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Multinational military forces in the Global South: iso-dependence and the quest for autonomy
in the security geo-culture

São Paulo

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A thesis presented to the Programa de Pós-graduação em Relações internacionais San Tiago Dantas, of the Universidade Estadual Paulista “Júlio de Mesquita Filho” (Unesp), the Universidade Estadual de Campinas (Unicamp), and the Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP), in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor in International Relations, in the concentration area "Peace, Defense and International Security", in the research line "Studies on International Security, Regional Security, new themes and approaches".

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Orientador/supervisor: Prof. Dr. Samuel Alves Soares.

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São Paulo, November 17, 2021.

In memory of my mother, Roswitha,
her struggle and love for life despite adversities.

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ABSTRACT

In the post-Cold War era, only three international military organizations with *standing* headquarters made up exclusively of militaries of states in the Global South have emerged in the field of peace operations. These are the Southern Cross Binational Peace Force in South America, the African Standby Force, integrating five sub-regional African forces, and the Peninsula Shield Force in the command structures of the Gulf Cooperation Council countries. The overall objective of this thesis is to analyze the factors that constrain and promote autonomous practices with multinational military forces in the regions of the Global South in the period 2000-2020. As a research hypothesis, we defend that, in a global field of military crisis management dominated by standards and capitals from central countries, the phenomena of organizational isomorphism and external dependence tend to interweave in the formations of multinational military forces in the Global South. For the analysis, we conceptualize a common condition – *iso-dependence* – in the peripheral formation of international military organizations. Further, this research uses a typological-comparative framework to analyze the organizational and operational differences between the three mentioned multinational military forces. From historical, critical, and postcolonial studies, we argue that the *epistemic autonomy* to conduct such force models in the peripheries is constrained in the context of a *security geo-culture* whereby specific attributions, knowledge, and security functions have been unevenly distributed in the modern world-system.

Keywords: multinational military forces; Global South; isomorphism; security geo-culture; iso-dependence; epistemic autonomy.

RESUMO

Na era pós-Guerra Fria, apenas três organizações militares internacionais com quartéis-gerais permanentes compostos exclusivamente por militares de Estados no Sul Global emergiram no campo das operações de paz. São elas: a Força de Paz Binacional “Cruz del Sur”, na América do Sul, a Força de Reserva Africana, que integra cinco forças sub-regionais africanas, e a Força Escudo da Península entre os países do Conselho de Cooperação do Golfo. O objetivo geral desta pesquisa é analisar os fatores que restringem e promovem práticas autônomas nas forças militares multinacionais no Sul Global no período 2000-2020. Como hipótese de pesquisa, defendemos que, em um campo global de gestão militar de conflitos dominado por padrões e capitais de países centrais, os fenômenos de isomorfismo organizacional e dependência externa tendem a se entrelaçar nas formações de forças militares multinacionais no Sul Global. Para a análise conceituamos uma condição comum – *isodependência* – na formação periférica de organizações militares internacionais. Além disso, esta pesquisa utiliza um modelo tipológico-comparativo para analisar as diferenças organizacionais e operacionais entre as três organizações militares multinacionais mencionadas. A partir de estudos históricos, críticos e pós-coloniais, argumentamos que a *autonomia epistêmica* na condução de tais modelos de força nas periferias é restringida no contexto de uma *geocultura da segurança* pela qual atribuições específicas, conhecimentos e funções de segurança tem sido desigualmente distribuídas no sistema-mundo moderno.

Palavras-chave: forças militares multinacionais; Sul Global; isomorfismo; geocultura da segurança; isodependência; autonomia epistêmica.

RESUMEN

En la era de post-Guerra Fría, solo tres organizaciones militares internacionales con cuarteles generales permanentes compuestos exclusivamente por personal militar de los Estados del Sur Global han emergido en el campo de las operaciones de paz. Estas son: la Fuerza Binacional de Paz “Cruz del Sur”, en Sudamérica, la Fuerza de Reserva Africana, que comprende cinco fuerzas subregionales africanas, y la Fuerza Escudo de la Península entre los países del Consejo de Cooperación del Golfo. El objetivo general de esta investigación es analizar los factores que restringen y promueven prácticas autónomas en las fuerzas militares multinacionales en el Sur Global en el período 2000-2020. Como hipótesis de investigación, sostenemos que, en un campo global de gestión militar de conflictos dominado por estándares y capitales de países centrales, los fenómenos de isomorfismo organizacional y dependencia externa tienden a entrelazarse en la formación de fuerzas militares multinacionales en el Sur Global. Para el análisis conceptualizamos una condición común, la *isodependencia*, en la formación periférica de las organizaciones militares internacionales. Además, esta investigación utiliza un modelo tipológico-comparativo para analizar las diferencias organizacionales y operacionales entre las tres organizaciones militares multinacionales mencionadas. A partir de estudios históricos, críticos y poscoloniales, sostenemos que la *autonomía epistémica* en la conducción de tales modelos de fuerza en las periferias es restringida en el contexto de una *geocultura de seguridad* por la cual atribuciones específicas, conocimientos y funciones de seguridad se han distribuido de manera desigual en el sistema-mundo moderno.

Palabras clave: fuerzas militares multinacionales; Sur Global; isomorfismo; geocultura de Seguridad; isodependencia; autonomía epistémica.

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1	– Logo of the Eastern Africa Standby Force.....	80
Figure 2	– The African Union Peace and Security Architecture.....	81
Figure 3	– African Standby Force regions.....	91
Figure 4	– A Juxtaposition of SHIRBRIG and EASBRIG.....	93
Figure 5	– ASF scenarios and timelines of deployments.....	112
Figure 6	– What is FOC?.....	114
Figure 7	– Parallel command structure.....	120
Figure 8	– Logo of the Southern Cross Force.....	127
Figure 9	– Southern Cross Force organizational structure.....	137
Figure 10	– Integrated command structure.....	155
Figure 11	– CJCS organization chart.....	155
Figure 12	– Organization chart of Land Task Force.....	156
Figure 13	– Organization chart naval component.....	157
Figure 14	– Combined air component.....	158
Figure 15	– Southern Cross deployment sequences.....	162
Figure 16	– Logo of the Jezira (Peninsula) Shield Force.....	169
Figure 17	– The PSF command structure.....	179
Figure 18	– Leading-Nation command structure.....	200
Figure 19	– Current PSF Organization.....	201
Figure 20	– Co-deployment – EASF: integrated command, separated units.....	224
Figure 21	– Composite – Southern Cross: integrated command; integrated units.....	224
Figure 22	– Attaché – PSF: one nation command, non-integrated units.....	224
Figure 23	– Fractalization effect in RRF model diffusion.....	231

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1 – Typological-comparative framework on international military organizations.....	30
Table 2 – PSF Troop Contributing Countries in two times.....	180
Table 3 – Variables and modes in the three international military organizations.....	209

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ACB	African Capacity-Building
ACD	Administration for the Control of Drugs
ACE	Allied Command Europe
ACIRC	African Capacity for the Immediate Response to Crisis
ACO	Allied Command for Operations
ACOTA	African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance
ACVW	Armored Combat Vehicles on Wheels
AFRICOM	Africa Command
ALCOPAZ	Latin American Association of Training Centers for Peace Operations
AMIS	African Union Mission in Sudan
AMISOM	African Union Mission to Somalia
APSA	African Peace and Security Architecture
APSTA	African Peace Support Trainers Association
ARRC	Allied Rapid Reaction Corps
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
APSA	African Peace and Security Architecture
AU	African Union
AWACS	Airborne Warning and Control System
BGPD	Bilateral Group of Political Direction
BMA	Binational Military Authority
BPST	British Peace Support Team
C3IS	Command, Control, Communications, and Information Systems
C4I	Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence
CAECOPAZ	Centro Argentino de Entrenamiento Conjunto para Operaciones de Paz
CECOPAC	Centro Conjunto para Operaciones de Paz de Chile
CJCS	Combined Joint Chief Staff
CJTF	Combined Joint Task Force
COMPERSEG	Comité Permanente de Seguridad
CONOPS	Concept of Operations
CPX	Command Post Exercises
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations

EASBRIG	Eastern Africa Standby Brigade
EASF	Eastern Africa Standby Force
EASFCOM	Eastern Africa Standby Force Coordination Mechanism
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EUROFOR	European Rapid Operational Force
FOC	Full Operational Capability
FOE	Friends of EASF
FORD	Friends of Rapid Deployment
FTX	Field Training Exercises
GCC	Gulf Cooperation Council
GPOI	Global Peace Operations Initiative
IADB	Inter-American Defense Board
IAPTC	International Association for Peace Training Centers
ICI	Istanbul Cooperative Initiative
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IGO	Intergovernmental Organization
IMET	International Military Education and Training
IPSTC	International Peace Support Training Centre
IRGC	Iran's Islamic Revolution Guards Corps
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
JTF	Joint Task Force
KAIPTC	Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Center
LRA	Lord Resistance Army
LTF	Land Task Force
MERCOSUR	Mercado Común del Sur
MJTF	Multination Joint Task Force
MTM	Mutual Trust Measures
NACS	Nordic Advisory and Coordination Staff
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCO	Non-Commissioned Officer
NORDEFECO	Nordic Defense Cooperation
OAS	Organization of American States
OAU	Organization of African Unity

OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OPEC	Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
PCRS	Peacekeeping Capability Readiness System
PSC	Peace and Security Council
PSF	Peninsula Shield Force
PSO	Peace Support Operations
PSOD	Peace Support Operations Division
R&D	Research and Development
RECAMP	Renforcement des Capacités Africaines de Maintien de la Paix
REC	Regional Economic Communities
RRF	Rapid Reaction Forces
RTF	Regional Task Force
SACEUR	Supreme Allied Commander Europe
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SCF	Southern Cross Force
SDC	South American Defense Council
SHIRBRIG	Standby Forces High Readiness Brigade
SIMUPAZ	Simulación para Operaciones de Paz
SOP	Standard Operating Procedures
STM	Standardized Training Modules
TOE	Tables of Organization and Equipment
UN	United Nations
UNASUR	Union de Naciones Suramericanas
UNDPKO	United Nations Department of Peace Keeping Operations
UNFICYP	United Nations Mission in Cyprus
UNIBAM	UN Infantry Battalion Manual
UNSAS	United Nations Standby Arrangements System
UNSC	United Nations Security Council

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1	INTRODUCTION.....	17
1.1	Methodology.....	28
1.2	Structure of the Thesis.....	31
2	CENTER-PERIPHERY, SECURITY, AND INTERNATIONAL MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS.....	33
2.1	Why center and periphery?.....	33
2.1.1	Asymmetries and ontologies.....	38
2.2	Center-periphery analysis of security.....	44
2.2.1	Liberal geo-culture of security.....	45
2.2.2	The world-system as a world-forces system.....	51
2.3	The “one-way street” of the global military isomorphism.....	54
2.4	Three functions in the security geo-culture.....	58
2.5	The diffusion of multinational force standards (the ‘rapid reaction’ model).....	64
2.6	An analytical framework for international military organizations.....	71
3	AFRICA: THE EASTERN AFRICA STANDBY FORCE.....	79
3.1	From colonial to postcolonial times.....	81
3.2	Mimetic pressures in the AU and ASF construction.....	86
3.2.1	What multinational force for Africa?.....	89
3.3	Coercive isomorphism and dependence.....	96
3.4	Normative pressures (training standards and exercises).....	104
3.4.1	Training standards.....	104
3.4.2	Combined Exercises.....	107
3.5	Operational concept and operational challenges.....	111
3.6	Interorganizational interactions.....	117
3.7	Closing remarks.....	124
4	SOUTH AMERICA: THE SOUTHERN CROSS COMBINED JOINT FORCE.....	126
4.1	Beyond the Andes: Argentina and Chile through common patterns.....	127
4.2	Building a Binational Force.....	133
4.2.1	Organizational structure.....	137

4.3	Isomorphic pressures.....	139
4.4	Dependence perspective.....	144
4.4.1	Doctrinal dependence.....	144
4.4.2	Technological dependence.....	148
4.5	Interorganizational interactions.....	154
4.5.1	Exercises.....	159
4.6	Operational concept.....	161
4.7	Closing remarks.....	166
5	ARABIAN GULF: THE PENINSULA SHIELD FORCE.....	168
5.1	From the "Pax Britannica" to the US rule in the Gulf.....	170
5.1.1	The GCC and PSF formation.....	175
5.2	Isomorphic pressures.....	182
5.2.1	Mimetic pressures.....	183
5.2.2	Competitive pressures.....	184
5.2.3	Normative pressures.....	188
5.3	External dependence.....	191
5.4	Operational concept and "culture of deterrence".....	195
5.5	Interorganizational interactions.....	198
5.6	Closing remarks.....	206
6	COMPARING INTERNATIONAL MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS.....	209
6.1	Isomorphic pressures.....	209
6.2	Dependence.....	213
6.3	Operational profile.....	215
6.4	Intercultural strategy.....	217
6.5	Multinationalism and specialization.....	220
6.6	Operational partnerships.....	222
6.7	Closing remarks.....	225
7	CONCLUSION.....	228
	REFERENCES.....	241
	REFERENCES OF INTERVIEWEES AND CONTACT POINTS.....	290
	APPENDIX A – INTERVIEW TOPICS AND QUESTIONS ON THE EASF.....	292

APPENDIX B – INTERVIEW TOPICS AND QUESTIONS ON THE SOUTHERN CROSS FORCE (SPANISH LANGUAGE).....	296
ANNEX A – EASF PARTNERS AND EXTERNAL SUPPORT.....	298
ANNEX B – TRAINING STANDARDS FOR THE “CRUZ DEL SUR” COMBINED FORCE	299
ANNEX C – MILITARY EXPENDITURES OF GULF COUNTRIES AND US ARMS SALES.....	302

1 INTRODUCTION

The history of international relations knows numerous cases in which two or more states coordinate their armed forces to achieve common strategic objectives. However, since the end of the Cold War, international military cooperation has taken a new dimension. The most important fact is that the quality of military collaboration has changed (KING, 2010; SOETERS; MANIGART, 2008; TRESCH, 2007). In the past, interactions in carrying out multinational operations – like NATO and the Warsaw Pact – used to pertain to procedures at the strategic level of chiefs of staff and headquarters, while currently, national units are being integrated at the operational and tactical levels. Multi-nationalization takes place in all segments and corners of the world with the aim to pool resources and competencies, to strengthen operational power and sustainability, and to increase legitimacy (GRAY; PURDY, 2018). Thus, the internationalization of military personnel (e.g., in multinational headquarters or permanent formations) and the multicultural character of military contingents during deployments¹ have become common features of military operations (TRESCH, 2007, p. 34).

Such internationalization has been an organizational phenomenon, as evidenced by the restructuring of NATO since 1990, and formulations in the United Nations (UN) and European Union (EU) concerning "stand-by" and "rapid deployment" concepts in multinational peace operations (GHALI, 1995; JONES, 1999; KOOPS, 2008). Internationalization also occurs as an isomorphic phenomenon, in which similar military organizations are diffused across the centers and peripheries of the world-system, and where the US model of defense transformation has been at the basis of applying standards operating, certifying procedures, knowledge, and combined concepts among - and beyond - NATO countries (FARRELL; TERRIFF, 2002; PRETORIUS, 2008).

Nevertheless, the literature on multinational operations remains relatively scarce. The relevant studies either focus on the broader phenomenon of multinational operations or are dedicated to specific case studies, with little analysis of their ramifications with the global diffusion phenomenon (DANIEL; WILLIAMS; SMITH, 2015). Furthermore, available studies mainly pertain to the western hemisphere, particularly to European military organizations where the degree of international cooperation is considered 'most prominent' given a large number of

¹ The term deployment can mean different things, depending on the service member's job, unit, and service branch. Generally, deployment means a scheduled time to move military fractions or columns from the regular duty station to the operations theater and start them. Deployment may involve soldiers, weapons, and vehicles so that forces are ready to begin operations.

relatively small nations and ditto forces (KING, 2011; SOETERS; MANIGART, 2008). So far, military organizations led by peripheral countries in the so-called "Global South", considering their variety and strategic significances for their different regions, have been neglected in systematic and comparative analyses. This thesis, therefore, aims to expand the empirical data on multinational military cooperation with primary and secondary data material on understudied regions in the world; at the same time, this research attempts to broaden the theoretical dimensions of multinational military cooperation.

The "Global South" most common idea refers to regions geographically located in the planet's southern hemisphere. However, from postcolonial and critical studies, the concept can be understood as a political metaphor that characterizes the interconnected histories of several peoples and regions in Africa, Asia, and Latin America that have experienced the economic and epistemic subjugation to western colonialism (SANTOS, 2010). In this way, the "Global South" has followed a different trajectory in the modern world-system (WALLERSTEIN, 2005; GROSGOUEL, 2009). These areas have adopted the structures of modern states; however, many of them would have several limitations whereby they would have "failed" as lacking some attributes compared to the western center, which justifies standards characterizations as "underdeveloped", "developing countries", "failing states", "peripheral" or the "third" of the worlds (BARKAWI; LAFFEY, 2006; GROVOGUI, 2007). Among these countries, several *ad-hoc* military coalitions have been registered in the field of peace support operations to confront the "new threats" of the post-Cold War world.² Until now, only three international organizations made up exclusively of the military of the Global South with permanent command structures or *standing* headquarters have emerged. These are:

- the African Standby Force (ASF) - made up of five sub-regional African forces with headquarters in Addis Abeba, Ethiopia;
- the Southern Cross Combined Peace Force (*Fuerza de Paz Conjunta Combinada "Cruz del Sur"*) with headquarters rotations between Argentina and Chile, and
- the Jezira (Peninsula) Shield Force, based at Hafr al-Batin, Saudi Arabia, folded to the command structures of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries.

² Complex and multidisciplinary conflict resolution mechanisms are currently called peace support operations. UN interventions were generically called peace operations, which included peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations (FRIISS; JARMYR, 2008). The post-Cold War period has seen a significative increase in the number of military operations that have required UN, NATO and other organizations to contribute multinational coalitions in order to implement a variety of missions such as peacekeeping, peace enforcement, antiterrorist actions, humanitarian aid, policing, etc. Although many of the operations are multidimensional, this research focuses on the military components and does not analyze the civilian or police components in missions.

So far, in the great Asian space, it was not possible to detect any initiative with 'combined forces'³ led by Asian countries in international conflict management. According to some experts and colleagues that we have consulted, although regional balances prevent interstate conflict in the so-called Asian "supercomplex", military cooperation without the participation of foreign powers – e.g., the US – is relatively tricky (BUZAN, 2012; CIORCIARI, 2008; PEREIRA; RIBEIRO, 2016). We could consider only some periodic combined exercises, such as the "Exercise of Force XVIII", composed of the countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and led by India (PARAMESWARAN, 2016). There are no regional formations here with permanent command structures or *standing* headquarters like those in Africa, South America, and the Arabian Gulf countries.

Discovering that these types of multinational forces are rare among countries in the Global South, there are currently only three, motivated our interest in studying these organizations - both in their diversity and common factors. The three cases mentioned - Africa Standby Force (ASF), Southern Cross Force, and Peninsula Shield Force (PSF) have manifested their main institutional developments in coincident periods, significantly since the beginning of the 21st century and extending to the present. In this way, the analysis of the factors that promote and constrain the formation of multinational military forces in the different regions of the Global South, particularly in the period 2000-2020, are the issues that conform to the **general objective** of this research proposal.

The three cases are characterized by the fact that they are forces *of* and not just *on* the global South as they are formally led by local actors, seeking greater self-reliance in international crisis management. Nonetheless, their practices with real military deployments have been very modest or even nil compared to the capabilities of US and NATO allies to intervene and influence conflict resolutions in all the world's regions (ALBASOOS, 2018; VÁRNAGY, 2015; VREÏ; MANDRUP, 2017).

As a "symptom" of these relative limitations, we can observe that several *ad hoc* coalitions have prevailed as 'effective' regional military mechanisms in their respective areas.

³ The word "combined operations" has one of its first formal records in World War II. The British War Office introduced it to denote multi-service activities involving air, land, or naval forces acting together and coordinated by the Combined Operations Headquarters. However, after World War II, the US Department of Defense began to use the term "combined" to exclusively denote operations of a multinational nature within the NATO framework. Thus, "combined" operation refers to operations carried out between units from two or more countries, while "joint operation" refers to maneuvers and operations between different branches of the force (naval, air, land). See, RUSH, R; EPLEY, W. **Multinational Operations, Alliances, and International Military Cooperation. Past and Future.** Washington, D.C: Center of Military History United States Army, 2006.

In the African Union (AU), despite numerous external capacity-building programs to equip and train personnel of the ASF, so far it has several difficulties to deploy troops in stabilization and counterinsurgency operations and, as an alternative, the AU has tended to promote other mechanisms such as "Regional Task Forces" against armed groups in Central Africa, Nigeria, and other areas (BRUBACHER; DAMMAN; DAY, 2017). In Latin America, the MINUSTAH in Haiti was the first joint participation project led by South American countries in a UN peacekeeping operation in the region, showing strong ties and interconnection at the general staff and battalions that met there (LLENDEROZAS, 2007). However, when extreme situations occurred, such as the earthquake that struck the island in 2010, with thousands of dead and devastated structures, the US took the lead, sending more than 14,000 soldiers and technicians to reestablish some order in the country (CAVALETTO, 2012). Among the Arabian Gulf countries, given the lack of consensus to deploy the Peninsula Shield Force in the Yemen war, the operation "Decisive Storm" was led by a Saudi led-coalition since 2015 (KRYLOV, 2018). However, the procedure showed a lack of capacity to set up an infrastructure to deploy combined intervention units. So, they turned to countries such as the US and UK for logistics and the US and Israel for intelligence and targeting, search and rescue operations (ARTEAGA, 2015; AL-OTAIBI, 2020).

Different difficulties persist in the regions of Global South in operationalizing multinational troops in real crisis scenarios and assembling a body of local expertise beyond technical assistance, R&D transfer, liberal peacekeeping standards, financial support from central countries, and even force models established by them. Although the three *standing* cases mentioned are based on the emulation of force models such as the Standby Forces High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG) concept or US/NATO models of command relations, a detailed observation will show a variety of indicators of external dependence in their organizational formations (FLEMING, 2015; FLASPOLER, 2019; SAMAAN, 2021; SAIDY, 2014; AITA, 2020; VÁRNAGY, 2010). Such situations encourage stereotypes about a halo of incompetence around these organizations to self-manage mechanisms to obtain or maintain peace in their regions. Hence, the pursuit of self-reliance and, more precisely, the *epistemic autonomy* to conduct internal organizational changes and define 'own' systems of managing conflicts seems particularly challenging for peripheral military organizations.

In this way, the **general question** of this research is: What factors constrain and promote autonomous practices with international military organizations in the Global South? From this

issue arise **specific questions** that, until now, the academic communities have not discussed and considered fully, such as:

- Why do countries in the Global South have more significant constraints than countries in the North in developing multinational military forces?
- How has dependence on external resources affected the formation of international military organizations in the Global South?
- How has the emulation of central force models influenced the formation of multinational forces in the Global South?
- Which are the organizational and operational differences among the Africa Standby Force, the Southern Cross Force, and the Peninsula Shield Force?

As the **central hypothesis** of this research, we defend that, in a global field of military crisis management dominated by capitals and standards formalized by central countries, the phenomena of 'external dependence' and 'organizational isomorphism' tend to interweave in the formations of multinational military forces in the Global South. In some situations, the dependence on external resources, in their different ontologies, can promote the isomorphic diffusion of force models. In other cases, cultural identification, normative injunctions, or attraction to specific force models can generate other kinds of external dependence in peripheral military organizations.

Several authors have analyzed patterns in the historical evolution of a 'world military culture'; notably, how technocratic capitals, weapons, and the prestige attached to great-power scripts for military action have contributed to shaping in smaller and weaker countries the norms about what constitutes a 'modern army', and eventually a multinational army (BLACK, 2002; FARRELL, TERRIFF, 2002; PRETORIUS, 2008; WENDT, BARNETT, 1993). A "one-way street" trend of military norms' diffusions would be constraining isomorphic processes.

Regarding the specific literature on militarization and external dependence in peripheral states, in the analysis of some authors, the processes related to military isomorphism and emulations of central countries' models constitute an epiphenomenon conditioned by economic processes. The peripheral emulations of modern military models are derivations explained primarily from economic dependence on advanced capitalist societies - "capital-intensive" dependence, as Wendt and Barnett stated (1993, p. 322) - in the technologies and resources necessary for militarization in areas where capital is relatively scarce. These are frequently materialistic perspectives that could include authors such as Kaldor (2010, 1976), Silva (2018), Hartman and Walters (1985), Krause (1992), Ross (1988), among others.

On the other hand, we can observe a reverse analogy in the literature considered relevant on military isomorphism and diffusion studies. Among referential authors near a branch called *sociological neo-institutionalism*, military dependence also constitutes an epiphenomenon. That is a relative consequence of other essential factors linked to the diffusion of cultural norms, the assimilation of ideas and practices, not least through professional networks, that ultimately are consequences from a "world culture", or a "world politics" (DEMCHAK, 2002; FARRELL; TERRIFF, 2002; FARRELL, 2005; FINNEMORE, 1996, 2003; GOLDMAN, 2006; KATZENSTEIN, 1996).

Thus, the two trends mentioned focus on different ontologies, "economy" or "culture"; moreover, both tend to weigh one of these phenomena – capitals dependence or norms diffusion - as a more relevant explanatory variable. Nevertheless, in the theoretical framework of this research, we will argue that standards diffusion and capitals, isomorphism and external dependence, although analytically different in the specific literature, both tend to be consubstantiated and both condition different organizational dynamics based on the kinds of external resource, isomorphic pressures, and external models internalized in each case.

As an analytical instrument, we formulated a concept that we call *Iso-dependence*. This concept refers to an 'attribute' in some actors as well as a perspective of analysis that assumes that organizational isomorphism and external dependency can constitute a *congenital* process, not only epiphenomena one of the other as the literature tends to understand.

As an attribute, *iso-dependence* refers to actors in a social system who cannot develop without emulating standards coming from the center. The concept denotes peripheral emulators that mimic, not because they choose to do so, but because they need to incorporate core models to develop themselves within the system. Their agency capacity is limited to deciding "how", "when", and "which" standards to emulate. As their organizational autonomy is limited vis-à-vis central actors, the pressures of emulating, translating, or editing core models are unescapable in their formations. *Iso-dependency* denotes a condition and *function* of peripheral emulators in an asymmetrical system rather than a decision or a dogma since there are no alternatives to the internalization of attributes formalized in the core. The more fragile and peripheral an emulator is, the more intense that condition, the more diluted are the conventional ontological differences between norms diffusion, isomorphism, and dependence.

In this way, isomorphic pressures and external dependence compose two faces of the same subordination process of actors in an asymmetrical system. As a form of analysis, *iso-dependence* can help to understand - among other social dimensions - the construction and

implications of the receiver position of states and organizations in the structures of international security; for instance, from the center-periphery dynamics that Wallerstein (2011, p. viii) analyzes in the perspective of the 'geo-culture largely fashioned around and dominated by centrist liberalism' since the French Revolution in the modern world-system. Taking concepts and perspectives from Wallerstein (2011, 1999, 1991), our analytical framework uses a concept calling here *liberal geo-culture of security*, namely a set of values that has shaped a field of axioms, standards, and forces as "security" throughout the system, both explicitly and latently. Although "security studies" have not been the axis in Wallerstein's extensive work, it does not limit the use of its concept of *geo-culture*; on the contrary, it is possible to guide and expand the analysis of its contradictory implications in the diffusion of norms, knowledge, and dominant devices that constitute a "security area" in the world-system.

With this analytical perspective, the **first specific objective** of the research is to analyze the implications of center-periphery asymmetries in the formation of international military organizations. In this direction, we contemplate the use of relational "contrapuntal methods", especially those found in postcolonial and critical security studies, which contemplate the multiple inequalities that constitute the mutual relationships between "strong" and "weak", "dominant" and "dominated", "centers" and "periphery" in a historical system.⁴ These perspectives characterize different regions and societies of the Global South from common structural weaknesses in various epistemic, legal, technological, ethnocultural, socioeconomic restrictions vis-à-vis the central areas. According to authors such as Seth (2011), Wallerstein (2011), and Quijano (2005), the genesis of these asymmetries can be traced in the concatenated form in which the Westphalian system of states, the capitalist economy, and Western colonialism expanded throughout the world. These *Longue durée* patterns, in a sense given by Braudel (1987, 2006), signal intrinsic processes to a hierarchical structure that tends to distribute different attributions according to the divergent evolution of the center and peripheries. With the colonial and postcolonial implications of this process, the diffusion of modern security management has evolved and given rise to an increasingly hierarchical division of functions between actors of the *security geo-culture*. Precisely, we distinguish three kinds of functions:

⁴ Postcolonial studies have offered contrapuntal readings (SAID, 1993) of the colonizer and the colonized, to point out the reproduction of colonial differences and postcolonial insecurities (BILGIN, 2016; GROVOGUI, 1996, 2006; MIGNOLO, 1995). However, contrapuntal readings of the world system can be found much earlier, at least since 1946 in the center-periphery approach developed by Raul Prebisch (2012) studies of international economics.

- a) broadcasting center;
- b) inter-carriers;
- c) recipient emulators.

The *broadcasting center* is defined by the junction of the highest order of abstraction, that is, theory, and the most concentration of capital and prestige that inspires (or leaves no alternative to) others. The *broadcasting center* is always made up of *some* actors of the capitalist center, a smaller group of states and organizations within the central production zones. By defining norms (written and unwritten) of what is appropriate and meaningful (for geo-culture) and effective (given the laws of science), these actors drive macrosecuritization; that is, it shapes standards and management technologies for dispersed and fragile zones.⁵

These actors tend to link *intermediary carriers* to their broadcasts. As we will also call here, the *inter-carriers* are state or non-state organizations, interagency entities, politicians, media personnel, civilian or military "experts", and other actors and networks located primarily in central and semi-peripheral areas. These are defined not as "norms makers" - although they can often co-participate there - nor as "recipients" - although they are also serial emulators - but essentially as transmitters of norms and devices for weaker *recipient emulators*.

