

Emerging Powers, Humanitarian Assistance and Foreign Policy: the Case of Brazil during Earthquake Crisis in Haiti

Sérgio Aguilar

State University of São Paulo (UNESP)
Campus of Marília/SP, Brazil
Department of Sociology and Anthropology
Av. Higino Muzzi Filho 737 - Câmpus Universitário
CEP 17.525-900 - Marília, SP - Brasil

Rua Davino Alves de Souza

n. 75 – Jardim Maria Isabel – CEP 17516-230
Marília, SP, Brasil

Abstract

During the management of the crisis after the earthquake occurred in Haiti in 12 January 2010, Brazil played an important role on the efforts of humanitarian assistance. Based on bibliography and documents the paper presents the role played by Brazil with the focus on the humanitarian assistance as part of country' foreign policy as an emerging power to increase the presence into the international system. To achieve this goal the article presents some considerations about emerging powers, foreign policy and theoretical concepts about humanitarian assistance and international relations, the extension of the earthquake in Haiti and the actions performed by Brazil during the response phase of the crisis management.

Keywords: Brazil; Haiti; Crisis Management, Emerging Powers; Foreign Policy, United Nations; Humanitarian Assistance

1. Introduction

On January 2010, an earthquake of major proportions in Haiti resulted in thousands of buildings collapsed, more than 200 thousand people killed, 300 thousand injured and about one and half million people displaced. The country was under United Nations (UN) mandate on behalf of the peacekeeping operation established since 2004 named UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), and the military command was from Brazil. In addition to the precarious structure of the country to deal with a crisis situation, the earthquake caused the death of high UN officials, the ineffectiveness of government systems, communications and logistics. Along with the chaos established, the willingness of governments, international organizations and NGOs led to the influx of people, materials, equipment and humanitarian aid in general.

MINUSTAH Military Force was led by a Brazilian general and included a Battalion and an Engineer Company from Brazil. As a consequence of the earthquake, the Brazilian government established a crisis cabinet and had an active presence on the efforts of assistance including the sending of another battalion increasing the Brazilian effective up to 2200 militaries. The paper is a result of a research financed by a São Paulo Research Foundation (FAPESP) and, using the role played by Brazil during the earthquake crisis in Haiti, aims to examine the humanitarian assistance to countries affected by natural disasters and/or involved in conflicts as part of emerging powers' foreign policy to increase their presence into the international system.

The article is set out as follows: a brief considerations about emerging powers and foreign policy, an outline of theoretical concepts about humanitarian assistance and the international relations, some results of the earthquake in Haiti, an outline of key role played by Brazil during the humanitarian assistance immediately after the earthquake and the conclusion focusing on the presence of Brazil in the Haitian peace process.

2. Emerging powers and foreign policy

Emerging powers are part of the developing world and even do not reach the same social levels of advanced countries, they've acquired a great level of industrial development that allowed the establishment of technological excellence areas and they have an economic capacity that may impact the economic international system. These countries have a significance and even regional leadership and aspire to a greater presence in global decision-making processes. In this sense, they try to influence the decisions of major powers or groups formed by them on various global issues. That is, to be active and differentiated actors in several spaces and areas in order to contribute for the construction of a new international architecture, which involves take on new responsibilities and new roles in the global scenario.

But, the quest for global leadership by these countries is still constrained both the limited political and economic capacity to respond to the demands are arising and the asymmetry that still exists in the international system. These countries try to compensate these limitations and constraints, by using their economic and foreign policy to achieve strategic and political goals.

The Brazil, for example, seeks to maintain certain independence of action within the system, preferring to analyze and decide in a case-by-case basis as they arise, avoiding alliances and patterns of automatic pre-established relationships with other actors. The country takes as a reference the principles of universalism and multilateralism, diversifying its partners and interests and working to strengthen its position in multilateral forums, as well as strengthen the international organizations, especially the United Nations (UN). Under the UN is one of the most active actors that defend the reform process, especially regarding the Security Council (SC), frozen since the end of World War II. Likewise, its foreign policy makes use of its importance and regional leadership to develop regional policies.

