



'The Threat in the Hemisphere': The Securitization Movement in the Triple Frontier and the Case of Hezbollah

Karime Ahmad Borrasschi Cheaito & Adriano de Freixo

To cite this article: Karime Ahmad Borrasschi Cheaito & Adriano de Freixo (30 Jun 2025): 'The Threat in the Hemisphere': The Securitization Movement in the Triple Frontier and the Case of Hezbollah, Middle East Critique, DOI: [10.1080/19436149.2025.2520648](https://doi.org/10.1080/19436149.2025.2520648)

To link to this article: <https://doi.org/10.1080/19436149.2025.2520648>



© 2025 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group



Published online: 30 Jun 2025.



[Submit your article to this journal](#)



Article views: 339



[View related articles](#)



[View Crossmark data](#)

'The Threat in the Hemisphere': The Securitization Movement in the Triple Frontier and the Case of Hezbollah

Karime Ahmad Borrasschi Cheaito^{a*}  and Adriano de Freixo^{b,c} 

^aSan Tiago Dantas Postgraduate Program (UNESP/UNICAMP/PUC-SP), São Paulo, Brazil; ^bFederal University of Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ), Rio de Janeiro, Brazil; ^cDepartment of Strategic Studies and International Relations, Institute of Strategic Studies, Fluminense Federal University (INEST-UFF), Rio de Janeiro, Brazil

ABSTRACT

In 1997, the US designated Hezbollah, a Lebanese political and armed actor, as a terrorist organization. The decision was shaped by political and economic factors and considered internationally non-consensual. Since the War on Terror began in 2001, the US has pressured Latin American countries to adopt such a designation. Allegations of Hezbollah's activities in the region primarily focus on the Triple Frontier Area (Brazil, Argentina, and Paraguay). Grounded in critical terrorism studies and the securitization theory, this article proposes the hypothesis that US imperialist interests have used Hezbollah as a pretext to increase regional monitoring and control, while advancing broader strategies of containment and sanctions against Hezbollah's main ally, Iran. The effort to label Hezbollah as a terrorist organization is therefore linked to the expansion of the US-led Global War on Terror agenda, and its attempt to contain and delegitimize anti-hegemonic actors. Using qualitative and historical-documentary analysis, this research adopts a case study approach focused on the three countries of the triple frontier. Based on primary and secondary sources, findings reveal that Hezbollah's securitization efforts in these cases have been shaped by US economic and political interference through local specificities.

ARTICLE HISTORY

Received 29 March 2024
Accepted 31 May 2025

KEYWORDS

Triple Frontier area; United States; terrorism; securitization; Hezbollah

On October 10, 2023, US General Laura Richardson, head of the US Southern Command, voiced concerns about Hezbollah's presence in Latin America (Estadão 2023). Her statement came just days after the October 7, 2023 military operation on

CONTACT Karime Ahmad Borrasschi Cheaito  karime.cheaito@gmail.com  San Tiago Dantas Postgraduate Program (UNESP/UNICAMP/PUC-SP), São Paulo, Brazil

*Researcher at the National Institute of Science and Technology for Studies on the United States (INCT-INEU), São Paulo, Brazil.

© 2025 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group

This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives License (<http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/>), which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, and is not altered, transformed, or built upon in any way. The terms on which this article has been published allow the posting of the Accepted Manuscript in a repository by the author(s) or with their consent.

Israel by Palestinian resistance groups, reigniting debates over Hezbollah's alleged activities in South America.

The organization emerged in the 1980s, in the aftermath of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, and remains tied to nationalist and pragmatic objectives. Its structure, therefore, is not decentralized. How can an organization rooted in Lebanon and with most of its operations centered in Lebanese territory – and more broadly, although to a limited extent, in the wider Middle East – be identified as a threat in Latin America? Has the United States influenced or interfered in the securitization of Hezbollah in the Triple Frontier area (TF)? If so, for what purposes? This article investigates efforts to securitize Hezbollah in the TF, with an analytical focus on the interference of the US in this process. More specifically, we treat the TF as a geographical point of contact between Brazil, Argentina, and Paraguay. This region is the confluence of the Paraná and Iguazú Rivers and the contact between the cities of Foz do Iguazú (Brazil), Puerto Iguazú (Argentina), and Ciudad del Este (Paraguay). To this end, the analysis focuses on the political and economic mechanisms employed by the US in the region and the objectives behind them.

According to Villa (2014, 376), 'nowhere in South America have the effects of the United States' global "war on terror" agenda been felt as strongly as in the Triple Frontier'. The genesis of the term TF, in a politicized and securitized context, dates to the attacks on the Israeli embassy in 1992 and on the *Asociación de Mutuales Israelitas Argentinas* (AMIA) in 1994 in Argentina, respectively resulting in, respectively, 25 and 85 deaths. In both cases, Hezbollah and Iran were treated as the primary suspects. The region's dynamics, characterized by various illicit activities, have led to its reputation as a 'lawless land' (Aita 2017; Castro 2021; Villa 2014). Since the 1990s, the TF has been identified by successive US administrations as a hub for logistical support and financial transactions that benefit armed groups in the Middle East, particularly Hezbollah.

Although a counterterrorism agenda has been present in the US since the 1980s (Cheaito and Rodrigues 2023), the September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center inaugurated a new dimension of this policy. The George W. Bush administration launched the 'Global War on Terror', implementing measures such as the legitimization of preemptive warfare, aimed at groups designated by the US as terrorists and at states suspected of supporting them. Under this agenda, the US established its surveillance mechanisms and redefined its international control standards.

Beyond the violence, control, and surveillance imposed by military and police apparatuses, the contemporary fight against terrorism involves a wide array of social, political, and economic mechanisms – often materialized through inter-state cooperation, particularly within the US (Maciel and Cheaito 2024). International organizations such as the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) have increasingly linked combating money laundering and terrorism to general prerequisites for credit concessions and the international credibility of states. Created by the G7 in 1989 and now part of the G20, its 'gray' and 'black' lists influence states' financial reputations and often prompt compliance under pressure from major powers. Scholars argue that the FATF serves as a tool for advancing US and EU foreign policy interests (Case-Ruchala and Nance 2024; Nunes Fernandes 2016). According to Corrêa (2013, 91):

‘The FATF, consequently, emerges as a mechanism for achieving foreign policy objectives, particularly those of the US and European countries’.

Through an analysis of the US political and security agenda, we argue that the attempts to securitize Hezbollah has served as a pretext for two key processes: expanding US control and surveillance in South America under the global counter-terrorism agenda, and the escalation of accusations and sanctions against Iran – Hezbollah’s main regional ally and US adversary – particularly under the Trump administration. To advance these goals, the US has relied on instruments such as the FATF and political pressure on local elites, fostering cooperation in security and population monitoring. Framing Hezbollah as a regional threat illustrates how the group has been instrumentalized as a scapegoat to justify regional security measures and to advance a specific US political agenda in the Middle East. These dynamics have also had consequences for Lebanese and Muslim communities in the TF, increasingly portrayed as ‘potential threats’ and ‘suspected supporters of terrorist financing’.

Based on the concept of imperialism, efforts to have the TF designate Hezbollah as a terrorist organization reproduced US interests despite local particularities. In this context, the research approaches such cases not as isolated developments but as components of a broader US global agenda. Accordingly, it begins by examining the historical and gradual incorporation of Hezbollah into South American political and security agendas, emphasizing the role of US influence in this process. Subsequently, the article conducts a detailed investigation of each country in the TF, illustrating the empirical analysis of US interference in South American security agendas. The analysis starts with Argentina, the only country among the three to have experienced terrorist attacks in the 1990s. It then explores Paraguay, where internal securitizing actors – under significant US economic and political pressure – mobilized accusations against Hezbollah.