Recipient emulators consist of weaker actors of peripheral zones that tend to internalize the *broadcasting center's* standards. Before performing proactive and deliberative roles in global security, these actors normally act as transmitters and 'iso-dependent' agents of devices, pacification doctrines and standards formalized in core areas. Their possible 'failure' and conflict scenarios provide inexhaustible empirical sources for collecting data, indispensable for contrasting and accumulating theories and doctrines in central regions, which can be distributed as standards and securitized "packages" circulating in global networks.

These asymmetries reflect the epistemic subordination of the Global South and the general situation of the social sciences, in terms of the intellectual division of labor that characterizes the construction of knowledge around the world (TICKNER, 2013; MIGNOLO, 1998; LATOUR, 1987, 1999) and the global networks that reproduce power differences within

⁵ This framework of groups reflects a synthesis of our reflections based on the influences of a variety of authors discussed in this thesis. The idea of a division of functions into three groups, in particular, is influenced by Puig (1986), who understood that the "international regime", "like any human group - micro or macro - has a division of functions and supreme distribution criteria that govern the conduct of those who make up the group" (p. 54). The first of these elements, the division of functions, led Puig, influenced by Werner Goldschmidt, to characterize the actors in three groups: the supreme distributors, the inferior distributors, and the recipients (RUIZ; SIMONOFF, 2017). However, in our proposal, we created new concepts and categories to explain the dynamics of security geo-culture in the world-system (WALLERSTEIN, 2011).

specific fields as in peace studies, strategic and security studies. In these structures, the more advanced military alliances or *ad-hoc* coalitions, such as NATO or those operations sponsored by the UN Security Council, constitute outstanding global security devices whose command could only be in the hands of the central actors. In contrast, the limitations of the regions of the Global South to operationalize their own instruments of conflict resolution - such as multinational forces - contribute not only to reproducing Northern countries' dependence on economic and military assistance but also to introducing and emulating their conceptions about the nature of the peace, conflicts, and ways of managing them.

However, emulating is not only about copying models but also about changing them. Diffusion of ideas does not occur in a *vacuum*. Ideas, concepts, or models can be adapted, edited, and reshaped as they travel through different contexts (SAHLIN; WEDLIN, 2008, p. 219). Force concepts, standards, and models are permanently transported and translated in the *locus* of other beliefs, practices, and traditions that provide indications of what needs to be done, of what is appropriate, and what is not in operations, as well as during peacetime (SOETERS, 2021). This brings the actors and interests to the analysis of such hierarchical structures. As cognitive sociologists have taught us, every social experience, whether civil or military, produces and reproduces knowledge and, in doing so, presupposes one or several epistemologies. Epistemology is any notion or idea, reflected or not, about the conditions of what counts as valid knowledge (SANTOS, 2010). It is through valid knowledge that a given social experience becomes intentional and intelligible. According to Bourdieu's "genetic structuralism" (1987, p. 23), it is essential to understand here how certain and persistent practices validate expertise on the conditions of what counts as peace, conflict, and ways of organizing force in multicultural contexts, but also how this expertise structure and guide these practices.⁶ In the military domain, it is translated into what tends to be called "strategic cultures", also "organizational cultures" on the conceptions, values, and use of the Force and other capacities in a strategic environment (SOETERS, 2021; JOHNSTON, 1995).

In Global South contexts, such possibilities put into perspective the "strategic autonomy", that is, the principle of "freedom of strategic action" that would guarantee the space for the autonomy of the decision in contexts of resistance to external constraints and the hierarchical structures of the world (SAINT-PIERRE, 2015). From organizational studies, the "local

⁶ According to Bourdieu, social structures, epistemic representations, and practices continuously constitute and are constituted. The socially constructed dispositions that guide action have a generative capacity. The structure is dynamic. It is that of a set of historical relationships, product, and producer of actions, which is conditioned and conditioning (BOURDIEU, 1987, p. 23).

ownership" principle is essential in this direction, which focuses on the relative ability of members of an organization to internally drive organizational changes despite external constraints (PFEFFER; SALANCIK, 2003). For our analytical framework, the crucial implication is that others, and other ontologies, appear in the study of military organizations. By "others", we refer to those who are "anchored in the lower echelons" of world politics, that is, those who are not located above the hierarchies or close to them, enjoying an unequal influence in the configuration of different dynamics, including other representations of the world policy and security objects (BILGIN, 2017, 2016).

Regarding studies on inter-organizational cooperation and military organizations, the first element that deserves attention, as Soeters (2019) stated, is that there is *not one way of military organization nor is there one way of conducting military operations* (p. 3). It is essential to realize that everything is in motion, as is contemporary military collaboration. It implies considering the research object in processual trajectories rather than understanding it as fixed and static. Reflexivity is another essential element, which opposes any dogma, and its object is the analysis of what actors and organizations are actually "doing" and what they "think" they are doing (BIGO, 2013). So, the focus will be on the actual meetings of military personnel of different nationalities and cultures working and training together in "recent" activities and operations.

An approach to the phenomenon of multinational forces can indicate two broad categories. On the one hand, "coalition forces", temporary structures formed to achieve a specific objective at a given time (for example, under the UN flag). On the other hand, "alliance forces" are defined as having a "permanent" multinational structure, both in times of peace and in times of war (PALIN, 1995). This last category has had an essential expression in the European context, often under the NATO orbit.⁷ The Western experience has shown that it is easier to create combined units than make them work (ARTEAGA, 2015). Authors such as Soeters and Manigart (2008), Soeters and Tresch (2010), King (2010), Arteaga (2015), and Reig (1998) argue that, as the degree of multinational integration increases, the challenges tend to multiply. It becomes more complex to comply with any political imperative; the military

⁷ According to Ayala Marín (2010, p. 31), the first European multinational unit, except those subordinated exclusively to NATO, was created in 1973 between the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. However, it was not until the 1990s that several multinational military forces began to form in Europe. Among several examples stood out the Corps of the Allied Army of Rapid Reaction (ARRC) in NATO structure, created in 1992, and the Eurocorps also built in 1992 in the framework of the EU.

organization can erode. The "effectiveness" of missions (the degree to which goals are achieved) exposes itself to more significant risks.

Given the complexity of today's conflict scenarios, western military organizations have required and often achieved greater adaptability, flexibility, and mobility to carry out operations worldwide, with a broad spectrum of functions. Greater distances and complex missions in peripheral and culturally unknown areas imply that more significant human and material resources are needed, which most national forces can hardly afford on their own. Tresch (2007, p. 37) and Soeters and Manigart (2008, preface) points out that the scope of military operations has become so demanding that the national armed forces have not been able or interested in conducting these missions without the support of other states. There are cost-sharing economic arguments that call for military cooperation in combined operations, which is consistent with the so-called "smart defense" in Northern countries, that is, as a more efficient way to employ resources that are limited (GIEGERICH, 2012).

On multinational forces in the Global South, a relevant contextual category in their formations is 'region'. Unlike military organizations as NATO, which can operate in distant world areas, international military organizations from the periphery tend to postulate *in* and *for* their regions. Following Buzan and Wæver (2003), this trend can be explained, in part, by the effects that the adjacency and territoriality of threats have on more minor powers, which encourages interdependencies in which meanings of threats and conflicts, relationships, identities, and practices take distinct dynamics from other regions.

With these premises, the **second specific objective** is to analyze how multinational forces in the Global South vary in profiles and forms of the Force based on regional security dynamics. The concept of Regional Security Complex (RSC), developed by Buzan and Were (2003), can be helpful to value the relative autonomy of the regional levels from the global system. However, we will try to avoid their monistic conception of security. The RSC rests on the existence of interdependence in security, which can be positive or negative (BALZACQ, 2007), which is deep and durable, although not permanent. On the other hand, from a constructivist perspective (WENDT, 2014), there is no external configuration given a priori but a security situation. If from the first perspective, the state and its political-military sector emerge as the centerpiece of the security complex, in the second, the security sectors and the nature of the threatened objects can be considerably varied. In Balzac's (2007) postulation, for example, RSC is much more heterogeneous than homogeneous. In the conception of Buzan and Wæver, a monism apprehends security in a sectorized way and with defined agents; in another, the

security logic can integrate several types of actors interacting in different sectors, which are not exclusively military (FERREYRA; SOARES, 2018).

As already mentioned, Force concepts, standards, and models are permanently transported and translated in the *locus* of other beliefs, practices, and traditions that provide indications of what needs to be done, what is appropriate, and what is not in operations as well as during peacetime. This possibility justifies the interest to understand the organizational and operational differences in the different international military organizations in the Global South regions.

In this way, the **third specific objective** of this research is to conduct a systematic comparison. As case studies, we have selected the three multinational forces with permanent command structures: African Standby Force (ASF), the Southern Cross Binational Force, and the Peninsula Shield Force (PSF). However, given that ASF consists of five sub-regional forces, we chose only one of them, namely the Eastern Africa Standby Force (EASF), one of the most developed and the one with the most available data in recent years. The EASF was established in 2004 to maintain peace and security in Eastern Africa. Currently, the Force comprises ten active member-states: Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, Sudan, and Uganda (EASF, 2020). Although the three cases selected also could have civilian components and naval and air bodies, our focus and the data collection are on land forces units.

1.1 Methodology

As an overall structure, the research consists of a qualitative and comparative methodology based on primary and secondary data material. As primary data, we have developed ten contact points with military and civilian officers who have worked with the selected organizations and provided us with different types of data exchange. In this regard, we have conducted four remoted interviews (video calls) with military advisors and attachés working with the African Union (AU) in Addis Abeba and Kenya; else, we had conversations in social networks with an EASF headquarter officer from Kenya. For the Southern Cross Binational Force, we have conducted remoted interviews with the current Chief of Staff of the Force, a former Chief of Staff, and a former civilian representant of the political body of the same institution. In addition, we developed telephone conversations with two officers from a training center in Chile, the Joint Center for Peacekeeping Operations in Chile (CECOPAC, its

acronym in Spanish), where members from the Binational Force usually carry out training courses and capacitation.

As to the Peninsula Shield Force, we used interviews with officers available on the media, official declarations, and reports from the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). In this case, we have not developed official contacts, and primary information through this means. After numerous and persistent attempts to contact the PSF through foreign embassies and official requests from the university, we concluded that one of the reasons for this limitation is precisely due to complex security issues in the Gulf region. It has been evident in this case that a more reserved communication policy prevails.

All our interviews were semi-structured, and generally, we have organized the questions following three main topics: a) institutional and operational development; b) international cooperation and assistance; and c) military training and integration. However, some questions have varied according to the issues that each interviewee addressed.⁸

The interviews were conducted online since the COVID-19 pandemic prevented traveling to do fieldwork. After a long and complex process of developing official contacts, sending many e-mails, and seeking telephone contacts with embassies, diplomatic personnel, and military attachés, we obtained the official invitation to conduct fieldwork at the EASF headquarters in Addis Abeba, Ethiopia. It was scheduled for March 2020, considering that EASF would carry out its annual combined field exercises on that date. We also received an invitation to do fieldwork at the Southern Cross Force headquarters in Buenos Aires, scheduled for October 2020 (the date of the annual field exercises). However, our plans changed with the irruption of the pandemic in March 2020.

The case of our travel plan to Addis Abeba was particularly frustrating. In the first days of March, we received the official invitation to do field work through coordinated contacts between the military attaché of the Brazilian embassy and a Kenyan military officer of the EASF. We had carried out the visa process to enter Ethiopia; we had bought air tickets for March 21 and reserved accommodation for ten days. However, in those days, the pandemic began to hit the whole world. The airlines started to cancel international flights, including our flight to Ethiopia from the Netherlands. We were faced with a dilemma. Should we try for other

⁸ Our interviews preserve the anonymity of the interviewees. Check the models of our interviews in APPENDIX A – Interview topics and questions on the EASF, and APPENDIX B – Interview topics and questions on the Southern Cross Binational Force. The files of the interview transcripts and digital audio records will be available in the digital repository of the website of the Group of Studies in Defense and International Security (GEDES).

available airlines - assuming the health risks and growing travel difficulties - or canceling the trip? We decided to cancel and postpone it. However, as the days went by, the health situation and flight restrictions worsened, our contacts with officers of the Forces also became less receptive to us, it was more challenging to access these organizations, and we had to abandon the fieldwork plan. Even the multinational forces restricted their activities because of the pandemic. EASF canceled its annual combined field exercises. Similarly, Southern Cross Force also postponed meetings and pieces of training. In was our exceptional context, a part of our research experience.

Hence, this research was primarily based on literature review, remoted interviews, and desk research. As secondary data for all three cases, we selected articles, books, theses, reports, and data on the internet, mainly in English and Spanish. We have also had access to official documents, notices, and communications from these organizations in local and international media as primary sources.

For understanding the data collection in the context of a systematic comparison, we built an analytical framework on organizational variables considered relevant in the literature on inter-organizational cooperation, isomorphism, and multinational military cooperation (DIMAGGIO; POWELL, 1983; FARRELL, 2005; FARRELL; TERRIFF, 2002; PFEFFER; SALANCIK, 2003; SHALIN; WEDLIN, 2008; SOETERS, 2018; SOETERS; TRESCH, 2010). Since these can present variations between the three cases, we created a scheme with their respective ideal-typical, theoretically derived modes. As a result, a typological-comparative framework was developed (see Table 1).

Table 1 - Typological-comparative framework on international military organizations

Variables	Modes			
Isomorphism	Normative	Mimetic	Coercive	Competitive
	Broadcasting	Chain-imitation	Mediation	
Dependence	Financial	Technological	Operational	Doctrinal
Operational Profile	Pragmatic		Absolutist	
Intercultural Strategy	Assimilation	Separation	Integration	
Multinationalism	Vertical		Horizontal	
Specialization	Simple		Advanced	
Operational Partnership	Attached	Embedded	Co-deployed	Composite

Source: own elaboration.

The analysis method consists of a synchronous comparison on inter-organizational and operational differences (the "most different systems") (HOPKIN, 2010), according to the analytical framework.⁹ However, it also pointed out common factors given the peripheral conditions of the three cases. Besides this, we have worked with "process tracing" methods to produce causal inferences from the study of empirical indicators considered relevant for the operationalization of the chosen variables. In the last section of the chapter entitled "Center-periphery, security, and international military organizations" (2), we describe how the method proposed has organized the flow of empirical data material in each case according to the theoretical dimensions of each variable. Moreover, the relationships of various regional and extra-regional organizations were studied in each case, and regional experiences with *ad hoc* military operations provided several empirical indicators on current regional forms of international military cooperation.

An essential part of the research was developed in the Graduate Program in International Relations "San Tiago Dantas", in São Paulo, Brazil, under the orientation of Professor Dr. Samuel Alves Soares. The academic internationalization program within the UNESP-CAPES-PrInt agreement in 2019 financially supported a second part of the research. In this framework, we developed a 'sandwich doctorate proposal' on multinational military forces in the Global South. The host and co-advisor, abroad, was Professor Dr. Joseph Soeters, from the Tilburg School of Social and Behavioral Sciences, Department of Organization Studies, Tilburg University, in the Netherlands. The election of Professor Soeters in the sandwich doctorate plan was justified, in part, by the fact that he is considered an international reference in the study and research methods on international military cooperation, with an extensive production mainly in the European context. In this way, a significant part of the research was carried out in the Department of Organization Studies at Tilburg University between 2019 and 2020.

1.2 Structure of the Thesis

The thesis presents a structure organized in chapters and their sections. The chapter "Center-periphery, security, and international military organizations" (2) consists of a theoretical discussion that aims to understand historical interconnections between the center-periphery relations in the world-system, the construction of a geo-culture of security, and the diffusion process of models of forces that constraint contemporary military collaborations. The

⁹ The empirical and theoretical underpinnings of the seven variables are developed in chapter 2.

last sections of this chapter inquire into different analytical traditions on key organizational variables such as military isomorphism, external dependence, and inter-organizational cooperation to theoretically establish the analytical framework for international military organizations.

The study of the three cases is developed separately in chapters 3, 4, and 5: the African Standby Force, Southern Cross Force, and Peninsula Shield force, respectively. The sections of each chapter are organized in a similar scheme according to the empirical requirements for operationalizing our relational analytical framework. Following the methodology detailed in the last section of chapter 2, we describe and analyze in those three chapters a variety of empirical indicators linked to models of forces, emulations, external dependence, operational concepts, and inter-organizational interactions in the historical and regional context of the case studies.

In this way, the main objective in the chapter "Comparing international military organizations" (6) is to apply the typological-comparative frame in the case studies. Here we synthesize and compare the main research findings of the three cases, applying all the theoretical concepts of the analytical scheme. Finally, as a conclusion of the thesis, we present a series of final considerations and reflections regarding the research results.

2 CENTER-PERIPHERY, SECURITY, AND INTERNATIONAL MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS

In this chapter, we discuss the relevance of the center-periphery analysis to understand hierarchical structures in international security and force models diffusion. The first part presents the main theoretical trends contributing to the center-periphery perspective in the study of global hierarchical structures. This paradigm, which we call "critical structuralism", has its foundational outbreak in the Global South, with the seminal contribution of Raul Prebisch (1949). Throughout this tradition, there has been no formal and consistent proposal for the implication of the center-periphery analysis around 'security studies'. Given this 'gap', in the next sections of the chapter we explore the following hypothesis: just as the unequal encounters between Western colonialism and the 'external arenas' of the modern world-economy expanded an axial division of functions between central, semi-peripheral, and peripheral zones, these asymmetries also promoted a division of functions in the security geo-culture among "broadcasting centers", "inter-carriers", and "recipient emulators".

In the third and fourth sections, we analyze the implications of that hierarchical structure in the security geo-culture, particularly what the literature calls the "one-way street" trends in the global military isomorphism. In the fifth part, we reflect upon the relevance of a specific force model in the post-Cold War order for multinational forces: the 'standby' and 'rapid-reaction' model. Finally, in the last section, we present the theoretical underpinnings of the variables and typologies that make up our analytical framework on international military organizations.

2.1 Why center and periphery?

Reflecting in terms of "fragility" or "weakness" of states, as done in the introduction, refers to categories not unknown in the West. These have been widely recognized in recent decades, including as an indicator of statistical studies in renowned research centers and think-tanks, such as the Fund For Peace and the International Crisis Group (ICG), as well as in intergovernmental organizations such as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the World Bank. There is today a substantial amount of literature on "state fragility", and every academic or agency seems to have its own name - in addition to "fragile" states, there are also states that are "failed", "failing", "collapsing", "at-risk",

"precarious", "vulnerable". Some are alternative descriptions for "fragile", and others are covered by the latter. These entities tend to signal "fragility" as a characteristic found in certain states or local situations that restrict essential functions of sovereignty, development, and internal stability. Due to the understanding in which fragility/conflict are attributes generated in one situation or another, it is possible to describe how these approaches tend to neglect the multiple relationships that integrate the "strong states" in the formations of different conflicts and weaknesses in the periphery.

The Index of Fragile States produced by the Fund for Peace (2021) is perhaps the most recognized today. It is an annual ranking of 178 nations published in *Foreign Policy*, classifying countries according to 12 social, economic, and military indicators. The index places each state in one of 11 frailty categories, ranging from "very sustainable" (rank 178) to "very high alert" (rank 1). It means that the lower a country is on the ranking scale, the more fragile it is.¹⁰ African countries occupy the first places on the list, followed by nations in the Middle East, Asia, and far from Latin America, where countries do not appear in the first places - except for Haiti in recent times. However, a Latin-American region with significant indicators of fragility characterized by the "lack of institutionality" and the exception to the rule of law that would serve as a breeding ground for organized crime and drug trafficking (MEJÍAS, 2014). Based on this index, Grono (2010), a researcher at the ICG, argues that not all states facing conflict are necessarily fragile (India could be a good example, with several internal conflicts and the conflict in Kashmir), but most of them would be; and not all fragile states are experiencing violent conflict, but nearly all of them have or have recently had. So, it would not be surprising that there is a correlation. Many of the conflict indicators used would also be indicators of state weakness.¹¹

A common feature in such research centers is the claim of objectivity and intellectual independence from any governmental or financial influence. However, some scholars consider the term "fragility" both pejorative and analytically imprecise as it would not be a concept of

¹⁰ These indexes regard variables such as growing demographic pressure, massive movement of refugees, chronic and constant population flight, severe economic crisis, criminalization or delegitimization of the State, progressive deterioration of public services, violation of human rights, as well as security apparatuses as a "State within the State", among other factors. For more details, see: Fund for Peace. **Fragility in the World 2021**. Fragile States Index. Washington, D.C. Available at: <https://fragilestatesindex.org/>. Accessed on 12 Aug. 2021.

¹¹ In the case of the World Bank, it identified "36 fragile situations" in 2016 – and all except a small number would be post-conflict situations or affected by ongoing conflicts. For more details, see: Harmonized List of Fragile Situations. The World Bank IBRD. 2018. Available at: <https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/fragilityconflictviolence/brief/harmonized-list-of-fragile-situations>.

one or another, but exists along a *continuum*, which is highly specific of the context and comes in a variety of social and cultural forms (BEEHNER, YOUNG, 2014). Further, some observations suggest that these indexes are poorly tabulated and dangerously conflict with the main concepts of what makes the state a state. It could lead to tautologies (like the use of "violence" as an indicator of an index ostensibly used to predict "violence"). These critics, including Coggins (2014), who, contrary to others such as Mazarr (2014), consider that a concept of 'failed state' can be rescued, consider its use, for example, the flow of Refugees as an indicator of the strength of the state, since Refugees cannot escape (as in North Korea) could be an indicator of state weakness (people feel insecure) or state strength (the state can coerce people not to leave).¹²

Such indexes might be "fatally failed" (EVERS, 2014). This appreciation is motivated by the idea that the response to global challenges and insecurities would be based in building "more State", and the belief in many strategists on conflict prevention that external intervention can be an adequate reaction. Thus, classifying a state as "fragile" can justify externally motivated interventions by "strong states", which could even lead to further destruction.¹³ For Bliesemann de Guevara (2012), reinforcing these stereotyped perceptions to prevent or manage conflicts and humanitarian crises is, at best, another sign of condescending and paternalistic worldviews. Conventional security studies tend to explain accommodations and adjustments by dividing the world into a series of spaces and locating the causes of events in one particular place or another. In this way, they do not contemplate the historical transformations of weak and fragile areas into constitutive relations with 'strong states' (BILGIN, 2017).

There would be deep historical reasons behind these analytical trends. On European countries, Barkawi and Laffey (2006) argue that "Europe is conceived as separate and distinct from the rest of the world, as self-contained and self-generating" (p. 331). This vision is consistent with the Eurocentric, provincial, regional concept of western modernity (DUSSEL, 1993, p. 5). Modernity, as a process of human emancipation, would be fulfilled in Europe,

¹² Moreover, these are indicators that refrain from any self-critical spirit about the fragility of Western democracies and the various forms of violence caused by liberal governments (MELBER, 2016). Countries that figure in the highest places of "stability", such as Finland, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, or Great Britain are also societies in which numerous xenophobic and racist organizations are formed that exert various forms of violence and influence decisions governments across national territories and borders.

¹³ There would be evidence of this, for example, as signaled by the global refugee crisis in which millions of people were forced to leave their places in Iraq, Libya, Syria, Afghanistan, trying to escape wars that interventions led by military coalitions of international powers contributed to aggravate.

essentially in the 18th century, through three key historical events: the Reformation, the Enlightenment, and the French Revolution (KANT, 2009; HEGEL, 1988; HABERMAS, 1989). In this way, the analysis of history, world politics, and security is carried out in – conceptual, empirical, and normative – terms that presuppose this centrality and separation from the - self-generated - weaknesses in 'the rest'.

As Barkawi and Laffey (2006) stated, in conventional form, security studies take the perspective of the powerful, of those who colonized, dominated, and competed for the world. There is a policy for security studies, and it is the policy of the "strong". On the other side, "weak states", "failing states", "collapsed states" concepts, although applicated in dispersed and specific areas, are not always inserted in a self-generated (autopoietic) situation, nor are they fed back by their own *motus* – as some statistical studies and think-thanks tend to point out. In essence, these "failures" as dysfunctions of sovereignty and modern institutions can be heteronomous in nature as they are developed and conceptualized in a historical system of complex relationships with "strong states" (BILGIN, 2017). Recognition of this mutually constitutive character has implications for the nature of explanation. Methodologically, this means that we cannot assume in advance that events and their causes are always found in the same place, even in the case of great and powerful states (BARKAWI; LAFLEY, 2006). In principle, it is essential to highlight the significance of the relationships between spaces and populations, their role in conducting events and processes, and the constitution of apparently discrete areas, temporalities, and entities (BARKAWI; LAFLEY, 2006). In this way, the conventional analysis of fragility/conflict in the Global South runs the risk of being merely situational - then superficial - whenever it does not regard the Braudelian *Longue Durée* factors that enhanced the fragile implantation, not of a specific state or local situation, but complete and extensive transregional systems of "sovereign states" in the Global South that had to deal with the standards of Western civilization.

Authors such as Seth (2011), Keene (2002), Wallerstein (2011b), Quijano (2005), and Guimarães (2001), among others, trace the origin of these asymmetries in the concatenated form in which modern capitalism, the Westphalian system of states and Western colonialism has expanded throughout the world. While the Westphalian system of territorially independent and mutually dependent sovereign states was taking shape in the 17th and 18th centuries¹⁴, very different colonial and imperial systems were established beyond Europe. Events and processes

¹⁴ The secularization of the State, the delimitation of territories, the recognition of the legal equality of states and sovereignty are some of the central processes agreed upon in the Westphalia peace treaties (1648), which are considered as the starting point for the conformation of the modern nation-state.

privileged in the conventional account of the IR discipline, such as the Peace of Augsburg and the establishment of the order of Westphalia, roughly coincide with the subjugation, exploitation, and colonization of the Americas, the pinnacle of the African slave trade, the founding of the British East India Company and the Dutch East India Company, Macartney's mission to the "Middle Empire" and so on (SETH, 2011, p. 173; WALLERSTEIN, 2011; RENOUVIN; DUROSELLE, 2000). The 19th-century heyday of the European interstate system is also the period of the career by the colonies, the division of Africa, and the development of various forms of colonial governance, such as mandates, protectorates, concessions, and franchises. The fundamental normative principles of the trans-European colonial and imperial systems were not equality and sovereignty. However, when established, a unitary juridical conception of "sovereignty" was distributed across national and territorial borders as needed to develop production chains and international trade and promote what Europeans and Euro-Americans considered good government among the diverse subalternities that constitute the Global South.

Observing these interactions allows us to challenge some western paradigms in the discipline of IR - and not just the neorealist theories about the idea of an 'anarchy' as a principle of order (WALTZ, 1979). For example, the "expansion of international society" narrative of the English School, which in virtually every historical particular follows the conventional account of the rise and expansion of capitalist modernity - first the West, then the rest - has not been seriously challenged or questioned. Keene (2002) discusses Hedley Bull's (2002) claim that European domination means that any understanding of international society must start with the emergence of the European Society of States. For Keene this allegation is a *non sequitur*: since "European dominance was primarily exercised through practices of colonialism and imperialism", if 'the fact of European dominance ought to dictate what our research program on order in modern world politics should be, it directs us away from the European states-system, not towards it' (2008, p. 28).

In IR studies, a variety of theories and approaches have explored such hierarchical dynamics of structural temporality, which has favored the formation of a "structuralist paradigm" between other paradigms such as "state-centric" and "globalist" (SODUPE, 1992). This paradigm, which we could also call a "critical structuralism", provides contrapuntal worldviews from the perspective of the less favored societies of the global order. Its diverse branches comprise distinct ontologies and analytical concerns on the modern capitalist system. Nevertheless, as will be argued in the next section, they all share the assumption that global

relationships are performed through the unequal distribution of attributions and functions. Else, the decisive categories that amalgamate this paradigm are notions of "center" and "periphery"; notably, spatial and societal dichotomies between dominant processes and dominated processes, both to describe the opposition, as well as to suggest an explanatory model of relational imbalance (SAUNIER, 2000). Not center, not the periphery, not the periphery, not a center. At its center, we will find the elements that participate in the unity of this object. On the periphery, we will find all the elements that come into contact with the center. Thus, they are linked to the historical object but stand out for their diversities, their differences, vis-à-vis the center.

2.1.1 Asymmetries and ontologies

Center and periphery were primary categories in human sciences to represent asymmetric spaces and groups relations. The center-periphery geometric metaphor has been frequently used in geography and history to explain relationships between dominant and subordinate places (such as city/neighborhood, urbanity/countryside, central power/local authorities) (SAUNIER, 2000). The concept is thus guided by the opposition between two fundamental types of places in a system: one who commands and can benefit from it, the center, and those who submit in peripheral position.¹⁵

In contemporary IR studies, center-periphery analysis has been a decisive contribution by scholars from the Global South. It is true that some economists, such as Ernst Wagemann (1930) – a Chilean of German descent – had already suggested something similar in the early 20th century, as also did the Romanian Mihail Manoilescu (BOATCĂ, 2005). However, it was not until the end of 1940, with the work of the Argentinian Raúl Prebisch (1949) and his colleagues at Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (CEPAL, its acronym in

¹⁵ In History, the concept appears relatively late. In the 19th century, European positivist history, attached to critical methods, did not think about the periphery. It is a largely “overly centered” story: works related to Hellenistic expansion neglect the study of barbarian cultures. Roman history makes a systematic reading of Greek authors close to Roman power, giving substance to a vulgate of the decay of Hellenic cities for the exclusive benefit of Rome, the new center of the world. In medieval history, the study of feudal rituals - on which many representations of the relations between the king and princes rest - leads to a pyramidal vision of the construction of the kingdom, which would have been done to the detriment of princely states. Traditional peripheries are evoked. They are never completely absent, but are only in their resistance, their opposition to the center; a center summarized in the State, in the imperial central power or even the same historical Eurocentric culture. To deepen this study, see: SAUNIER, G. Quelques réflexions sur le concept de Centre et Périphérie. *Hypothèses*, n. 3, 2000/01, p. 175-180. 2000.