In this aspect we can observe two features. The first deals with the enhancement of identities, interests and even common values to the establishment of regional arrangements. The Common Market of the South (MERCOSUL) can be included as an example, by geographical proximity, and/or the common interests of its two protagonists, Brazil and Argentina. In this context, the types of cooperation and integration and the intensity and depth of its development are typically tied to the complexity of economic and, above all, security relations in the region where the emerging powers are inserted.

The second would be to seek the expansion of these mechanisms by establishing inter-regional links. An example of this feature would be the Union of South American Nations (UNASUL), created by the action of Brazilian foreign policy, bringing together all South American countries, comprising members of two major sub-regional blocs, MERCOSUL and the Andean Community.

It is interesting to notice that the priority given to relations with Latin America appears in the Brazilian Constitution of 1988. The constitutional goal of Latin American integration was perceived as too ambitious by subsequent governments to the time of its promulgation. The priority became the South America, something more attainable.

The Brazilian regional policy also intends to strengthen its image among the neighbors, increasing confidence and providing new arrangements. As the regional stability is understood as a prerequisite for economic development, Brazil has used its economic capacity to allow the execution of projects to foster development. The projects financed by Brazil in several neighboring states under the Initiative for Integration of Regional Infrastructure in South America (IIRSA, 2012) and the fund created by the IBSA (India, Brazil and South Africa) managed by United Nations Development Program (UNDP) that allows these countries to finance poverty reduction projects in other countries such as Haiti, Guinea Bissau and Cape Verde can be seen as examples (IBAS, 2012). That is, the IBSA was formed as a forum for consultation and coordination on significant political issues, but works in economic development because of the connection stability – development.

By using the economic, diplomatic and other non-military resources to project foreign policy in pursuit of a greater role in the international system, Brazil, and the emerging powers in general, acquire greater significance and responsibilities on the global scenario. At the same time, they are requested more frequently to participate in several areas, for example, to increase their presence in UN peacekeeping operations and/or to participate in financing development projects in poorest countries.

Thus, as an emerging power and accordingly to the characteristics pointed out above, Brazil has involved in an unprecedented way in the peace process in Haiti. This case serves to reinforce that it is not clear the intention of Brazil, in the short and medium term, to acquire a global power status, but exert more influence in decision-making world process, leading regional arrangements, articulating joint political and economic projects, supporting reform and strengthening of the international organizations and the emergence of new mechanisms of global governance. In this sense, be a protagonist in Haiti is part of this strategy that seeks greater visibility as an emerging global power.

3. Emerging powers and humanitarian assistance

International humanitarian action, although based in natural law, came to be treated collectively in the field of international society from the mid-nineteenth century and it was associated, initially, with the question of armed conflict. The Geneva Conference of 1864 resulted in a recognition by the European powers of the need for legal rules that guarantee the protection of personnel in charge of medical assistance and humanitarian institutions and wounded during armed conflicts. From the Conference a set of rules that became known as international humanitarian law or armed conflict international law was formed. Thus, the so-called humanitarianism left the realm of natural law and joined also in the field of international positive law.

With the events of the two great wars of the twentieth century occurred the codification of new rules which became known as the Geneva Law which covered the protection of wounded, sick, shipwrecked persons, prisoners and civilians in armed conflict that were added to those covered by the so-called Hague Law which encompasses the conventions of 1899 and 1907.

At the end of the Cold War the emergence of various intrastate conflicts increased humanitarian needs, especially the necessity of integrated responses with the coherent application of policy instruments, involving diplomacy, trade and development initiatives. So, the humanitarian aid politicization has emerged, bilateral funding has increased and the relationship between assistance and the UN peace-building operations in countries ravaged by armed conflict have been established. Nowadays, humanitarian assistance relates both to the actions of peace building during or after armed conflict and to provide immediate help in crisis situations, especially to victims of natural or political disasters, supported by the principle of human needs.

One of the definitions for humanitarian assistance is an "emergency assistance provided in extreme cases, including distribution of food and water and the provision of temporary shelter and other non-food items that will temporarily save lives" (Lange & Quinn, 2003, p. 13). For the Brazilian government humanitarian assistance is defined as "any action that contributes to help countries and people who are in emergency situations, public disaster, social upheaval, natural or manmade disasters, armed conflict, acute food insecurity, and imminent or serious threat to life, health and to the guarantee of human rights" (Brasil, MRE, 2010).