Finally, the third section of the article analyzes the Brazilian case, where, despite the absence of an official designation of Hezbollah as a terrorist organization, the country responded to US pressure by enacting anti-terrorism legislation in 2016. Brazil remains the only country in the TF that has not formally adopted this designation, although the issue persists on its political agenda.

Materials, Methods, and Theoretical Perspectives

Understanding how the US has constructed a connection between this Middle Eastern actor and Latin America requires analyzing its strategic interests through the framework of imperialist logic. According to Capasso and Kadri (2023), imperialism should be analyzed as a sociological phenomenon tied to the reproduction of the exploitative logic of capital worldwide. The authors argue that US-led imperialist policies unfold in the Global South through sanctions, wars, and/or neoliberal reforms. However, US imperialism does not operate unilaterally: there exists a political – and notably economic – power relationship that is articulated with the dominant classes in the Global South. In other words: imperialism represents a set of material

exploitative relationships between countries in the North and South, facilitated through class collaboration (Capasso and Kadri 2023).

From critical terrorism studies (Jackson, Smyth, and Gunning 2009), this research aims to analyze the attempts to recognize Hezbollah as a terrorist organization through the politicization of the concept of terrorism. The criteria defining what constitutes terrorism and who qualifies as a terrorist have been established by hegemonic powers, particularly the US after 2001. For this reason, the designation of certain organizations, armed groups, and individuals as terrorists is neither consensual nor free from contradictions and contestations. Terrorism is employed as a pejorative term by hegemonic actors to morally justify their claims of legitimacy and the moral condemnation of their opponents. This, in turn, legitimizes the use of state violence and precludes the necessity for negotiation and compromise (Franks 2009).

Terrorism, for instance, exemplifies how international relations are shaped by ontological dualism and constructed 'threat perceptions' (Maciel and Cheaito 2024). According to Rego-Monteiro (2021), there is a fluid notion and ambiguity surrounding the 'perception of threat', making it an efficient tool for the political structure and, specifically, for the police and military apparatus in managing territories and populations. By operating as a perception, discourses about threats can proliferate even when the 'threatening' facts or individuals do not correspond to actual threats. Engaging with Franks (2009), terrorist threats serve the hegemonic states and decision-makers because they reinforce their political influence and grant them authority beyond conventional legal boundaries. The process of designating Hezbollah as a terrorist organization will be analyzed in this article as a political process aligned with an imperialist policy aimed at delegitimizing any counter-hegemonic movement opposing the US.

The securitization movement, as defined by the theoretical framework of Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde (1998, 23), understands 'security' as a move that takes politics beyond established rules, framing the issue either as a special kind of politics or as something above politics. Securitization can be seen as a more extreme version of 'politicization': 'The exact definition and criteria of securitization are constituted by the intersubjective establishment of an existential threat with a saliency sufficient to have substantial political effects' (Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde 1998, 25). The purpose of using the concept of securitization is to understand the motives – and mechanisms – that led securitizing agents – that is, governments and political leaders who have the capacity to define threats and transform a specific issue or actor into a security concern – in the TF in dialogue with US securitizing agents to announce and reproduce accusations against Hezbollah.

In this research, we consider as securitizing agents the government officials, political representatives, and decision-makers of the United States, Argentina, Paraguay, and Brazil who were in office during the analyzed period (2001–2020). Within this timeframe, our analysis focuses on the moments when the securitization of Hezbollah was particularly prominent and/or under debate. Although securitization theory requires investigation into how the audience – particularly civil society – responds to securitization attempts, our focus is on securitizing agents with the analysis of audience reception and perception left for future research.

The case study method was employed alongside bibliographic-documentary research techniques, which involved the following procedures: defining the case; formulating and delimiting the problem; identifying common variables through bibliographic and documentary surveys; establishing a macro-perspective of the research problem that encompasses the international context; examining possible interconnections between political, economic, geostrategic, and discursive decisions; establishing correlations between the data obtained and the central objective; verifying and assessing the coherence of the information and data; and systematizing the analysis and results. In the three cases analyzed, the central focus of the investigation was the political and economic mechanisms of US interference in efforts to designate Hezbollah as a terrorist organization in the TF. Based on this, the study sought to understand, through the official discourses and documents issued by the securitizing agents, the US influence in this process, characterized by a dialogue between political elites.

To analyze the discourses – both those spoken and those written by the political elites of the US and the TF – critical discourse analysis (CDA) was employed. According to Jackson (2005), the use of this method assumes that discourse is a social practice that forms part of a dialectical process, understood as both shaping and being shaped by social structures. CDA is considered an interdisciplinary method capable of combining social and textual analysis. As such, it involves a careful reading of the text and its elements – such as terms, expressions, and mentioned actors – and understanding them within a historical context and propagated by figures with specific interests.

Among the existing research on Hezbollah, there is a notable scarcity of studies that analyze the relationship between US imperialist interests in South America and the accusations targeting the group. While significant work has been conducted on the securitization of the TF – such as those by Castro (2021), Castro and Cardone (2023), Amaral (2007), Ferreira (2009), Villa (2014), and Pinto (2011) – important gaps remain regarding a deeper examination of the securitization process of Hezbollah in the region. Within the body of literature that specifically addresses Hezbollah and its alleged presence or role in South America (Costanza 2012; Escudé and Gurevich 2003; Karmon 2009; Levitt 2015, 2022; Shaw 2019), there is a predominance of narratives that echo accusations originating from the US government. Rather than reproducing or implicitly accepting these claims, this article aims to examine how Hezbollah has been instrumentalized as a pretext and political tool to further US interests both in South America and the Middle East. 2023

The ‘Terrorist Threat’ in South America

Hezbollah is a Lebanese organization comprising an armed wing, a political party, and a social services network. Its armed wing, known as the Lebanese Islamic Resistance, was established in 1982 during the Lebanese Civil War (1975–1989), in response to the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, known as ‘Operation Peace for Galilee’. The organization’s primary goal was to engage in armed struggle for the liberation of occupied Lebanese lands. In 1984, the name Hezbollah (Party of God) was adopted, and in 1985, it issued the ‘Open Letter to the Oppressed of Lebanon and the World’,

marking its official foundation, its goals, and its main enemies: Israel and the United States (Daher 2019; El Hussein 2010; Norton 2007; Saad-Ghorayeb 2002).

In 1990, with the end of the Lebanese Civil War and after intense internal debates, Hezbollah established its political wing and participated in the first postwar parliamentary elections in Lebanon. As a result, it secured political representation for the Shiite population, which had been underrepresented and neglected due to the sectarian structure that characterizes the country's political system¹ (Costa 2004; Kanaaneh 2024; Norton 2007). Despite the formation of its political arm, Hezbollah declared it would not disarm due to the ongoing threat posed by the Israeli occupation in southern Lebanon. In a survey, Hezbollah was described as the most heavily armed non-state actor in the world. Thirty percent of respondents reported having 'a lot' or 'quite a bit' of confidence in Hezbollah, with 85% of this group identifying as Shia – highlighting the organization's significance within their community² (Roche and Robbins 2024).

Just as imperialism exists, so does anti-imperialism. According to Kanaaneh (2024), since its inception, Hezbollah has sought to consolidate its presence within Lebanese society and the broader Middle East as an anti-imperialist force opposing the influence of the US, Israel, and their allies. Alongside its principal ally, Iran, the Lebanese organization has pursued, since the 1980s, the construction of a counterhegemonic bloc aimed at resisting US presence and interference in the region. Kanaaneh (2024) refers to this initiative as the '*muqawama* project' (Resistance, in Arabic).