Spanish) such as the Brazilian Celso Furtado (1965), that the center-periphery approach came to be recognized worldwide as a model for historical-structural analysis in development economics. The core of Prebisch's explanation, the center-periphery division, was not considered a zero-sum game in which the center nullified the periphery. The center-periphery division did not imply an imperialist exploitation strategy from the center to the periphery but a problem of unequal diffusion of technological-industrial progress (BRICEÑO RUIZ, 2012). The center and the periphery were the historical results of how technical progress was propagated since the Industrial Revolution, giving rise to different production structures in the international trade order – mainly, primary exporting and industrialized economies. It was the cause of the growing deterioration of the international terms of trade for peripheral countries. To justify the industrial transformation in Latin America, which had already been taken place since the great depression of the 1930s, CEPAL scholars questioned ideas of "theories of comparative advantages" in which international free trade would end up favoring the progress of these 'backward' areas ' (RICARDO, 1996; HOSELITZ, 1960; ROSTOW, 1960). Prebisch (1944, 1949) argued that the diffusion of technological progress in the periphery would only be achieved by sectors linked to the export of primary materials to the center. To modify this distribution pattern, he proposes industrialization programs through import substitution.

At the turn of the 1950s to 1960s, different intellectuals of the so-called "dependence theory" in Latin America also adopted the center-periphery concepts under the influence of CEPAL scholars. However, they questioned their economist diagnoses. The core of the criticism was the methodological approach of CEPAL, of omitting or softening the political aspects and class struggles in development studies, that is, the so-called "internal factors" in peripheral states. Within the framework of "peripheral capitalism", some 'dependentist' sociologists argued, proper development (national and autochthonous) is not possible, only a "development of underdevelopment" (MARINI, 2000, 2018; DOS SANTOS, 1998; FRANK, 1970), a "sub-capitalism" or a dependent and associated development (CARDOSO; FALETTTO, 1970, also: FURTADO, 1956). In a way, such authors "rescued" and complemented contributions formulated half a century earlier by the authors of the theories of Imperialism and Marxism (KOLLING, 2007; PEREIRA, 2015). While from classical Marxism came the fundamental laws and categories that made it possible to explain the functioning of capitalism at its most abstract and essential level - surplus value, the exploitation of the labor force, the process of formation and accumulation of capital, the theories of imperialism provided a first more elaborate view of how capitalist modernization - especially from its "monopoly phase" -

was articulated on a planetary scale, causing a hierarchical "unequal and combined" development between different regions. A series of authors from countries such as Russia and Germany - among whom, Hobson (2002) (this one, a non-Marxist), Hilferding (1985), Kautsky (1920), Bukharin (1984), Luxemburg (1971), and the most influential of them all, Lenin (2011), signaled the nature and dynamics of the new stage of international capitalist expansion. At that time, it was characterized by the predominance of monopoly and financial capital - from the main - but not exclusive - perspective of the countries that commanded this process: the industrialized nations.

In Latin America, another theoretical trend that has continued the tradition begun by Prebisch was the so-called "School of Autonomy". Unlike Marxist and dependency theories, the "autonomists" with referents such as Puig (1986, 1984, 1980) and Jaguaribe (2008) analyze the external constraints in peripheral states through the strategic possibility in the Cold War order of taking advantage of certain "margins of maneuver" to sustain a "Path to autonomy". Autonomists recognize the phenomenon of dependency and the structural asymmetries induced by the capitalist mode of production. However, "it is about to overcome them through strategic maneuvers supported by a correct political diagnosis" (PUIG, 1986, p. 49). In this perspective, it is always possible to analytically establish what the "potential margin of autonomous decision" based on genuine national interest is, that is to say, the "maximum capacity of own decision", which can be achieved, or at least in relative terms, by analyzing the objective conditionings of the "real world" - material and psychological - for those who make foreign and domestic policy decisions. According to Puig (1986): "The conception of the potential autonomy margin naturally implies leaving aside the so-called "dependency theory" (or adapting it, in any case, as necessary) [...]", to its automatic version (Gunder Frank, dos Santos); or to its semi-automatic manifestations (Furtado, Cardoso) (p. 49).¹⁶

In Europe, the heuristic renewal of the center-periphery approach comes mainly from the *École des Annales* in areas of History. Two contacts were essential: Latin American sociology and economics, which introduce core-periphery analytics, and geography, which leads to Braudelian geo-history. In Braudel's (1987, 2006) work, going beyond the atomist approach to state-nation, the historian contemplates spatiotemporal objects such as the capitalist economy

¹⁶ Puig clarifies that it is not easy to precisely determine the potential autonomic margin: it would be necessary for this to have a deep knowledge of the relevant disciplines and especially of International Relations. A large part of the problems experienced by Latin American governments in their relations with developed countries were due precisely to a wrong appreciation of the content of their potential margin for autonomous decision-making" (PUIG, 1986, 31).

and proposes a definition of their centers. His questions about structural time and space lead him to deal with the peripheries and their dynamics of transformation. Braudel (2006) understands that when he explains that the center of the Mediterranean world economy "moves" from Venice to Genoa between the beginning and the end of the 16th century. After Braudel, the core-periphery concept was independently developed in detail in Wallerstein's (2011) world-systems model and Arrighi's (1993) accumulation cycle theory. However, it is fundamentally necessary to attend to the work of Wallerstein (1995, 1999, 2011), because it is, in fact, in this neo-Marxist social historian - a disciple of Braudel - where we find the most explicit and systematic references to the concept of center and periphery. Wallerstein (2011) distinguishes between what he calls the "world-economy" (the market of the entire universe, the human race that trades) and the "world-economy" (human groups that exchange among themselves within the same system). The particularity of the capitalist world-economy is that it becomes a world-economy in about four centuries. It is not the first modern world-economy to exist, but the first to survive for so long, and it has achieved this by becoming, precisely, fully capitalist.

Prebisch (1949) categories were incorporated and recognized by Wallerstein (1995, p. 12), but with significant differences. For Wallerstein, the center's quality is not inherently defined by the particular class of economic activity, such as the technical-industrial sector, which from CEPAL's perspective was decisive. In analyzing world-systems, whether or not the activity is one of transformation (agricultural, industrial) or services (of goods, information, transport, finance) does not necessarily define the center. At certain times and under certain conditions, any of these activities can be nuclear or peripheral, high gain or low gain. What matters first is to what extent the activity is, or can be, relatively monopolized at a given point in time and space. The capitalist's commitment is to capital accumulation. Therefore, the capitalist will vary the locus of commitment (product, place, country, type of activity) as the opportunities to maximize the income of the activities change.

Another original development by Wallerstein (2011, 2005) is the concept of "semi-periphery", a set of areas and states that combine nuclear and peripheral activities within their borders. This designates one center becoming the periphery of another; a periphery breaking its dependence to become part of the center or periphery of another center. Center, periphery, and semi-periphery thus make up a system socially structured by an integrated axial division, whose guiding principle is the incessant accumulation of capital. The fundamental mechanism that realizes this principle is constructing extensive goods production chains that cross multiple

political boundaries. Chains constitute, conceptually and historically, a series of operations that are significant as nodes in a chain. The conditions that prevail in the multiple nodes of each chain vary over time, as do the conditions of any node concerning any other.

In this perspective, an interstate system is a plane of analysis among a series that together form the integrated frame of reference of world-system (WALLERSTEIN, 1995). Both developed simultaneously and could not continue to exist without the other. With the French Revolution, what Wallerstein (2005; 2011) understands as a "global historical event", the world-system begins to develop a *geo-culture*: "that is, a set of ideas, values, and norms that were widely accepted throughout the system and that constrained social action thereafter" (p. 16). Yet, the liberal ideology that dominates geo-culture has been permanently challenged by anti-system movements and conservative reactions that are created along with it. We will return to this concept when we approach the perspective of security. Before this, it is essential to finalize our theoretical discussion on the center-periphery concept.

Postcolonial critics (far from rejecting the antithesis formulated at CEPAL) have also used "center" and "periphery" concepts.¹⁷ However, unlike Latin American structuralism or world-system analysis – with its emphases on materialist ontologies ("capitalism", "accumulation", "production chains", etc.) – for post-colonial literature, there may be other forms of hierarchies, linked to culture, race, sex, gender, language, knowledge which would explain the political economy in global capitalism and not the other way around (SAID, 1993; QUIJANO, 1999, 2005; SANTOS, 2009; GROSGOUEL, 2009). For example, different forms of work that are articulated with the accumulation of capital worldwide are distributed according to a racial hierarchy; coercive (or cheap) labor is done by non-European people situated in the periphery, and "free wage labor" is situated in the center. Race can also affect the global hierarchy of gender relations: unlike pre-European patriarchies where all women were inferior to men, in the new 'colonial power matrix' some women (of European origin) have higher status and greater access to resources and educational formation than some men (of non-European origin). Contrary to Eurocentric assertions, race (FANON, 2008), sexual difference, sexuality (TICKNER, 1993), spirituality, and epistemic inequalities (SANTOS, 2010, 2011)

¹⁷ Among several postcolonial critics using "center", "periphery" and "world-system" language, see: SANTOS, B., S. Estado e sociedade na semiperiferia do sistema mundial: o caso português. **Análise Social**, vol. XXI (87-88-89), 3.º-4.º-5.º, 869-901. 1985. BARKAWI, T; LAFFEY, M. The Postcolonial Moment in Security Studies, **Review of International Studies**, v. 32, n. 2, p. 329–52. 2006. GROSGOUEL, R. Para descolonizar os estudos de economia política e os estudos pós-coloniais: transmoderidade, pensamento de fronteira e colonialidade global. In: SANTOS, B; MENESES, M (eds.). **Epistemologias do Sul**. Ed. Almedina. Coimbra, 2009, p. 383- 418.

are not superstructural elements that add to the economic and political structures of the world-system, but rather an integral, interwoven, and constitutive part of this broad "package entangled" what is called patriarchal/capitalist/colonial/modern world-system (GROSFOGUEL, 2009).¹⁸

Now, we can understand better the "interdisciplinary crack" that affects the tradition of center-periphery analytic. In general, CEPAL academics, dependence, and world-systems analysts conceptualize cultural relations as an instrument and an epiphenomenon of the economic processes of accumulation. Although they recognize its importance - like Wallerstein (2011) through the concept of "geo-culture" - they have difficulties in expressing culture in a non-reductive way and would therefore have some difficulty incorporating it into their theories (GROSFOGUEL, 2009, p. 398). On the other hand, postcolonial theorists would also have difficulty conceptualizing economic processes. Many postcolonial scholars recognize the importance of the political economy, but they do not know how to integrate it into the analysis without reproducing a "culturalist" type reductionism (GROSFOGUEL, 2009). Thus, the bibliography produced by both sides oscillates between the "danger" of economic reductionism and the "danger" of culturalism.

Grosfoguel (2009) suggests that the "culture versus economics" dichotomy is a "chicken and egg" dilemma, that is, a false dilemma that arises from what Wallerstein (1998, p. 286) called the legacy of the liberalism of 19th-century as geo-culture of the modern world-system, which instituted the division of social analysis into three areas, three logics. In Wallerstein's words, "The social sciences of the 19th century left us with a terrible legacy: the claim that social reality occurs in three different and separate settings - the political, the economic, and the sociocultural. We have built our institutions of knowledge based on this distinction, and in our literature, we speak of three groups of factors or variables (WALLERSTEIN, 1998, p. 286).¹⁹ With these propositions, Wallerstein argues:

¹⁸ Currently, the core zones of the capitalist world-economy coincide with predominantly white/European/Euro-American societies, such as Western Europe, Canada, Australia and the United States, while the peripheral zones coincide with formerly colonized non-European peoples. Japan is the exception that confirms the rule, as it was never fully colonized or dominated by Europeans and, like the West, played an active role in building its own colonial empire. China, although never fully colonized, found itself peripheralized by the use of colonial outposts such as Hong Kong and Macau for direct military interventions (GROSFOGUEL, 2009).

¹⁹ In Volume IV of his book *The modern World-System*, precisely in Chapter 5 "Liberalism as Social Science", Wallerstein develops the reasons for this fragmentation of social knowledge and how it is professionalized. "The professionalization of social science took the form, within the universities, of the establishment of distinctive disciplines and the creation of corresponding professional/academic

Every social scientist ordinarily uses the distinction between three fields: the economic, the political, and the sociocultural. Nobody believes us when we say that there is only one terrain with only one logic. Do we believe it? Some of us, certainly, but not all. And we all repeat ourselves in using the language of the three fields in almost everything we write. It is time that we seriously attack this matter (WALLERSTEIN, 1998, p. 293).

Regarding nomothetic divisions in social sciences, “solid as granite” as Wallerstein (1998) stated, it is not surprising that “center” and “periphery” encompass polysemic ontologies. It is difficult, if not impossible, to establish a consensual definition. Despite the disciplinary differences, all these center-periphery branches respect the intrinsic logic of the concept. The question about the center and the periphery is to admit a particular relationship between the two terms. In all the approaches presented here, the center and periphery are necessarily linked to a specific historical object: the modern capitalist society. At its center, we will find the elements that participate in the unity of this object. On the periphery, we will find all the elements that come into contact with the center. Thus, if someone changes objects, one can no longer treat the center and the periphery in the same terms. Similarly, if someone changes the disciplinary element on the object (e.g., from "economy" to "security"), one can no longer treat the center and the periphery in the same terms.

2.2 Center-periphery analysis of security

How is the area of “security” built in the center-periphery relationship? How could we understand and define the 'center' and the 'periphery' from 'security studies'? Further, how could this relationship explain the diffusion of security and force concepts at the 'macro level'? In principle, no comprehensive answers to these questions have been given. In the theoretical tradition that begins with Prebish (1949), there has been no formal proposal to apply the center-periphery analysis in "security studies". This "gap" is understood, in part, by the same disciplinary divisions of the structures of knowledge in social sciences. The *CEPAL* structuralists concentrated on "economic" aspects of the center-periphery relationship; also dependence theories, although they are more sensitive to the "political" analysis of power and class struggles. In the School of Autonomy - that begins with Puig (1984, 1986) and Jaguaribe (2008) during the Cold War order - although they paid attention to the so-called 'traditional

national (and eventually international) organizations for the various disciplines. It did so not as a single discipline, but “fragmented into many sub-disciplines, new organisations, and specialisms” [...] As we shall see, a discipline, a profession, is “a vocabulary, an organization, a journal and a conference”. WALLERSTEIN, I. **The Modern World-System IV**. 2011, p. 237.

security issues', their units of analysis focused mainly on the foreign policy of the State. In any case, it is necessary to update them (RUIZ, SIMONOFF, 2017) and extend them heuristically beyond the Latin American space and to the unit of analysis of *Longue durée* proposed by Braudel (1987) and developed in the world-system concept by Wallerstein (2011). Yet, "security" has not been the axis in the reflections of Wallerstein either; probably, because he understood that "security" - or even military issues as Wallerstein (2011) once explained - does not have enough "analytical autonomy" comparing to the broader socio-economic variables.

On the other hand, even though postcolonial critics brought valuable objects linked to 'culture' (MIGNOLO, 1995; SAID, 1993), to epistemic inequalities (SANTOS, 2010, QUIJANO, 2005) and have approached with "contrapuntal methods" to security studies (BILGIN, 2017; BARKAWI; LAFHEY, 2006, AYOUB, 1991), none of them have expressed any sustained commitment to the center-periphery tradition of analysis. In this sense, in the path of exploring the construction of a center-periphery analytical framework of security, we believe that it is important to extract and synthesize the main contributions of these analytical trends and even link them to more current ones that come from critical theorists, "macrosecuritization" perspective and of the sociology of organizations.

2.2.1 Liberal geo-culture of security

An initial step in that direction is to recognize that a *geo-culture*, dominated by "centrist liberalism" for most of the 19th and 20th centuries, as Wallerstein explains (2011, p. 96; 1995, p. 3), as well as has instituted norms in the structures of knowledge that separated nomothetic fields - economics, sociology, and political science - has also done it for a disciplinary field of 'security'. Although frequently subsidiary to those other fields, this "security field" has also had separated knowledge, skills, norms, and devices. It occurs, with more institutional definition, after the Second World War. Not just because the global expansion of US power spawned and funded a generation of academics guided towards "area" studies, 'security studies' and 'international relations' more generally, but because it appeared to place the liberal State at the heart of the security question (NEOCLEOUS, 2008, 2000). This orientation is an effect of what we call here *liberal geo-culture of security*: that is, *a set of values that has shaped a field of axioms, standards, and forces as "security" throughout the modern world-system*. It is a geo-culture in the same way given by Wallerstein (2011). By a geo-culture, Wallerstein (2011) understood the "values that are very widely shared throughout the world-system, both

explicitly and latently” (p. 277).

According to Mariutti (2020, p. 3), understanding geo-culture in the terms proposed by Wallerstein requires a change of view, as it is not a superstructural phenomenon. On the contrary, Wallerstein qualifies geo-culture as an *underside* of the other processes of the world-economy, or even the way in which the system becomes aware of itself.²⁰ By *underside*, we must understand both its bottom face – submerged, *out of the immediate line of vision* – and its “inner part” if we visualize it mentally like a sphere (MARIUTTI, 2020, p. 3).

Until the long nineteenth century, there had been a disjunction between the political economy of the world-system and its discursive rhetoric (WALLERSTEIN, 2011). It was the geo-cultural consequences of the French Revolution that made it imperative to overcome this disjunction. The irruption that represented the French Revolution and the process of Napoleonic wars occurs through two basic norms: the normalization of political change and the popular redefinition of sovereignty in the figure of the ‘citizen’.²¹

It should be remembered that “security studies” have not been the axis of Wallerstein’s reflections. However, our analysis will focus on the diffusion of security norms, devices, and forces models in the expansive and contradictory logics of the geo-culture of the world-system. The most backward axioms of what we call here *liberal geo-culture of security* lie in the central statute attributed to the republican nature of each State of law, given what Kant (2006), for instance, enshrined as “perpetual peace” [1795]. Kant, but in general the political theory of Contractualism and the philosophy of Utilitarianism – for example, from “the volunteer of the greatest number” idea (BENTHAM, 2010, 2015) - placed the domestic mode of governance and views of a social contract of each State in the core of the liberal security project. Liberalism, indeed, was never a meta-strategy of anti-statism (WALLERSTEIN, 2011). On the contrary, even the most prominent “minarchist” views of liberal theorists defend that the state should not abandon its role as the regulator of ‘public security’ (MISES, 2008; NOZICK, 1988). That John Stuart Mill [1861] could declare that security is “the most vital of all interests” and that “the greater security of property is one of the main conditions and causes of greater production” (2001, p. 28-200). In the same vein, Adam Smith said: “the increase of security would naturally

²⁰ See more details, in: MARIUTTI, E. **Notas sobre o conceito de geocultura**. Texto para Discussão. Unicamp. IE, Campinas, n. 396, Aug. 2020.

²¹ Following Wallerstein: “Since ideologies are in fact political programs to deal with modernity, each one needs a “subject,” or a principal political actor. In the terminology of the modern world, this has been referred to as the question of sovereignty. The French Revolution asserted a crystal clear position on this matter: Against the sovereignty of the absolute monarch, it had proclaimed the sovereignty of the “people.” WALLERSTEIN, I. **The Modern World-System IV**. 2011, p. 11.

increase industry and improvement” (1977, p. 253). Smith, for all his scorn of politicians, does not disdain to enter into pragmatic calculations of State: “The objects of police are the cheapness of commodities, public security, and cleanliness if the two last were not too minute for a lecture of this kind. Under this head, we will consider the opulence of a state” (1977, p. 349). While Hegel [1817] is heavily influenced by Smith’s account of the political economy of *the wealth of nations*, his own understanding of the system of private property is that it needs to be administered by the state: “its adjustment also needs to be consciously regulated by an agency which stands above both sides” (HEGEL, 1987 *apud* NEOCLEOUS, 2000, p. 10).

According to Marx, in *The Jewish Question* (2005): “security is the highest social concept of civil society, the concept of the police; the entire society is there just for that, to guarantee to each one of its members the preservation of their person, their rights, and their property (p. 40). In this Marxist vein, Neocleous (2000) argues that ‘security’ for liberalism came to refer to “the liberty of secure possession” (p. 10). One of the reasons for this is that the private property system necessarily requires the existence of a class of poverty. “The problem, however, is not poverty per se, but the fact that from the class of poverty a further, more dangerous ‘class’ can emerge, a ‘rabble’ without right, integrity, and honor and thus in rebellion against property” (NEOCLEOUS, 2010, p.11).

In this connection, Wallerstein (2011) argued that despite the triumph of liberalism in proclaiming the sovereignty of “people”, such victory has been hollow. “From the outset, there was no agreement about who were the “people” (2011, p. 11), who have their rights recognized and who have no. In this sense, if 1789 inaugurated the tensions of the modern era with liberalism as the dominant meta-strategy, the revolution of 1848 was the first in a series of insurrections and critical events in the world-system that consolidated ‘radical’ doctrines but also normalized tensions with restorations by conservators. In Wallerstein’s words: “It was in 1848 that we first see clearly that there would be two kinds of antisystemic movements, two separate ways of dealing with this exclusion: more rights within the nation (the social revolution), and separating one ethno-national group from another, dominant one (the national revolution)” (2011, p. 159).²² Thus, the liberal state would then be the only institution within

²² For the liberal ideology, it was clear that the main threat to their privileges came from industrial workers, among other groups designated by reason and gender excluded from citizenship rights and, above all, that simple repression would not bring satisfactory results. In Wallerstein’s words: “The revolutions of 1848 constituted the first world-revolution of the modern world-system. It is not that it occurred in all parts of the world-system; it did not. Nor is it that the revolutionaries achieved their objectives; by and large, the revolutions were defeated politically. It is that the revolutions centered around issues of exclusion—exclusion from the benefits of citizenship.” WALLERSTEIN, I. **The Modern World-System IV**. 2011, p. 159.

society with the necessary capacities to manage certain insurance against revolts, disorder, insurrection, crime and other forms of social risks. There is here a hermeneutic of ‘security’ as an o-economy, from State to the market, being refocused on individuals and, ultimately, on ‘property’ as the imperative of incessant ‘insecurity’ that justifies incessant ‘security’ managements.

The promulgation of a static, "definitive" metric on this managerialism constitutes the liberal geo-culture of security as a standard approach. Changing over several eras, and anchored in the security geo-culture, knowledge from the liberal tradition has been spatialized and periodized by the global networks center-periphery, on the arenas of ideology and social sciences, subordinating and incorporating "other" ways of understanding ‘threatening objects’ as "alternative", "local", "radical" expressions, or even, to paraphrase Boaventura Santos (2010), being "produced as non-existent". These were the ones who insisted that their social movements must be "anti-systemic" - that is, what they should seek is to destroy the historical system that made possible that reversion of 'equality' that undermines the recognition of their rights (WALLERSTEIN, 2011).

In social sciences and more specifically in the “security studies”, this line that divides those who are included and excluded explains the normal attempts, on the one hand, to delimit, order, expand, and, on the other, to redefine, refund, generify the field of security. For instance, since 1980, security studies have tended to expand and interrelate with more and more fields beyond “national security” and militarist doctrines, in a wide range ‘interdisciplinary’, ‘multisectoral’, that the UN has well represented in reports on "human security", "food security", "environmental security", "democratic security" (See, for example, the UN “Palme Commission” (1982). During this time, critical and postcolonial theorists are rising to redefine and expand the area of security to various subaltern perceptions, class groups²³, genre²⁴, race²⁵, among others, whose common pattern has been the claim for having been neglected in the “silence of the discipline” (NEOCLEOUS, 2008).

The standard assumption of liberal security geo-culture remains that security is valid as the foundation of freedom, democracy, and good society and that the main question is how to

²³ For instance, the “Welsh School”, that lays out the foundations of a Frankfurt School critical theory approach to security studies. See: JONES, R. *Security, Strategy and Critical Theory*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1999.

²⁴ See, for instance: TICKNER, A., J. **Gender in International Relations: Feminist Perspectives on Achieving Global Security**. New York: Columbia University Press, 1993; STEANS, J. **Gender and International Relations** Cambridge: Polity Press, 1997, p. 104–29.

²⁵ See: HOWELL, M. Is securitization theory racist? Civilizationism, methodological whiteness and antiblack thought in the Copenhagen School. **Security Dialogue**. 2019.

improve the power of the State to improve 'security'. On the other hand, the 'critical studies' assumption remains that security is valid just as the outcome of the "emancipation" of social forces oppressed by this power. "Emancipation, not power or order, produces true security" (BOOTH 1991, p. 319).²⁶ However, the postcolonialists are the first to question that this "emancipation" is inscribed eurocentrically in the same liberal tradition that they criticize (BARKAWI; LAFFEY, 2006; BILGIN, 2017; AYOUB, 1991, for instance). Notwithstanding, the latter's interest in finding a greater openness of the security area to those "other" non-eurocentric subaltern perspectives is also questioned by other critics. As Bigo (2001, p. 95) points out, how to *maximize* security always seems to remain the core issue. Thus, there is a danger that these approaches do not quite manage to shake off the managerialism prevalent in more traditional security studies: the desire to 'do' security better.

The assumption seems to be that while we might engage in a critical security interrogation, we could never entirely be against it (NEOCLEOUS, 2008). Underlying here is an oxymoron in which by rejecting security, by way of its pluralization or diversification, 'security' is encouraged. Furthermore, an ontological fetishism underlies, for the academics who do, expand, or diversify "security studies", because, precisely, it is the selective, disciplinary, self-referential, and secular (in the non-theological sense) rubric of "security" an effect of the colonality of knowledge associated with that geo-culture. Criticizing or deconstructing it can calm critical mentalities - or some imperative of "resistance" - through the virtual recognition of some rights, but it does not exempt them from the security geo-culture but can even serve to reinforce it. Following Wallerstein (2005, p. 42), these paradoxes and debates that divide those who are included and excluded reflect the exact history of the world-system in the last two centuries, in which liberalism and radicalism were faced in the arenas of ideologies, anti-systemic movements, and the social sciences. But these debates have taken place *within the framework of a geo-culture that proclaimed the inclusion of all as the definition of a just society* (WALLERSTEIN, 2005, p. 43). The triumph of liberalism in defining geo-culture was also possible because of the growing importance of the anti-systemic movements that fight for those rights. Here is the paradox, since these movements exist, in principle, to

²⁶ Postcolonial thinkers have argued that in these "critical" and "liberal" traditions rest on profoundly racist assumptions. As Kant, a figure dear to both liberal and critical scholars, observed, 'Humanity achieves its greatest perfection with the White race'. See: SINGH, U., M. **Liberalism and Empire: A Study in Nineteenth Century British Liberal Thought**. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1999; INAYATULLAH, N; BLANEY, D, **International Relations and the Problem of Difference**. London: Routledge, 2004.

undermine the system, not to sustain it, or what is evident in our field, to reinforce "security". So, what if it was 'security' that has been thinking us before we have been thinking it? What if the essential logic of 'security' lies not in freedom or emancipation but technologies of modeling subjects around modern rationalities of peace?

Following this theoretical reflection on security geo-culture, we can focus that this concept also comes relatively close to the Copenhagen School theorists called *macrosecuritization*. What distinguishes 'macrosecuritization' from 'securitization', following Buzan and Weaver (2009) is given by the scale of the analysis (which is beyond the regional, local, or State level) and by the possibility of building and diffusing "packages" of securitized processes, usually at a lower level.²⁷ However, from a contrapuntal perspective, the principle of 'structural anarchy' that Buzan and Weaver (2009) inherited from the IR mainstream could limit understanding the historical and theoretical origin of the phenomena that the same 'macrosecuritization' contemplates. Between the macro and regional levels, interactions between what they call "great powers" and "lesser powers" are apprehended in the field of 'processes' within the anarchy framework.²⁸ Buzan (2006) offers two possible reasons for the origin of macrosecuritization, one being "globalization", and the other "belief in a universal ideology" and cites the Cold War as a historical example of the macrosecuritization in which this phenomenon was "capable of structuring the mainstream security dynamics of interstate society for many decades". From a contrapuntal perspective, it is not "globalization" that originates these securitized asymmetries, but these asymmetries that promoted "globalization" (and even a dominant idea about it, which the Copenhagen School seems to adopt). In this sense, they did not contemplate how the same unequal spread of interstate structures worldwide, with class relationships, coloniality, and capitalist production, can contain "primitive" indicators of modern macrosecuritization.

²⁷ The concept of macrosecuritization was developed reflecting cases such as the "Global War on Terrorism" and the United States' ability to impose threat agendas in peripheral countries after September 11, 2001, such as in Colombia, categorizing "narcoterrorism".

²⁸ We note that Buzan and Weaver took a long time to incorporate this new category at the "macro-level" (2006, 2009) after gaining recognition with the proposed concept of 'securitization' (WEAVER, 1998) and the theory of regional security complexes (RSC) (BUZAN, WEAVER, 2003). Why this lethargy? One answer is the initial priority given to the regional level of analysis, with the RSC, which has led to a special appreciation of the relative autonomy of these "anarchic structures" as sectorized or mutually exclusive units. In this way, they favored analyzes in which securitized issues and conflicts were understood as separate or self-generated, although the global trend goes in the opposite direction to highlight their heteronomy. The "late" proposal of the concept of macrosecuritization was to *aggiornare* the theory to this global fact. However, 'anarchy' remains the inevitable milestone to understand asymmetric interactions of the regional level with the global system (global powers).

Theoretically, considering the formal origin of the interstate Westphalian system (1648) and the informal origin of the capitalist economy (around the 16th century, according to Wallerstein), we can reflect of origins of these disseminations through what Marx (2018) called "primitive accumulation" and discussing what Smith (1977) also called "previous accumulation". According to the so-called "primitive accumulation" (covered in Book 1 of *The Capital*), the origin of the capitalist mode of production is not linked to a simple rationalization of the division of social labor or to a peaceful process in which workers worked more diligently than others - as defended by Adam Smith. But to a violent process of expropriation (from family, artisanal, peasant) separating the direct producer from his means of production and formed an enormous mass of workforce free and available. In this more vernacular discussion, it is possible to inquire about a theoretical "primitive securitization": a constitutive relationship between an original form of violence - 'enforcement' and, then, 'force' - and the social order of production or 'capital' to be protected; *pari passu*, to inquire how some actors have become the protagonist of a culture, whoever was favored or disadvantaged with it, or even why actors with certain qualities of class, race, among others, have managed to produce, and still reproduce, what is the security (and "force") in others.

