</sup>. The three marine created also a trilateral war game of crisis management at the strategic operational level (Aguilar 2010, 303).

In the African continent, with the end of the Cold War, a series of conflicts fueled by the ideological struggle between the two superpowers lost their meaning and sources for funding stopped, allowing their resolution, as the cases of Angola and Mozambique. The end of the apartheid regime in South

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<sup>2</sup> In a joint maneuver in 2002, for the first time the new Brazilian aircraft carrier was employed in waters of foreign jurisdiction with Argentines and Uruguayans vessels (Aguilar 2010, 299)

<sup>3</sup> The exercise was expanded and added naval units from South Africa, Argentina, Chile, Colombia, El Salvador, Ecuador, USA, Honduras, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela (SDM 1997).

Africa virtually opened the doors of the country to foreign relations and also helped it to strengthen its ties with Brazil.

In 1993, Argentina and South Africa created the exercise Atlasur, in the context of ZPCSA, focusing surface, anti-aircraft, anti-submarine and electronic warfare action. The countries also tested logistical support mobile procedures and improved interoperability between their naval and naval-air. In 1995, at the invitation of Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay began to participate in the operation and Paraguayan officers were present as observers (Aguilar 2010, 299).

In Brazil, the National Defense Policy (NDP) adopted in 2005, incorporated the multidimensional concept of security, much discussed within the Organization of American States (OAS) during the 1990s, "covering the political, military, economic, social, environmental and other fields ", but it maintained the external defense as the primary duty of the Armed Forces. Among the strategic guidelines, it presented greater exchange with the armed forces of friendly nations, particularly those of South America and Africa, bordering the South Atlantic (Brazil. PR 2005).

The NDP also stated that Brazil would participate in peacekeeping and humanitarian actions in accordance with its national interests. This was confirmed by the government when it dispatched armed troops to UN peacekeeping missions in Angola and Mozambique in the mid-1990s. For these two countries, the Portuguese language and common history as Portuguese colonies, weighed in the decision of a higher share of the country in UN peacekeeping efforts. But also it indicated a greater role for African affairs in the Brazilian international agenda.

The National Defense Strategy (END) showed that one of the most pressing concerns of defense is in the South Atlantic. The identification and analysis of the main strengths and vulnerabilities led the END to determine the articulation of the armed forces "capable of taking into account the requirements of each operating environment, particularly the Amazon and South Atlantic" (MD, END 2008, 45). The END has determined that, in preparing the hypothesis of employment, Military Strategy of Defense should contemplate the use of the Armed Forces due to the threat of armed conflict in the South Atlantic. Consequently, the plans of equipment and articulation of the Armed Forces should "contemplate a proposal for a spatial distribution of

military and quantifying the necessary resources for effective service of the "Hypotheses of Employment", in order to enable the increase of military presence in the strategic areas of the South Atlantic and of the Amazon region (MD, 2008, 49).

At the opening of the National Defense Strategy Seminar, in November 2012, the then Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Celso Amorim, raised concern about tensions in the West African countries, such as in Mali and Guinea-Bissau, drug trafficking linked to terrorism and maritime piracy, in addition to the risk of bringing to the South Atlantic "military organizations with other purposes or aiming other enemies or adversaries." Amorim stated that "in Brazil's strategic surroundings, the primary focus of the logic of cooperation consists, on the one hand, in South America, concerning also Antarctica, and on the other hand, the South Atlantic, extending to the western edge of Africa" (Amorim 2012, 10).

Following the official discourse and the defense documents, several Brazilian government actions contemplated African countries. Cooperation agreements in the area of defense were signed with Cape Verde (MRE 1994b), in 1994, South Africa (MRE 2003), in 2003, Guinea-Bissau (MRE 2006), in 2006, Mozambique (MRE 2009b) and Namibia (MRE 2009a), in 2009, Nigeria (MRE 2010c), Senegal (MRE 2010d), Angola (MRE 2010a) and Equatorial Guinea (MRE 2010b), in 2010.