In response to this anti-US and anti-imperialist agenda, the United States designated Hezbollah as a terrorist organization in 1997 (see Cheaito 2023). As emphasized by Capasso and Kadri (2023), imperialism seeks to isolate and suppress any political organizations or ideological movements that challenge its objectives and interests. One way to legitimize policies against groups like Hezbollah and Iran while delegitimizing their actions is to accuse them of terrorism.

The narrative employed by the US in 1997 emphasized Hezbollah's connections with Iran and the 'terrorist threat' both posed to international and regional security, specifically to the principal US ally in the Middle East: Israel (Cheaito 2023). However, when accusations against Hezbollah extend to Latin America, a new dimension emerges: the so-called *crime-terror nexus*. As defined by Makarenko (2004, 130), this concept refers to the 'direct use of crime by terrorist groups as a source of funding', potentially enabling alliances between criminal organizations and groups designated as terrorists. In the accusations made by the US in 2014, it is claimed: 'Since the 1990s, Hezbollah has enjoyed ideological and financial support from the Lebanese

¹The Lebanese political system is based on a sectarian separation of political and military posts. This model was based on a disputed demographic census carried out by France in 1932, which indicated that Maronite Christians were the majority ethno-religious group and should assume the main institutional posts. As a result, Sunnis and Shiites were denied access to resources and political representation. This form of political organization needs to be analyzed within the framework of sectarianism, a model of modern social relations responsible for transforming, in the Lebanese case, religious identities into political identities. Hezbollah, as a party composed almost entirely of Shiites, has come to politically represent this population, which constitutes its main support base.

²Hezbollah established its own social and economic institutions to assist its supporters, who were considered the most marginalized group in Lebanon. These foundations provide a range of services such as schools and educational systems, as well as hospitals and clinics (Kanaaneh 2024).

community in the TF of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay, a region known for arms, drugs, counterfeiting, and human trafficking' (United States 2014, 14).

Political elites in Argentina, Paraguay, and Brazil reproduced this accusation with varying degrees of priority. For Ireton (2019, 14):

The [crime–terror] nexus should, therefore, not be seen as the explanatory force behind Hezbollah's designation as a security threat or as the justification for this designation, but rather as part of the construction of the threat and, consequently, a product of securitization.

Thus, the allegations based on the *crime–terror nexus* were identified as outcomes, not causes, of the securitizing movement surrounding the organization. The primary element used by the US to justify its accusations is the notable presence of an Arab community in the region since the late nineteenth century, originating generally from Lebanon, Syria, and Palestine.³ With Hezbollah viewed as a threat since the 1980s due to its anti-US and anti-Israel stance, the presence of a Shia Lebanese population in the TF has been used – often through racialized and generalized assumptions – as a pretext to label the region a threat to US security in the Hemisphere. Consequently, the surveillance and control of Arab populations – particularly Lebanese and Muslim communities – intensified after 2001, as part of cooperation between the US and local political elites, who implemented security strategies aligned with the broader 'Global War on Terror'.

Researchers such as Daher (2019) acknowledge that the organization's main sources of support come from Iran and the Shiite diaspora, especially those located in Latin America. What thus becomes the focus of debate, controversy, and disputed narratives is the origin and purpose of these resources. At this point, it is necessary to differentiate between those who are sympathizers and supporters of Hezbollah, who are located in various parts of the world – including South America – and those who are members of the organization, which is not structured in the form of dispersed and decentralized cells. This distinction is often neglected, and this negligence – which is not without political purpose – results in Lebanese individuals being perceived as suspicious.

According to Castro (2021), there are significant challenges in defining and verifying the activities of individuals who identify as Hezbollah sympathizers in Latin America. Similarly, Ireton (2019) acknowledges the presence of such sympathizers in the region but emphasizes that claims regarding their activities and ties to Hezbollah have largely been based on speculation.

During the height of the War on Terror, US government agencies renewed their actions – and their intervention practices – in Latin American countries 'considered potentially corrupt, reluctant, or unable to enforce their laws, and lacking the necessary resources to combat drug trafficking and the terrorist threat' (Amaral 2007, 47). Thus, soon after 2001, US Southern Command's efforts reinforced that the Global

³Since the 1950s, immigration flows have been characterized by the arrival of Muslims, particularly from Lebanon. The Lebanese Civil War, which began in 1975, further increased the arrival of this religious community. From the 1980s and 1990s onward, the number of Lebanese of Shia origin who settled in the cities making up the TF (Foz do Iguaçu, Ciudad del Este, and Puerto Iguazú) grew exponentially. In numerical terms, the data are imprecise due to the different ways these groups have been identified (which, until the 1950s, were generally categorized as 'Turks' and later as 'others') and discrepancies in data between non-state and religious organizations.

War on Terror extended to South America, reframing local issues such as drug trafficking and organized crime within this paradigm of counterterrorism.

In 2002, the US expanded its presence in South America by joining the ‘3 + 1 Group for Triple Frontier Security’. According to Villa (2014), the goal was to improve crime fighting and prevent money laundering and potential fundraising for terrorist organizations in the region. Another mechanism of direct US interference in the TF occurred through the establishment of so-called Fusion Centers or Integrated Border Operations Center (Ciof). It consists of an interagency model and an intelligence office in the TF that aims to bring together agents from 16 institutions and unify databases. The model is inspired by the center run by the DEA (Drug Enforcement Administration), in the US. The first base was established in Argentina in 2016 and, later, in the binational area (Brazil–Paraguay) of the *Usina de Itaipu*⁴ (Castro 2021).

On December 28, 2012, the US Congress passed the ‘Countering Iran in the Western Hemisphere Act’ in response to reports alleging military advances by Iran and Hezbollah in the region. According to Milani (2021), these allegations mobilized US Southern Command and the official narratives surrounding this regional ‘threat’. In addition to this, the Hezbollah International Financing Prevention Act of 2015 and its 2018 update aimed to impose economic sanctions against the organization and individuals suspected of providing support, directly or indirectly. With these laws, the Lebanese community residing in the TF and sending financial resources to Lebanon became targets of investigation and suspicion of ‘financing terrorism’.

Looking at the Country Reports on Terrorism, in dialogue with the analyses of Ayerbe (2019) and Castro (2021), there is evidence of continuous and gradual US pressure to convince South American governments that Hezbollah and Iran ‘continued to operate in the Triple Frontier’ (United States Department of State 2019, 187). But the administration of Donald Trump (2017–2020) and the leadership transitions in the US State Department from Rex Tillerson to Mike Pompeo led to allegations that terrorist groups were using the TF for money laundering being ‘presented no longer as a conjecture but as a certainty’ (Castro 2021, 81).

When analyzing the South American cases that designated Hezbollah as a terrorist organization,⁵ all occurred during the Trump administration, which was characterized by adopting a more aggressive foreign policy toward Iran. In 2018, for instance, Trump announced the US withdrawal from the nuclear agreement with Iran and imposed stricter sanctions on the country. It is evident that the increased political pressure on South American countries to designate Hezbollah as a terrorist organization was aimed not only at the group itself but also at its key ally, Iran. Recognizing Hezbollah as a terrorist group consequently implies identifying Iran as a financier of terrorism – a claim that would legitimize the imposition of sanctions to further Iran’s regional and international isolation. In this context, Mike Pompeo symbolized the advancement of this agenda in Latin America. He politically pressured countries to

⁴The Itaipu Dam is a binational hydroelectric power plant located on the Paraná River along the border between Brazil and Paraguay. It is one of the largest hydroelectric power plants in the world in terms of energy generation.