2.2.2 The world-system as a world-forces system

From the world-system perspective, the historical formation of the current spatial asymmetries was developed through the encounter between western colonialism expansion and the so-called 'external arenas' to the modern world-economy. In Wallerstein's (2011) terms, it is approximately in the 1850/1940 period that "peripheralization" of the "external arenas" is completed. In the last 200 years, the modern world-system significantly impacted areas that until then had experienced limited effects: Japan, China, Southeast Asia, New Zealand, inland Africa and the western interior of North America (DUSSEL, 1993, BLACK, 2002). According to Black (2002), a previous period (1700-1850) increased interaction between different parts of the world. For at least part of the period, there were several expansive powers, including China, Burma, Siam, the Afghans, Mysore, the Marathas, the Sikhs, Egypt, the Zulus, and the jihads in West Africa. The organizational culture of these forces varied immeasurably. However, these were times of raising colonial projection of European military power overseas. In this process, the industrial capacity of the Atlantic European societies and their naval forces was essential. In the mid-19th century, the forced trade openings through unequal treaties with China and the

Nankin Treaty after the Opium Wars (1839–1842) were emblematic. Further, the Treaty of Kanagawa (1854) in the 'gunboat diplomacy' of the US and Commodore Perry's navy encounter with samurai units in Japan (RENOUVIN; DUROSELLE, 2000).

These encounters promoted, often *manu militari* and based on western technological advantages, a process of peripheralization of these 'arenas' that integrated them into the axial division of labor as weaker sources of capital accumulation in the production chains and, therefore, with more fragile State structures (WALLERSTEIN, 2011). As we know, it is in the center where the highest levels of capital accumulation occur. It is not by chance that the most advanced weapon and technocratic systems are found within this area, while their state monopolizations are usually more plausible. The police and the army are the classic devices of this monopoly. But as we move away from the center and observe areas where most of the productive processes are peripheral and, therefore, weak sources of capital accumulation, this monopoly tends to be diluted, and the weaker the State, the more diluted it is.

Thus, the temptation of armed sectors (militias, ethnically defined groups, insurgence movements) to control the executive is usually greater each time a government appears incapable of preserving security. The most common result of this was (and continues to be) the internal conflict over "national identity". The creation and maintenance of the states were often the product of violent social struggles, governed by fragile constitutional frameworks in which the instinct for self-preservation of ruling elites often prevailed over the interests of the modern ideal of nation (AYOGB, 1991).²⁹ Walker (1993) notes that the liberal State itself, far from being the provider of security, has often been a primary source of insecurity and it is sometimes complex to identify how any useful concept of 'security' can bypass the participation of states in, for example, "enforced disappearances" and human rights abuses.

These peripheral weaknesses have tended to justify local elites' adherence to central countries' military support against internal threats within their borders, and here lie some systemic factors of the so-called "dependent basis" of capital-intensive militarization processes in the logic to 'secure' or to avoid 'failures' of peripheral interstate structures. As Wendt and Barnett (1993, p. 322) explain to us, both the states of the center and the periphery have relied on physical, financial, and human capital, that is, conventional and "technocratic" forces in which military capability is based primarily on 'capital' (advanced weapon systems, budget,

²⁹ For instance, a study by Istvan Kende estimates that of the 120 wars during the period 1945-76, 102 were internal wars (the use of the term is certainly debatable) (including wars against political rule and tribal conflicts). While another study by Kidron and Segal, covering the period 1973-86, found a combination of 66 internal and 30 border wars (ACHARYA, 1995).

and high skills of soldiers) rather than unconventional, "armed peoples", in which capacity is based more on "work" (as in mobilizing massive militias). According to Silva (2018), "the fundamental issue of peripheral militarization is based on the emulation of industrial military organizations – whose technique of undertaking violence requires capital-intensive instruments – by societies where capital is scarce" (p. 60). For Kaldor (1976, p. 293), that reflects a "Form of Force", a consequence of the resulting relationship between military organization, technology and societal variables. "The techniques of force are the weapons and the way they are used. The relations of force are the organization of men, the nature of military hierarchy the way men are drawn into the armed forces. The techniques of force are at once the product of the level of technology in society and the appropriate tool for a particular set of military relations" (p. 293). Techniques and armaments carry a set of social relations necessary for their manufacture and use; after all, they carry within themselves a social system. Hence, the militarization in peripheral areas results from the expansionist tendency of this forms of relationships between technology and armaments in capitalist societies.

'Capital' and 'force' are mutually needed. If the world-economy changes, the world of forces that protects it changes. And vice versa, the 'form of force' can also alter the social order. If any exceptionality - radicalization, social revolt - breaks any of its central or dispersed ramifications, then a dynamic of accumulation and extraction of surplus-value here are also in risk. In effect, the world-economy system is also a *world-forces system*: a set of three modern attributes – *state control*, *technologicism*, and *technical professionalism*. Specialized, trained and regular military organizations, for the external defense of sovereignty of states, and the difference with other domestic forces (such as police), can be understood as typically "Westphalian" forms of forces. It is inherent to the sovereignty regime after the Treaty of Westphalia (1648). As Black (2022) points out, the evolution of these forces occurred against the background of a world where there was a general lack of such specialization. On the other hand, Professionalism is the result of the emerging liberal ideology between the 18th and 19th centuries (associated with Enlightenment ideas on equality, nationalism, merit, and bureaucratic rationality) (GOLDMAN, 2006, p. 70). These ideas shaped military in opposition to the aristocratic armies in which officers were aristocrats first and promotion came from ties to political authority. Still, they might also be contrasted with a decentralized, part-time, militia army. Liberal military doctrines adopted new norms of recruitment, training, and command, based on merit, what defined the modern criteria: full-time officers and non-commissioned officer (NCOs) who see themselves as military men first; a centralized command structure; high

levels of internal differentiation; and promotion based on expertise and merit.³⁰

Such principles integrated modern use and diffusion of force through different mechanisms from the center to the peripheries. The question here is how do these mechanisms of military diffusion occur? What are its primary forms and center-periphery modes of diffusion? The specialized literature in a branch called *new institutionalism* has given systematic answers to these questions and has focused on studying the “isomorphic pressures” that affect inter-organizational fields of military diffusion. In the next section, we will describe the main contributions of this analytical field; nonetheless, we will argue on their lack of studies on the implications of western colonization processes as a primary mechanism of global military isomorphism.

2.3 The “one-way street” of the global military isomorphism

In the seminal work on institutional isomorphism and widely referenced in DiMaggio and Powell (1983), the authors seek to identify the factors that promote the homogeneity of modern organizational forms and practices whose macro trends they discuss through the secularization metaphor of the *Iron Cage* developed by Max Weber. In these terms, going beyond the perspectives that focus on competitive rationality and the search for greater efficiency, they argue that the homogenization of modern organizations emerges from the structuring of a "rationalized environment" defined in functional terms as "organizational fields".³¹ The authors explain this concept as:

[...] those organizations that, taken together, constitute a recognized area of institutional life: key suppliers, resources and consumers, regulatory agencies, and other organizations that produce similar services and products. (DIMAGGIO; POWELL, 1983, p. 148).

In the similar vein of reflection, scholars of military and security norms diffusion (FARRELL; TERRIFF, 2002; GOLDMAN, 2006; FINNEMORE, 2013; REINSCH, 2011; KOURTIKAKIS, 2010) have sketched how the interlinked professional and organizational fields of soldiers or peacekeepers can gradually develop the same understandings of meanings

³⁰ For a broader discussion, see: HUNTINGTON, S. **The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations**. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981.

³¹ Bureaucratization and other forms of homogenization emerge out of the structuration of organizational fields. That fields start out displaying considerable diversity, but once a field becomes established, there is an inexorable push towards homogenization. This process is affected largely by the State and the professions, which have become the great rationalizers of the 20th century (REINSCH, 2011).

and cultural norms about the normative use of the force, technical tools, their jobs, and profession. This phenomenon occurs through different mechanisms. These are:

- *Normative pressures*: stemming from military professionalization through formal educational basis and networks across which new models diffuse (FARRELL, 2005; DIMAGGIO; POWEL, 1983).
- *Mimetic pressures*: referring to responses to uncertainty (DIMAGGIO; POWEL, 1983), or the identification needs of actors (SAHLIN; WEDLIN, 2008) resulting in imitative modeling from "prestige" or "reputation" of others.
- *Coercive pressures*: referring to actors in an unequal relation compelling others to adopt the same organizational concept. Hence, the two keywords here are power and dependence (DIMAGGIO; POWEL, 1983; KOURTIKAKIS, 2010).
- *Competitive pressures*: referring to the usual neorealist assumption that the "anarchic system" creates powerful competitive incentives - mainly between great powers – to adopt the most successful military practices (GOLDMAN, 2006; WALTZ, 1979).

Under the broader rubric of “military change”, these authors have taken such concepts to explain the historical military norms’ diffusion between different nation-states (FARRELL; TERRIFF, 2002; GOLDMAN, 2006; FARRELL, 2005).³² However, we will rarely find in this sociological branch studies in colonialization periods and how the processes of colonial imposition of Western military norms helped to establish the modern foundations of these professions in peripheral areas. It is a point that deserves attention.

In general terms, the historical origin of modern military professionalization in most peoples, former “external arenas” and peripheries of the world-system - in Africa, Latin America, and Asia - frequently comes from the destruction/submission of their indigenous forces and knowledge or being compelled to take modern norms, even trying to resist European expansion (BLACK, 2002). For instance, from the second half of the 19th century and its cast upon at the Berlin Conference (1884-1885), African colonial troops were lightly armed gendarmeries, patrolling troublesome borders against hostile neighbors, searching tax evaders and low-level insurgents, and otherwise enforcing order (REID, 2012). African troops were well drilled and acquired the regimental ‘traditions’ and ethos, symbols, and insignia, according

³² Farrell (2005) argued about two sets of global norms that shape how modern-states generate military power. First are conventional warfare norms, which provide the basic template for the military organization: standing, standardized, and technologically structured military forces. Second are norms of humanitarian law, which define what is morally acceptable in military operations, ruling out certain modes (e.g., ethnic cleansing) and means (e.g., chemical weapons) of warfare.

to the standards of their European counterparts (OLAWALE; SKÖNS, 2014). In Latin American, Spanish and Portuguese army leaders played a crucial role in shaping colonial societies against 'wild' and rebellious indigenous leaders (KRUIJT, 2012). With the feudalization of their territories, the vassals of lords, indigenous peoples were often incorporated into their local forces (SOTELO, 1977).

Given that European forces had destroyed their local armies, it is not surprising that their training recruits quickly internalized Western military values as 'superior' to their own and constitutive of 'modernity' (WENDT; BARNETT, 1993). These were put through training and socializing into the metropolis administration based on a 'new' military tradition, suppressing agency capacity in the colonized, subsuming 'mimetism' as a relatively autonomous activity. This process *implanted* norms about what constitutes a 'modern' force, with its 'symbols' and 'prestige' references in the liberal ideas of development, peace, and progress (PRETORIUS, 2008).³³

Following isomorphism studies, such colonial implantation corresponds fundamentally to what they usually call *coercive isomorphic pressures*: actors in an unequal relation compelling other to adopt the same organizational model within a specific organizational field (DIMAGGIO; POWELL, 1983). However, as we said, we will rarely find in this sociological branch studies of military isomorphism from western colonialization periods. If we focus on one of its main current referents (FARRELL, 2005, 1998), it will be possible to illustrate how their analyzes tend to neglect the foundational role of “coercive isomorphism” in the historical and modern “one-way street” trend of military diffusion between the center and peripheral areas.

In Farrell's view, modern military isomorphism is mainly a result of *normative* pressures - that stem from professionalization - in addition to the competition logic of a neorealist imperative, maximizing power and the notion that military - mainly in great powers - are by nature competitive. “Professionalization remains a central mechanism whereby norms of conventional warfare are diffused around the world and reproduced by the militaries of developing states” (FARRELL, 2005, p. 465). Farrell (2005, p. 465) argues that the weaker and

³³ The creation of powerful syncretic ‘Western/native’ forces, especially by the French and British in Africa (REID, 2012) and later by the British in India (BLACK, 2002), was a key process of military professionalization. Within Europe there was also a process of combination. Armies were largely raised among the subjects of individual rulers, but “foreign” troops, indeed units, were also recruited and there was a process of amalgamation in which alliance armies were built up. The Prussians were especially guilty of this process, forcibly raising troops, for example, in Mecklenburg and Saxony (BLACK, 2002).

smaller a state is, the more *normative* its military emulation mechanisms become. We need to remember that while coercive isomorphism generally arises from compelling weaker organizations, *normative* isomorphism typically stems from professionalization. Professions are subject to the same pressures as are organizations (DIMAGGION; POWELL, 1983). According to Farrell (2005, p. 466), in practical terms, this military diffusion process involves officers being sent for training in military academies of "developed countries" and central military advisers, literature, and equipment being received by "developing countries". Farrell's explanation of this 'one-way street' trend is limited to categorizing that "Small states seek the prestige attached to great-power military symbols, as well as the certainty provided by great-power scripts for military action" (2005, p. 466).

Nonetheless, a systemic analysis will remain superficial (even tautological) if these symbolic and normative inequalities are self-explanatory. In this sense, even in neo-institutionalist terms, it is crucial to observe that the current normative orientation of military diffusion in the peripheries also constitutes a historical consequence of *colonial coercive isomorphism*. It is a causal process that Farrell (2005, 1998) has overlooked mainly because his usual time frame of analysis does not include the complexities of the historical processes of Western colonization. On the contrary, his study focuses on processes of military diffusion between contemporary independent states as normative consequences of a (curiously) undefined "world culture". In one of his prominent publications (2005), Farrell deals with the concept of "world culture" several times, considering only its "causal impacts" but does not define what its specific ideological attributes are and how it was imposed in the world. In this sense, the concept of *liberal geo-culture of security* formulated here may be much more precise.

Following Wendt and Barnett (1993) and Pretorius (2008), the modern "one-way street" of the world military culture diffusion expresses broader asymmetries in which central countries have shaped peripheral elites' ideas about what constitutes a 'modern army'. Today's military world culture constitutes an asymmetrical structure precisely because Western definitions of modernity are its center, the reference point for peripheral elites, and because of these ideas fuel dependency (because of capital-intensive) patterns of militarization (WENDT; BARNETT, 1993; also: SOETERS, 2018, p.105). It does not mean peripheral states are passive objects forced to accept Western military ideas against their will, but it contains the idea that the global military isomorphism is structurally asymmetric, constraining a primarily "one-way street", proto-hierarchical process.

2.4 Three functions in the security geo-culture

As we will observe in detail in the three case studies of this thesis, although the decolonization processes meant the "nationalization" of many colonial forces, this did not necessarily mean adhering to autochthonous epistemic constructions. Most postcolonial states inherited doctrines, equipment, and organizational structures implanted through colonial coercive pressures. With the postcolonial implications of those isomorphic processes, the contemporary diffusion of standards of force and security devices has evolved, combining mimetic and normative pressures in military, security, and peacekeeping fields, and given rise to an increasingly clear hierarchical division of functions between actors into the liberal geo-culture of security. Precisely, we distinguish three types of functions:

- a) broadcasting center;
- b) inter-carriers;
- c) recipient emulators.

The *broadcasting center* is always made up of *some* actors of the capitalist center, a smaller group of states and organizations within the central production zones. By defining norms (written and unwritten) of what is appropriate and meaningful (for geo-culture) and effective (given the laws of science), the *broadcasting center* drives macrosecuritization; that is, it shapes norms and management technologies for dispersed and fragile zones. It is defined by the junction of the highest order of abstraction, theory, and the most concentration of capital and prestige that inspires (or leaves no alternative) to others. The broadcasting center's rationalities are inherently 'open-ended': it deals not just in closed circuits of control, but in calculations of series of possible and probable events, and therefore susceptible to readaptations according to the times and locations of the world-system.³⁴ In Latour terms (1987), they are 'centers of calculation', to which distinct peripheries areas are subsequently networked. Norms and devices formation consists then of repeated 'cycles of accumulation' whereby 'inscriptions' are gathered from myriad sites distributed across vast expanses of territory, and networks between human beings and the objects they study are created. The broadcasting center's attributes do not consist in being the source of original ideas or concepts, which often makes

³⁴ This analytical framework gathers concepts developed by theorists of the diffusion of ideas, such as Sahlin and Wedlin (2008) and Czarniawska and Joerges (1996). In defining some attributes of what we call *broadcasting center*, we take ideas from Foucault (1978) (the idea of "rationalities open-ended"), by Latour (1987) ("center of calculations") and by Bourdieu (1987) (on the impossibility of finding an absolute origin of ideas).

no sense - if not downright impossible - to find an origin (BOURDIEU, 1987), but in making them powerful as it selects and circulates them. Indeed, ideas can become legitimate and popular not precisely because of their properties but because of who transports and supports them and how they are packaged, formulated, and codified for specific situations (CZARNIAWSKA; JOERGES, 1996).

In this way, the *broadcasting center* tends to link *intermediary carriers* to their broadcasts. As we will also call here, the *inter-carriers* are defined not as "norms makers" - although they can sometimes co-participate there - nor as "recipients" - although they are also serial emulators - but essentially as transmitters of standards and devices for weaker *recipient emulators*. These transmitters are state or non-state organizations, civil, politician, or military experts, among other actors located primarily in central and semi-peripheral areas, giving practical meaning to Sahlin and Wedlin (2008 p. 227) call "mediation-mode" of diffusion. Normative entrepreneurship is (and, as some academics and officials believe, should be) the broadcasting center's domain. A norm is formally codified in some agencies on the center's initiative and therefore follows its global or selective diffusion process. This process can sometimes have specific coordination of *inter-carriers* in certain inter-organizational fields; or also, without this coordinated support, there may be a more uncoordinated diffusion, in what Sahlin and Wedlin (2008) called "chain-mode imitation", among a diversity of actors who copy a message but do not know its origin.

Both 'modes' help to promote the diffusion of standards and devices to *recipient emulators*. These are weaker actors of peripheral zones that tend to emulate the broadcasting center's ideas. As already mentioned in the introduction of the thesis, following reflections of Sahlin and Wedlin (2008, p. 219) ideas change as they flow. Ideas do not diffuse in a *vacuum* but are permanently transported and translated in the *locus* of other beliefs, actors, and practices. The proactivity of peripheral actors resides in the ways of doing translations: the relative ability to decide on ways to resist, edit or adapt the central formalized ideas (which standards, when, and what possible combinations). Local translations put into perspective the possibility of different "organizational cultures" at regional levels (SOETERS, 2021, p. 1) and the "autonomy of decision" (SAINT-PIERRE, 2015, p. 34) that is, the 'strategic freedom of action' of peripheral actors in a hierarchical structure according to locally self-generated interests. In this sense, the *epistemic autonomy* of peripheral states and organizations is relatively narrow. Peripheral actors sometimes may have the potential to generate some innovations, oppose "normative resistance" (KOTYASHKO *et al.*, 2018), or even act as the figure of a competitive

emulous in its strict sense: that is an actor who, by emulating, also intends to surpass those he took as a reference. Despite this, there is little place for global security standards production by peripheral countries.

Only a few actors of central zones have been modern *broadcasting centers*. After the French Revolution, centrist liberalism began to dominate and expand the security geo-culture. In this period, it was the Napoleonic model of waging war, with its "citizen armies", the original use of "divisions" and "corps" of force in large bodies maneuvered, that had an enormous impact on the world-force system. In his work *On War*, Carl von Clausewitz (1997) used these experiences to develop his theoretical models of the significant characteristics of an 'effective military command'. However, the British Empire has also been an eminence in naval forces.³⁵ With the defeat of France in the war against Prussia in 1871 and after the German unification, these three models, the Prussian, the French, and the British, constituted the broadcasting center of the set of global standards that provide the basic template for the modern military isomorphism: technical professionalization, standing, standardized, and technologically structured military forces (FISCHER, 2008).³⁶ In the case of the Russian Empire, despite its condition closer to the central areas, in this period it constitutes one of the first lines of emulation of Western military reforms. At the beginning of the 19th century, its infantry became more homogeneous around the Napoleonic model, although frontier forces remained more isolated: the Caucasian corps and Cossack forces achieved an identity separate from the rest of the Russian Army (MENNING, 1986, p. 31). Following the Crimean War and during the period when Prussian victories were reshaping military concepts, Russia embarked upon those reforms which would shape the way Russians would prepare for and go to war for the next half century (KIPP, 1986, p. 90).³⁷

³⁵ Although some of these innovations had begun to be implemented decades ago, it is up to Napoleon to be widely adopted. See more details, in: SAINT-PIERRE, H.; BIGATÃO, J. *Las mutantes máscaras de Marte*. In: Tamayo, A. (ed.) **Conocer la guerra, construir la seguridad: aproximaciones desde la sociedad civil**. Lima: Instituto de Defensa Legal. 2008.

³⁶ The development of this professional field, but also the increasing "cult of professionalism", especially by the end of XIX century in Europe and the US, was a powerful normative driver of military isomorphism. It became in a 'world-wide institutionalization of collective beliefs about appropriate military practices occurred' (FARRELL, 2005). In these periods, ones of the most prominent of these schemes were the British Military Advisory and Training Team (BMATT) and later the US International Military Education and Training (IMET) programme, giving norms an even more restricted "Anglo-Saxon substance". See also: Pretorius (2008).

³⁷ According to Menning (1986), this was the legacy inherited by subsequent Russian theoreticians as diverse as N. P. Mikhnevich (1849-1927) and V. K. Triandafillov (1894- 1931). They, in turn, would serve as intellectual midwives in the birth of military theories that would eventually culminate in the modern Soviet operational art.

In peripheral countries, such reforms were more than a matter of copying a successful military machine. There was also a bigger dimension that focused on the impact of nationalism, modernization, and secularization. The modernization of Japan's army, from 1868 with the Meiji Restoration, in response to French and then to German models, and of its navy, under the inspiration of the British model, is a good example of this bigger dimension (GOLDMAN, 2006; RENOUVIN; DUROSELLE, 2000). Goldman (2006), in addition to Japan, also studies this process in Ottoman Turkey and Kemal Atatürk's since 1922 and concludes that while competitive strategies is an important driver of diffusion, *mimetic* 'non-competitive' pressures like the desire for "prestige" and "legitimacy" are equally potent drivers of military diffusion.

Until the end of World War II, there were no formal doctrines of "pacification" or "national security" as would happen later in which other State agencies and areas are included. However, the "military science" developed in this period created crucial tools for managing colonial territories, populations, and conflicts in State building processes (OLIVEIRA, 2014).

After 1945, and throughout the current period that extends into the 21st century, the *broadcasting center* have tended to form around the so-called "US military transformation" experience (FARRELL; TERRIFF, 2002), although the former extensive area of Warsaw pact (1955-1990) also built differentiated Soviet doctrines (as the "Soviet operational art") (KIPP, 1986). Unlike the previous period, a "security area" with scientific status emerge here. This is not only due to the multiple implications of the use of the concept of "national security" by the US National Security Council and the Central Intelligence Agency rather than "defense" (be it as narrowly military) or even "national interest", but also by the rise of methodological behaviorism in "conflicts researchers" in the western university system.³⁸

This development had a direct influence on more systematic studies of "peace." "Peace" now as a scientific object, in which human behaviors are prescriptive and modifiable objects by 'smart' management of conflict's resolution. Here are inscribed not only the development of doctrines of counterinsurgency and pacification but also those most critical and reflexive schools of emerging peace studies, with contributions such as those of Galtung (1998, 2005), who helps to forge standards such as *peacekeeping*, *peacemaking*, and *peacebuilding*, among

³⁸ The birth of "peace studies" occurs in the late 1950s in the US, although without explicitly referring the term "peace" in its initial name. In these early days, it was seen the emergence of the expression "conflict research", used to designate the concern with the peace resolution of conflicts on a large scale, providing the intellectual goals that led academics, such as K. Boulding, H. Kelman, and A. Rapoport creating the *Journal of Conflict Resolution* in 1957 and the *Center for Research on Conflict Resolution* at the University of Michigan in 1959 (OLIVEIRA, 2017).

others, which would later become a doctrinal base for current UN peacekeeping operations.³⁹

In Cox (1981) terms, there has been an expansion and evolution of security studies as *problem-solving* knowledge for "failing" transformable places.⁴⁰ If the trend in previous periods was towards the peripheralization and the building of modern state, the contemporary trend has been towards identifying the periphery as a place of "failure" and "restauration" of state structures. However, as "revolutionary wars" and "wars of national liberation" have shown in numerous and technologically inferior peoples on the periphery, the broadcasting centers needs much more than "hard power" to pacify violent focus of class struggles and revolutionary politics (SAINT-PIERRE, 2000, p. 67). When "new" failing processes occur in the eyes of the broadcasting center, new manipulation and translation processes must also be carried out that allow the conflict to be recovered as 'knowable' objects of study. This is because the theory does not reflect an independent reality but rather a language from which a social object that is constructed is apprehended. Therefore, how knowledge is transformed through distinct data collection processes, accommodation, negotiation with trial-and-error testing is crucial. In Latour terms (1987, p. 223) such mediations between a local experience and central theory allow the conversion of the empirical local into mobile, immutable, and combinable 'references'; that is, abstractions of reality that can be easily moved and combined.

For example, with the experience of failure in Indochina, for the first time, France's general staff tried to adapt the military apparatus to a counterinsurgency war, in the case of Algeria. Their expressions were manuals and books prepared by the military with tactics and concepts in which "a conflict today is an interrelated system of political, economic, psychological, military actions" - as stated in *La Guerre Moderne* of Roger Trinquier (2006, p. 5); where it seeks to achieve control and support of the population through "pacification units" based on "pacification zones", and medical, educational and ideological efforts (GALULA,

³⁹ The institutionalization of the field on conflict resolution and research on peace, in universities and through periodicals, intensified in the following decades. In the US, it is worth mentioning: The Hoover Institute's Project on International Conflict and Integration (Stanford University); Program on International Conflict Analysis and Resolution e The Program on Negotiation (at Harvard University). In Europe, between several centers of research, we can mention The Polemological Institute (Netherlands); Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI); Center for the Analysis of Conflict (CAC – University College London).

⁴⁰ For instance, 'Peacebuilding' doctrines require the "transformation of conduct" between the parties involved in disputes in the structure of the conflict. The study of conflict resolution should lead to a prescriptive change in human behavior, whose actions would gradually cease to be violent and hostile. Attention is placed on the negotiating process, the role of the mediator, and transforming relations between the parties so that they become cooperatives. See: WALLENSTEEN, 2012; MITCHELL, 2005, 2008.

1964), among other approaches. This kind of 'references' quickly circulated throughout the US, for instance, in the US Army theoretical journal *Military Review* which, aware of its own ignorance about the Vietnamese people and pacification, learned from French mistakes 'on the ground' and perfected a variety of counterinsurgent doctrines (as in the National security doctrines) to contain communism and they scattered them throughout Latin America. These doctrines have been recently reissued and updated during the early years of the "war on terror," around the same time that the US Counterinsurgency Field Manual was published (BENEDETTI, 2013; ULLMAN; WADE, 1999). We have also witnessed the confluence of these doctrines with NATO peace operations or in accordance with chapter VII of the UN Charter (peace-enforcement) (TERRY, 2000). In today's "wars between people", the UN or NATO peacemaker is often required to apply "robust" and "kinetic" means, in addition to non-kinetic methods, to implement a mandate.⁴¹ What is in evidence here is the progressive integration of doctrinal references from successive management experiences in failing areas and circulating in networks on *long-distance social control* logics that can be observed across the globe, in fragile or conflict zones, from Cambodia to East Timor, from Colombia to Somalia or Afghanistan. From the constellation of university departments, think tanks, security and defense planning teams, public and private, a dispersed inter-organizational field emerges within each time clearer division of functions between 'broadcasting center', 'intermediary carriers', and 'recipient emulators'.

Nowadays, these 'inter-carriers' are often governments and organizations with the capacity to fund and transfer specialized data and management technologies. Among various examples, in Africa, actors like China, Japan, the African Union, United Nations, and specific arrangements as the Nordic Defense Cooperation (NORDEFECO) have been "partners" for years transferring resources educational standards to various 'capacity-building programs' in security fields (FLEMING, 2015; BAYEH, 2015). Great geopolitical players can adopt, transmit and support security devices. As the example of China, financing specific projects as the Logistic Base of the Africa Standby Force in Cameroon, among other forms of assistance in regional UN peacekeeping centers in Africa (INTERVIEWEE 1, 2020). Nevertheless, peripheral and semiperipheral actors still do not perceive China as a formulator of global or regional standards

⁴¹ Following Friis (2010) the UN's Capstone Doctrine and the United States Army Counterinsurgency Field Manual share similarities in six areas: (1) a focus on civilian solutions; (2) a need to protect civilians; (3) international coherence; (4) owned by the host nation; (5) use of intelligence in support of operations; (6) limitations in the use of force.

of conflict resolution. Although a more balanced international order of three leading players - US, Russia, and China - has been consolidated in the last few decades, this balance did not automatically translate into three organizational broadcasting centers with competitive and different crisis management standards.

China or Russia could develop their own cultural norms with original systems of management interpretation (for instance, based on Chinese Confucian or deep Russian values). However, so far, those values have not been institutionalized or organized globally, not even in its regions. The relatively recent incorporation of former Warsaw Pact countries into NATO is a prime example of such normative, but also mimetic and even coercive pressures (as without proper standardization, quality and safety in operations was not formally acknowledged) (MERLINGUEN, 2003). These geo-normative balances are not permanent and may change. However, so far, the Western US/NATO models have had a dominant and expansionist presence in the international socialization of the inter-organizational fields of military cooperation and military crisis management.

2.5 The diffusion of multinational force standards (the ‘rapid reaction’ model)

From the data research made here, it is possible to argue that in the post-Cold War era, the concept of *rapid reaction forces* (RRF) has been one of the keys to understanding a specific model of force that conceptually amalgamates organizational changes in the main experiences on international military organizations with permanent command structures. That force model includes both centers – the NATO Response Force (NRF), the EU Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF), and the peripheries - the African Standby Force, the Peninsula Shield, and the Southern Cross Force – as well as several UN arrangements. This section focuses on understanding the relevance of the RRF concept diffusion in current international military cooperation.

As explained in the introduction, international military cooperation has changed during the last decades. In the Cold War period, multinational collaboration to carry out operations – in alliances such as NATO and the Warsaw Pact - use to pertain to the strategic level - between chiefs of staff and headquarters (SOETERS; MANIGART, 2008; TRESCH, 2007). Following King (2010, p. 44), in the western side, all members of NATO consented to a common Alliance Strategy and to a High-level doctrine. NATO members agreed to the move to Flexible Response in 1967, and land forces adopted Follow-on Forces Attack in 1984. Despite this higher-level coherence, the adoption of common military doctrine at the lower levels was very superficial.