In general, they intended to promote cooperation in research and development; give logistics support in the acquisition of defense products and services; share knowledge and experiences in the field of operations, in the use of military equipment of domestic and foreign origin and in the compliance with international peacekeeping operations; share knowledge in science and technology to promote joint military training and education, joint military exercises, and the corresponding exchange of information; and collaborate on issues related to military equipment and systems. Cooperation would take place through visits of high-level delegations; meetings between defense institutions; exchange of instructors and students of military institutions, participation in theoretical and practical courses, internships, seminars, conferences, debates and symposia held in military entities as well as civil organizations of interest to the defense; visits of warships and military aircraft; cultural and sporting

events; trade facilitation initiatives related to materials and services associated with the area of defense; and development and implementation of programs and projects which can be applied to the technology of defense, with the possibility of participation of military and civil entities of strategic interest to the parties.

In 2004, under the auspices of the General Cooperation Agreement that was signed in 1981, Brazil and Mozambique conducted a complementary adjustment related to public safety. Cooperation in this field involved the coordination of strategies and exchange of information on national programs for the prevention and combating of crime; technical cooperation guided by the Brazilian experience of the implementation of the Unified Public Safety System; actions of personnel training, in particular capacitating teachers and teacher training, cooperation in the field of implementation of management systems of knowledge and information, of statistics, of applied research, and of diagnostics formulation of criminal justice and public safety; and studies aimed at modernizing the area of management of public safety institutions. The National Secretariat for Public Safety of the Brazilian Ministry of Justice was responsible for implementing the actions and the ABC as responsible for coordinating, monitoring and evaluating those actions (MRE 2004a).

In 2009, a Complementary Adjustment to the Basic Technical and Scientific Agreement existing between Brazil and Guinea-Bissau since 1978 provided for the implementation of a Training Centre of the security forces in that country, with the aim of contributing to the restructure and modernization of the sector of security and defense, leaving the Brazilian Federal Police responsible for the actions arising from the adjustment (MRE 2009c).

In 2010, one of the strategic partnerships signed with Angola was the public security and defense. The guidelines in this area, presented the encouragement to cooperation between the ministries of defense and public safety organs and the maintenance of "regular consultations on bilateral, regional and multilateral issues", including initiatives within the Zone of Peace and Cooperation in the South Atlantic and "cooperation for the solution of conflicts in Africa and other regions, including peace building in post-conflict situations." In the field of technical, scientific and technological cooperation, the partnership contemplated actions for the development of human resources and joint research in the fields of shipbuilding, public security and defense. It also established a Bilateral High Level committee to "coordinate, monitor,

evaluate, guide and ensure the implementation of the partnership" (MRE 2010e).

Among the countries of the Atlantic coast of Africa, Namibia has established itself as the largest recipient of Brazilian cooperation in the field of security and defense. In 1994, the Naval Agreement signed between the two countries began the relationship between their navies in order to "create and fortify the Naval Wing of the Ministry of Defense of Namibia." All costs of transfer and stay in Brazil, as well as the Brazilian military who would stay in that country as liaison officers, were covered by the then Brazilian Navy Ministry (MRE 1994a). At that time positions were made available in the Brazilian naval schools for both officers and soldiers, and an initial internship was offered to 145 Namibians sailors in the Southeast Naval Patrol Grouping, in Rio de Janeiro (MB Md. 2011).

In 2001, Fernando Henrique Cardoso's government signed a new Naval Cooperation Agreement with the same goal as the one before. For him, the Brazilian Navy should assist in the organization of the Maritime Patrol Service of the country so that Namibia would be able to protect its interests in its internal waters, territorial sea and exclusive economic zone, supply vessels and "assist in the planning and development of an appropriate infrastructure to berthing and logistical support for such vessels". The costs of training and evaluation conducted in Brazil were transferred to the Namibian government and the Brazilian Naval Mission in Namibia was established (MRE 2001).