⁵The South American countries that officially recognized Hezbollah as a terrorist organization are: Argentina (2019), Paraguay (2019), and Colombia (2020).

recognize Hezbollah as a terrorist organization in exchange for partnerships and cooperation. These partnerships focused on security, surveillance, and monitoring – tools that were also used for civilian control.

For this reason, this process cannot be analyzed solely as because of external pressure, nor can it be understood in isolation, without considering the connections between the individual cases. It is also necessary to account for the dialogue with local governments and political elites in each of these countries and how they are aligned with the US imperialist agenda. Hence, the political and economic pressure exerted by the US for South American countries to recognize Hezbollah as a terrorist organization can be analyzed in two phases: from 2001 onwards, there was economic pressure, primarily led by the FATF, for Argentina, Paraguay, and Brazil to implement anti-terrorism laws; and from the Trump administration (2017–2021), there was an intensification of political pressure for Hezbollah to be designated and accused as a terrorist organization. This process corresponds to (1) US interests in expanding surveillance and monitoring systems in South America; (2) establishing common security agendas and alliances among regional political elites; (3) Using Hezbollah as a pretext to widen sanctions and intensify efforts to isolate Iran, since designating Hezbollah as a terrorist group implicitly reinforces the narrative of Iran as a state sponsor of terrorism.

The Argentine Case: From the Attacks to the Designation of Hezbollah as a Terrorist Organization

Argentina was the first TF country to officially designate Hezbollah as a terrorist organization in 2019. However, terrorism has been debated in the country since the 1990s, following attacks in Argentina's capital. In 2011, the country passed Law 26.734,⁶ which established that any crime listed in the Penal Code would carry double the penalty if committed with the intent to terrorize the population. The law's broad and ambiguous wording leaves the interpretation of what constitutes a terrorist threat to the discretion of the judiciary. In this case, the decision to pass the law was driven by the country's intention to align with international standards, particularly the recommendations of the FATF. In Argentina, in a 2017 request for the repeal of the 2011 law, it was alleged that the FATF had even threatened the Argentine government, highlighting its role in pressuring and coercing the law's approval (Argentina 2017).

The Argentine case was also unique in the way the debate on terrorism and Hezbollah took place simultaneously. This is because the organization and Iran were the first and main suspects in the attacks perpetrated in the Argentine capital during the 1990s. The attacks and their repercussions have been analyzed in various studies, including those by Byman (2003), , and Harb and Leenders (2005), Norton (2009), and Saad-Ghorayeb (2002). Despite the accusations, both Iran and Hezbollah denied any involvement, and the researchers also diverged on the outcomes of the investigation.

For example, a report published by the BBC on November 11, 2005 raised doubts about the official findings. What is evident is that the investigative process, which

⁶Law 26.734, known as the Anti-Terrorism Law, was enacted in Argentina in December 2011 during the administration of President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner.

remains inconclusive, has been mired in political and judicial controversies – from the suspicious death of special prosecutor Alberto Nisman to subsequent accusations against former President Cristina Kirchner (O Globo 2021). In its most recent update, Argentine justice determined that Iran was behind the 1994 attack and that it was carried out by Hezbollah (G1 2024). This ruling contrasts with a 2022 statement by Mossad, the Israeli intelligence service, which claimed that Iran was not involved (Times of Israel 2022).

However, it is noteworthy that the Argentine announcement recognizing Hezbollah as a terrorist organization was signed by President Mauricio Macri on the 25th anniversary of the AMIA bombing – 25 years after the attack – during the administration of Donald Trump. On that occasion, US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo was present and congratulated the decision, marking an important political symbolism. The Argentine government issued a decree on July 18, 2019, stating that:

UNIDAD DE INFORMACIÓN FINANCIERA DE LA REPÚBLICA ARGENTINA (UIF-AR), an autonomous and self-contained entity within the Ministry of Finance of the Nation, ordered the freezing of assets of the terrorist organization Hezbollah, specific entities of its military wing, and leaders of the organization. (Argentina 2019)

The fact that Hezbollah was recognized as a terrorist organization 25 years after the attacks shows how this decision permeates political and economic interests. In these decisions, the context cannot be disregarded. The decision to recognize Hezbollah as a terrorist organization served as a means to address both domestic and international demands for accountability regarding the attacks.

On the external front, the leadership transitions in the US State Department to Mike Pompeo meant that the pressure to implement an anti-Hezbollah agenda in the region became more intense. In 2022, the Argentine Ministry of Justice and Human Rights published material asserting that investigations had pointed to the ‘potential involvement of Hezbollah in the region’ and identified the group’s ‘relationship with organized crime groups’ (Argentina 2022, 159). While Argentina has its specific context marked by terrorist attacks, the document also echoes allegations made by the US regarding Hezbollah’s connection to local organized crime – framing the organization within the broader narrative of a *crime-terror nexus* in the region.

The case of Argentina, the first South American country to officially recognize Hezbollah as a terrorist organization, highlights the politicization of this process. US interference is evident both in the investigations carried out into the attacks of the 1990s and in the economic pressure to enact anti-terrorism laws based on FATF guidelines. And since the Trump administration, political cooperation between elites has been evident in recognizing Hezbollah as a terrorist group.

Paraguay: The Crime–Terror Nexus and Its Contradictions

Following Argentina, Paraguay recognized Hezbollah as a terrorist organization in 2019. But firstly, it is necessary to analyze the country’s anti-terrorism law (Law No. 4024/10), enacted on May 6, 2010, during the administration of President Fernando Lugo.

The passing of this law was met with opposition from human rights organizations and popular sectors, which feared it could lead to the criminalization of social movements. According to the newspaper *Última Hora* (2010), the Paraguay secretariat

Seprelad (*La Secretaría de Prevención de Lavado de Dinero o Bienes* or Secretariat for the Prevention of Money Laundering, in English) engaged in intense lobbying and pressured the Executive for the law's approval. This pressure was based on the threat of potential sanctions against Paraguay should it fail to implement terrorism classification measures. In other words, both internal and international pressure suggested that Paraguay risked losing access to international credit if it did not adopt an anti-terrorism law in line with standards set by agencies such as the FATF.

Within this economic pressure, the country also passed Law No. 4100/2010, 'Approving the Memorandum of Understanding between the Governments of the Grupo de Acción Financiera de Sudamérica (GAFISUD) States against Money Laundering', and in 2016, Law No. 5582/2016, an amendment to the 2010 law. Currently known as Grupo de Acción Financiera de Latinoamérica (GAFILAT), GAFISUD is a regional body analogous to the FATF, whose work it recognizes – demonstrating the alignment and convergence of interests and relationships between the region and the directives of the FATF.

Speculation about Hezbollah's presence in Ciudad del Este dates back to 2002, with allegations of involvement in arms and drug trafficking, as well as money laundering (Ireton 2019). While the crime–terror nexus appears as a common element in both Argentina and Paraguay, the latter placed greater emphasis on this connection when officially designating Hezbollah as a terrorist organization in 2019, during the administration of conservative President Mario Abdo Benítez.

At that time, measures against the organization were announced by Interior Minister Juan Ernesto Villamayor. A document titled 'National Risk Assessment of Terrorism Financing in Paraguay', published by *Seprelad* in 2019, was based on the 'Terrorism Financing Risk Assessment Guide' published by the FATF in the same year. The document states:

There is no history of acts of terrorism in the country ... [but] there is the possibility that sympathizers of Islamic extremist groups, specifically Hezbollah, operate in the country; this takes into account the number of Lebanese citizens living and conducting business in the TFZ [Triple Frontier zone], data suggesting that terrorist groups might be funded from the area. (Paraguay 2019a, 20–21, emphasis added)

This passage highlights several elements: (1) the invocation of the crime–terror nexus as a central justification for securitizing Hezbollah in the region, despite the absence of a history of terrorist activities in the area; (2) the treatment of Hezbollah sympathizers and members as synonymous; (3) the assumption that Hezbollah's presence in the TF is attributable only to the existence of a Lebanese community in the area, based on broad, simplified, and racial criteria.