International aid has never been totally apolitical. The contributions of governments reflect national priorities and interests, which sometimes raise difficulties to obtain funding. Sometimes it causes an inflow of resources in certain areas over others. That is why, by several factors, some crises receive more attention and, therefore, more resources than others. By getting involved into the resolution of crises, states and humanitarian agencies become part of the local socio-economic realities. Thus, in any case, there is a political engagement (Pugh, 2002).

Theories of International Relations have several explanations about the involvement of States in the delivery of humanitarian aid. Realism deals with relations between States based on national interests within an anarchic international system. For this, the assistance would be a selfish form of countries exercising power in the international system, to demonstrate greater power or influence in the case of countries aspiring to become global players, or one way to oppose to the ruling powers (Waltz, 2002; Morgenthau, 2003).

The bilateral relations established by the aid strengthen and may even put the countries that receive assistance in the influence sphere of the states that offer help. Furthermore, the support happens in the hope of reciprocity, i.e. intending to receive some return, for example, and perhaps most common, the increase in bilateral trade.

In a globalized world, the interests of major countries are going further and further away. The major powers have global interests. Regional powers may, according to their growth, extend its interests to the overall plan. Thus, events across the world that decades ago would not have the slightest interest become important and lead countries to help. Realism deals with security as priority. Thus, this perspective of assistance can be related to the maintenance of internal, regional or international security.

Assistance may also be related to the application of the Joseph Nye's soft power concept (Nye, 2002), used as an informal mechanism for the exercise of influence in countries receiving aid.

Under the liberal point of view, assistance happens to help needy people, understanding that only cooperation would allow keeping the peace. The increase of humanitarian actions in recent decades is related to the growth of interdependence among states (Keohane & Nye, 1997). So, there would be a relationship based on cooperation between the actors of the system. From the security point of view, cooperation and states commitment around common values such as the provision of assistance, allow the formation of security communities that would result in greater regional and international stability (Deutsch et al, 1957). Because there is a dynamic on these communities, cooperation would result in new common interests and policies, which would even collaborate to create a culture of peace (Buzan, 1991).

In Brazil, some researchers attribute the attitude of Lula's government foreign policy to the non-indifference concept.¹ In his inaugural speech President Lula established that diplomatic action would be guided by humanistic perspective. In 2005, in his speech at the XXXV OAS General Assembly, the Minister of Foreign Affairs Celso Amorim said that the government of President Lula was associated to the basic principle of non-interference, an attitude of non-indifference, providing "support and solidarity in active situations crisis" when requested (Brasil, MRE, n.d.).

In order to explain the role of Brazil in the international collective action in Haiti under the auspices of the United Nations, this "diplomacy of solidarity" would be the design and the implementation of collective action "done by a third party interveners in international or internal conflict, lack of motivation resulting of its national interest and moved only by a duty of conscience" (Seitenfus, n.d.).

So, conducted by national interests, aiming to exercise power or simply providing assistance guided by a humanistic perspective, Brazil has been an important actor in the Haitian peace process. During the 2010 earthquake crisis in both, individually or leading the military component of MINUSTAH, Brazil played an important role, when the Brazilian government assigned priority to efforts to help that country.

4. Haiti and the earthquake

Haiti, located in Central America and with a rugged historical trajectory since independence in 1804, became the poorest nation in the Americas and one of the poorest in the world. Internal conflicts, poverty, illiteracy, diseases and natural disasters are common frameworks in the history of this country that, since its independence, has tried to establish a stable government based on democracy and respect for human rights. As part of this historical backdrop of turmoil, a severe internal crisis resulted in the resignation of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide in early 2004. The chaotic situation that settled in the country led to an international intervention with the establishment of the MINUSTAH.

The Security Council determined that the mission would restore order, through a mandate in three key areas: secure and stable environment, political process and human rights. To achieve its objectives was authorized a strength of 6,700 military, 1,622 police officers, 548 UN civilians, 154 UN volunteers and 995 local hires (UN, S/RES/1542, 2004). Due to changes in mission after the earthquake, the effective of MINUSTAH increased and reached over 14 000 people (UN, S/RES/1908, 2010).