The agreement led to a series of subsequent actions. In 2004, the Corvette Purus, which had been "retired", was transferred to Namibia being baptized in that country "NS Lt-Gen Dimo Hamaambo". In the same year, it was agreed on the supply vessels built in Brazil and, in 2006, the Brazilian navy created Technical Support Groups and sent military to the Walvis Bay base. In 2009, the first patrol vessel built in Brazil was delivered, baptized "Brendan Sinbwaye" (Bastos 2011). Jobs for Namibians became available at the Naval Academy in the courses of Improvement Officers in Hydrographic and Officer Training of the Instruction Center Admiral Wandenkolk (CIAW), in specialization and training courses of sailors and soldiers (MD. MB 2011).

Actions also included cooperation for the creation of the Namibian Battalion Marines and the implementation of course for soldiers' training; the

development of the Ceremonial of the Navy; promotion of joint actions of instruction and military training, joint military exercises; and exchange of information and collaboration on issues related to systems, software and equipment, among others (MD. MB 2011).

In April 2010 the Naval Mission in Namibia had five officers and eleven soldiers and sub-officers (MD MB, 2011; Prado 2009). Earlier that year, the graduation of the first class of Namibian Marines Soldiers formed by the Navy of Brazil took place. The soldiers started to work in "Marine Corps Battalion", the future Marine Infantry Battalion of Namibia (Revista Forças Armadas 2011).

Under IBSA, in 2005, the conduction of joint operations called "IBSAMAR" began, bringing together the navies of Brazil, India and South Africa in the South African coast, between the cities of Cape Town and Simon's Town. (MD. MB 2011).

In 2006, as a result of the cooperation agreement of 2003, the air forces of Brazil and South Africa began to develop a project of missile air-air of short range, able to perform maneuvers to achieve targets during the flight and with an infrared sensing system, called A-Darter (Rangel, 2010, 48).

The military schools of formation of advanced studies of the Army began to receive students from the African countries, especially of the Portuguese speaking ones. In the Military Academy of Agulhas Negras, in 2011, of the 42 foreign cadets who were enrolled, 27 were from CPLP countries (ten of Angola, ten of Mozambique, two of Cape Verde, one of Guinea Bissau and four of Sao Tome and Principe). The School of Command and Joint Staff of the Army (ECEME) has a course aimed at officers of friendly nations (ONA), which receives an average of 11 students per year, including Africans. In 1999, it received one Angolan and in 2007 and 2011 officers from Nigeria<sup>4</sup>. With Gabon, cooperation in the area of higher education, included the formation of that country's military in the colleges of the Brazilian Navy and the two governments have shown interest in developing cooperation in the fields of

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<sup>4</sup> Information provided to the author by Agulhas Negras Military Academy's divisions of instruction and the School of Command and Joint Staff of the Army in 2011.

military training, training for combat operations in the tropical environment and the fight against bio-piracy (MRE 2004b).

In 2012 the Mauritanian Defense Minister visited Brazil and at the meeting with the Minister Celso Amorim they discussed the possibility of conducting joint exercises between the two navies (Murmel s.d). There are close contacts with Cape Verde for training in the naval area, air patrol and with the Army in the area of maintenance of order (Amorim 2012, 12).

In 2013, the Apa patrol vessel, built by the British company BAE Systems, in its journey from the port of Portsmouth in the UK to Brazil, participated in missions in Mauritania, Senegal, Angola and Namibia (Murmel s.d). The same had happened earlier in the maiden voyage of the ocean patrol ship Amazonas, which held joint exercises and narrowed ties with the navies of Cape Verde, Benin, Nigeria and Sao Tome and Principe (Brazil, Amorim 2012, 12).

Within the scope of Air Force, the Air Force Academy (AFA) formed pilots from Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau<sup>5</sup> and the Brazilian government agreed to the selling of the light attack aircraft Super Tucano to Mauritania and Burkina Faso (Amorim 2012).

The Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries (CPLP) became a very active in international forums as far as discussions in the field of security and defense are concerned. Based on a legal document called CPLP Protocol of Cooperation in the Field of Defense, the Ministers of National Defense Meeting, the Meeting of Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Center for Strategic Analysis (CAE, initials in Portuguese) were created, with the purpose of discussing the professionalization of the armed forces, ethics and the military profession<sup>6</sup>.