The document also contains an important contradiction, as evidenced by the following excerpts: 'No operations indicating signs or suspicions of being directed toward terrorism, terrorist organizations, or individual terrorists were found in the TF' (Paraguay 2019a, 26), but: 'Recognized as terrorists by the US and Argentina; and by Decree No. 2307/2019, the Republic of Paraguay recognizes ISIS and Al-Qaeda as global terrorists, and Hamas and Hezbollah as international terrorists' (Paraguay 2019b, 38). The contradictions present in the documents highlight how Hezbollah has been used as a pretext by political elites to advance their agendas.

The interference of the US and its political and security agendas in TF – first with the economic pressure for the implementation of anti-terrorism laws; and second through the political pressure

for the recognition of Hezbollah as a terrorist organization – followed the same pretext and logic as the Argentine case. Despite the absence of concrete evidence linking Hezbollah or its affiliates to terrorist activities in the TF, Paraguay yielded to US pressure and officially designated the organization as a terrorist group. In response, Mike Pompeo, through the US Embassy in Paraguay, issued a statement on August 21, 2019 congratulating the Paraguayan government's decision and stating that 'this important measure will help reduce the ability of these groups to plan terrorist attacks and raise money worldwide, including in the Western Hemisphere'.

This reflection seeks to critically examine how the focus tends to fall on individuals – rather than the financial systems that would enable such transactions – as the primary targets of securitization. It also considers how, similar to the Argentine case, Mike Pompeo's statements symbolize the political alignment of internal and external interests. Moreover, the association with criminal activities pushes the debate toward a framework of criminalization and militarization in a region marked by a significant market for weapons and surveillance technologies. These dynamics help frame the context in which Brazil begins to engage with similar narratives.

Brazilian Anti-Terrorism: Law 13.260/2016 and the Debate around Hezbollah

Brazil remains the only country in the TF not to officially designate Hezbollah as a terrorist organization. However, this exception does not imply the absence of securitization efforts; on the contrary, Hezbollah continues to be a subject of concern and political discourse within Brazil's national security agenda.

Historically, terrorism has been a peripheral concern on Brazil's domestic political agenda. Even at the height of the 'War on Terror', when US government agencies claimed evidence of 'Islamic terrorist groups' in the region, the issue did not significantly impact national political discourse. This situation changed in 2015 when the Executive submitted the Bill 2016/2015 to the National Congress, aiming to: 'regulate terrorism, address investigative and procedural measures, and redefine the concept of a terrorist organization'. With Congressional approval and Presidential promulgation, this bill became Anti-Terrorism Law No. 13.260/2016.

The law was enacted under the administration of President Dilma Rousseff, from the *Partido dos Trabalhadores* (Workers' Party). Thus, it is imperative to analyze the factors that led the Rousseff's government to introduce anti-terrorism legislation – that was swiftly approved by parliament despite strong criticism from national activists. Interestingly, it became clear that the emergence of terrorism on Brazil's political agenda was not the result of a pressing internal threat but rather catalyzed by the very formulation and approval of Law 13.260/2016.

The Anti-Terrorism Law coincided with a series of mega-events throughout Brazil, providing a plausible rationale – security concerns – for enacting such legislation.⁷ The argument advocating the need to safeguard mega-events and modernize Brazilian legislation in

⁷Pan American Games in Rio de Janeiro (2007), Military World Games (2011), Rio + 20 International Conference (2012), Confederations Cup (2013), World Youth Day, which included the visit of Pope Francis (2013), World Cup (2014), and the Olympic and Paralympic Games (2016).

response to international terrorism (Freixo and Armele 2021) reinforced the notion of a unified front between transnational terrorist groups and domestic criminal factions.

As with the previous cases, the role of the FATF deserves attention. Since Brazil's accession to the organization in 2000, the country has faced increasing pressure to tighten anti-terrorism laws, despite claims that its existing legislation already adhered to FATF standards (França 2017). Over time, this economic pressure intensified, culminating in 2014 with the threat of Brazil's potential inclusion on the FATF's black-list, which could result in a downgrade of the country's investment standing by credit rating agencies and a subsequent decline in foreign investments (Freixo and Armele 2021). Consequently, the formulation of this anti-terrorism legislation took shape with its processing and approval occurring in record time.

Thus, it can be inferred that Law 13.260/2016 was enacted primarily in response to international pressure rather than as a result of concrete domestic demands or advocacy from national political actors. Raul Jungmann, who served as Defense Minister during Michel Temer's administration (2016–2018), stated that the legislation would not have been ratified were it not for the FATF's implicit threat to withhold approval of the 2016 Olympic Games (O Globo 2016). Simultaneously, as Bill 2016/2015 progressed, Brazil became embroiled in a political crisis culminating in the 2016 impeachment of President Dilma Rousseff, paving the way for the rise of the far right and the election of Jair Bolsonaro in 2018.

Among recent legislative proposals debated in the National Congress is Bill 3283/2021, which would amend penalties and classify 'acts committed in the name or favor of organized criminal groups' as terrorist acts. In response, several social movements, such as the MST⁸ (*Movimento dos Trabalhadores Sem-Terra* or Landless Workers' Movement, in English), have criticized the bill, arguing that under the guise of combating organized crime factions, activists and social movements could inadvertently face criminalization.

Regarding the Hezbollah case, it is noteworthy that the proposal to designate Hezbollah as a terrorist organization is not new in the country. The genesis of discussions on this topic dates back to a crucial event occurring two months after September 11, 2001, when approximately 15,000 people gathered in Foz do Iguaçu for an event called 'Peace Without Borders'. At that time, the event was organized by the local Muslim community in response to reports portraying the region as a hotspot for terrorist cells, with particular suspicion of Hezbollah (Folha de S. Paulo 2001).

The allegations against the organization also involve a supposed linkage between Hezbollah and organized crime, notably the *Primeiro Comando da Capital*⁹ (PCC). This accusation was substantiated and widely disseminated, both nationally and internationally, through an article by Francisco Leali published in the newspaper *O Globo* on November 9, 2014. The article claims that Lebanese traffickers allegedly operating in the TF were associated with Hezbollah and had connections with the PCC. The

⁸The MST is a Brazilian social movement advocating for agrarian reform and land redistribution. Since its founding in the 1980s, the MST has organized mobilizations to challenge land concentration and promote social justice in rural areas.

⁹The Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC), one of the most powerful and influential criminal factions in Brazil, has a history dating back to the early 1990s when it was founded in the state of São Paulo. Today, it has at least 33,000 members and is active in several countries. The Triple Frontier has been primarily used by the PCC for drug-trafficking activities.

article includes a quote from a 2008 Federal Police document mentioning the ‘alleged involvement’ and noting that the witness was considered ‘unverified’ (O Globo 2014).

Castro and Cardone (2023) analyze how suspicions regarding Hezbollah’s alleged connection with the PCC – originally based on a journalistic article and a Federal Police document lacking conclusive evidence – gradually shifted from conjecture to widely accepted fact. The absence of conclusive evidence reinforces our argument that Hezbollah has been used as a pretext, or *scapegoat*, for broader political and security agendas linked to US imperialist interests. The statement, however, was used by the American think tank Foundation for Defense of Democracies and appeared in official reports (such as the April 17, 2018 meeting draft of the House Homeland Security Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence) and was replicated in research (Levitt 2015). Thus, like the Paraguayan case, discussions involving Hezbollah in Brazil have developed in the context of public security and the *crime–terror nexus*.