¹ The non-indifference concept emerged within the African Union (AU) in contrast to the culture of non-intervention would have been responsible for the inaction of the community in some African conflicts in the 1990s (Murithi, 2009).

After six years of MINUSTAH's mandate with some progress, especially in the security field, in January 12, 2010 an earthquake of major proportions caused the loss of hundred thousands human lives and destroyed a considerable part of the initiatives and projects that were underway. The earthquake occurred around 5 p.m. with a magnitude of 7.3 on the Richter scale and epicenter about 17 km southwest of the capital.

Because it reached the most populous area of the country, the earthquake created an unprecedented situation. Port au Prince was responsible for more than 65% of economic activity and 85% of Haiti's taxes revenues (GoH, 2010a, p. 5). About 20% of federal employees were killed and 28 buildings that housed government institutions were destroyed (Interlandi, 2010, p. 46). Several others suffered serious. Basic services were suspended, banks, gas stations and stores in general were closed. In the National Penitentiary more than 4,000 prisoners escaped, including many gang leaders, raising concern about the violence (Keen, Elledge, Nolan & Kimmey, 2010, p. 89).

About 1,500,000 people (15% of the population) were directly affected. More than 300,000 dead, 1,300,000 people went to temporary shelters in the metropolitan area of the capital and more than 600,000 people left the affected areas into other parts of the country (GoH, 2010a, p. 7). Around 300,000 people were injured (Relief Web, 2010), about 105,000 houses were completely destroyed and over 208,000 were damaged, more than 1,300 educational institutions and more than 50 hospitals and health centers collapsed or became unusable. The main seaport of the country couldn't be used. The damages were estimated at \$ 7.9 billion (just over 120% of GDP, 2009) (GoH, 2010a, p. 7).

Peace operations, by their own characteristics and as result of the experience accumulated by the UN in more than 60 years developing such activities, have a crisis management plan, including evacuation of UN staff, government officials and civilians in general in case of need. But the earthquake in Haiti the UN command had lost several employees, including the Special Representative of the Secretary General and one of its deputies. The military command of MINUSTAH, the position of Brazil, sought to provide initial relief and at the same time maintaining safe conditions. Meanwhile, the willingness of governments and international organizations and NGOs led to the influx of people, materials, equipment and humanitarian aid in general in amounts above the manageability of those who took control of the shares in the country.

The presence of several humanitarian assistance actors results in the need to establish relations of cooperation and coordination among them and the authorities responsible for the crisis management. The effort to coordinate aid activities is one of the United Nations activities, especially when a crisis occurs in the context of a peacekeeping operation such as the one that happened in Haiti. In this context, due to damage at the airport in Port au Prince and the need to establish the flow of humanitarian aid coming from governments and international organizations and NGOs, the United States assumed the repair of key installations and control of landing and takeoff. In addition, they sent a force composed of 22,000 soldiers to help the government in the actions of humanitarian assistance.

Thus, the three main actors who acted in the phases of the response and recovery immediately after the earthquake were the Government of Haiti (GoH), MINUSTAH and the U.S. Joint Task Force – Haiti (JTF-H). During the actions undertaken by MINUSTAH and U.S. forces there was the concern to strengthen the government, coordinating with him activities and priorities, in order to demonstrate that GoH led the effort to assist the population.

5. Brazil and the assistance to Haiti

Brazil had already engaged in an unprecedented way in the peace process in Haiti. Initially, the country assumed the military component command of the UN mission, being the country with the major strength in the MINUSTAH military component. In addition, encouraged the participation of other countries theretofore little active in peace operations such as Paraguay, Peru and Bolivia. In the beginning of the mission, Paraguayans and Bolivians militaries joined the Brazilian contingent and Ecuadorian took part in the Chilean engineering company. Later these countries sent troops "under their own flag". As a result, the South American countries account for 45% of the total of MINUSTAH military and police personnel.² Brazil still led sub-regional policy coordination among the MERCOSUL countries. Several meetings were held between the governments of Brazil, Chile, Argentina and Uruguay, which resulted in the decision to obtain major weight in the operation.

²Calculation based on the dates of UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UN. DPKO, 2010).