Under the auspices of CPLP, the Operation Feline was created, in October 2000. It is held annually on a rotating basis, with the participation of elements of the armies of each of the countries of the Community and with a Multinational Joint Staff. The operation is conceived in the theme of the

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<sup>5</sup> Information given by AFA to the author of this paper.

<sup>6</sup> In 2010, the 12th Ministers of National Defense of CPLP Meeting was held in Brasilia, as well as the 3rd Center for Strategic Analysis of CPLP Seminar (Brasil, PR 2010; Brasil. MD 2006)

missions of peacekeeping and humanitarian aid (Brazil. EB s.d.).

Brazil established permanent military missions along with the Brazilian embassy in South Africa, Nigeria, Angola and Sao Tome and Principe, and the Brazilian Cooperation Agency supported it with scholarships for staff training in the area of security and defense through the so called "cooperation in knowledge "(FKA 2009).

ABC operationalized the Memorandum of Understanding signed by the defense ministries of Brazil and African countries to conduct courses and training in the three armed forces. There was also a provision for the establishment of a Police academy in Guinea-Bissau and the training of police officers to assist the country in the restructuring of the security forces on a regular basis (FKA 2009).

## **Conclusion**

Brazil is part of the group of developed countries that have not yet reached the same social levels of the superpowers, but it has an economic capacity that may impact the international economic system. Those countries, the so-called "emergent", have an importance and a regional leadership and aspire to a greater presence in global decision-making process (Aguilar 2012).

Brazilian self-perception as an emerging power began to conform itself in the late twentieth century, due to the situation of the country as one of the largest economies in the world, possessing the largest and most diversified industrial park in Latin America, the vast mineral and natural resources and advanced technology in some areas, in addition to the enormous capacity for food production.

Brazil sees the contemporary global order as a multipolar, asymmetrical structure, where the prevailing uncertainty and the possibility of multiple actors generate insecurity. In this context, the strengthening of multilateralism would be the best option for a country with the size of Brazil to transit in the system, to face the competitiveness of trade, to respond to the uncertainties caused by state and non-state actors that affect the safety and to reduce the asymmetry with the major powers.

The choice of multilateralism indicates the need to strengthen bilateral political relations and the conformation of groups with common interests such as IBSA and BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa). Thus,

South-South cooperation has become part of the search for autonomy of Brazilian foreign policy, expressed in the diversification of partnerships and forums for action.

The search for autonomy was implemented in different ways by the Brazilian government since the democratization of the country, either by the increasing distance of the most powerful countries, adopted by the José Sarney's administration, either through more active participation in international institutions and the commitment to various treaties in the areas of human rights and the denial to nuclear proliferation – a hallmark of Fernando Henrique Cardoso's foreign policy (Vigevani and Cepaluni 2012). Under Lula's government, and currently in Dilma Rousseff's government, a diversification of partners was sought which led to the deepening of relations with emerging countries such as South Africa, China, India and Russia, and with African countries, especially the West Coast and the Portuguese language.

In the Brazilian perspective, the conformation of a more stable world begins with stability at the regional level. Thus, the creation and strengthening of arrangements in South America would guarantee peace in the subcontinent and, consequently, better development conditions for the region as a whole. In South America, the greatest examples of actions in this regard were the creation of the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) and its South American Council of Defense.

With no sworn enemies in its surroundings, the political and strategic options designed by the PDN and END elected South America, the South Atlantic, the western coast of Africa and Antarctica as areas of strategic interest. From the point of view of defense, the Amazon and South Atlantic are now the priority areas. In other words, they determined the priority of Brazilian politics for formatting a cooperative process in South America and the countries of the west coast of Africa.

The defense planning refers to the possibility of intervention of a great power, or coalition of powers, against which the country would face difficulties. Thus, regional arrangements around these areas would strengthen the deterrent power, giving a collective character to the need for defense. It is in this direction that UNASUR, the Organization of the Amazon Cooperation Treaty and ZOPACAS work.