In 2018, under the administrations of Donald Trump in the US and Michel Temer in Brazil, Hezbollah once again drew media attention in Brazil due to a new case. In September, the Federal Police arrested Assad Ahmad Barakat, sanctioned by the US Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) in 2004 and accused of being a principal financial agent of Hezbollah in Latin America (Ireton 2019). Barakat was extradited to Paraguay and, in 2021, was sentenced by a Paraguayan court to two years and six months in prison for identity fraud. In this context, ‘it seems contradictory that the arrest of a person accused of falsification was the most frequent mention of terrorism in the region, considering he was not indicted for terrorist acts’ (Castro and Cardone 2023, 7).

Despite US pressure on South American nations to recognize Hezbollah’s activities in the region, the administrations of Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995–2002), Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (2003–2010), Dilma Rousseff (2011–2016), and Michel Temer (2016–2018) resisted, notwithstanding the aforementioned 2016 anti-terrorism legislation. This resistance is rooted in Brazil’s traditional diplomatic and political stance, which aligns the country’s designation of terrorist organizations with that of the United Nations (UN), an entity that does not classify Hezbollah as a terrorist organization. With the election of far-right conservative Jair Bolsonaro as President in 2018, this issue gained significant prominence on Brazil’s security agenda. Far-right legislators have proposed measures deviating from Brazil’s historical diplomatic positions. For instance, Bill 4894/2023 ‘provides for political and economic sanctions related to Hamas and Hezbollah, classifies them as terrorist groups, and criminalizes support for these groups’ (Câmara dos Deputados 2023a).

The ideological alignment between Brazil, the US, and Israel during Bolsonaro’s tenure became evident through efforts to integrate the agendas and demands of the latter two countries into Brazil’s domestic and foreign policy.¹⁰ For instance, on the social media platform X (formerly Twitter), Eduardo Bolsonaro – son of then-president Jair Bolsonaro – praised Paraguay’s 2019 decision to designate Hezbollah as a terrorist group, stating he was unaware of ‘plausible arguments justifying

¹⁰One example was the Brazilian government’s attempt to move its embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. The plan was not successful. It faced backlash from Brazil’s agribusiness sector, which was threatened by Arab-Islamic countries. These countries are major importers of Brazilian products.

considering the Hezbollah terrorist group as a political party'.¹¹ We argue that, despite not being officially designated as a terrorist organization, the trend of securitization persists.

On November 8, the Federal Police launched 'Operation *Trapiche*' following an alert from the FBI – US government intelligence – indicating possible Hezbollah recruitment efforts in Brazil (G1 2023). On October 10, 2023, Eduardo Bolsonaro requested a 'Motion of Repudiation against the actions of the terrorist groups Hamas and Hezbollah against the State of Israel' (*Câmara dos Deputados* 2023b). This indicates that the discourse surrounding these organizations remains relevant and actively debated in the country. What has slowed down Brazil's official recognition of Hezbollah as a terrorist organization are the country's own institutions, which argue that such a designation would go against Brazil's diplomatic principles.

US economic and political influence has clearly played a role in shaping Brazil's anti-terrorism legislation. This influence also extended to efforts to criminalize individuals allegedly linked to Hezbollah – even though the group is not officially recognized as a terrorist organization in Brazil. These dynamics reveal the contradictions of the process and underscore how the alignment between US interests and a specific political elite in Brazil has guided securitization efforts.

Conclusions

This article investigated the efforts to securitize Hezbollah in the TF, with an analytical focus on US interference in this process. It examined the political and economic mechanisms employed by the US in the region, aiming to demonstrate that the construction of Hezbollah as a threat is fundamentally a political process. In this context, the key actors were the US and South American political elites, operating in concert. Rather than treating the accusations against Hezbollah as isolated or purely evidence-based, this research contributes to the broader field by framing the case within the dynamics of US imperialism and its strategic interests in both South America and the Middle East.

The accusations based on the *crime–terror nexus* are seen not as the cause, but as a result of Hezbollah's securitization in the TF. The causes must be examined through the political interests of the United States and local elites. Two movements stood out. First, after the 2001 declaration of the 'Global War on Terror', the US increased international political and economic pressure. Countries were urged to follow its counter-terrorism agenda. Second, institutions like the FATF began to pressure states to adopt anti-terrorism laws. These laws included security mechanisms often developed with US cooperation. As a result, the US was able to intervene – directly or indirectly – in several regions, including South America.

In the second phase, there is the specific case of Hezbollah, which is the focus of this investigation. Although accusations regarding Hezbollah's alleged presence in South America have circulated since the 1990s, there was a clear intensification of

¹¹Available at <https://x.com/BolsonaroSP/status/1163498934091825152?s=20>.

these claims over time, accompanied – more importantly – by increased political pressure on countries to designate Hezbollah as a terrorist organization, particularly during the administration of Donald Trump. Based on the US's political agenda, it became evident that Hezbollah served as a pretext to legitimize increased surveillance and monitoring of the region; to exert control over the Lebanese and Muslim populations residing in the TF; and to justify heightened sanctions against the organization's main ally in the Middle East: Iran. As Iran and Hezbollah represent agendas that challenge US imperialist interests and hegemonic projects, the United States has sought to sanction, delegitimize, and further isolate these actors.

Alongside this external pressure, there was an internal dynamic within each government, shaped by their own interests, political decisions, and/or economic coercion, and aligned with the international agenda. While the cases share common elements – such as the interplay between external and internal political elites, along with political and economic pressures – their outcomes and justifications reflect the specific contexts and particularities of each country. Beyond a political and legal debate, these attempts to securitize Hezbollah have led to the stigmatization of a significant portion of Lebanese communities in these countries, which are considered suspicious of 'financing terrorism' for sending funds to their families, for example. It is essential to note that Hezbollah, in addition to its armed wing, functions as a political entity and administers a network of social services. Consequently, people who send money to a relative affiliated with the party or contribute to charities associated with it can be investigated or imprisoned on charges of financing international terrorism.

How have the populations of these countries responded to the accusations made? What impacts have arisen from such designations? These questions, which emerge from the understanding of Hezbollah as a pretext for a broader political agenda, both regional and international, become a focus and opportunity for future research.

Disclosure Statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

ORCID

Karime Ahmad Borrascchi Cheaito  <http://orcid.org/0000-0003-3060-3702>

Adriano de Freixo  <http://orcid.org/0000-0002-0361-8565>

References

- Aita, Edson. 2017. "A Tríplice Fronteira sul sob a ótica do terrorismo: uma análise da legislação antiterrorismo da Argentina, Brasil e Paraguai." *Estudos Internacionais: revista de relações internacionais da PUC Minas* 4 (2): 35–55. <https://doi.org/10.5752/P.2317-773X.2016v4n2p35>.
- Amaral, Arthur Bernardes do. 2007. "A Tríplice Fronteira e a Guerra ao Terror: dinâmicas de constituição da ameaça terrorista no Cone Sul." *Carta Internacional* 2 (2): 48–58.
- Argentina. 2017. "Diputados." Comisión Permanente de Legislación Penal. Proyecto de Ley. Accessed April 07, 2025. https://www.diputados.gob.ar/comisiones/permanentes/clpenal/proyecto.html?exp=0649-D-2017&utm_source=chatgpt.com.