Later, the governments of these four countries have established a discussions forum materialized in meetings attended by diplomats and officials of the respective defense ministries in order to coordinate their activities in that country. In addition to the significant presence in MINUSTAH, the Brazilian government has established several technical and scientific projects within the so-called international technical cooperation. It consists of technical support (not financial, as normally occurs in traditional cooperation) with the sending of specialized expertise body in certain sectors to empower segments of the population in knowledge areas where there is a lack of technical resources. The projects are developed or implemented by Brazilian institutions singly or in triangulation with other countries and/or international organizations in several areas. The Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC), which belongs to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), is in charge of the establishment and coordination of projects. Guided by the MFA, it seeks to accelerate the economic development of the partners, sharing experiences and techniques available through the knowledge and experience transfer in non-commercial basis, in order to promote the autonomy of them. In 2004 the ABC has produced fourteen initial projects (Brasil, ABC, n.d.).

One of the most successful projects in Haiti was the garbage collection, developed by IBSA (India, Brazil and South Africa) and involved later, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), that included the financial aid to the collectors, moving the economy, trash removal, a very serious problem in that country, and the production of fuel derived from garbage (Ambassade du Brésil à Port-au-Prince, 2010). When the earthquake struck Haiti on January 12th 2010, the Brazilian government decided that it was not just a matter of international humanitarian aid, but had the need to reconstruct the operational capability of the Brazilian Battalion and MINUSTAH itself.

Thus, the President set up a Cabinet Crisis in the Presidential Palace, which worked until May 13th, 2010. Initial priority was given to the rescue of survivors and the provision of food and water to the Brazilian battalion. It was decided to centralize government stocks of food and medicines and donations in a collection centers in Rio de Janeiro. The actions had to be coordinated with the Ministry of Health (drugs), the Civil Defense (food, water, shelter items) and the Institutional Security Cabinet of the Presidency (services). The crisis cabinet meetings were at first daily, and later came to be held in a longer term (Soares, 2011). In the cabinet the decision to send firefighters to assist in rescue operations was made. After consultation with the governors of Rio de Janeiro and the Federal District, was sent a team of 51 firefighters (31 from Rio de Janeiro and 20 from Brasilia), with sniffer dogs and 2.5 tons of equipment. The team was transported by Brazilian Air Force (FAB) aircraft and received logistical support in the Brazilian Battalion in Port au Prince (Clark, n.d.). Initially, the priority was to find and bring to Brazil the Brazilians dead bodies (Soares, 2011).

In Haiti was established a structure with members of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defense and Health, and Civil Defense to raise the humanitarian aid needs coordinated by the Brazilian Ambassador in Port au Prince. At the Brazilian Embassy in Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic capital, was established the Support Group from which were sent by truck products valued at \$ 120,000, especially water (Ambassade du Brésil à Port-au-Prince, 2010). In the morning after the earthquake, the first aircraft with Brazilian authorities went to Port au Prince and the first FAB aircraft carrying aid took off on the same evening. Thereafter, two to three FAB daily flights with aid were sent to Haiti, for a total of 219 flights that transported to 4.644 people and 1.900 tons of food, water, medicines, grains, and general items (including the FAB field hospital, lifesaving equipment, 7.200 square meters of canvas, 100 tents, etc.). The Brazilian government sent 26 doctors who worked in the FAB field hospital for six months. Until May 28th, the hospital has registered 36,028 medical care and 1,145 surgeries, and helped in 522 births (Ambassade du Brésil à Port-au-Prince, 2010).

In a joint operation with Italy, the Brazilian Navy sent two helicopters, two teams of Naval Air Force, and a medical team specialized in Aeromedical Evacuation. These detachments totaled 15 officers and 44 noncommissioned officers, and a load of about 2.2 tons of general items. The Brazilian navy helicopters operated in conjunction with the Italian, especially, aeromedical evacuation missions of wounded, transportation of personnel and equipment, search and rescue and support for ground troops (Brazilian battalions and Italian engineers). The Brazilian medical team was composed of six doctors and eight nurses from the Navy, five civilian doctors and six civilian nurses appointed by the Ministry of Health, who worked together the Italian doctors in the Italian hospital ship, in emergency medical procedures for victims rescued by helicopters from the land (Brasil, MB, 2010).