Such forms of military cooperation reflected what Soeters and Manigart (2008, p. 3) called *horizontal multinationalism*.

Currently, national units are also being integrated at (deeper) operational and tactical level, in the formation of mixed and multinational battalions and brigades during deployments; a form of military integrations among units that Soeters and Manigart (2008, p. 3) call “*vertical multinationalism*”. In NATO, out of initial *ad hoc* processes, 'Guidelines for Operational Planning' (GOP) emerged in the late 1990s. The GOP lays out a single, established structure for operational planning with common operational concepts and practices (KING, 2010). It has been disseminated, formally, through European staff colleges, the NATO School, and through NATO operational headquarters, that periodically began to conduct "Combined Joint Exercise" (KING, 2010).

The new dimensions of military multinationalism in western countries are not just the result of globalization or the need to reduce economic costs through more cooperation (PALIN, 1995; GIEGERICH, 2012). It is also a progression from the center strategic perceptions changes in its relationship with peripheral failing areas. After the USSR's fall, many more minor security problems “in” and “around” the core countries quickly replaced one larger monolithic (communist) security problem. Now, academics in central countries argue on "complex emergencies" (KEEN, 2008; KALYVAS, 2001) that can no longer be explained by ideological reductionism.⁴² In terms of the 'New Strategic Concept' of NATO, approved at the NATO summit in Rome in November 1991, the new risks to allied security are "multifaceted” and "multi-directional" (NATO, 1991).

The most significant change is the recognition that in protecting its security interest, NATO allies must be prepared for the first time to operate “outside” the traditional NATO Treaty area and commit its forces in (non-Article 5) peacekeeping operations “around the world” (TERRIFF, 2002; TERRY, 1999; JONES, 1999). NATO began to develop new operational planning to deploy in conflict resolutions and, more specifically, “rapid preventive action” in diverse failing areas. Of particular note, the allies would develop a limited but ‘militarily significant’ proportion of ground, air, and sea immediate and *rapid reaction forces* (RRF) (NATO, 1991; ST-PIERRE, 2006; SLOAN, 1994). Military rapid response mechanisms are generally understood as troops that are on *standby*, in ‘peace times’, remaining *On-Call*, ready to be deployed to a crisis within a short time frame (REYKERS; KARLSRUD, 2017, p.

⁴² “New wars”, competition of resources, ethnic and hybrid conflicts, terrorism and failing State are the expressions of the new perceptions (KALDOR, 1999) (as if these were not, in fact, long-lasting features in peripheral areas in the world-system).

421). RRFs are usually defined as robust forces capable of immediate deployment, in addition to demonstrating three basic principles: *mobility*, *flexibility*, and *effectiveness* (LANGILLE, 2004). Expressly, the concept of RRFs must be understood as a “reactive force” and should not be confused with preventive (or pre-emptive) deployments.⁴³

As Langille (2007, p. 219) argued, the “rationale” underlying primarily initiatives to enhance rapid deployment capabilities in military organizations was very compelling. Frequent delays, vast human suffering, and death, diminished credibility, opportunities lost, escalating costs - as observed in in Somalia, Rwanda, and Bosnia Herzegovina - were just some of the tragic consequences of slow and inappropriate responses. Unprecedented demand for prompt UN assistance highlighted the deficiencies of existing arrangements, challenging the Organization and member-states (LANGILLE, 2019; ST-PIERRE, 2006).⁴⁴ However, the development of RRF has not resulted in a greater acceptance of their use for humanitarian purposes or as a tool for saving human lives. Indeed, there seems to be an underlying disappointment and tension between the increasing need for rapid reaction capability and the incapacity and political reluctance to get involved, especially militarily.

In the context of NATO, in response to this call for action, internal changes in the command and force structures occurred immediately after the Cold War. NATO created three new categories for all its designated forces: Reaction Forces (which were further broken down into Immediate and Rapid Reaction Forces), Main Defense Forces, and Augmentation Forces (DENI, 2006; JONES, 1999). Among the reaction forces, the alliance’s new Immediate Reaction Force (Land) (IRF(L)) would be the first to respond in the event of an actual Article Five threat to an alliance member. However, the ACE Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC), established in October 1992, reinforced the IRF(L) and was the major land component of the rapid reaction forces with the ability to participate in crisis operations (DENI, 2006).⁴⁵

Given the US dominant position as *primus inter pares* in western allied security, Soeters

⁴³ ST-Pierre (2009, p. 5) highlights that this logic is clearly demonstrated in the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ (RtoP), as the humanitarian use of military force is specifically associated with the second responsibility: *the responsibility to react* (Responsibility to Protect: Final Report, xi).

⁴⁴ According to St-Pierre (2006), such conflicts could have been significantly limited, contained, and even prevented if missed opportunities had been seized through “timely diplomatic interventions” or a “more determined international response. The resurgence of violence in many countries has also provided the basis for encouraging preventive operations and for ‘seizing’ the opportunities for early action before they become ‘missed’.

⁴⁵ The ARRC consists of a multinational staff of 300 personnel (representing 17 NATO countries) based in Rheindahlen, Germany. During peacetime, it has operational control over only one division – a combined division consisting of one brigade each from the UK, Belgium, Germany, and the Netherlands and known as the Multinational Division-Central.

(2019, p. 11) argues that NATO has given indicators of coercive and semi-coercive pressures. For instance, in the strategic formulation of common policies, admonishing member-states for not complying with the 2% expenditure norm. Even quasi-coercively threatening them with financial, trade-related sanctions because of the "unpaid bills", and where the North American military model has been at the base of the design of operational doctrines, standard operating, and certifying procedures, training, functional capacities among the members of the Alliance (also: PRETORIOUS, 2008; REINSCH, 2011).

Among several US proposals, at a meeting of Defense Ministers held at Travemunde, Germany in 1993, US proposed the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept - later endorsed at the Brussels Summit of 1994 (JONES, 1999). The CJTF was presented as a new concept that provides flexible military means "separable but not separate" from the integrated military structure of the Alliance - to enable to generate forces at a short time, providing rapidly deployable task forces with appropriate command arrangements (TERRIFF, 2002).⁴⁶ CJTF concept was modeled on the US concept of joint task forces (JTFs) and adaptive force packages. While "combined joint task force" is not explicitly defined in US doctrine (precisely Joint Publication 1-02), it can be derived from a related definition to mean: "A subordinate command consisting of land, air, and/or sea forces from two or more allies" (JONES, 1999).

The concept of rapidly deployable military forces, however, is not new. US aspirations to obtain a global mobility capability were voiced as far back as the Kennedy administration. In that time, the Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara, created a fire-brigade organization, subsequently renamed Strike Command, with a mission "to furnish rapidly deployable, combat-ready forces in an emergency situation, calling for response on a scale less than all-out nuclear war" (ISENBERG, 1984; BATES, 2009).⁴⁷ The idea of an RRFs surfaced again in 1977 when Carter issued a directive ordering a mobile force that could respond to brush-fire wars without diverting American troops from NATO and Korean areas. There was only desultory planning until the Iranian revolution, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan abruptly propelled the Rapid Deployment Force into a priority program. In this sense, by March 1980, the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) was established at MacDill Air Force Base, Florida (ISENBERG, 1984).

In the context of "new threats" in the post-Cold War era, the RRF model has gained

⁴⁶ A CJTF can be formally defined as a deployable multinational, multiservice formation generated and tailored for specific contingency operations (JONES, 1999).

⁴⁷ This command eventually consisted of the 100,000-man Strategic Army Corps and some 50,000 additional personnel from the U.S. Air Force's Tactical Air Command.

greater relevance at the point that it has become a neuralgic concept when it comes to an understanding the design of multinational forces at the UN and regional organizations such as the AU and Arab GCC, among others. Yet, before being adopted by peripheral organizations, an updated concept of Rapid Reaction Capability was first endorsed through the UN standby arrangements system (UNSAS) in 1994 and the creation of the UN Stand-by Forces High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG) in 1997. Nevertheless, as we will show here, all these initiatives are primarily based on US/NATO experiences.

In January 1995, Secretary-General Boutros Ghali (1995) presented "Supplement to a Peace Program". Such document is the first major report in which Boutros-Ghali has supported "strategic reserve", "rapid reaction force", perhaps of battalion-sized units, to deploy when emergency needs for peacekeeping troops (GHALI, 1995, paragraph 44).⁴⁸ A standby arrangements team was established within DPKO in 1994 to identify requirements in peacekeeping operations and UNSAS, establish readiness standards, negotiate with potential participants, establish a database of resources, and assist in mission planning (LANGILLE, 2014). The legislative measures within the UN efforts to make it happen began with the Friends of Rapid Deployment (FORD) (CORD II, 2013; LANGILLE, 2000; BEHRINGER, 2003).

Under the leadership of experts from Canada, Denmark and the Netherlands, this informal group, made up of twenty-seven member states, developed and discussed national reports that led to the construction of the SHIRBRIG.⁴⁹ The Canadian report *Towards a Rapid Reaction Capability for the United Nations* (CANADA, 1995) was primarily used as the baseline for their dialogue on the area of standby arrangements (CORD II, 2013). Indeed, from this Canadian document derives the vanguard concept of standby force proposed to UN:

[...] based on the principle of linking all of the levels of the UN system, especially an operational headquarters and mission groups provided by member states at the tactical level, for the purpose of deploying a force as rapidly as possible for a brief period, either to meet an immediate crisis or to anticipate the arrival of follow-on forces or a more traditionally-organized peacekeeping operation (CANADA, 1995, p. 52).

The same Canadian reports on which the SHIRBRIG concepts were based contemplate the "current experiences" of the US, France, and NATO as the "models" that contain the "primary elements" of that concept (CANADA, 1995, p. 18-21). As the report states:

⁴⁸ In two proposals contained in his June 1992 report, "An Agenda for Peace", Boutros-Ghali recommended UNSC action that might have resulted in a rapid reaction force-type capability. In the following year, the General Assembly asked the UNSAS to secure the personnel and material resources required for peacekeeping.

⁴⁹ See: THE NETHERLANDS. **The Netherlands Non-Paper: A UN Rapid Deployment Brigade: A preliminary study.** April 1995. And: DENMARK. **Report by the Working Group on a Multinational UN Standby Forces High Readiness Brigade.** Chief of Defense: 15 Aug 1995.

This study looked at the operation of the U.S Central Command (CENTCOM), a unified command (with a single commander, a broad, continuing mission and composed of two or more services) capable of deploying an operational-level headquarters with a variety of tactical units (CANADA, 1995, p. 19).

Regarding NATO, the report takes the example of the ACE Mobile Force or AMF (L), created in 1960 as a rapidly-deployable, multinational force:

The process by which the AMF(L) deploys is suggestive of possible analogous arrangements in the UN context [...] Early warning is a key factor in effective, rapid deployment. A request by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe to deploy the AMF(L) is forwarded to NATO's Defence Planning Committee in Brussels for discussion among states. HQ AMF(L) is then able to begin turning its contingency planning into mission-specific planning (CANADA, 1995, p. 20).

From these models, the report concludes that SHIRBRIG must be built on six generic or basic components: First, there must be an **Early-warning mechanism** to provide advance notice of impending conflict or crisis. Second, there must be an effective **decision-making process** to facilitate contingency planning and the implementation of operations. Timely decisions are essential if rapid reaction is to be achieved (p. 21). Third, there must be **readily-available transportation and infrastructure**. The ability to transport personnel and equipment to and within a theatre of operations is fundamental to a successful rapid-reaction capability (p. 22). Fourth, **adequate logistics support** is crucial to effective rapid-reaction. A force deployed in conflicts must be self-sufficient to the extent that it can feed, clothe, and house itself during at least the initial period of a crisis. Fifth, a key element is **adequate finances**. At the international level or among multinational forces, finances are more problematic. Sixth, a rapid-reaction capability must have **well-trained personnel**. Personnel must also have training in skills to a variety of missions and tasks ("mission-specific training).

Indeed, SHIRBRIG, established in 1997, followed those principles. Although it was deactivated in 2009, it had a relative success participating in six UN missions in 12 years of life. After its first deployment to the peacekeeping mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) in 2000, the Brahimi Report (2000) singles out SHIRBRIG as an essential model for establishing similar regional arrangements elsewhere.⁵⁰ While the UNSC in the 2000–10 period stressed the role of regional organizations in managing conflicts, central countries like the UK, US, and France have been more actively aligned around the objective of closer cooperation with regional actors to enable rapid-reaction capabilities (LEBOEUF, 2018).

⁵⁰ The "Brahimi Report" (2000) has been a key document. Many of its recommendations were adopted by the UN peacekeeping forces with "effective deployment capacity within a period of 30 days", counting from the approval of the Security Council resolution, in which a traditional peace operation is established, or within 90 days in the case of complex peace operations (UN, 2000, p. 63).

In this context, the SHIRBRIG and NATO references were decisive for inspiring similar force models worldwide. It was established as a global standard model, next to the North American and NATO military experience, channeled by different intermediary transmitters. The DPKO and countries like Canada, Denmark, and the Netherlands leading the Friends of Rapid Deployment (FORD) have played an important role in reformulating and promoting a force model based on NATO and US experiences.

In this sense, such actors have played functions in the *mediation-mode via* diffusion of the force model based primarily on *broadcasting center* experience (SAHLIN, WEDLIN, 2008); precisely, as *inter-carriers* between the *broadcasting center* (US/NATO) and eventual *peripheral global emulators*. The circulation of models and standards in peripheral areas may occur in various complex hybrid mechanisms and modes of diffusion. The diffusion analysis cannot disregard the influence of locally generated interests, regional security dynamics, and different strategic and organizational cultures on using the force and international standards. How have these factors combined and constrained the formation of the EASF in Africa, PSF in the Arabian Gulf, and Southern Cross Force in Latin America? How to systematically understand their organizational and operational differences?

2.6 An analytical framework for international military organizations

As mentioned in the introduction, one of the research objectives consists of a systematic comparison of the three cases in the Global South, based on primary and secondary data material. For understanding the data collection in the context of a systematic comparison, we built an analytical framework on seven organizational variables considered relevant in the literature on inter-organizational cooperation, isomorphism, military dependence, and multinational military cooperation (DIMAGGIO; POWELL, 1983; PFEFFER; SALANCIK, 2003; SHALIN; WEDLIN, 2008; SOETERS; TRESCH, 2010; SOETERS, 2018, 2021; FARRELL; TERRIFF, 2002; FARRELL, 2005; WENDT; BARNETT (1993).

Since these can present variations between the three cases, we created a typological-comparative scheme with their respective ideal-typical, theoretically derived modes (see again Table 1 below). In this direction, this section describes each of such variables and their typologies. Some variables presented in this chapter are recovered here, and others specific to international military organizations are incorporated. Then, we explain the methodological details whereby the variables will be applied and operationalized in the case studies.

Table 1 – Typological-comparative framework on international military organizations

Variables	Modes			
Isomorphism	Normative	Mimetic	Coercive	Competitive
	Broadcasting	Chain-imitation	Mediation	
Dependence	Financial	Technological	Operational	Doctrinal
Operational Profile	Pragmatic		Absolutist	
Intercultural Strategy	Assimilation	Separation	Integration	
Multinationalism	Vertical		Horizontal	
Specialization	Simple		Advanced	
Operational Partnership	Attached	Embedded	Co-deployed	Composite

Source: own elaboration.

a) Isomorphism

Following the sociological new institutionalism, the first variable compares 'isomorphic pressures' (DIMAGGIO; POWEL, 1983) and 'modes of 'diffusion' (SHALIN; WEDLIN, 2008). As shown before, several authors have sketched how a "rationalized environment" has been conducive to produce military isomorphism. We have already detailed its primary mechanisms. However, we will repeat them here once it may help readers to understand this work better. These are:

- *Normative pressures*: stemming from military professionalization through formal educational basis and networks across which new models diffuse (FARRELL, 2005; DIMAGGIO; POWEL, 1983).
- *Mimetic pressures*: are responses to uncertainty (DIMAGGIO; POWEL, 1983), or the identification needs of actors (SHALIN; WEDLIN, 2008), resulting in imitative modeling from "prestige" or "reputation" of others.
- *Coercive pressures*: referring to actors in an unequal relation compelling others to adopt the same organizational concept. Hence, the two keywords here are power and dependence.
- *Competitive pressures*: based on the assumption that the "anarchic system" creates powerful competitive incentives - mainly between great powers – to adopt the most successful military practices (FARRELL, 2005; GOLDMAN, 2006).

Center-Periphery relations may drive isomorphic pressures. As Farrell (2005) points out, there is a "one-way street" trend of normative military isomorphism in that peripheral and small states "seek the prestige attached to great-power military symbols, as well as the certainty provided by great-power scripts for military action" (p. 466). Following Wendt and Barnett (1993) and Pretorius (2008), this "one-way street" trend expresses broader asymmetries in which central countries have shaped peripheral elites' ideas about what constitutes a 'modern army' (even multinational armies).

Considering typologies of Sahlin and Wedlin (2008, p. 227), the military diffusion process can express at least three different ways through which ideas, models, and practices are diffused and adopted:

- Via the *broadcasting mode*: a central model inspiring (or leaving no alternative to) others.
- Via the *chain mode of imitation*: an idea or practice being repeated but in different links without knowing the origin of its development.
- The *mediation by others* (also called *carriers*): diffusion via international organizations such as NATO or the UN, as well as via media and researchers in expert committees, among others.

Ideas, concepts, or models can be edited and reshaped as they travel between different emulators. In this sense, diffusion can generate not only homogenization but also variation or change patterns within military isomorphism.

b) Dependence

As argued, global military isomorphism would not be entirely understood without the implications of peripheral military dependence. But here lies a more fundamental question: What are the kinds of external dependence in military organizations? As Rouquie (1984, p. 168) pointed out, military dependence is a "multifaceted" phenomenon. Authors such as Wendt and Barnett (1993), and Silva (2018) argue that the factors of military dependency, mainly in peripheral countries, tend to be 'capital-intensive' (based in technocratic systems, weapons, and human capital demands). However, they do not delve into a typology of military dependency to understand more thoroughly the empirical differences between organizations. In this regard, some propositions developed in the so-called "resource-dependence theory" (PFEFFER; SALANCIK, 2003) are useful. This approach assumes that to survive every organization

requires external resources, that is resources that are controlled by others. Thus, organizations are always constrained by uncertainties and networks of interdependence with others. The key to our analysis is the kind of external resources that may generate external dependence and control in military organizations. We distinguish at least four kinds of resources generating military dependence to glimpse empirically its main modern patterns:

- *Financial*: when external financial assets support the activity of military organizations.
- *Technological*: when military capabilities' development relies on the transference of science and technology (S&T) from others.
- *Operational*: when external support with respect to personnel or equipment is needed to execute tasks at the operational/tactical level during deployments.
- *Doctrinal*: when military organizations sustain their formation in emulating doctrines, skills, and concepts created by others.

c) Operational profile

As shown, processes towards isomorphism can affect organizational changes. Now, it is important to note that these changes also affect the normative scope of the use of force. For instance, a multinational peacekeeping operation often requires its personnel to adopt Rules-of-Engagement such as the "non-use of force except in self-defense" of UN missions. These rules denote an "operational culture" consisting of a common set of values and beliefs at the strategic and operational levels, in which nonetheless local, regional, and national environments can interfere, generating different approaches of operations (e.g., RUFFA, 2017; SOETERS, 2021). Theoretically, perceptions on how to understand the use and scope of force, its *modus operandi*, and environment can be typified in nuances on the "hard" and "soft" uses of force (JOHNSTON, 1995) or more deterministic or discontinuous visions in relation to the role of violence in military pacification.⁵¹ Following Janowitz's footsteps in the modern military

⁵¹ One of the pioneers in the West in demonstrating how cultural differences shape generic interorganizational agencies has been Geert Hofstede (1984). His work reflects a given national culture defined as "a collective programming of the mind that distinguishes the members of one group or category of people from another" (HOFSTEDE, 2010, p. 9). In Hofstede's conception, culture is the "software of the mind"; it makes the hardware, the human brain, work. Despite criticism, he developed a model of dimensions of cultural value that remains the most robust and influential model on culture in central countries, stimulating several works in the cross-national perspective in military organizations. See, for instance: Soeters (1997) Soeters, Bos-Bakx, (2003), Moskos and Wood (1988), Ruffa, 2017; Dalgaard-Nielsen (2005) and Friessendorf (2008).

system, we can distinguish two main ideal approaches with respect to *operational profiles* (Janowitz 1971 *apud* TRAVIS, p. 264):

- the *absolutist* approach, emphasizes the importance of wins (fast), dominance over enemies, coercion, punishment and combat mentality. "Since the political objectives of war are gained by victory, the more complete the victory, the greater the possibility of achieving political goals". And
- the *pragmatic* approach, emphasizes lasting success, persuasion, and adaptation to others, stability, peace, and reconstruction maintenance, a discontinuity on the use or the threat of violence by adapting it to political objectives.

d) Intercultural strategy

Another important dimension linked to culture in international military organizations has been how these manage interoperability challenges coming from differences in language, beliefs, and practices among military personnel (SOETERS, 2018, p. 25-28). Intercultural and inter-organizational interactions occur in commanding headquarters, in project teams from different nations working together, submit of military and politician personnel from different countries working together or headquarters in the process of internationalizing their workforce. Interactions also can occur at operational and tactical levels in missions, exercises, and operations. All these encounters are not exempt from tensions or *caveats*⁵² among mindsets about the meaning of commitment, Rules-of-Engagements, visions of military competence, standards operating, technologies, and perceptions on who is in power, who has the largest economic, and reputational capital. For these reasons, it is easier to create multinational units than to make them actually work (ARTEAGA, 2015). In general, there are at least three ways to deal with the challenges provoked by inter-organizational and intercultural interactions (SOETERS, 2018, p. 27-28; SOETERS; TRESCH; 2010):

- *Assimilation*: occurs when smaller or junior partners adapt and often become affiliates of a larger or a senior partner from whom they are dependent or whom they consider superior.

⁵² In NATO concept, *caveat* is any limitation, restriction, or constraint by a nation on its military forces or civilian elements under NATO command and control or otherwise available to NATO, that does not permit commanders to deploy and employ these assets fully in line with the approved operation plan. NATO Standardization Agency. **Glossary of Terms and Definitions**, AAP-6(2008), 2008, p. 2-C-2,).

- *Separation*: emerges during operations in three main ways:
 - dividing the area of operations into smaller geographic segments or areas assigned to different leading nations;
 - separating the operation in different periods of time;
 - task-related separation, distributing various tasks to particular units.
- *Integration*: occurring least frequently as it is the most complex way to achieve cooperation between armed forces of different nations. In this mode military personnel is integrated in the multinational military organization without national distinctions under the idea that all nations are equal equivalents and can make a comparable contribution at all force levels.

e) Multinationalism

Another distinction refers to what Soeters and Manigart (2008, p. 3) have called *multinationalism* in the military organizational matrix. Two forms may be distinguished:

- *Horizontal multinationalism*, the most traditional form of interaction between national contingents, consisting of a basic alignment of units where contacts related to operations only occur at the level of headquarters. And
- *Vertical multinationalism*, which implies a greater and deeper degree of cooperation and interaction between national components, taking the form of mixed units.⁵³

f) Specialization

Another dimension is the degree of specialization – *simple* or *advanced* - in multinational cooperation (SOETERS; MANIGART, 2008, p. 3):

- *Simple integration*: there is no task specialization between national components constituting the task force and cooperation takes the form of a simple juxtaposition of the national units. And
- *Advanced cooperation*: there is a certain degree of specialization in the execution of the mission or operation's set of tasks.

⁵³ According to Soeters and Manigart (2008), if these two dimensions (multinationalism and specialization) are crossed, we can obtain four distinct forms of multinational military cooperation: "simple horizontal" (eg, the Eurobody); "Advanced horizontal" (Oper. Enduring Freedom-Afghanistan); "Simple vertical" (ISAF) and "advanced vertical" (There are no examples to date, but perhaps someday).

g) Operational Partnerships

The analysis of military multinationalism can be complemented by adding the perspective on *operational partnerships* in peacekeeping missions, which is also valid for our standing “operational partnerships in-waiting” (DANIEL *et al.*, 2015). The focus here is on how is or could be the formation of command and units during deployments. There are four types of partnerships based on two crossing variables: Does the partnership use multinational command structures? Does the partnership feature multinational operational units? These are:

- *Attached*: an independent operational unit works alongside and is under the operational command of a larger unit.
- *Embedded*: troops from a country are integrated within operational units of another country to form mixed units under the command structure of the latter.
- *Co-deployed*: distinct national units operate as part of a multinational command involving officers from both countries.
- *Composite*: troops from different countries form mixed units that serve under a multinational command involving officers from two or more countries.

In these categories, “operational partners” can be *junior*, *senior*, or *equal* partners, as determined by mandates, the size of countries' troop contributions, and their reputation and international standing.

h) Method details

As mentioned in the introduction, our method analysis consists of a synchronous comparison on inter-organizational and operational differences (the “most different systems”) (Hopkin, 2010), according to the seven variables of the analytical framework. In this way, we created a multivariable analysis method for international military organizations.

Regarding the variable *isomorphism* (DIMAGGIO; POWELL, 1983), to analyze its different causes (*isomorphic pressures*) around the EASF, Southern Cross, and PSF, the research examined government reports, official documents, and military and civil speeches in interviews on their command structures, military units, training, and ongoing organizational projects to trace indicators of identifications, emulations, or the need towards standards and external references. On the possible *modes of diffusion* in each case (SAHLIN; WEDLIN, 2008), the study inquired how the regional level - with its various organizations - behaves in

the face of the diffusion of external models of force and standards in the field of international conflict management. At least three options were considered: a) The existence of a local epicenter with the adequate capacity to adopt global standards and coordinate their translations at the regional level; b) situations in which global standards are adopted between different local actors but in an uncoordinated way. And c) the presence of a close and direct peripheral link with the broadcasting center, leaving no alternative to regional mediations.

Second, the perspective of *external dependence* can manifest itself in different conditions. *Operational dependence* can be tested only in cases of deployments in real crisis scenarios based on indicators *in situ* of external support. In other cases, the analysis of all dependence types can focus on how external tangible and intangible resources affect, or not, the “local ownership” principle within organizations. It refers to its members' ability to internally drive its change processes despite possible dependence on resources (PFEFFER; SALANCIK, 2003). Following Simister and Smith (2010), this principle is the criterion that usually differentiates the *outside-in* perspective of ‘capacity-building’ programs and the *inside-out* of ‘capacity-development’ programs. On the one hand, ‘Capacity-building’ is “often understood as a purposeful, externally driven process to strengthen capacity over time” (p. 3). On the other hand, ‘Capacity-development’ is seen as ‘an internal capacity-building process’.

In the third place, to comparatively analyze *operational profiles*, we have focused on the ‘operational concept’ in the three cases according to each force's structure. Operational concepts are generic schemes of maneuver. They provide the conceptual basis for operational planning and influence the design and employment of military forces (ECHEVARRIA II, 2016).

Fourth, to analyze the *intercultural strategies* in the three case studies, our research sought to understand historical and power relations processes in constructing the identity of the member-states regarding ethnic-linguistic, religious, and national features in their postcolonial relations. In this way, we compared indicators linked to the cultural heterogeneity/homogeneity of personnel and military and their implications within the international military organizations.

The variable's *multinationalism* and *specialization* consist of tracking formal indicators of inter-organizational interactions, forms of training and deployments in eventual missions, resources contributions among member-states, and their distribution of functions and roles in the organizational structure of each case. Finally, *operational partnerships* analysis was based on the study of inter-organizational interactions, albeit emphasizing military deployment procedures.

In this way, the following three chapters (3, 4, and 5) study each case separately, starting with EASF, then Southern Cross Force, and finally Peninsula Shield. Thus, in the comparative chapter (chapter 6), all the variables and typologies presented here are compared and fully elucidated in a cross-regional relational perspective among the three cases. In particular, the last four variables of the analytical framework are applied explicitly only in the comparative chapter.

3 AFRICA: THE EASTERN AFRICA STANDBY FORCE

Despite various innovations in recent years, the African continent has relied on external solutions for its endemic challenges; this is a long history. Nowadays, the idea of "African solution to African problems" has become a compelling maxim of the African Union and its leading member states like South Africa and Nigeria (MNGOMEZULU, 2019, p. 12, NATHAN, 2013, p. 48). The catchall phrase was coined by the political economist George Ayittey (1992; 1994) in response to the behavior of the international community in the humanitarian disasters in Somalia. Ayittey relieves what he calls "ownership of solutions" - if you formulate your own solutions to your problems, you would have every reason and incentive to see them work. External or foreign solutions were not viable in Africa since they were either "imported" or "dictated" to Africans. Therefore, Africans would not own those solutions. It implies that this is the time for Africans to take things into their "own hands" and use their resources to solve Africa's troubles. These resources also imply knowledge. As one security analyst in Africa argued, "we should first understand our problems and come up with solutions employing our own perspectives" (FIGUREMARIAM, 2008, p. 1). Here knowledge is essential to develop a capacity to understand "own problems". Precisely, *epistemic autonomy* to manage an idea of "own problems" and eventually "own organizational forms" seems to be more a wish than a reality in the African destinies.

With this normative spirit, in 2004, countries from East African coordinated in the regional organization Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD) signed a memorandum to establish the "Eastern Africa Standby Brigade" (IGAD, 2004). Since 2007, the Force changed its name to the Eastern Africa Standby Force (EASF), composing a multidimensional organization (with civilian, police, and military components), as well as joint components (land, naval, and air) (BAYEH, 2014, 2015). Currently, the force comprises ten active member-states: Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, Sudan, and Uganda. The Republic of South Sudan has had observer status with the EASF since April 2013 and is expected to become a full member in the short term.

By way of presentation, figure below shows the official EASF logo (Figure 1). As can be seen from the logo, the member countries are understood within the limits of East Africa. The EASF is a subregional organization whose mandate is to enhance peace and security in the Eastern Africa region (EASF, 2014).