- Argentina. 2019. "UIF ordena congelamiento de activos de Hezbollah, su ala militar y líderes de la organización." Ministerio de Justicia. Accessed August 22, 2024. <https://www.argentina.gob.ar/noticias/uif-ordena-congelamiento-de-activos-de-hezbollah-su-ala-militar-y-lideres-de-la>.
- Argentina. 2022. "Evaluaciones nacionales de riesgos de lavado de activos y de financiación del terrorismo y de la proliferación de armas de destrucción masiva." Ministerio de Justicia y Derechos Humanos. Accessed August 22, 2024. https://www.argentina.gob.ar/sites/default/files/2022/11/evaluaciones_nacionales_de_riesgos_de_lavado_de_activos_y_de_financiacion_d_el_terrorismo_y_de_la_proliferacion_de_armas_de_destruccion_masiva_1.pdf.
- Ayerbe, Luis Fernando. 2019. "La política de la administración Trump para América Latina: ¿reinención de la Doctrina Monroe?" *Revista Tempo do Mundo* 5 (1): 225–240.
- BBC. 2005. "Hezbollah nega envolvimento em ataque na Argentina." *BBC Brasil*, November 11, 2005. Accessed March 2, 2023. https://www.bbc.com/portuguese/noticias/story/2005/11/051111_hezbollahcpg.
- Buzan, Barry, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde. 1998. *Segurança: um novo quadro de análise*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Byman, Daniel. 2003. "Should Hezbollah Be Next?" *Foreign Affairs* 82 (6): 54–66. <https://doi.org/10.2307/20033756>.
- Câmara dos Deputados. 2023a. "Portal da Câmara dos Deputados." Bill 4894/2023. Accessed October 18, 2023. <https://www.camara.leg.br/proposicoesWeb/fichadetramitacao?idProposicao=2394641>.
- Câmara dos Deputados. 2023b. "REQ 3473/2023." Accessed October 18, 2023. <https://www.camara.leg.br/propostas-legislativas/2394712>.
- Capasso, Matteo, and Ali Kadri. 2023. "The Imperialist Question: A Sociological Approach." *Middle East Critique* 32 (2): 149–166. <https://doi.org/10.1080/19436149.2023.2176943>.
- Case-Ruchala, Devin, and Mark Nance. 2024. "The Limits of Enforcement in Global Financial Governance: Blacklisting in FATF as Rational Myth." *International Studies Quarterly* 68 (3): sqae115. <https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqae115>.
- Castro, Isabelle Christine Somma de. 2019. "Rotular o Hezbollah traz prejuízos ao Brasil." *Núcleo de Pesquisa em Relações Internacionais*. Accessed October 15, 2023. <https://nupri.prp.usp.br/blog/rotular-o-hezbollah-traz-prejuizos-ao-brasil/>.
- Castro, Isabelle Christine Somma de. 2021. "Securitização da Tríplice Fronteira: uma análise dos *Country Reports on Terrorism* publicados durante a administração de Donald Trump (2017–2020)." *Conjuntura Austral* 12 (58): 77–91. <https://doi.org/10.22456/2178-8839.111503>.
- Castro, Isabelle Christine Somma de, and Ignacio Javier Cardone. 2023. "Limites na mídia: A representação da Tríplice Fronteira nos jornais *Folha de S. Paulo* e *O Globo* (2011–2019)." *Opinião Pública* 29 (3): 724–760. <https://doi.org/10.1590/1807-01912023293724>.
- Cheaito, Karime Ahmad Borrascchi. 2023. "O Processo de Designação do Hezbollah como Organização Terrorista pelos Estados Unidos da América: Acusações, Contradições e Consequências (1985–2006)." Master's thesis, Instituto de Estudos Estratégicos da Defesa e da Segurança, Universidade Federal Fluminense.
- Cheaito, Karime Ahmad Borrascchi, and Thiago Rodrigues. 2023. "Ameaça Islâmica' antes do 11 de Setembro: uma análise desde os Estudos Críticos de Segurança." *Malala* 11 (14): 28–54. <https://doi.org/10.11606/issn.2446-5240.malala.2023.213415>.
- Corrêa, Luiz Maria Pio. 2013. *O Grupo de Ação Financeira Internacional (GAFI): Organizações Internacionais e Crime Transnacional*. Brasília: Fundação Alexandre de Gusmão (FUNAG).
- Costa, Renatho José. 2004. "Hezbollah: Organização Terrorista ou Anseio de uma Nação?." In *Notas Internacionais*, edited by Thiago Rodrigues and Cynthia Marcucci, 121–158. São Paulo: Editora Desatino.
- Costanza, William. 2012. "O Hezbollah e sua missão na América Latina." *Estudos em Conflito e Terrorismo* 35 (3): 193–210.
- Daher, Aurélie. 2019. *Hezbollah: Mobilization and Power*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- El Hussein, Rola. 2010. "Hezbollah and the Axis of Refusal: Hamas, Iran, and Syria." *Third World Quarterly* 31 (5): 803–815. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2010.502695>.

- Escudé, Carlos, e Beatriz Gurevich. 2003. "Limits to Governability, Corruption and Transnational Terrorism: The Case of the 1992 and 1994 Attacks in Buenos Aires." *EIAL – Estudios Interdisciplinarios de América Latina y el Caribe* 14 (2): 127–148.
- Estadão. 2023. "A General Americana vê 'intenções malignas' da China, da Rússia, do Irã e do Hezbollah no Brasil." *Estadão*. Accessed October 18, 2023. <https://www.estadao.com.br/politica/marcelo-godoy/general-americana-ve-intencoes-malignas-da-china-da-russia-do-ira-e-do-hezbollah-no-brasil/>.
- FATF-GAFI. 2024. "'Black and Grey' Lists." Accessed February 1, 2025. <https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/countries/black-and-grey-lists.html>.
- Nunes Fernandes, Ignácio. 2016. "Estándares Internacionales de Represión al Terrorismo Internacional: Un Paradigma Político Criminal para Argentina y Brasil." London: Editorial Académica Española. 248 p.
- Ferreira, Marcos Alan Fagner dos Santos. 2009. "A guerra global contra o terrorismo na América Latina: A Tríplice Fronteira Argentina, Brasil e Paraguai como uma ameaça à segurança dos Estados Unidos?" In *De Clinton a Obama: Política dos Estados Unidos para a América Latina*, edited by Luis Fernando Ayerbe, 175–194. São Paulo: Editora Unesp.
- Folha de S. Paulo. 2001. "Folha Online – Cotidiano – Moradores da 'tríplice fronteira' realizam ato pela paz em Foz de Iguaçu." November 11, 2001. Accessed October 17, 2023. <https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/folha/cotidiano/ult95u40351.shtml>.
- França, Guilherme de Jesus. 2017. "As Origens da Lei Antiterrorismo: Os Tortuosos Caminhos da Localização das Normas Internacionais de Combate ao Terrorismo no Brasil." Master's thesis, Centro de Pesquisa e Documentação de História Contemporânea do Brasil/CPDOC, Fundação Getúlio Vargas/FGV.
- Franks, Jason. 2009. "Rethinking the Roots of Terrorism: Beyond Orthodox Terrorism Theory – A Critical Research Agenda." *Global Society* 23 (2): 153–176. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13600820902766219>.
- Freixo, Adriano, and Vinícius Armele. 2021. "A Lei Antiterrorismo Brasileira e a Circulação Internacional de Regimes Jurídicos Punitivos." *Passagens. Revista Internacional de História Política e Cultura Jurídica* 13 (1): 105–128.
- G1. 2023. "PF prende 2 e faz buscas em MG, DF e SP contra suspeitos de planejar atos de terrorismo." November 8. <https://g1.globo.com/politica/noticia/2023/11/08/pf-operacao-suspeitos-atos-terroristas.ghtml>.
- G1. 2024. "Justiça da Argentina decide que Irã esteve por trás de atentado terrorista em centro judaico em 1994, o maior da história do país." April 11. Accessed August 22, 2024. <https://g1.globo.com/mundo/noticia/2024/04/11/justica-argentina-decide-que-ira-esteve-por-tras-do-atentado-terrorista-de-1994-em-centro-judaico-de-buenos-aires.ghtml>.
- Harb, Mona, and Reinoud Leenders. 2005. "Know Thy Enemy: Hizbullah, 'Terrorism' and the Politics of Perception." *Third World Quarterly* 26 (1): 173–197. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/3993770>. <https://doi.org/10.1080/0143659042000322973>.
- Ireton, Daisy. 2019. "The Threat That Grows While America Sleeps: The US Securitisation of Hezbollah in Latin America under the Obama Administration." Master's thesis, Relações Internacionais em Perspectiva Histórica, Faculdade de Ciências Humanas, University of Utrecht.
- Jackson, Richard. 2005. *Writing the War on Terrorism: Language, Politics, and Counter-Terrorism*. Manchester; New York: Manchester University Press; Distributed exclusively in the USA by Palgrave.
- Jackson, Richard (editor), Marie Breen Smyth e Jeroen Gunning, eds. 2009. *Critical Terrorism Studies: A New Research Agenda*. Abingdon: Routledge. 292 p.
- Kanaaneh, Abed. 2024. "The Hegemony of Resistance: Hezbollah and the Forging of a National-Popular Will in Lebanon." *Middle East Critique* 33 (1): 3–24. <https://doi.org/10.1080/19436149.2023.2249344>.
- Karmon, Ely. 2009. "Iran and its Proxy Hezbollah: Strategic Penetration in Latin America." *Documentos de Trabajo (Real Instituto Elcano de Estudios Internacionales y Estratégicos)*, no. 18. Madrid: Real Instituto Elcano. <https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/articulo?codigo=2984363>.