Thus, the Brazilian position could be described as an attitude of preventive security, i.e., more based on an analysis of possible changes in the international context in the long term, and with the definition of a more favorable scenario to the country in the international system in the short term, than with the need for the immediate defense of the territory.

In the case of the South Atlantic, the priority is given on the grounds of the Brazilian perception of the necessity to protect the natural resources of the continental platform (which grew since the discovery of oil deposits in the Pre-Salt), and the Brazilian foreign trade conducted mainly through the Atlantic. This means guaranteeing the use of this space without constraints. As a result, the need for actions that go beyond the Brazilian territorial waters or areas of exclusive economic exploitation, reaching the Atlantic coast of Africa, emerged.

Thus, diversification of partnerships and strategic interest led to the deepening of relations and establishment of arrangements with the countries of the West African coast, in several areas, including defense and security, in order to consolidate peace zone in this area.

It is in this context that South-South cooperation takes place. In addition to the fields of trade, technological development, education and lending and financing for national reconstruction of States which have recently ended armed conflict, as the cases of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea Bissau, among others, a number of agreements were signed in the field of security and defense.

At the same time there was a conjunction of interests of both parts between Brazil and Africa. For these, the priority given by Brazil to the deepening of relations, and resource availability arising from it, was fully absorbed. First, because programs, projects and resources for development are always welcome, especially for poorer countries or those with serious structural problems, some due to the processes of violence which occurred in the last decades. Second, that approach was facilitated by historical ties to former Portuguese colonies or because of the slave trade. Third, Brazil is seen and presented itself as a better option for the development of cooperation projects than the former metropolis. Fourth, the Brazilian cooperation represents an action that changes the axis of aid dependency, hitherto exclusively from the countries of the North to the ones in the South. Fifth, the concept of cooperation practiced by Brazil involves the transfer of knowledge and takes

into account the interests and priorities of the recipient countries, different from the "imposing cooperation" of North-South relations, where the 'donor' countries often indicate which projects they want to fund, in accordance with their own interests.

This parameter of knowledge transference remains in the projects and initiatives in the area of security with Latin America and Africa, regions where the concept applied is the one of ample security, integrating public policy and food or environmental security, for example.

As the relationship between Brazil and most African countries is asymmetric, cooperation adds little to the Brazilian military power, but adds greatly to the power of those who receive the benefits of the relationship. For example, the partnership of Brazil and Namibia does not mean an increase in Brazil's of military power, but has allowed the establishment of the Namibian Navy, including marines, and the significant increase in the ability to secure the sovereignty of the State. In these cases, cooperation, under the strict point of view of security and defense, resembles military assistance

Thus, the agreements indicate the use of the Brazilian power in favor of least developed countries in Africa. The availability of funds and resources to support the strengthening of the armed forces of some countries, indicate the prominence that the Brazilian governments, from the 1990s on, have given to the relations with that continent, especially the South Atlantic countries.

As it can be seen, there is no intention to create a large collective defense mechanism in the field of security and defense – one able to act as to guarantee the use, without constraints or threats, of the South Atlantic. The cooperation that is sought is one in which the African countries bordering the Atlantic can build military forces and public safety capable of ensuring internal peace (and, consequently, regional) peace. Brazil would be, therefore, contributing to a safer world and achieving a better articulation with various actors in the international system.

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**ABSTRACT**

South-South Cooperation has become one of the axis of the Brazilian Foreign Policy, especially when related to Africa. Besides the economic, political and technologic areas, among others, the Brazilian government created a series of cooperation agreements with many African countries in the field of security and defense. This paper analyses the objective and reach of the actions concerning South-South Cooperation between the government of Brazil and the African countries, especially the ones from Atlantic Africa, making use of a bibliography related to the subject and sources derived from the Ministry of External Affairs and the Ministry of Defense.

**KEYWORDS**

South Atlantic; Brazil; Foreign Policy; South-South; Africa.

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