Figure 1 – Logo of the Eastern Africa Standby Force



Source: EASF, 2018 – Licensed under CC BY-SA 4.0, available on Wikimedia Commons.


In 2014, the EASF declared Full Operational Capability (FOC). Since then, the organization has been under processes of institutional arrangement and working in the standardization of procedures, doctrine, and training to produce capabilities of operating in the AU pre-determined scenarios (INTERVIEWEE 3, 2020). EASF has been a heteronomous organization within a continental project. The AU supported its formation as a 'regional mechanism' (RM) and four other RECs⁵⁴/RMs that have established their regional brigades (AU, 2003). Within the same standard operating procedures (SOPs) and coordinated in a Continental Planning Element, these RECs/regions composed multidimensional components integrated into the Africa Standby Force (ASF) (AU, 2003; CILLIERS, 2008).

In turn, ASF is just one of the pillars of a larger operational structure, the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), established in 2003, for implementing decisions on conflict prevention, peace support operations, peace-building, and post-conflict reconstruction, among others (see Figure 2 below). The APSA is anchored on the African Peace and Security Council (PSC), the collective security and early-warning arrangement to facilitate rapid response to conflicts in Africa and overseeing the activities of the Panel of the Wise (PoW); the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS); the ASF; and the Peace Fund (PF) (AU, 2003).

Most organizational changes in the five regional forces must conform to the standards and strategic guidelines established by AU and APSA. Therefore, a comprehensive analysis of the formation of the EASF cannot be separated from the continental picture.

⁵⁴ The initial 'RECs' means "regional economic communities". Since not all RECs correspond with ASF Regions the terminology REC/Region is used throughout the chapter.

Figure 2 – The African Union Peace and Security Architecture



Source: own elaboration.

Further, as mentioned in the previous chapter, the diffusion of modern military structures in Africa has deep roots in colonial coercive isomorphism. From these roots, military crisis management fields were developed in postcolonial periods. Thus, the first section of this chapter contemplates the transition between these two times. Then, the following sections attempt to distill different sources of military isomorphism, external dependence, and indicators related to operational concepts and inter-organizational interactions into the EASF.

3.1 From colonial to postcolonial times

Over the last 130 years, the concept of 'Africa' has emerged. It is a European word, and its definition comes first from Europeans.⁵⁵ However, in recent years the subjects of this definition have struggled to take complete control of this defining process. For example, the decision made in 1958 during the first Conference of Independent African States held in Accra, declaring that "the north of the Sahara" is included in the definition of Africa, has had lasting effects until today (DÖPCKE, 1999). In the case of the concept of "East Africa" or "Eastern Africa", which currently constitutes the operational scope of the EASF, the history of its definition is not very different. Due to former colonial territories of the British, managed by

⁵⁵ According to some geographers and etymologists, this word comes from the Latin «aphrīca» «afrīca» and represents in the form of the Greek «Αφρική» (Aphrikē) which has the same meaning. Thus, the current name Africa would have been formed by the Romans, who took it from the term Afri, the name of a people about whom we know nothing. The Roman conquerors called the territory of Carthage Africa Vetus (old Africa), once they had reduced it to a province, and Africa Nova (new Africa) to Numidia. See, for instance: SOCA, R. **El origen de las palabras: diccionario etimológico ilustrado**. Rey Naranjo. Barcelona: 2018. 525 p.

“East Africa High Commission” , also the German East Africa, the word East Africa is often (especially in the English language) used to specifically refer to the area now comprising Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda. However, this has never been the convention in many other languages (for instance, speakers of *Kiswahili* in that region), where the term had a broader context and therefore typically included Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Somalia (FITZPATRICK; PARKINSON; RAY, 2006; MAXON, 2009).

Regarding African armies, these are often described as a product of the western colonial era, which is too simplistic (ASSENSOH; ALEX-ASSENSOH, 2001). Already during pre-colonial times, warfare was far from unknown. There was autochthonous expertise that has played a crucial role in the history of the continent. However, the geo-cultural metrics of modern observers have often considered it highly "ritualized" and with "limited objectives" (CHUTER; GAUB, 2016, p. 9) or incapable of maintaining armies until the European arrival.⁵⁶ Many societies did have structures of Force designed for war-waging. The Zulu *Impi* (meaning war or combat bodies) were particularly prominent. Shaka Zulu's reign established his army in 1810, which was able to survive the Anglo-Zulu war of 1879 (REID, 2012). The "Ashanti Empire" has also stood out for its fierce and warrior culture (FAZILET, 2012). Other were pastoral societies with minor structures that adopted non-modern approaches to warfighting. The Maasai warriors - the *moran* - are examples of non-modern terms of organization and combat forms (TIGNOR, 1972).

With the European colonization, mainly from the second half of the 19th century and its cast upon at the Berlin Conference (1884-1885), these autochthonous expressions began to be subsumed, not absolutely, but critically, within the attributes of the world-force system (professionalism, technologism, and statism). In this period, no modern IGOs contributed to standardizing modern military structures or models of crisis management, nor were there formally independent states, with a few exceptions, such as Abyssinia and Liberia. What predominated in Africa were colonial administrations and factories managed by several imperial powers (CHUTER; GAUB, 2016; OLAWALE; SKÖNS, 2014). Far from the postcolonial imperatives of consensual management strategies, the colonial diffusion of modern doctrines and forces has obeyed much more to forms of *coercive pressures* than to *mimetic* (DIMAGGIO; POWELL, 1983). We must regard that mimetic isomorphism implies

⁵⁶ Assensoh and Alex-Assensoh quote Basil Davidson, the celebrated London based scholar on Africa, in their edited volume, *African Crossroads*: “Africans have been alienated from their own history by Europeans.”. See more in: Assensoh, A, B, Yvette M. Alex-Assensoh. **African military history and politics: coups and ideological incursions, 1900–present**. Palgrave. New York: p. 48. 2001.

some degree of autonomy of the emulators to choose how and when to make translations of central concepts. For some decision-making capacity, recognition is required both by the broadcasting center and the emulators themselves. However, the colonial regime in Africa was built on suppressing the agency capacity of the colonized, and 'imitation', as a relatively autonomous activity, was curtailed, except for rare exceptions.⁵⁷

African colonial troops were frequently lightly armed gendarmeries, patrolling troublesome borders against hostile neighbors, searching tax evaders and low-level insurgents, and otherwise enforcing order (REID, 2012, p. 150-155). The primary function of African colonial forces was local security and border control. In general, the African workforce served imperial interests to maximize local self-sufficiency without recourse to European forces and minimize colonial surveillance costs through African units' standardization (REID, 2012; CROCKER, 1974, p. 273). From the early 19th century, the British raised local levies in each coastal territory of Gambia, Sierra Leone, and the Gold Coast. The so-called "Forty Thieves", or the "Oil Rivers Irregulars", were one such 'regiment', guarding English commercial interests. Loosely run militias acquired more permanent and official aspects like the "Royal West African Frontier Force" or the "West African Regiment". The French began recruiting men into the *Tirailleurs Senegalais* from the 1850s. Later, in 1890, France created the *Troupes Coloniales*, which became a prominent feature of its defense policy, with more than 40 African battalions for external service during the interwar years (CROCKER, 1974, p. 273). One of the larger forces in the early 1900s was the *Belgian Force Publique*, at some 20,000, recruited among rootless and displaced. In countries with a sizeable European settler population, ranging from Rhodesia in the East to Senegal in the West, colonial forces were often raised and led by white officers; some were incorporated into the western armies and fought in the world wars of the

⁵⁷ In the rare case of Abyssinia in this period, the Shoa Kingdom under Menelik was a great admirer of European modernity and military and executed modernization policies like no other government before. Between 1880 and 1900, Menelik imported a massive number of rifles, Hotchkiss guns, and artillery pieces while hiring French and Russian military experts to instruct his soldiers in their use. With this policy, Menelik promotes the professionalization of the Ethiopian army and later was able to repulse an Italian attempt at conquest in the battle of Adowa in 1896. In other words, as a result of mimetic pressures, the emulation of those modern force models made it possible to reinforce sovereign attributes in Abyssinia at the end of the 19th century - at least for a time, if we regard the invasion of Ethiopia in 1935 by Italy. See: LUCKHAM, R; BEKELE, D. **Foreign Powers and Militarism in the Horn of Africa: Part I**. African Political Economy, p. 11. 1984.

20th century (COATES, 2020; KOLLER, 2017; PAGE, 1987). It also highlights a colonial type of "combined forces" that spread modern armies in Africa (REID, 2012).⁵⁸

In the apex of the "imperial pax" between the 1920s and the 1940s, African armies were increasingly ethnically defined due to the 'martial race' theory. Ethnic minorities were often disproportionately recruited into the militaries, as did the elevated *spirit of corps* with which colonial officers deliberately imbued soldiers. It was an obstacle to professionalization that the post-colonial period inherited government methods as personal rules, patrimonialism, and ethnic nepotism around the military (HOWE, 2001). In some cases, the army directly interrupts the liberal democratic process. Many African forces' 'national' representation is problematic as military leaders had strong incentives due to ethnic loyalties to resist a transition to liberal democracy and majority rule (OUÉDRAOGO, 2014; BARKA; NCUBE, 2012).

According to Olawale and Sköns (2014, p. 2-3) at formal independence, a majority of African states remained tied to their former colonial rulers through defense and security agreements, which frequently included the building of military bases by former colonialists, the modelling and training of African security forces on those of colonial powers. According to Crocker (1974, p. 267), African states inherited soldiers, equipment, organizational structures from Europe. The former British and French colonial territories inherited a pool of under 90,000 men (including white cadres) at their respective independence between 1957 and 1964. However, these newly independent African forces were meager in absolute size by any standard. In many cases, it lacks those supporting arms and services that make it possible to operate and deploy armed power against internal opposition (GINIO, 2016). However, this precarious colonial legacy stimulated a vested 'national interest' in military cooperation with western forces.

The elaborate network of defense treaties and the training and aid agreements negotiated in 1960, for instance, with francophones governments, is the evident result of a renewed dependence on the 'interest' of African organizations that 'accept' the military influence of their former metropolises. These agreements allowed it to hold a monopoly over the sales of arms to the newly independent countries and over important minerals such as uranium (GINIO, 2016, p. 8). According to Wyss (2016), France succeeded in establishing long-lasting security relationships with its former colonies. Continuity was built into the francophone provisions

⁵⁸ For example, Sierra Leone's military culture is still heavily influenced by the memory of its involvement in the II World War; the *Tirailleurs Sénégalais* are a well-known Francophone equivalent. See: CHUTER, D., GAUB, F (eds). **Understanding African armies**. UE Institute for Security Studies. Paris: Report N° 27, Apr 2016.

enabling France to take direct action (or refuse to take action) when conflicts or coup d'etat threatened the domestic order – e.g., in Senegal in May 1968, Chad intermittently or Madagascar in 1972, and most bluntly in Gabon since 1964 (CROCKER, 1974. p. 285). In the British's case, by contrast, decolonization was primarily followed by military withdrawal. It was not, however, for lack of trying. The Anglo-Nigerian Defense Agreement, the Kenya-British military cooperation, among other cases, clearly illustrates that the British, driven by its global cold war military strategy, wanted to secure its long-term interests in sub-Saharan Africa (NJAGI, 2013).

Although the decolonization processes meant the "Africanization" of many colonial forces, this did not necessarily mean adhering to autochthonous constructions.⁵⁹ Algeria apart, no former territory gained statehood with more nationalist-oriented military institutions (ASSENSOH; ALEX-ASSENSOH, 2001). We perceive two pressures, one mimetic and one normative, on this continuity. In the first, an army capable and willing to deal with threats to internal security is essential for most African regimes. A modern professional army is ideal for this purpose, and newly created states prefer to adhere to benchmark military models rather than embark on the uncertainty that doctrinal innovation implies. The normative reason is, precisely, the continuing military training and education of African personnel by central countries. The costs of not establishing strong professional militaries were high: persistent instability, social fragmentation, deterred investment, and stunted liberal democratization (OUÉDRAOGO, 2014). Education was often under control by elite programs, for instance, the International Military Education and Training Program (IMET) - that to help spread US conceptions of security and military policy (WENDT; BARNETT, 1993) - or by French military schools that had trained West African peacekeepers through its RECAP program, among others (FLEMING, 2015). This expresses new forms of dependence of African armies; but now with national projects trying to take advantage of this dependent condition's inherent 'benefits'.

In this period the first modern "pan-Africanist plans" in the military appear. For instance, discussions on a collective security mechanism through the so-called "African Pax" have been on the rise and articulated as early as 1967 by Ali Mazrui, who advocated a peace

⁵⁹ The bulk of African states achieved independence in the 1960s. In some places it came about peacefully (in most of Francophone Africa for example). In countries where there was a large settler population, and sometimes a Creole population as well, violence occurred more often. Long colonial wars were fought, for instance, in Algeria (1954-62), and in Mozambique, Angola and Guinea-Bissau (1960-1974) with colonial powers wishing to keep these colonies part of their own national territory.

"that is protected and maintained by Africa herself". So too was the notion of collective African security vaunted by early postcolonial leaders such as Ghana's Kwame Nkrumah, who lobbied for a Pan-African army within the Organization of African Unity (OAU). Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, similar proposals emerged, such as Sierra Leone's call for an African Defense Organization (1965), Nigeria's demands for an African Defense System (1970), or proposals for an OAU Defense Force (1978–1981). However, such initiatives failed. In part because within the OAU, there was strict respect for the principle of non-intervention and sovereignty that prevented the employment of regional forces (WARNER, 2015).

Moreover, African countries were often internally or regionally divided by what Thabo Mbeki called the 'Architecture of Cold War Africa'. Africa became a major battleground in the struggle between powers of the “capitalist field” and the “socialist field” who systematically intervened with weapons and equipment to enforce their areas of influence against the other. The end of the Cold War reversed that interventionist trend. Once the primary motivation for U.S incursion into Africa, the threat of Soviet expansion, disappeared, the continent lost relevance to western countries' interests. As former Secretary-General of the UN, Kofi Annan, puts it, "across Africa, undemocratic and oppressive regimes were supported and sustained by the competing super-Powers in the name of their broader goals, but when the Cold War ended, Africa was suddenly left to fend for itself" (ANNAN, 1998, parag. 11). This will be the beginning of new incentives and pressures converting the 'Architecture of Cold War Africa' into the 'African Union architecture'.

3.2 Mimetic pressures in the AU and ASF construction

Since the end of the Cold War, two main linked factors have generated *mimetic* pressures related to international crisis management in the continent. The first refers to African countries' greater "freedom", and the second refers to the greater identification of African leaders with the broadcasting center to manage their insecurities. This "freedom" had the tragic sign of the abandonment of central economies. Several African scholars argued that with the "loss" of its geostrategic value, Africa was left "alone" and was called upon to cope with the distortions and disorder left by colonialism's legacies and the rivalry of the Cold War (DERSO 2016; LEBOEUF, 2018; OLAWALE; SKÖNS, 2014; VAN NIEUWKERK, 2016). Two major peacekeeping failures underscore such central disengagement. The first was the failure to restore order in the civil war in Somalia. The other was the failure of the UN mission to halt the

1994 genocide in Rwanda. These events, coupled with a growing number of collapsed states⁶⁰, converted the immediate post-cold war period into one of Africa's darkest, bloodiest, and bleakest of times. According to Derso (2016, p. 16), no other time has been more horrific and tragic outside of the colonial era than during this period. Following van Nieuwkerk (2016, p. 4), since 1989, Africa has experienced 75% of the world's conflicts between nonstate groups. The passivity of central powers and the UN's failure in the face of serious conflicts generated an environment of uncertainty that compelled the African states to "get serious" about providing more robust conflict management skills (ABOAGYE, 2016).

In the early 1990s, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) broke that rule of non-intervention of OAU intervening in Liberia (BELLAMY; WILLIAMS, 2005, p. 157). At the time, this initiative was considered "illegal". Nevertheless, they acted with relative success, and such intervention had the delayed support from the UN and the OAU. It was a confusing and contradictory episode. However, it opened the doors to a new regional legitimacy of intervention in conflict resolution. In these years, various African leaders, such as South Africa's Thabo Mbeki, Nigeria's Olusegun Obasanjo, or the Libyan Muammar Ghaddafi, called for a renewal of the OAU and its conflict management mechanism by a more responsive mechanism to intervene in conflicts plaguing the continent (FLEMING, 2015, p. 8).

In early 1990s, the OAU stood out for its statements against neocolonialism and external interference in the endemic challenges on the continent. Nevertheless, as work began on new Pan-African security architectures in the late 1990s, the need for more security socialization with central countries begins to prevail (FOHTUNG, 2016). In principle, identifying all African countries with liberal standards of democracy, human rights, and new concepts sponsored by the UN such as "human security" was crucial. These values were the 'cornerstones' for initial agreements (as the Cotonou Agreement, 2000), donor-recipient channels of security cooperation, especially with the EU: a reference integration model.

The Constitutive Act, adopted in July 2000 in Lomé, Togo, formally converted the OAU into the African Union and finally was established in July 2002 in Durban, South Africa. The influence of the European model on the constitutive norms of the AU has been remarkable,

⁶⁰ The fall of Siad Barre in 1990, for example, resulted in the collapse of the Somalia State. Similarly, after years of authoritarian rule under Mobutu, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), formerly Zaire, descended into one of Africa's brutal civil wars in which millions of people perished. In Liberia, the civil war that ensued following the rebellion that Charles Taylor waged against Samuel Doe's government led to the implosion of Liberia and the descent of its people into the abyss of horror. Likewise, Sierra Leone's civil war unleashed as much horror on the people of the country as in Liberia. See: ABOAGYE, F (ed). **A Comprehensive Review of African Conflicts and Regional Interventions**. African Union Commission and APSTA Secretariat. Nairobi: 2016.

especially in its constituent stage (FOHTUNG, 2016; BABARINDE, 2007). The architects of the AU have not hidden the fact that the AU is modeled on the EU. Mbeki was the leading supporter of the EU model and canalized support for his proposal among the other African governments (SICURELLI, 2013). Gaddafi has admitted that he drew his inspiration from the EU experience (NEVIN, 2001, p. 10-13). According to Babarinde (2007, p. 8), at the July 2001 OAU summit in Zambia that dealt with the transition from the OAU to the AU, several references were made to the AU loosely based on the EU model. On the other side, the EU promoted itself as a successful role model due to its ability to keep peace within its border by strengthening regional integration. As Romano Prodi (2001), the former President of the European Commission, stated in 2001, "by making a success of integration, we demonstrate to the world that it is possible to create a method of peace" (p. 6). According to the EU strategy for Africa (2005), this method was also appropriate to Africa. In order to achieve these goals, the EU used a broad range of tools, such as security dialogue and development aid programs - for example, in the Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES) reached in 2007, and more coercive ones, such as political conditionality (SICURELLI, 2013; HAASTRUP 2013).

According to the study of Babarinde (2007, p. 8), the AU's prominent institutions - namely the Executive Council, the Commission, and the Pan-African Parliament - relatively reflect their European example. Still, the single policies of the African regional organizations also aim to imitate the European experience. For Sicurelli (2013), the Common African Defense and Security Policy are emblematic of this attempt. Despite these nominal similarities, the way power agencies within the AU differ remarkably from the EU. For instance, while the European Commission is a supranational institution, the African Commission is just a secretariat. In this sense, the authors who studied these similarities also highlight a variety of limits of imitation in AU agencies.

Regarding the field of international crisis management, given the growing reluctance of central countries to carry out direct military interventions in Africa, the trend has been to cooperate to "shift the burden" supporting militaries willing to participate in peace operations (WARNER, 2015). Especially since the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, in New York, western countries have shown a renewed interest in military cooperation with Africa. In the context of the 2002 National Security Strategy (NSS), the Bush Administration highlighted the growing importance of addressing 'failing states'. The NSS suggests that the US will work with other countries to help alleviate suffering and restore stability and "help strengthen Africa's

fragile states.⁶¹ Else, the continent has been a growing source of energy imports and profitable business opportunities in the telecommunication and minerals sectors for central economies; moreover, as Chinese influence spreads in the last decades, it is an arena of intensifying power rivalry (LEBOEUF, 2018).

3.2.1 What multinational force for Africa?

On the design of multinational forces, the challenge for AU leaders was to figure out what kind of Force, what operational structure, should be the most suitable for the continent. The AU leaders solved these crucial issues by adopting a specific 'standby force model' and their institutionalization in the ASF since May 2003 as one of the pillars of African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). The AU's "Policy Framework" Document for the establishment of the core institutions of the ASF scheme stresses that "the SHIRBRIG concept acts as a very good model for the sub-regional standby brigade groups recommended by the ACDS [African Chiefs of Defence Staff] and endorsed by African Member states" (AU, 2003, II Annexes. Annex E-6, para.15).⁶²

Regarding its 'Skeleton Rapid Deployment Headquarter', the AU recognizes that "SHIRBRIG provides a good example of the HQ structure" (AU, 2003, p. 6). The AU points out the "particular utility" of SHIRBRIG's Planning Element "as it is a full-time staff with no other function than to prepare for UN missions" (AU, 2003, Annexes). In the same document, there are 13 mentions of 'SHIRBRIG' and another 6 mentions of 'NATO' as 'the examples' of standby procedures, logistic systems and standardizing command mechanisms, respectively.

Concerning the EASF, the Kenyan retired Colonel Peter Marwa (2006), former Chief of Conflict Prevention in IGAD HQ DJIBOUTI, states: "The concept of the Standby Force was developed with the assistance of the UN [...]. The SHIRBRIG model remains the best example for our regions to learn from" [...] "In the case of EASBRIG at the time of establishing the

⁶¹ For more details, see: **U.S. Support To African Capacity For Peace Operations**. The ACOTA Program. Henry L. Stimson Center, Washington, 2005. Available at: https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/15012/ACOTA_BriefFinal_Feb05.pdf.

⁶² For more details, see: (AU) African Union. **Policy Framework for the Establishment of the African Standby Force and Military Staff**. May 2003. Part II Annexes, Annex E-6, para. 15. Document adopted by the Third Meeting of African Chiefs of Defense Staff 15-16 May 2003. Available at: http://www.africaunion.org/root/AU/AUC/Departments/PSC/Asf/doc/POLICY%20FRAMEWORK%...And::http://www.easfcom.org/images/documents/2016/easf_key_documents/ASF_Policy_Framework-english.pdf. Accessed on 12 Mar. 2020.

Brigade SHIRBRIG was involved in the experts meeting in Jinja Uganda and provided valuable contribution, which shaped the concept. Knowing that the concept of standby was derived from them a need arises for the SHIRBRIG to be a partner in the development of the EASBRIG” (p. 126).

We need to remember that SHIRBRIG was created to act as a rapidly deployable peacekeeping force worldwide - just in the same way - purpose and design - as the ASF is expected to act on the African continent. Furthermore, it is essential to remember that before being emulated by AU and ASF, the concept of rapid deployment forces, as SHIRBRIG modeled, was first endorsed by the UN. Expressly in January 1995, in the document "Supplement to a Peace Program" of Boutros Ghali (1995, paragraph 44) - and under the guidelines of the "Friends of Rapid Deployment" (FORD) and later recommended by the Brahimi Report (UN, 2000) to regional arrangements worldwide. As we described in the previous chapter, the same reports on which these proposals were based contemplate the "current experiences" of France, the United States, and NATO as "models" that contain the "primary elements" of the vanguard concept of the Force (CANADA, 1995). Here it is possible to verify the UN's role in the *mediation-mode* of diffusion of the dispositive of Force between the broadcasting center and peripheral emulators. Else, the part of regional mediation and coordination by the AU in translating the management concept for the sub-regions. This diffusion also shows how organizations tend to model themselves by following similar organizations in their field that they perceive as more legitimate or successful.

Since 2003, the entire “roadmap to the operationalization” of the ASF concept was planned in an inter-organizational complex of African actors, RECs/regions, and the inter-carriers of the core force model. That involved meetings, negotiations, and workshops between the AU officers, representatives of SHIRBRIG, as well as the G8, the UE, and DPKO officials to develop a solid implementation plan that the UN Security Council could approve (AU, 2005, Annex B; CORD II, 2014). In this way, the explicit adoption of SHIRBRIG as a model has provided a basis for solid military cooperation (TATSCHL, 2009). Indeed, the AU requests experts and officers (in logistics, communications, and ops/training) from the DPKO and SHIRBRIG to be located at the AU Commission in Addis Ababa – scheduled to August 2004 (ISS, 2004).⁶³ These officers help develop the AU PLANELM staffing and equipment tables,

⁶³ In a ‘non-paper’ prepared by the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) on the operationalization of the ASF, it shares several details of such inter-organizational processes. The report describes the establishment of a PLANELM at the AU HQ in two steps: “During step 1 three officers from the

including the proposed *On-CALL* military staff reinforcement system and studies on the continental logistic system, C3IS system, and training concept (AU, 2005). As a result, based on the Maputo Report of July 2003, the ASPA coordinates a 'federalization' strategy by five sub-regional brigades and rapidly deployable standby brigades, namely the basic standard of what we could call "5 African SHIRBRIGs" (See Figure 3).

Figure 3 – African Standby Force regions



Source: own elaboration based on Cilliers (2008).

According to experts such as Joachim Koops (2009), former Lessons Learned Adviser to SHIRBRIG, and Colonel Christof Tatschl (2009), SHIRBRIG's former Chief of Staff, the most extensive and most promising project among the five regional blocks has been the

UNDPO and/or SHIRBRIG will undertake preparatory staff work for (step 2) the establishment of a core AU PLANELM consisting of 5 African officers by 1 October 2004. In the period from 1 October 2004 until 30 June 2005, the AU PLANELM will undertake and lead the staff work and preparations for the establishment of the ASF including three key technical studies. The output from these studies should include costed plans for providing: logistics; Command, Control, Communications and Information Systems (C3IS); and training support to the ASF" (p. 1). [...] "That AU HQ requests a six month attachment of three experienced officers (logistics, communications and ops/training) from the UNDPKO and/or SHIRBRIG, with effect 1 August 2004, to be located at the AU Commission in Addis Ababa" (p. 4). ISS - Institute for Security Studies. **Non-paper on the operationalization of the African Standby Force**. March 2004. 22 p.

EASBRIG - later called Eastern Africa Standby Force (EASF). SHIRBRIG and EASBRIG have strengthened cooperative ties since the beginning of the ASF project. According to data of these authors, SHIRBRIG-EASBRIG cooperation originates before completing the formal establishment of EASBRIG on 11 April 2005 - when the Summit of Eastern Africa Heads of State Government signed the Memorandum to establish it. In 2005 such countries signed a memorandum of understanding establishing three main elements: the EASBRIG Headquarters, the LOG-BASE, and the PLANELM. Moreover, the Force begins to be managed by a political body (IGAD, 2005).

The Brigade's institutionalization is a relative consequence of the support by SHIRBRIG officers. Between 2003 and 2004, Eastern African officers approached SHIRBRIG's Planning Element with a request for military cooperation (CORD II, 2014). Officers of the SHIRBRIG Planning Element launched a comprehensive scheme, the African Capacity-Building Initiative (ACB), to support developing common operational standards, procedures, and training on a wide range of peacekeeping and rapid intervention issues. The program's fundamental guiding principle was already apparent: SHIRBRIG wanted to transfer its knowledge and expertise in immediate crises to its African partners to increase their ability "to help themselves" (TATSCHL, 2009, p. 93). After some visits of SHIRBRIG officers in the African headquarters in 2004, the Commander of EASBRIG sent two officers to SHIRBRIG's Headquarters in Denmark for half a year. SHIRBRIG's Planning Element integrated these officers into the staff structure and included them in all training and exercise activities. It was the first step in establishing a common basis and a growing mutual trust (KOOPS, 2009). In words of the Kenyan Colonel Marwa (2006): "we have planned to request SHIRBRIG to arrange a study tour in January 2005 for a number of officials from the IGAD, the PLANELM and the Brigade HQs to be acquainted with the concept of standby as soon as the latter two are operational" (p. 126).

After this successful precedent of intensive collaboration, the ECOWAS followed the example of EASBRIG and approached SHIRBRIG later with similar aims (KOOPS, 2009, p. 21). According to Col Tatschl (2009), there were some "key drawbacks". For instance, there was a high frequency of EASBRIG's staff rotation and turnover, making long-term planning difficult and, on many occasions, forcing SHIRBRIG officers to repeat the training cycle with every major turnover within EASBRIG. Nevertheless, the similarities between organizations and the common standard procedures allowed SHIRBRIG to support and cooperate "in a very effective way" (TATSCHL, 2009, p. 96). During the five years of SHIRBRIG- EASBRIG

relations, a substantial knowledge transfer took place. According to Tatschl (2009, p. 96), during the ACB scheme, EASBRIG more and more became an "intelligent mirror" of SHIRBRIG. As an "intelligent mirror", they copied the well-functioning areas, adapted them, and enhanced and improved others. Indeed, when comparing the organizational structures of SHIRBRIG and its African "intelligent mirror", it becomes clear that they are remarkably similar, although with various contrasts (See Figure 4).

Figure 4 - Juxtaposition of SHIRBRIG and EASBRIG

SHIRBRIG	EASBRIG
Political-military decision-making nexus	
States on MOU Steering Committee The Steering Committee	Assembly of Head of Estates Council of Ministers of Defense and Security Committee of Chief of Defense Staff
Coordination mechanism	
Contact Group	Secretariat (EASFCOM)
Strategic and operational HQs	
PLANELM SHIRBRIG Headquarters Pool brigade of Units	PLANELM Force Headquarters Logistic Base (LOG BASE)

Source: own elaboration.

This yields inherently strong potential for interoperability and brigade-to-brigade cooperation. Both SHIRBRIG and EASBRIG designed multinational **brigades of similar size**. On paper, when fully deployed, both can have around 5,000 troops, composing headquarters unit with communication facilities, infantry battalions, reconnaissance units, medical, engineering, and logistical support, as well as helicopters and police (KOOPS; VARWICK, 2008; EASF, 2016, 2017). Both are designed for **rapid deployment** (in some cases within 15-30 days from an official request), requiring approval from the UN Security Council in the case of SHIRBRIG or also the AU for EASBRIG (AU, 2003).