- Levitt, Matthew. 2015. "Iranian and Hezbollah Operations in South America: Then and Now | The Washington Institute". December 16, 2015. <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/iranian-and-hezbollah-operations-south-america-then-and-now>.
- Levitt, Matthew. 2022. "Hezbollah: Party of Fraud – How Hezbollah Uses Crime to Finance Its Operations." *Relações Exteriores*, July 27, 2022.
- Maciel, Tadeu Morato, and Karime Ahmad Borráschi Cheaito. 2024. "O 'Nexo Crime-Terror' na América do Sul e a Securitização do Hezbollah na Colômbia: o Projeto Cassandra (2008-2016)." *Conjuntura Global* 12 (2): 16–35. <https://doi.org/10.5380/cg.v12i2.90776>.
- Makarenko, Tamara. 2004. "The Crime-Terror Continuum: Tracing the Interplay between Transnational Organised Crime and Terrorism." *Global Crime* 6 (1): 129–145. <https://doi.org/10.1080/1744057042000297025>.
- Milani, Livia Peres. 2021. "Política Externa dos EUA para a América do Sul Desde o 11 de Setembro: Negligência ou Militarização?" *Contexto Internacional* 43 (1): 121–146. <https://doi.org/10.1590/s0102-8529.2019430100006>.
- Norton, Augustus Richard. 2007. "The Role of Hezbollah in Lebanese Domestic Politics." *The International Spectator* 42 (4): 475–491. <https://doi.org/10.1080/03932720701722852>.
- Norton, Augustus Richard. 2009. *Hezbollah: A Short History*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- O Globo. 2014. "Polícia Federal aponta elo entre facção brasileira e Hezbollah." *O Globo*, November 9, 2014. Accessed October 22, 2023. <https://oglobo.globo.com/politica/policia-federal-aponta-elo-entre-facao-brasileira-hezbollah-14512269>.
- O Globo. 2016. "Jungmann diz que lei antiterror foi imposição externa para a Olimpíada." *O Globo*, July 22, 2016. Accessed October 20, 2023. <https://oglobo.globo.com/rio/jungmann-diz-que-lei-antiterror-foi-imposicao-externa-para-olimpiada-19766066>.
- O Globo. 2021. "Justiça da Argentina Absolve Cristina Kirchner em Caso Relacionado ao Suposto Acobertamento de Suspeitos do Ataque AMIA." *O Globo*. <https://oglobo.globo.com/mundo/justica-da-argentina-absolve-cristina-kirchner-em-caso-relacionado-ao-suposto-acobertamento-de-suspeitos-do-ataque-amia-25229175>.
- Paraguay. 2019a. "Secretaría de Prevención de Lavado de Dinero o Bienes. Evaluación Nacional de Riesgos de Financiamiento del Terrorismo en Paraguay." Accessed February 01, 2025. <https://www.seprelad.gov.py/userfiles/files/biblioteca/evaluacion-nacional-de-riesgos-financiamiento-del-terrorismo.pdf>.
- Paraguay. 2019b. "Statement by Secretary Pompeo on Paraguay's Designation of Hizballah as a Terrorist Organization." *US Embassy in Paraguay*, August 21, 2019. <https://py.usembassy.gov/statement-by-secretary-pompeo-on-paraguays-designation-of-hizballah-as-a-terrorist-organization/>.
- Pinto, Paulo Gabriel Hilu Rocha. 2011. "As Comunidades Muçulmanas na Tríplice Fronteira: Significados Locais e Fluxos Transnacionais na Construção de Identidades Étnico-Religiosas." In *A Tríplice Fronteira: Espaços Nacionais e Dinâmicas Locais*, edited by Lorenzo Macagno, Silvia Montenegro, and Verónica Giménez Béliveau, 183–202. Curitiba: Editora UFPR.
- Rego-Monteiro, Lício Caetano. 2021. *Esperando os Bárbaros: Geopolíticas da Segurança no Brasil do Século XXI*. Rio de Janeiro: Consequência.
- Roche, MaryClare, and Michael Robbins. 2024. "What the Lebanese People Really Think of Hezbollah." *Foreign Affairs*. Accessed August 22, 2024. <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/lebanon/what-lebanese-people-really-think-hezbollah>.
- Saad-Ghorayeb, Amal. 2002. *Hezbollah: Politics and Religion*. Londres: Pluto Press.
- Shaw, Daniel Odin. 2019. "Beyond Necessity: Hezbollah and the Intersection of State-Sponsored Terrorism with Organised Crime." *Critical Studies on Terrorism* 12 (4): 582–604. <https://doi.org/10.1080/17539153.2019.1592074>.
- Times of Israel. 2022. "Report: Mossad Says Iranian Agents Not Involved in Hezbollah's Argentina Bombings." *Times of Israel*. <https://www.timesofisrael.com/report-mossad-says-iranian-agents-not-involved-in-hezbollahs-argentina-bombings/>.

- Última Hora*. 2010. “Senado Aprueba Ley Antiterrorista y Abre Peligrosas Interpretaciones.” May 7. <https://www.ultimahora.com/senado-aprueba-ley-antiterrorista-y-abre-peligrosas-interpretaciones-n319813>.
- United States. 2014. “Committee on Foreign Affairs House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade.” February 4. Accessed February 1, 2025. <https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-113hhrg86587/html/CHRG-113hhrg86587.htm>.
- United States Department of State. 2019. “Country Reports on Terrorism 2019.” Accessed February 1, 2025. <https://www.state.gov/reports/country-reports-on-terrorism-2019/>.
- Villa, Rafael Duarte. 2014. “O paradoxo da macrossegurização: Quando a Guerra ao Terror não securitiza outras ‘guerras’ na América do Sul.” *Contexto Internacional* 36 (2): 349–383. <https://doi.org/10.1590/S0102-85292014000200002>.