The Brazilian navy ship Garcia D'Avila made several travels to Haiti. Between February and June 2010, it's carried 176 tons of food, 127 tons of medicines, 85 tons of water, 1,284 cisterns distributed to Haitian farmers, and 17 tons of other relief items (Ambassade du Brésil à Port-au-Prince, 2010).

Immediately after the earthquake, the Brazilian government offered 15 million dollars for humanitarian assistance to Haiti. The Brazilian government also made voluntary contributions to World Food Program, Government of Haiti, United Nations Population Fund, Food and Agriculture Organization, Inter- American Institute for Cooperation on Agriculture, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, International Organization for Migration, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (Ambassade du Brésil à Port-au-Prince, 2010).

Besides the immediate donations remittance and medical and rescue teams' sending, was organized a donors' meeting on 31 March, where was tried to consolidate the help of Haiti. The meeting was held in New York, convened by UN and co-chaired by Brazil with Canada, Spain, France and the European Union, and was attended by representatives from over 100 countries (Guimarães, 2011). At the time Brazil contributed with U.S. \$ 172 million, plus the U.S. \$ 167 million that had already been sent before in emergency aid. The donation was handed over in cash to be used by the GoH in various areas such as construction of emergency care units, to build a dam, staff training, direct support to the GoH budget in a fund managed by the World Bank, and technical cooperation (Ambassade du Brésil à Port-au-Prince, 2010).

On May 19, 2010, when the Haiti Reconstruction Fund was opened, Brazil was the first country to contribute with U.S. \$ 55 million. The Brazilian population donation has reached 1,920 million dollars (deposited in an UNDP bank account) plus U.S. \$ 2,513 millions (deposited in a MFA bank account). The amounts were transferred to Haiti Emergency Relief Response Fund, managed by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) (Ambassade du Brésil à Port-au-Prince, 2010).

The Brazilian non-governmental organizations associated in a campaign for Haiti received donations of about U.S. \$ 340,000 and the Brazilian company AMBEV has donated 300,000 liters of drinking water that were transported by trucks from the Dominican Republic. Brazilian private companies donated about 65 tons of canned meat, 13 tons of sugar, 39 tons of milk powder, 13 tons of orange juice and 400,000 liters of water (Ambassade du Brésil à Port-au-Prince, 2010).

Two days after the earthquake, the UN Security Council authorized an increase in effective MINUSTAH. Brazil has been asked to support an additional battalion to form the MINUSTAH. In the crisis cabinet installed by Brazilian presidency this issue was discussed with Ministry of Defense and armed forces representatives and guidelines were dispatched to the President to decide the conditions under which Brazil would respond to the UN request. So, Brazil sent an additional battalion increasing its effective in 900 militaries (Soares, 2011).

As the deadline to deploy this battalion was short (about a month for this troop arrive in Haiti), the Army Commander's directive was that it should be composed, with the greatest possible, by militaries that had been in Haiti before. Thus, the battalion was composed of troops from several Brazilian locations and reached its effective 80% of soldiers who had been in MINUSTAH. For preparation of the troops guidelines were passed by videoconference to the military areas commanders that mobilized the troops, gathered them during one week in Rio de Janeiro for training, receipt of material, etc. As humanitarian assistance to Haiti was placed as priority to the Brazilian government, the authorization to send the troops and the necessary additional budget assigned to the Ministry of Defense were approved, by symbolic vote in National Congress on January 28th and quickly released to covered costs. The first elements of the battalion began to arrive in Port au Prince on 13 of February (Soares, 2011). Thus, the military personnel of Brazil in MINUSTAH consisted on the General as MINUSTAH Force Commander, an official adviser to the Brazilian ambassador and more than 2.200 personnel in the UN military component (Brasil, MD, n.d., p. 10)

6. Conclusions

The humanitarian assistance to countries affected by natural disasters and/or involved in conflicts as part of emerging powers' foreign policy to increase their presence into the international system. Brazil is the sixth biggest economy in the world and tries to gain major political power, presence and influence in the global decision-making process.