Deployments have a **limited period of self-sustainability** in the ground, around 60 or 90 days, enabling regular, long-term UN or AU Units to form and succeed the brigade (KOOPS, VARWICK, 2008). Both have expert committees and forums **compatible** with the **DPKO and UNSAS structure**, sharing standard operational procedures (SOPs) and concepts of training. Although both Forces are *On-call* and not stationed together permanently, they have components of **standing headquarters** - SHIRBRIG based in Høvelte Barracks near

Copenhagen and EASBRIG in Addis Ababa (EASF, 2020). In both cases, when not deployed, the troops remain under national command, and Unit Commanders must periodically attend conferences and training exercises organized by the PLANELM to ensure the brigade's cohesion (KOOPS, VARWICK, 2008).

At the **strategic-political level**, both forces created decision-making structures separate from their most functional bodies, with functions on the leadership of the Force, the strategic control, and authorization of deployments. Both are composed of Defense, and Foreign Relations representatives, who conform to the principles agreed in their respective constitutive MOUs by the member-states and hold periodic meetings with presidents or directors who rotate among the signatories annually. Member-states can decide on a case-by-case basis whether they would participate in any given mission. National sovereignty would not be affected by membership in the brigades (CORD II, 2014). In the case of SHIRBRIG, it is Steering Committee (SC). In the EASF, the supreme authority is the Assembly of Heads of States. Lower in the structure, the Council of Ministers of Defense and Security and the Committee of Chief of Defense (IGAD, 2005). The Council appoints the Director and Heads of the Secretariat and the Commander upon recommendation of the Committee of Chiefs of Defense Staff for stand-alone missions. The Committee serves as an advisory Military Committee of the Council and the Assembly. It oversees and directs the PLANELM, the Headquarters, and the Logistics Base (LOG-BASE).⁶⁴

On the other hand, SHIRBRIG and EASBRIG have analog '**coordination mechanisms**' - or liaison offices - between 'political organs' and the 'operational'. The *Contact Group* based in New York, in the case of SHIRBRIG, and the other, EASBRICOM (later called 'Secretariat'), based in Nairobi, do the day-to-day work of the organizations. These agencies have military and diplomatic advisers who liaison with UN (SHIRBRIG) or AU PSC (EASBRIG) and the Committee of member-states. In particular, the EASF Secretariat plays an important coordination role as its mandate includes mobilization of resources, management of the 'EASF Fund', the publication of information, and consultation between the member-states, the AU, and their stakeholders and advisors (EASF, 2016, 2017; BAYEH, 2014).

Overall, the **Planning Elements** (PLANELM) comprises officers and advisors of member-states, including the Commander and the Chief of Staff. The PLANELM "serve as multi-national full-time planning headquarters" (IGAD, 2005). It is responsible for ensuring the

⁶⁴ For more details, see: SHIRBRIG. **Steering Committee**. 2009. SHIRBRIG website. Available at: http://www.shirbrig.dk/html/stee_intro.htm. Accessed on: 21 Jun. 2020. In the case of the EASF MoU (2005) outlined the functions of the three policy organs under article 6, 7 and 8, respectively.

coordination of troop units to facilitate common standards and mission planning. The permanent officers also organize and conduct joint training exercises. The Commander and Chief of Staff positions rotate by nation. In SHIRBRIG every two years (CORD II, 2014).⁶⁵ In the case of EASF, as agreed on the MoU (2005), the head of PLANELM, co-located in Kenya, needs to be a military officer of the rank of colonel.⁶⁶ Being Ethiopia, the Headquarters host, appointed the first commander of the EASF, while other officers were seconded by member countries (BAYEH, 2015).

Despite the numerous similarities, there are also some visible differences. First, EASF does not have a "Pool Brigade of Units". Moreover, unlike SHIRBRIG, EASF does have a LOG BASE. The question is, why? In the case of the 'Pool Brigade of Units', that implies a specific legal agreement that commits the member-states in the selection of various types of capabilities to the generation of a pre-pledge and pre-earmarked pool of troops on a level of "high readiness" - as the 'MoU for the Contribution of Units to the SHIRBRIG Force Pool (MOU / SB). The SHIRBRIG Pool consisted of 4000-5000 personnel which exceeded the force requirements. This force requirement would maintain an 'overlapping capability' in case one or more of the member-states decided not to provide troops for a particular mission (KOOPS, 2009). In EASF, there is still no legal structure that systematically commits the member-states to a pre-earmarked pool of troops. In this sense, military as the Kenyan Capt. William Ligawa (2015) and scholars as Tlalka (2013) have emphasized the fragile legal basis of the EASF. Currently, the most important agreements signed a Memorandum of Understanding and a 'Policy framework'. Most of these troops pledged are usually committed in their countries and would take a relatively long time before deploying through the EASF. In the absence of a legal framework of earmarked troops, we better understood why the need for more "robust" political decision-making bodies in the EASF - for the members to broadly discuss – in the Assembly - on each relevant event.

Lastly, the EASF has a Logistic Base (LOG-BASE) while SHIRBRIG does not. The LOG BASE serves as the regional base for sub-depots and maintaining, storing, and managing the logistical infrastructure and other resources for readiness and operations. Part of the explanation through the "Roadmap for the ASF" (AU, 2005) is as follows: "In its system [SHIRBRIG], contingents deploy fully self-sustained for 60 days. This might not be the case

⁶⁵ For more details, see: SHIRBRIG. **Introduction to the PLANELM**. 2009. SHIRBRIG website. Available at: http://www.shirbrig.dk/html/plm_intro.htm. Accessed on: 12 Jun. 2020.

⁶⁶ Their functions are outlined in the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Eastern Africa Standby Brigade (MoU) under article 9, 10 and 11, respectively.

with African contingents. In this regard, ASF owned logistics bases will be required" [...] "In the absence of large military alliances such as NATO in Africa, individual AU member-states may be best placed to provide this capability" (p. A 2). This difference is partly due to the units' relative logistical limitations in Africa to eventual self-sustaining deployments.

To understand these and other formal differences of EASF with SHIRBRIG, we must regard an emulative context hugely different from that of the central countries, associated with various structural fragilities, cultural heterogeneity, and weighed *realpolitik* legacy among African states that affect other forms of military integration. However, before addressing forms of interactions within the EASF and its particular context, it is essential to analyze its other forms of isomorphic pressures and its elements of external dependency.

3.3 Coercive isomorphism and dependence

Analytically, *coercive* pressures are not based on attraction or identification in external models - such as *mimetic* pressures - but on unequal power relations that compel specific organizational behaviors (DIMAGGIO; POWELL, 1983). As mentioned before, NATO has given examples of 'formal' coercive pressures between its members - in the strategic formulation of common policies, admonishing member-States for not complying with the 2% expenditure norm. Even quasi-coercively threatening them with financial, trade-related sanctions because of the "unpaid bills" (SOETERS, 2019, p. 11). In not-NATO actors, like AU countries, coercive pressures of the broadcasting center have also been present. However, given that African countries do not share a legal framework of military integration with NATO members, these coercive and quasi-coercively threats may be more informal, expressed in the denial of resources for those organizations that do not conform to the required standards. It is about the material induction in economically dependent organizations to act according to international standards. Following a Foucauldian conception that Merlinguen (2003) applied to analyze the role of IGOs as NATO in the 'international socialization' of weaker actors, these IGOs can exercise a "molecular form" of powers that evade and undermine the material, juridical and diplomatic limitations under their influences. In more practical terms, this induction occurred in Africa through the control activity of IGOs and capacity-building programs for recipient emulators. In the case of EASF, which we will address in detail here, its operational structure has been highly dependent on resources from IGOs such as the Nordic Defense Cooperation (NORDEFECO, 2015) or the group 'Friend of EASF', among many others (EASF, 2019). If the

EASF members do not meet the goals set out with these IGO's, which are periodically tested - in terms of training, exercises, and standards procedures - they risk losing the assistance they depend on. It is not a mere 'incentive', but *pressures* carried out by military surveillance of donors and the same structural precariousness of these countries.

The relative lack of self-generated economic resources challenges African armies' principle of 'ownership'. In general, the AU and the five RECs/regions lack 'own' sufficient funds to support troops, police, strategic airlift capabilities, training facilities, management structures, and qualified staff to sustain even relatively small-scale peace operations (NDAGUBA, 2018; BAM, 2015; ONDITI; OKOTH, 2016; LEIJENAAR; LOTZE, 2015; FAMIAH, 2015; DE CONING; GELOT; KARLSRUD, 2016; CILLIERS, 2008). Internally, it reflects a 'mandate-resource gap': the disjuncture between the PSC's willingness to authorize or made changes in such missions and the AU's capacity to implement them. The question of supplies is essential to mount modern equipment in military organizations. Poor armies do not have essential equipment and weapons, and they do not also have training tools. It can be a problem before more "ambitious" objectives as 'interoperability' in multinational arrangements.

According to one of our interviewed, who has been working as military advisor to the AU by the European Union: "interoperability is a problem for rich armies, not for poor armies" (INTERVIEWEE 2, 2020, p. 2). This harsh statement suggests that a country needs to have reached many techniques in its control before reaching interoperability at a significant level. "Interoperability is not only about communications or coordination. One of the critical issues on regional forces is supplies" . The national troops (the general or officials) need to get a minimal understanding of users to reach - before interoperability - standards procedures to operate efficiently. However, this would not be the case for numerous African armies. It would be a challenge that gets in the way of interoperability and, therefore, on the goal of rapid reaction capabilities.

In EASF, only some member-states have regularly assumed their membership payments. According to the EASF Director, General Fayisa Getachew, speaking to the media in December 2020: "the financial status of the organisation is currently poor" . Until December 2020, "only two member States have so far submitted their annual assessed contributions for 2020" (KARUHANGA, 2020). Following data from our interview with one of the Colonel advisors of the British Support Team to the EASF: "in 2018, the member-states of EASF have funded around 4% of the EASF training, with the other 96% funded by EU through the APSA

[African Peace and Security Architecture], or from UK, or from Nordic states and some third nations" (INTERVIEWEE 3, 2020, p. 4). The high dependence on external sources was also evident in the EASF 2014 activity budget. To the EASF Report of the Council of Ministers of Defense and Security of 25th April 2014, the donor group Friends of EASF provided almost USD 4 million out of the nearly 5 million dollar EASF activity budget for 2014. The EASF member-states, on the other hand, only provided a meager 2.5 percent of the budget, with contributions totaling USD 117,000 (EASF 2014, p. 22).

As Tlalka (2013) points out, the obstacle must be understood as a shortage of own funds and the lack of military, police, and civilian experts, a problem that undermines 'local ownership'. EASF has declared Full Operational Capability (FOC) in 2014 - before other regional brigades of ASF – but how capable the EASF is, leaves several doubts given its fundamental logical problems to support troops (INTERVIEWEE 3, 2020). If EASF deploys troops while in short supply of weapons and equips, it could suffer the same fate as the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS), which had its 18-man patrol and 20-man rescue teams kidnapped by one of the fighting factions in West Darfur (BAYEH, 2014, 2015).

These orientations illustrate how EASF had relied on external support for all operations, and any substantial decrease inevitably affects the Force's effectiveness (CILLIERS, 2008). The impact of the IGOs in AU REC/regions should be highlighted here. The UN has primarily supported African peacekeeping initiatives and the build-up of the APSA. The UN-AU cooperation on security is evident in establishing a UN liaison office to the AU, major UN funding and capacity-building of the AU's organs, and several co-deployments, such as the hybrid UN-AU mission (UNAMID) in Sudan (WILLIAMS; DERSSO, 2015; WILLIAMS, 2011). Else, the majority of UN peacekeepers deployed in the world in recent years have served in Africa (UN, 2020), and it is not easy to see this massive effort being replaced purely by African organizations. NATO, since 2005, has also been cooperating with AU, primarily based on *ad-hoc* military-technical cooperation. NATO Allies were committed to expanding collaboration on operational support, including strategic air- and sealift and planning support for AMISOM in Somalia. Training support, including inviting AU officers to attend courses at NATO training and education facilities; and assistance to the ASF through the liaison office of NATO embedded at the AU's headquarters in Addis Ababa (NATO, 2020). In the case of the EU, as we said, it is the single largest donor to AU peacekeeping since 2007, for instance, in the nexus of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES) (HAASTRUP, 2013).

Since AU actors depend on assistance from these IGOs - among others - they relatively lose organizational autonomy to take decisions on strategic guidelines, size, and duration of their missions and operations. In the case of the EASF, following categories of authors as Simister and Smith (2010) and Fleming (2015), there are several donors, stakeholders, or partners who, to varying degrees, contribute to a kind of "supply-driven" building process - opposed to "demand-driven" - as an *externally driven process* that facilitates and affects 'change' within the "recipient organization".⁶⁷ Key partners supporting EASF military component have been the Nordic Defense Cooperation (NORDEF) from Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden, since 2009. Else, the British Peace Support Team (BPST), United Nations Development Program (UNDP), and the AU receive funding from the EU (EASF PARTNERS, 2020; DESMIDT; HAUK, 2017). In turn, since 2008 the *Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit* (GIZ) has supported especially police capacities of the EASF and in the framework of broader assistance to the AU and AFRIPOL (GIZ, 2020, 2011).⁶⁸

Funds of stakeholders and donors are channeled through two principal ways: directly to the EASF and EASF budgets or by bilateral partner support, directed to specific programs managed by EASF and, in particular, by the EASF Secretariat coordination (EASF, 2016; DESMIDT; HAUK, 2017). In 2007, some donors created the informal group 'Friends of EASF' (FOE) to exchange information and monitor exchanges with the EASF (TLALKA, 2013). It is unclear which countries attend the FOE meetings most regularly, but the "traditionally" interested in this consist of the Nordic countries, the United Kingdom, Germany, Japan through the UN, Canada, and the Netherlands. France and the United States of America also provide technical assistance to EASF (EASF, 2020).

With the Africa Capacity-Building Programme (ACB) package, the NORDEF has been the largest donor to EASF, contributing more than 11 million USD since its inception in 2009 (KÁRASON, 2019; FLEMING, 2015, p. 53; NORDEF, 2012). The primary recipient of the ACB Programme has been the Eastern African Standby Force Coordination Mechanism (EASFCOM) in Nairobi, Kenya. It also supported the EASF Planning Element in Nairobi. According to the document *African Capacity-Building Perspective Plan for 2010-2015*, the Nordic countries will support the build-up of EASF to achieve Full Operational Capability

⁶⁷ Until recently, ECOWAS was the primary beneficiary of capacity-building programs from the West. See: EU Commission. Action Document for Institutional support to ECOWAS. Available at: <https://ec.europa.eu/international-partnerships/system/files/im2019-wa-c2019918-actiondocument.pdf>

⁶⁸ For more details on the EASF's regular external partners and the support they provide, see ANNEX A – EASF PARTNERS AND EXTERNAL SUPPORT.

(FOC) and strengthen the African partners' abilities to deploy to peace operations and to ensure military interoperability (KÁRASON, 2019). It contemplates a modernization plan of the African armed forces, support to training and education of military personnel (NORDEFECO, 2015, 2016). The ACB program has been managed through a Framework Nation concept and regulated in a Technical Agreement. The support is mainly within the following three areas:

- a) Land Forces with Denmark being the framework nation,
- b) Maritime capacity building with Norway being the framework nation, and
- c) PSO education and training with Finland being the framework nation.

In order to coordinate these projects, a military advisor group, Nordic Advisory and Coordination Staff (NACS), was established in 2009 in Nairobi (NORDEFECO, 2015, p. 10). In short, NACS staff provide and oversee funding, provide advice and technical assistance and report home on the ACB Programme. In 2012, the Nordic Defence ministers decided that the support program should continue, focusing on support to EASF 2013 Field Tactical Exercise by the presence of Nordic experts and funds, enhancing "focus on maritime capacity component" and establishing courses on "human rights, gender issues, emergency management, and peace negotiation (NORDEFECO, 2012, p. 22).

It is important to note here that advisors and stakeholders define and accomplish the goals and missions of a heteronomous organization. Between EASF and these IGOs, it is possible to argue on an asymmetric negotiation: in exchange for institutional, technological, and economic resources, local officers and member-states are subjected to surveillance by the IGOs' effectiveness standards. That reflects the "outside-in" perspective on capacity-building, which measures capacity as the organization's "ability to satisfy its key stakeholders" (SIMISTER, SMITH, 2010; FLEMING, 2015). We can understand here how economic dependence and coercive isomorphism enables other forms of dependence - doctrinal, operational, and technological. It includes the EASF's ability – the Secretariat, for instance, or on the several visits of officer's delegations⁶⁹ - to meet reporting requirements of donors, demonstrate financial and procurement standards of doctrines and joint exercises, according to the external donor's rules, and meet deadlines for implementation, as set out in the donor - designed program or project document (FLEMING, 2015). This heteronomy shows the persuasive power exercised through IGO's and the material induction of African organizations' behavior in a normative direction. Taking a Foucauldian conception, the instruments of

⁶⁹ See, for instance: Danish Naval Chief of Staff Visits EASF. EASF website. <http://www.easfcom.org/index.php/en/opportunities/tenders/9-news/509-danish-naval-chief-of-staff-visits-easf>

discipline - hierarchical observation, normalizing judgment, and examination - are employed by IGOs just as national authorities can use them to discipline soldiers. The logic is, if a dependent organization is using instruments of Force, it should happen so that 'it does not get out of control'.

For example, in April 2018, the ASF launched a three-day Strategic Plan 2015-2020 Review Workshop in Naivasha, Kenya (EASF, 2018) - a six-year road map defining procedures for the Standby Force conduct prioritization and application of resources. Members of EASF Senior Management attended the workshop - also the Head of GIZ / AU's Police Project and Technical Advisors, among others. These strategic plans could not be conducted without the consent and approval of stakeholders. As a former NACS Coordinator stated in an interview with Fleming (2015):

It is always EASFCOM's decisions but sometimes NACS will not fund certain ideas or activities. ...They have developed the plan, we are paying for everything. We always try to see what should be prioritized. Sometimes it is not the right timing. ...We try not to tell them too much what to do but when we disagree with something, we say no (RASMUSSEN 2014 *apud* FLEMING, 2015, p. 47).

The German organization GIZ, whose projects have long operated at the EASF Secretariat headquarters, developed quantitative and qualitative indicators to assess the "impact" of these projects and decide each year on their continuity.⁷⁰ In 2015, to the surprise of several staff members, Germany decided to end its capacity-building project to the Secretariat, implemented by the GIZ (DESMIDT; HAUKE, 2017).

In an interview, the former EASF Joint Chief of Staff Brig. Gen. Gituai bemoaned that the donors often do not support the initiatives or activities the donors disagree with (GITUAI, 2014 *apud* FLEMING, 2015, p. 47). He argued that activities that were approved for funding by donors received a smaller budget than the estimated cost of the approved activity. The activities and initiatives of EASFCOM, then, are limited to the degree of support from the donors. In turn, this affects the degree of ownership in decision-making (GITUAI, 2014 *apud* FLEMING, 2015, p. 47). The EASFCOM Joint Chief of Staff critically noted that if the Nordic countries send an adviser or officer with every fund, there would soon be more external advisers at EASFCOM than EASF staff (GITUAI 2014 *apud* FLEMING, 2015, p. 41). The Joint Chief of Staff asks rhetorically: "Do we really need all these Nordics here? Apart from financial support and being involved in a bit of planning, maybe they are just playing golf?" (Gituai

⁷⁰ See, GIZ. Project evaluation: summary report Kenya: Strengthening the Eastern Africa Standby Force. Corporate Unit Evaluation. 2016.

2014 *apud* FLEMING, 2015). In the NORDEFECO side, in November 2016, the Nordic Defense Ministers agreed to continue their support to EASF but emphasize the challenge of ensuring local ownership (KÁRASON, 2019). There is the acknowledgment that the Secretariat has relied on too many advisors, which created a sort of safety net of (human, financial) resources on which to rely and has taken away the incentive to reform the Secretariat and develop owner capacity (DESMIDT; HAUKE, 2017).⁷¹

According to the interviews we have conducted with military advisers from the British Support and European Union at the AU and EASF, there is a general assessment: external support has made some progress, generating headquarters processes, and contributing to exercises and training processes, and standard procedures (INTERVIEWEE 2, 2020; INTERVIEWEE 3, 2020; INTERVIEWEE 4, 2020). All these advisors agree that, compared to other ASF subregional brigades, the EASF has achieved a certain degree of operational capacity, for instance, "in a very small activity with AMISOM and those with elections supervision in the Comoros Islands" (INTERVIEWEE 3, 2020, p. 2). In terms of military exercises "the actions of EASF exercises are far more modern than other regional blocs, but that does not mean that exercises are being effectively done" (INTERVIEWEE 4, 2020, p. 3).

In particular, the advisors have questioned why EASF management declared Full Operational Capability (FOC) in 2014. This attribute would not have been thoroughly tested. According to one of our interviewees, who has worked more widely in the articulation of the five regional blocks of ASF:

I don't think EASF has ever been fully tested in terms of all troops being forces generated and prepared to go on operations. So, I think it is interesting to try to understand how it reached Full Operational Capabilities and what does the West think of FOC (INTERVIEWEE 3, 2020, p. 3).

Reinforcing this vision, another of the Colonel advisors stated:

When you look at successful of exercises you must understand the judge of advanced militaries. So, for instance, the vision of Western militaries of the US would be different to the view of African militaries. So, the African certain thoughts target on training and seal training would judge their success in their own perception, and the Western may not agree in their findings (INTERVIEWEE 4, 2020, p. 2).

⁷¹ In 2016, the policy directors of NORDEFECO invited the management of EASF along with the director of the Secretariat of EASF, Chanfi Issimail to a meeting in Copenhagen to discuss EASF's development. In 2017, at a meeting with Scandinavian technical advisors through NACS, EASF Director, Dr. Abdillahi Omar Bouh "took the opportunity to thank the Nordic countries for the support they have accorded EASF over the years". See, EASF, "Management Holds Talks with Technical Advisors from Nordic Countries. EASF. Available at: <http://www.easfcom.org/index.php/en/about-easf/9-news/338-management-holds-talks-with-technical-advisors-from-nordic-countries>.

The fact that EASF members declared FOC without the Western advisors' explicit approval marks certain limits to their external influence. On the other hand, we asked one of our interviewees about the 'proactivity' of the EASF, and it was interesting to note that they are waiting for better performance in military exercises given the high amount of financial resources:

[...] Looking forward to the common processes exercises coming up in early next year, the exercise would be funded and delivered by the UK and Denmark with the AU. Both UK and Denmark are seeing that if you want to you out funding and it is quite a lot of money, you must put the headquarters under the pressures at deploying training orients, which is really important to us. The donor nations that we see those some money as well sends. They judge whether the headquarters has or not an organizational develop. And, so, we are in negotiation in the moment with the EASF to trying to make sure the exercises design, in such way that every point benefit from it and EASF come on the exercises as a better organization (INTERVIEWEE 3, 2020, p. 4).

We note that all these assistances are not mere philanthropic altruism but ruled by the principle of *do ut des* ("I give so that you will give"). The transmission of resources can be interrupted if the organization does not comply with the broadcasting center's guidelines and run the risk of disappearing as such. Moreover, a transaction between IGOs and controlled recipients induces organizational standards and, therefore, military isomorphism in the EASF. That is the coercive aspect of a type of diffusion that resides in the material induction of dependent organizations' behavior; a *suppli-driven* building process where the primary source of actual authority is not the EASF Policy Organs - The Assembly of the EASF Heads of States, or the Council of Ministers - or regional leaders such as Ethiopia or Kenya. But specific IGOs and funding programs "around" the EASF.

Considering interviews conducted by Desmidt and Hauk (2017) with a group of EASF donors, they highlight those specific issues promoted by them, such as combating transnational crime or gender issues, would not have had enough internal traction. They also suggested that donor's influence had diminished due to the declined amount of donor funding (DESMIDT; HAUK, 2017). According to Bayeh (2015) sometimes these IGOs and advisors have identified capacity needs within EASF that were not necessarily deemed a priority by EASF. According to Fleming (2015), it has been demonstrated time and again that donor-driven strategies do not create sustainable capacities and local ownership. We can recall the Foucauldian concept whereby central organizations and intermediary transmitters can "conduct the conducts" of peripheral emulators. Such relations will show particular and precise ramifications describing the normative pressures and their modes of professional individuals' subjection.

3.4 Normative pressures (training standards and exercises)

While coercive isomorphism generally arises from compelling weaker organizations, normative isomorphism typically stems from professionalization. In the military profession, isomorphism often materializes through standardized education and training systems, ranging from military schools to war colleges and higher education institutions. However, as DiMaggio and Powel (1983) point out, the professional project is rarely achieved with complete success. Professionals must compromise with nonprofessional clients or regulators.

In the African case, numerous armies have often been called "patchwork" armies (LEBOEUF, 2018) due to the irregular formation of attributes of military professionalism that the broadcasting center proclaims. Especially in sub-Saharan Africa, scholars have questioned the lack of 'objective' civilian control, the civilian-military separation, meritocracy criteria, and the lack of essential skills of its soldiers (QUÉDRAOGO, 2014; BARKA; NCUBE, 2012; HARSCH, 2019).⁷² However, in the last decades, several African countries have registered a growing appropriation of the "rationalized myths" of the broadcasting center. Not just in terms of subordination to civilian rules and human rights imperatives or modernization of equipment and conventional skills⁷³, but mainly in terms of a significant increase in African peacekeepers.

3.4.1 Training standards

African soldiers are generally more suited to peace operations deployments than fifteen years ago when conditions were considerably more difficult. Africa has become the region that contributes the largest number of soldiers and police to UN missions. Bangladesh, Rwanda, and

⁷² In 2012, both Mali and Guinea-Bissau's militaries asserted political power just before presidential elections when elected leaders would be empowered vis-à-vis the military. Other times, mutinies evidence the unprofessionalism. The largest mutiny over the last decade occurred in Burkina Faso and also Madagascar. In the D. R. of the Congo, numerous military defections and rebellions put a strain on the process of disarmament and demobilization. Human rights abuse against civilians by the Nigerian military in Boko Haram's battle suggest weak command and control capabilities (QUÉDRAOGO, 2014). The collaboration of the Ugandan People's Defense Forces in wildlife trafficking reflects a lack of discipline in the face of economic opportunism. Ethnic favoritism and co-optation practiced in Kenya and tensions between the different forces provide further cause for reflection about military professionalism in Africa (LEBOEUF, 2018).

⁷³ For instance, Ghana and Senegal are renowned for their efficiency and effectiveness. Further, the Nigerian military is often held up as being one of the best in Africa, given its large size and its modern equipment. See more in: LEBOEUF, A. Cooperating with African Armed Forces. Focus stratégique, Nr. 76 Bis. IFRI Defense Research Unit. Paris, France. 2008

Ethiopia are the three most significant contributors worldwide in January 2021 (UN, 2021). This growth is not just explained by the greater interest of African countries in peacekeeping but also by the diffusion of training and education in a growing network of training centers in Africa. There are 15 peacekeeping centers of 'excellence' in Africa - of which eight are governmental and seven non-governmental (ZIF, 2020). The Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Center (KAIPTC) stands out, located in Accra, Ghana, recognized as a center of excellence within APSA. Among EASF countries, the International Peace Support Training Center (IPSTC), located in Nairobi, has been decisive in normalizing its training courses. Some centers are specialist institutions, such as training schools for mine clearing. Shorter operational training courses are also offered on human rights, humanitarian law, mine detection and clearance, first-line reconciliation, mediation, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), among others.

On the other hand, the US Department of State claims to have trained over 250.000 African soldiers and civilians in peacekeeping skills since 1997. It has been done primarily through the African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) and the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI). Further, the establishment of the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) in 2007 provided a new focal point to support several dimensions of AU peacekeeping missions (WILLIAMS, 2011). The French military has trained West African peacekeepers through its RECAMP program,⁷⁴ and the UK, Canada, and the Nordic countries have all contributed with capacity-building of African peacekeepers.

The activity of these training systems entails more than the transfer of information (FLASPOLER, 2019). In the context of peacekeeping training, liberal norms of security geo-culture become standards of conduct. Promoting them by several intermediary transmitters, standardization is also promoted. In this way, peacekeeping training is a form of geo-cultural immersion of local emulators in a liberal mind of standards of behavior that "they otherwise find universally accepted" (FLASPOLER, 2019, p. 1). "Reflecting constructivist definitions, norms change behavior, and '[re-] constitutes' peacekeeper subjects. They are institutionalized at the international level, before cascading to the domestic level once the tipping point is reached" (HOLMES, 2019, p. 10). Peacekeeping training is instrumentalized as a mechanism to transfer UN humanitarian and protection norms to 're-socialize' military personnel as UN peacekeepers and transfer technical skills of the cosmopolitan peacekeeper. According to the

⁷⁴ The Reinforcement of African Peacekeeping Capacities Programme was later renamed EURORECAMP when the European Union took over the program.

"Ten Rules Code of Personal Conduct for Blue Helmets", peacekeeper needs to be disciplined, caring, considerate, impartial, mature and to have integrity. They need to have respect and courtesy of the local culture, traditions and customs, and be able to analyze and report, and that they can manage local expectations while explaining the mission mandate. They must promote the environment, including flora and fauna... (UN, 2020).

Foucault (1991) uses a somewhat pejorative term as it reminds us of how the comportment of horses is mastered: soldiers' work – like many other professions – is subject to 'dressage'. Soldiers are intensively trained to internalize and comply with the rules, procedures, skills, and drills the military organizations prescribe and control. It leads to a normalization process that consists of comparison, differentiation, hierarchizing, homogenization, and exclusion (FOUCAULT, 1991, p. 183).

At the AU level, the Commission's Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD) in Addis Ababa has been working to provide UN and AU standardized doctrines and provide the ASF with similar training and planning processes for the five regional standby forces. Notably, the perception of one of our interviewees is interesting in this regard because of his role in harmonizing the five regional brigades of the ASF:

I have been part of office work to provide standards doctrines of peace support operations. And it goes from there is a high level of understanding of what peace operations entail. It covers the interest in the mission planning process. So, at the moment, different regional blocks have different planning processes, and their aspiration is to deal with once standards process which everybody who feeding to ASF uses it, and then some of the low levels of standards of operating procedures and tactics whom that used by EASF would be standardized. I think, personally, that is very important and there is a lot a work to be done (INTERVIEWEE 3, 2020, p. 5).