With the end of the Cold War, the Brazilian foreign policy sought to adapt to the new global order. For that, the country has adopted a posture to increase its participation in the formulation and acceptance of the bases and rules of international order, placing them in line with the general principles of this system, their regimes and procedures, by adopting a model that some authors have named "autonomy through participation". The Brazilian strategy for major international insertion relied mainly on increasing the country's participation in multilateral bodies. That is, because of the view that in an anarchic and asymmetric international system, where prevails the major powers decisions, the multilateral space should be privileged as a means to achieve national interests.

In the last decade Brazil is taking advantage of the decline of US global leadership, mainly during the George W Bush administration, to increase its regional influence using the "soft power" to attract their neighbors or other countries. Hence, the Brazil, and the emerging countries in general, are enabling the development of best practices in several areas at a regional level and try to extend it gradually to a global level.

The Brazilian foreign policy has some principles as respect for international law and peaceful resolution of conflicts. On the global security scenario, it has increased its participation in peacekeeping operations, shown a greater willingness to help solve global problems through international organizations - in the case the UN. As a consequence, there has been an increased of importance and the state action and it is seen as a global player on the international chessboard.

Brazilian participation in the Haitian peace process would be a new foreign affairs attitude of the State, called "diplomatic solidarity". Participation in UN collective efforts is devoid of self-serving motives and would be solely because of the duty of conscience or diffuse interests. That is, the motivation was linked to the principles of humanity and solidarity. It does not seek real gains, do not yield economic gain and is based only on moral and political questions. In this sense, would be the projects of cooperation with Haiti carried out through the Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC).

The Lula's government has successfully used the discourse of cooperation in the international system and promotion of economic development with social justice as the way to keep peace. Moreover, since some previous governments, Brazil has focused on the relations with South American neighbors. The Brazilian participation in MINUSTAH and coordination established between the MERCOSUL members strengthen relations in the block, and with the block and Latin America countries.

The decision to participate, and how to participate in the Haitian peacekeeping mission is political, is an instrument of foreign policy. In this context, the role of Brazil in Haiti would be linked to the country's interest in increasing its influence in the UN security system and the pretension to obtain a permanent seat on the Security Council.

Thus, the decision to be a relevant actor in the Haitian peace process can be seen as a combination of factors: the strengthening of the multilateral security system, especially the UN; to seek greater inclusion in this system, to support MINUSTAH, peacekeeping operation established according international norms and the principle of peaceful resolution of conflicts; to participate in the efforts to develop and promote social justice in that country; and to increase sub-regional cooperation, especially among the MERCOSUL countries, strengthening the understanding intra-block in the military issues and other areas.

In the same way is the role played by Brazil during the crisis caused by the earthquake in 2010. The question was raised as a priority by the government. As a result there was the fast dispatch of humanitarian aid, financial aid was made directly to the government of Haiti and through international organizations and UN specialized agencies. Brazil sought to strengthen the Haitian government in management actions, as well as strengthen MINUSTAH in the actions of humanitarian assistance. Thus, in this case, the involvement of personnel and resources was perfectly aligned with the country's foreign policy that seeks to play a leading role on the international agenda.

References

- Ambassade du Brésil à Port-au-Prince (2010). *Assistance du Brésil a Haïti Après le Tremblement de Terre du 12 Janvier 2010*. Ressources Financières. Port-au-Prince, le 29 juillet 2010.
- Brasil. ABC (n.d.). Retrieved from <http://www.abc.gov.br/projetos/cooperacaoPrestadaTriangular.asp>.
- Brasil. MB (2010, January 26). Centro de Comunicação Social da Marinha, *Press Release*, Operação Conjunta entre as Marinhas do Brasil e da Itália no Haiti, Brasília.
- Brasil. MD (n.d.). *O Brasil no Haiti: o esforço de reconstrução*, Brasília.
- Brasil. MRE (2010, January 7). Retrieved from <http://kitplone.itamaraty.gov.br/temas/balanco-de-politica-externa-2003-2010/7.1.10-assistencia-humanitaria>.
- Brasil. MRE (n.d.). *Discurso pronunciado pelo Ministro Celso Amorim por ocasião da XXXV Assembléia Geral da Organização dos Estados Americanos - "Tornando realidade os benefícios da Democracia"*. Retrieved from <http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/sala-de-imprensa/discursos-artigos-entrevistas-e-outras-comunicacoes/ministro-estado-relacoes-exteriores/discurso-pronunciado-pelo-ministro-celso-amorim>.
- Buzan, Barry (1991). *People, States and Fear. An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era* (2nd ed.) Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Clark, Daniella (n.d.). Bombeiros do Rio enviados ao Haiti trabalharam nos resgates em Angra. *G 1*. Retrieved from <http://g1.globo.com/Noticias/Mundo/0,,MUL1449726-5602,00-BOMBEIROS+DO+RIO+ENVIADOS+AO+HAITI+TRABALHARAM+NOS+RESGATES+EM+ANGRA.html>.
- Deutsch, Karl et al. (1957). *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area. International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Government of Haiti (GoH) (2010a). *Action Plan for National Recovery and Development of Haiti*, Port-au-Prince. Port-au-Prince.
- Government of Haiti (GoH) (2010b). *État D'Urgence Bulletin D'Information du Gouvernement Haïtien*, Port-au-Prince, 23 Janvier 2010.
- Government of Haiti (GoH) (2010c). *Intervention de Madame Suze Percy Filippini, Ministre Conseiller a la Reunion du Groupe des Amis D'Haiti Organisation des Etats Americains (OEA)*, Washington D.C., le 19 Janvier 2010. Retrieved from http://haiti.org/files/Haiti_Intervention_at_OAS_Friends_of_Haiti_Mtg%20011910.pdf.
- Guimarães, Daniel (2011). Interviewed on Port-au-Prince on October 22, 2011.
- IBAS. Retrieved from <http://www.ibsa-trilateral.org>.
- IIRSA. Retrieved from <http://www.iirsa.org>.
- Interlandi, Jeneen (2010, November 15). For Haiti, No Relief in Sight. *Newsweek*, 44-49.
- Keen, P. K. Elledge, Mathew G. Nolan, Charles W. & Kimmey, Jennifer L. (2010). Foreign Disaster Response: Joint Task Force Haiti Observations. *Military Review*, nov./dec. 2010, 85 – 96.
- Keohane, Robert & Nye, Joseph S. Nye (1977). *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition*. Boston: Little Brown.
- Lange, Maria & Quinn, Mick (2003). Conflict, Humanitarian Assistance and Peacebuilding: Meeting the Challenges, *International Alert*. Retrieved from <http://www.international-alert.org>.
- Morgenthau, Hans J. (2003). *A Política entre as Nações*. Brasília, São Paulo: IPRI, UNB, Imprensa Oficial.
- Murithi, Tim (2009). *The African Union's Transition from Non-Intervention to Non-Indifference: an ad hoc Approach to the Responsibility to Protect?* Retrieved from http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/ipg/ipg-2009-1/08_a_murithi_us.pdf.
- Nye, Joseph S. *Understanding International Conflicts: an Introduction to Theory and History* (4th Ed.). New York: Pearson Longman.
- Pugh, Michael (2002). Like It or Not, Humanitarians are Political. *Humanitarian Affairs Review*, winter 2002, 4–7.
- Relief Web (2010, July 2). *Haiti: six months on from disaster*. Retrieved from <http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900SID/MINE-877QDU?OpenDocument&RSS20=02-P>.
- Seitenfus, Ricardo (n.d.). *Elementos para uma diplomacia solidária: a crise haitiana e os desafios da ordem internacional contemporânea*. Retrieved from [http://www.seitenfus.com.br/arquivos/elementos-diplomacia\(1\).pdf](http://www.seitenfus.com.br/arquivos/elementos-diplomacia(1).pdf).
- Soares, General Williams José (2011). Interviewed in Curitiba on July 11, 2011.
- UN. DPKO (2010). *UN Mission's Contributions by Country*. Retrieved from <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors/2010/missioncountry.zip>.
- UN. S/RES/1542 (2004). *Resolution 1542 (2004)*. New York, 30 April 2004.
- UN. S/RES/1908 (2010). *Resolution 1908 (2010)*. New York, 19 January 2010.
- Waltz, K. (2002). *Teoria das Relações Internacionais*. Lisboa: Gradiva.