The AU and its member-states adopted training structures following standards as the UN Core Pre-deployment Training Materials (CPTMs) and the Integrated Training Service (ITS) (CPTM, 2017). The UN pursues three phases of training: 'pre-deployment', 'induction', and 'ongoing training' architecture (CPTM, 2017). The training efforts in Africa reflect these training structures, which provide pre-deployment training for uniformed personnel (IPSTC, RPTC, KAIPTC, among others), ongoing training for deployed peacekeepers (KAIPTC and ACCORD), and training for peacekeepers who are not deployed at the time of the training (KAIPTC and ACCORD) (FLASPOLER, 2019). The AU stresses that trainings standards are guided by ASF doctrines, AU guidelines, UN Standardized Training Modules (STM) and other documents (AU, 2006, p. 3). "It is understood that the ability to grasp the training required to operate in the ASF is directly dependent on the level of education, in particular in the emerging technologies in C3IS, acquired by officers and NCOs. Consequently, there is a need for a

change of attitude towards improving their professional military, police and civilian education.” (AU, 2006, p. 2).

Following this normative framework, the EASF identified common training centers as the Military Academy in Rwanda and the Jinga Staff College in Uganda (BAYEH, 2015, p 496). In March 2014, the Director of the EASFCOM signed two agreements with Regional Training Centers: the Sudan Peace Operations Training Center and the Ethiopian Police University College on Conduct of Training in Sendafa (EASF, 2014). However, the International Peace Support Training Center (IPSTC) in Kenya has probably been the most relevant to EASF personnel (KIMATHI, 2010). Such center attempted to standardize courses for trainees of peacekeepers and based on the support of partners from all over the world, including Japan, the UK, Germany, Canada, and the US (IPSTC, 2014).

3.4.2 Combined Exercises

EASF has recorded progress related to the standardization of combined exercises beyond training systems. The member-states have agreed to conduct combined activities regularly. In the EASF, the preparation of national units is always the responsibility of each member-state. They have committed to training them according to common standards (EASF, 2014, art. 16) and harmonize their training cycle with UN and other external training plans (KIMATHI, 2010).

EASF has conducted multinational 'Command Post Exercises' (CPX) and 'Field Training Exercises' (FTX) to evaluate the level of preparedness and interoperability to respond to a potential crisis (BAYEH, 2015; EASF, 2016). CPX and FTX are training models adopted by all brigades of the ASF. Even the continental exercises of the ASF, AMANI I culminated in 2010, and AMANI II conducted in 2015 were CPX and FTX, respectively (AU, 2012, 2015).

The CPX category has a long tradition in the North American and British armies (RUTHERFORD, 1964). NATO uses it, also UN peacekeeping, and the EASF has followed suit through the AU guidelines (2005). The US Defense Department dictionary refers to "an exercise in which the forces are simulated, involving the commander, the staff, and communications within and between headquarters" (US, 2016, p. 41). CPX is a category that historically evolved from field exercises, military drills, and war games. The western culture usually recognizes a symbolic origin in the game of chess - "the oldest form of game war" - and in more militarily realistic maneuvers such as "Kings Game" made by C. Weikmann in 1664 in

Germany (RUTHERFORD, 1964, p. 3). Current CPX focuses on the battle-readiness of train staff and commanders on correct procedures, rehearse for field exercises and maneuvers and test the control command of deployment plans and new concepts.

According to our interview with the military attaché in Addis Ababa, these are called "a la carte" exercises since these do not necessarily involve field deployments of troops, and therefore are less costly exercises and less risk to personnel than a Field Training Exercise (FTX) (INTERVIEWEE 1, 2020).

The simulation scenarios used by EASF in various CPX and FTX were based in the "Republic of Carana". These drill scenarios have served as scenario-based training exercises by African peacekeeping forces - as AMANI Africa - and UN peacekeeping training (AU, 2020). The "story of Carana" was initially developed in 2002-2003 by experts at the UN DPKO. It is a 'failing State' located on a fictional island, "Kisiwa", off Africa's eastern coast. The scenario is characterized by dire consequences of a prolonged conflict for the civilian population throughout Carana, particularly the number of refugees and internally displaced persons. In the context of human rights violations and atrocities, the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the AU authorizes the deployment of the AU Mission in Carana (AMIC). This mission would include brigade-sized military components, military observers, and 1250 civilian police officers, including former units, to assist in maintaining law and generate a ceasefire throughout Carana (IPSTC, 2020).

To date, EASF has performed three 'command posts' and three 'field training exercises'. (EASF, 2020). These are:

- 1) CPX 2008 in Kenya;
- 2) FTX 2009 in Djibouti;
- 3) CPX 2011 in Sudan;
- 4) FTX 2013 in Uganda;
- 5) CPX 2014 in Ethiopia;
- 6) FTX 2017 in Sudan.

According to our report from EASF, the realization of a new FTX was scheduled for March 2020 in Kenya, but it was canceled due to the pandemic (INTERVIEWEE 3, 2020).

The first and second exercises mentioned, CPX in Kenya and the FTX in Djibouti, were essential primary stages for initial harmonizing command and staff training procedures. These were considered 'successful' and 'historical' facts (KIMENYI, 2008). The four days of FTX in Djibouti brought approximately 1500 troops, police, and civilian staff together from 10 Eastern

African countries working side-by-side for the first time. According to General Zakaria Cheikh Ibrahim, chief of general staff of Djibouti: “There have been long preparations with experts around the region for this gathering in Djibouti. "This exercise is for Africans planned by Africans to keep peace in the region. We wish for the exercise to be a success" (EASTERN..., 2009). That prompted the Initial Operational Capability (IOC) declaration in 2010 and was essential to generate more significant efforts to fill gaps detected by members and advisors.

According to the military attaché in Addis Abeba we interviewed, the combined exercises were crucial, especially in improving interaction at the highest levels - the political and strategic - between the national headquarter and political representations to evaluate norms and documents that the members intend to build. Regarding particularly the CPX, the Colonel said that “[...] each preparatory paper of operation at the regional, national, or AU level has some questionable items by either participating country, either from the standby force or from the army operation” (INTERVIEWEE 1, 2020, p. 3). At this level, people sitting at a table to discuss problems of a cultural nature may arise from people with different national backgrounds. In each simulated problem's decision-making dynamics, the applications of what is on the paper or document are trained. “From there, participants generated discussions about which would be the most coherent decision, what is right and what is wrong, in that simulated situation” (INTERVIEWEE 1, 2020, p. 3).

Member state's last participation in a multinational Field Training Exercise was in November 2017 (EASF, 2018). Such exercises have been framed in the EASF's Strategic Plan 2015-2020, whose objective has been to maintain a well-trained and regularly exercised force and maintain operational readiness to participate in a peace support mission. The FTX 2017 was conducted from 20th November to 6th December, in Gibeit Region, near Port Sudan, Sudan, under the guidance of the PLANELM staff.

FTX 2017 developed an Exercise Play Planning: (1) Chaos and Anarchy in the Republic of Carana; (2). EASF Deploys its Forces in the Republic of Carana; (3) Evacuations of the Sick and Wounded; (4) Search and Rescue Mission for the Kidnapped Governor of Sinkat Province; (5) Rescue Mission for Kidnapped Villagers.

The field exercises comprised 1029 participants from military, police, and civilian backgrounds. It was probably the most important exercise in the Force's short history. For the first time, EASF visibly exercised its logistics capability. The forward FHQ start-up kit includes a self-sustaining headquarters with accommodation and the start-up kits that were successfully tested. EASF conducted strategic lift with the external Friends and Partners' support and

external supervision in the multinational force's readiness (EASF, 2018). Troops from Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, and Kenya were airlifted to Sudan by Rwanda airways, and the staff officers from Comoros, Djibouti, Seychelles, and Somalia moved to the exercise area by commercial Air. Ethiopia offered to transport its troops by road, covering a roundtrip distance of 3400 km. From FTX 2017 experiences, EASF remarkably improved its capacity in the four phases of the exercise: 1) deployment, 2) induction, 3) exercise play: and 4) redeployment.

Following the statements of our interviewees, these exercises would not always be an accurate criterion to evaluate whether a multinational force is doing well or not. The "success" of EASF military combined exercises should be taken with care because these are not connected with the "success" at the level of deployment or even the 'Full Operational Capability' (FOC) declared in 2014 (INTERVIEWEE 2, 2020; INTERVIEWEE 3, 2020; INTERVIEWEE 4, 2020). The field exercise in 2017 would have been mainly 'technical', and there would still be a long way to develop international standards. Essential aspects of training guidelines would not have been truly tested, "being put under pressure and having to work hard and for long hours to produce products" (INTERVIEWEE 3, 2020, p. 5).

Although exercises are in themselves something very positive, "the question of standards is always key, which level do you want to reach [...] This is a point; after all, you have disconnected the level of capacity, of competence, to the fact to be deployed" (INTERVIEWEE 2, 2020, p. 4). In the words of another military adviser: "I do not think these successful in exercises have a relation to its deployment or not" (INTERVIEWEE 4, 2020, p. 3).

According to the British Support Team officer, there would be cultural factors behind the lack of more remarkable progress in training:

They [African soldiers] do not like to be seen fail or to make mistakes. It is quite easy for people confident in their hands if they fail seen to make mistakes. Now, in my army, we are on big training exercises with a lot of pressure quickly. We are expecting to fail because only by failing and making mistakes do we learn to when with you then go on in operations and you know how not same mistakes again. I think it is the fundamental cultural issue that we try to resolve (INTERVIEWEE 3, 2020, p. 4).

Behind these cultural issues, which the British Team Support will try to "resolve", could be the African military's suspicion or reluctance to expose their weaknesses to "stranger subjects looking for failures". In any case, these tensions fuel doubts among military advisers whether the EASF members have managed to take advantage of these training opportunities.

3.5 Operational concept and operational challenges

So far, the dimensions analyzed allow us to understand various adaptations of the EASF to the global inter-organizational field of multinational peace forces. However, these also influence other aspects related to the mission and operational concepts in its security landscape. Military isomorphic diffusion can be both an organizational and operational phenomenon. The study of this dimension constitutes a previous condition for the objectives of the comparative analysis in chapter 6, relative to *operational profiles*. Further, it is the occasion to inquire about the challenges regarding the EASF operationalization.

A first issue that deserves attention is that the AU has developed a doctrinal framework called “peace support operations” (PSO), which is different from the classical distinctions of the UN Charter between Chapters VI and VII operations (AU, 2019, p. 82). The conceptual form of ASF and the EASF missions, unlike the SHIRBRIG form, may not use the UN's peacekeeping and peace enforcement concepts in eventual operations. “Peace-enforcement” is not a concept used in the AU's founding documents nor its peace support operations doctrine (PSO). Like the EU or NATO, the AU preferred to use the ‘PSO’ concept, which encompasses a spectrum of operations that are not defined by the level of force, impartiality, or consent but rather by function and purpose (DE CONING, 2017, p. 6).⁷⁵

As de Coning (2017, p. 5) explained, for the AU, the purpose of the mission and the context within which it is undertaken inform the degree to which consent, impartiality, local ownership, and other factors shape the mission. The “Policy Framework” for the establishment of the ASF (AU, 2003) defined six ASF deployment “scenarios” that range from military advice to small military observer missions to multidimensional operations to interventions to stop mass atrocity crimes (See the Figure 5 below).

In EASF, one of the latest CPX, conducted from 13th - 22nd November 2014 in Adama, Ethiopia, was developed according to these AU “scenarios” . With the code name CPX "Mashariki Salam", 299 participants of the EASF member-states - including military, civilian, and police components - have participated in this exercise (EASF, 2014). There they worked with the idea of ‘containing’ the conflict in "Karana" (AU, 2020). Deterioration of peace, tribal

⁷⁵ According to de Conning (2017, p. 5), even though the AU has its own founding documents, such as its Constitutive Act and its Peace and Security Protocol, as well as its own peace support operations doctrine, it has to also relate to UN concepts such as peace enforcement. The UN has the primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security, and according to Chapters VII and VIII of the UN Charter, when regional organizations such as the AU need to use force for enforcement purposes, they need prior authorization by the UN Security Council.

and political party animosities have occurred since the "Presidential and National Assembly elections". Consequently, the AU PSC authorizes a hypothetical intervention according to "ASF scenario 5" (EASF, 2014).

Figure 5 – Scenarios and Timelines of deployments

Scenario	Description	Deployment requirement (from mandate resolution)
1	AU/Regional military advice to a political mission	30 Days
2	AU/Regional observer mission co-deployed with UN Mission	30 Days
3	Stand-alone AU/Regional observer mission	30 Days
4	AU Peacekeeping force for Chapter VI and Preventive Deployment Mission (and Peace building)	30 Days
5	AU Peacekeeping Force for complex multidimensional Peace Keeping Missions including those involving low level Spoilers	90 Days with the military component being able to deploy in 30 days
6	AU intervention, e.g. in genocide situations where the international community does not act promptly	14 Days with robust military force

Sources: own elaboration based on BOUHUYIS, 2015.

In this simulation, the AU approves a broad mandate of an "Africa Union Mission (AMIC I)" authorizing the deployment of 6,700 troops for an initial period of six months "to restoring stability". Among various tasks, EASF would be mandated to roll out a ceasefire agreement and an action plan for the overall implementation of a disarmament, demobilization, reintegration, and repatriation (DDRR) program for all armed parties in Carana (IPSTC, 2020).

However, it is essential to differentiate those training activities 'on paper' from the question "How capable EASF is?" (INTERVIEWEE 3, 2020, p. 2). EASF has not yet been tested in real deployments - namely, military units in "high risk" conflicts. If we call now EASF Headquarters, one of our interviewees describe 12 months in the term of behaving a number of troops who are not permanently based with them:

If we say EASF is gone to deploy tomorrow, will it have a problem identifying where troops are? Which member States are providing? Which troops and human and training of that troops? That is what EASF have their weaknesses at the moment. I think the idea on the concept is very good, but in reality, they are a bit limited because their forces are not permanently a side to EASF (INTERVIEWEE 3, 2020, p. 2).

So far, EASF has played a minimal role in securing peace in the region. EASF has had some modest activities, and it is possible to describe them to understand their scope better.

By certain limited elements in the EASF or by specific member-states, but not by the EASF as a whole, the EASF has sent military experts to Somalia as part of the African Union

Mission (AMISOM) and has undertaken election observations in the Comoros and Ethiopia in recent years.

On request of the African Union in 2010, the EASF carried out a fact-finding Mission to Somalia and conducted a Force Generation workshop to augment the AMISOM¹ Forces. Moreover, EASF has been incorporated as part of the UNSOA/UNPOS⁷⁶ - Military Technical Working Group Meeting on Somalia. The EASF has deployed 14 officers as part of a technical team that will support AMISOM (BOUHUYS, 2015). Further, the Force deployed a police component to AMISOM. The core of the component has been 142 Ugandans (TLALKA, 2013).

On the other hand, EASF sent observers to the elections in Comoros in 2016. Their main task was to monitor Comoros keenly and carry out a general assessment of the security situation as an early warning measure mandate (MWIKALI, 2018).

In June 2021, EASF deployed an Election Observation Mission (EOM) to Ethiopia. A total of 28 observers were accredited by the National Election Board of Ethiopia (NEBE). The main objective was to observe and assess the conduct of the 6th general election in line with the EASF mission plan (EASF, 2021).

The EASF has not engaged in the Burundi conflict despite this having lasted since 2015. Despite some coordination between the AU and EASF as regards the concept of operations of the potential mission to Burundi, interviewees at the EASF Secretariat - by Desmidt and Hauck (2017, p. 18) - expressed frustration about the lack of involvement in political mediation and early warning, what reflects painfully the failure to involve the EASF timely when it might be needed, according to its mandate and its slogans of “Full Operational Capability (FOC)” .


As one of the interviewed advisers says, “[...] perhaps, EASF has miss several opportunities in the recent past where EASF could have deploy or have a bigger influence, in Somalia and before AMISON started and the elections in Burundi, which prevailing all troubles being in South Sudan” (INTERVIEWEE 3, 2020, p. 2). The advisor alleges that the EASF nations opposed these possible deployments and the possibility of having an effect on the ground has been lost. The paradox, however, is that these nations have had a persistent interest in declaring the FOC.

Following Desmidt and Hauck (201), before relying on clear agreements on standards with UN or AU and their advisors, the FOC declaration may have been motivated by a policy of seeking to show achievements, obtain appreciation, and benefits at the AU and donor levels

⁷⁶ UNSOA/UNPOS = United Nations Support Office for AMISOM/United Nations Political Office for Somalia.

by establishing a 'new stage'. Member-states of EASF declared FOC in 2014 based on assembling several operational pieces of training cycles and various operational capabilities on paper. When announced 'FOC', EASF provided a detailed report and presented its achievement and means to the AU and their external partners (See an example in Figure 6).

Figure 6 - What is FOC?



Source: EASF Annual Report 2015.

Most of our interviewees recognized that the EASF had come a long way since its establishment, and the organization is still young. In the words of one of them:

[...] people of member states promise the capability, and you have to trust to pay with delivery it is with required. The other issue is if the standards should be pre-defined by the AU or not. So, the reason is that a certain guideline such as ASF regional blocs needs that kind of news to pride their own training. They do not know the standard that they must hear at a point when they become a high readiness brigade (INTERVIEWEE 4, 2020, p. 2).

As we understand from the interviewees, the promise of the EASF to deploy in military operations (the premature FOC declaration) expose it to possible demands for concrete actions, which negatively helps to make its weaknesses more visible. There would then be a failure in the FOC statement because it constitutes a kind of parameter that highlights the gaps in the actual preparation for deployments of the EASF.

According to the same advisor cited above, there would be broader legislative failures in troop preparation in the AU:

That is a failing in the AU. In otherwhere, there were training exercises pretend, but it is not possible to do it and then also on political issues, some regions, and some African States well not allow the AU and UN to come to agree on politics at the level of preparedness. So, again, politics gets in the way of military preparedness (INTERVIEWEE 4, 2020, p. 2).

These interviews reflect that there would not be a consistent understanding between organizations such as the UN, AU and regional blocs on how to understand the conditions of the FOC. It is not clear what FOC is. These inconsistencies are largely correlated to the failure to set standards of preparation. It is an issue of concern to the AU's military advisers and which they are currently trying to resolve gradually.

On the other hand, an advisor we interviewed points out that the East African states' operational capacity cannot be evaluated only in terms of the proactivity of EASF. We should not ignore that five neighboring countries have participated in large missions such as AMISOM, although it is not an EASF mission (INTERVIEWEE 2, 2020). Further, Ethiopia is one of the first providers of UN blue helmets globally. Thus, they have been in operational training cycles and missions before and beyond EASF. As the same interviewee noted:

The capacity of EASF can't judge its validity in terms of a number of exercises. In almost Africa, EASF troops meaning one of the leading nations [...], are quite operational because there are deploy, there is employment. So Ethiopian troops are very good but not because of EASF. Because they are employed on the ground of fighting. Indeed, it is not because your EASF product is good or bad that its individual users are not doing it well (INTERVIEWEE 2, 2020, p. 4).

All our interviewees agree that being deployed as 'a Force' is not just a question of certification. 'It is also a question of politically defending a situation' (INTERVIEWEE 4, 2020). If the EASF is about to be deployable or restricted, it is due to 'political reasons', not by military capabilities, civilians, or policemen.

As one of the advisors interviewed stated: "You have here disconnected the level, the appreciative level of the force, whatever it is, good or bad, to the question that could be deployed or not" (INTERVIEWEE 2, 2020, p. 4). The troops' deployment on the ground, especially outside its borders, will always have political issues to consider for different organizational and national interests. For this reason, the CPX and FTX are helpful mainly to exercise interoperability at the political-strategic level - interpretation and application of mandates, protocols between the national headquarters, AU, and other organizations (INTERVIEWEE 1, 2020).

Operationalizing the EASF also encounters obstacles in the changes recently guided by the AU and regional leaders regarding the need for increasingly coercive intervention in the

continent. In the last decade, the continental AU's rapid deployment capabilities have been readjusted to the emergence of a particular kind of operation called "stabilization operations" (DE CONING et al, 2016; also: LOTZE WILLIAMS, 2016). Amid ongoing conflicts, the intervention to contain them in the absence of a peace agreement, rather than in post-conflict situations as many UN peacekeeping operations indicate, characterized "stabilization operations".

Most of the AU operations to date, especially Somalia, CAR, and against the Lord's Resistance, have been deployed to protect governments and their citizens by using offensive, lethal force and other means to contain preidentified aggressors or regain control over the territory.⁷⁷ There is no established doctrinal framework that articulates the strategic principles of "stabilization missions"; however, the lessons 'on the ground' have proved that ASF is not suited to current demands. As the AU Panel on the Assessment of the ASF (2003) has pointed out, today there is a critical gap 'between the consensual peacekeeping model the ASF, and the actual enforcement and stability operations of AU' (DE CONING 2014, p. 34, 36). For instance, in Mali in early 2013, ECOWAS Standby Force did not respond adequately, and France had to deploy a force to stem the incursion of rebels trying to overthrow the government.

Attempting to address the obstacles inhibiting the ASF, since 2013, some African countries have developed new initiatives. One of these has been the African Capacity for the Immediate Response to Crisis (ACIRC). ACIRC follows the standby concept. It did not create multidimensional capabilities but exclusively military (AU, 2019). ACIRC was created 'outside' of the APSA framework, with alternate funding and staffing models, premised on volunteerism by states to deploy rapidly (within 15 days) (WARNER, 2015). However, the operationalization of ACIRC encountered similar regional challenges. These range from outright opposition from some member states, funding gaps, troop contribution, political and logistical worries, as well as the question of how to integrate the ACIRC into the AU's structure (BROSIG; SEMPIJJA, 2015; CARVALHO; LEIJENAAR, 2019).⁷⁸

⁷⁷ One of the first stabilization operations surges in Somalia with AMISOM. What began in 2007 as a small protection contingent of Ugandan troops deployed to enable the withdrawal of a much larger Ethiopian force also defending the TFG quickly turned into a warfighting operation. See more, in: LOTZE, W., WILLIAMS, P. **The Surge to Stabilize: Lessons for the UN from the AU's Experience in Somalia**. New York: International Peace Institute, May. 2016.

⁷⁸ While 10 states signed on the establishment of ACIRC, the 25th AU Assembly decided in June 2015 it would only be an interim measure. The signatories were South Africa, Algeria, Angola, Uganda, Tanzania, Niger, Chad, Liberia, Senegal and Sudan. Key countries such as Nigeria, Ethiopia, Kenya and Egypt are not endorsing the concept, partly out of fear of South African dominance. See: AU - African Union. **Declaration on Self-Reliance**. Johannesburg: AU. 2015. Available at: <http://www.saflii.org/au/AUDECLARATIONS/2015/5.html>

On the other hand, some African countries became involved in another growing military form: the Task Forces. They are not standing structures but *ad hoc* coalitions. These are mainly the Regional Task Force (RTF) created to combat the Lord Resistance Army (RTF-LRA), and the Multination Joint Task Force (MJTF) against Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Basin. The idea of a regional task force was officially introduced in October 2010 at the first AU Regional Ministerial meeting on the Lord Resistance Army. The AU Assembly recommended the authorization of a Regional Task Force in July 2011. Troops of affected countries formed this: CAR, DRC, South Sudan, and Uganda (BRUBACHER; DAMMAN; DAY, 2017). Such forces do not reflect traditional AU PSOs and ROEs as they do not seek a political settlement but rather an outright military victory over armed groups, counterinsurgency, and counterterrorism mandates. Despite structural limitations, since the RTF and MJTF were deployed, the strength of LRA and Boko Haram has weakened significantly, resulting in an overall decrease in operations and the number of attacks on civilians (BRUBACHER; DAMMAN; DAY, 2017; AU, 2019, INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, 2020).

In a continental context that tends towards counterinsurgency strategies and *ad-hoc* solutions, the standby forces composing the ASF may find it more challenging. The situation becomes even more complex regarding the inter-organizational challenges between East African countries. International military cooperation in that region is characterized by different complexities related to significant cultural and linguistic heterogeneity among the member states and various tensions and some signs of mistrust among diverse of the ten member-states of the EASF. The forms and dynamics of these interactions are the subjects of the last section of this chapter.

3.6 Interorganizational interactions

How do international interactions and contributions occur at different strategic and operational levels in the EASF? This question acquires central relevance concerning variables we will apply in the comparative chapter: inter-organizational strategies, multinationalism, and operational partnerships. Some of these issues have already been addressed. We have pointed out, for instance, that EASF does not generate a “pool” of pre-assigned troops such as SHIRBRIG. The EASF legal base cannot engage its national members in that format. In the Burundi crisis, one of the obstacles to the effective operation of EASF has been this weak legal framework. EASF policy framework had been structured on a non-binding Memorandum of

Understanding (MoU), and thus, had a less legal basis for compelling members to contribute to EASF or to enforce peace and security (NIBIZI, 2018).

According to our report from East Africa, the EASF command structure would be more influenced by external factors - 'politics' - rather than legal/formal procedures. The troops are not entirely under the command of the EASF. Even the troop-contributing country still dictates where its troops would be deployable with the EASF, and every year the member-states renew their troops pledged. According to one interviewee: "there is a "gray zone" that depends purely on the independence of that country from which the brigade is".

In words of the Kenyan Captain William Ligawa (2015), this mechanism does not have "a force" [...] "It is necessary the members should commit the pre-pledged troops to the EASF [...] Command, and control of these troops should exclusively remain with the mechanism" (INTERVIEWEE 1, 2020, p. 86).

Following the analysis of two advisors interviewed, a fact that deserves attention is that there is no single leading State in this organization (INTERVIEWEE 1, 2020; INTERVIEWEE 3, 2020). Comparing with other African Standby Forces, there is no "nation base" on which the Force is structured. Looking to ECOWAS brigades, it has been built mainly around Nigeria. In the case of SADC brigades, were led by South Africa. In EASF, there has not been a leading regional actor, but two prominent, Ethiopia and Kenya. These states have a long history of rivalries, not insignificant. The most prominent countries in the region have often been anchored in influences disputes in leading regional organizations (such as IGAD) and border disputes among them. In turn, regional asymmetries have sometimes enabled distrust in smaller states (Djibouti, Comoros, Burundi, Seychelles) over intentions of greater ones (TLALKA, 2013).

Old mistrusts and national interests favor the perception of cooperation and integration through national means rather than the collective regional point of view (TLALKA, 2013; ROBINSON 2014). As one of our interviewees stated:

Something else happens in South Sudan, but it is not in Kenyan interest, for example, to deploy in South Sudan. There have been unwilling to provide their troops to EASF. So, becoming part of a concept of regional force has been very good, but most of the member States really only think about their own nations rather than the region (INTERVIEWEE 3, p. 3).

Moreover, the fact that ten diverse member-states made up the EASF raises complex questions about interoperability and unity of command. The background of the military can be so different that it can generate lethargy and disengagement among themselves within the

EASF. For example, in 2019, the director of EASF was a Colonel from Djibouti (Abdillahi Omar Bouh), and since 2020, the new director is from Ethiopia (General Shiferaw Fayisa). In the Joint Chief Staff, the main General is from Sudan; on the Force, the Military Chief Staff is from Comoros (INTERVIEWEE 3, 2020). These persons have different military experiences. They would have further training and other doctrines and procedures. Therefore, they may also have different national interests. An interviewee asked: Is EASF more important to them, or is the national insignia they represent more important to them? Whom do they listen to first? Is it the national chain of command, or is EASF?


According to one of the advisors of the EASF, reflecting about Kenya and Ethiopia relations: “[...] when you have a rivalry of power in the same area, this totally affects common institutions” (INTERVIEWEE 2, 2020, p. 3). “Never, you will have Ethiopian troops on the command of Kenyan troops, never” (INTERVIEWEE 2, 2020, p. 4). In the case of AMISOM, the same interviewee refers to the inability of the AU to coordinate the national troops under the same command. “AU is enabled to give any order to set up the Commander”. If the Commander is, for example, a minor nation, it would be Uganda, but the Ugandans commander wishes to take orders from its capital and not from the alien. So, the Ethiopian commander will never take orders of AMISOM commander; they will take order of its capital. It starts with a kind of rivalry and incapacity to be a real regional mechanism (INTERVIEWEE 2, 2020).

These observations are coincident with Simon Mulongo, deputy to the AU Commission to AMISOM in 2018. “AMISOM operates in a “contingent-centric” environment where everything — from troop deployment to equipment — is mainly controlled by the troop-contributing country and not the mission”. As a result, force commanders do not have complete leeway to direct their own forces, which can delay or even hamper operations (AFRICAN CENTER FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES, 2018). Such restrictions observed in AMISOM are also presented in the EASF interactions. The interaction between the national units would be limited to a more superficial form about “where some will do it and where others will do it” (LIGAWA, 2015), with communications mediated by the Force Headquarter and the Regional Planning Element. If there is coordination between national forces, it is mainly at the strategic-operational level of EASF, not at the tactical level. Hence, they would not need joint-combined training. As one interviewee points out:

[...] Each national brigade participating in the EASF has its own doctrine and practical application in the field. There is no interference “from above” in terms of how the troops will behave. How they will solve the problems in the field. How they will achieve the objectives given to them, except by the limits imposed on any battlefield, as the ROE (INTERVIEWEE 1, 2020, p. 4).

The interviews convey the idea of forms of interaction that do not effectively seek military integration between national units but rather coordination in eventual multinational operations. If we take some theoretical model of command based on the manuals of the US Joint Chief Staff, it is possible to make analogies between the EASF commands and the "Parallel command structure" presented in its US doctrine manual on 'multinational operations' (US, 2019, II-7) (see Figure 7).

Figure 7 – Parallel command structure



Source: US, 2019, II-7.

Under a "parallel command structure", no single force commander is designated. The multinational force leadership must develop a means for coordination among the participants to achieve unity of effort. A parallel structure can be accomplished by using "coordination centers" (for instance, the EASF Headquarters in Addis Abeba or the PLANELM located in Nairobi). Nonetheless, according to the manuals of the US Joint Chief Staff, "because of the absence of a single commander, the use of a parallel command structure should be avoided, if at all possible" (US, 2019, II-7).

Regardless of how the EASF is organized operationally, each nation furnishing forces usually establishes a national component, often as a national command element, to effectively administer its forces. The national component provides a means to administer and support the national forces, coordinate communication to the parent nation, tender national military views and recommendations directly to the multinational commander, and facilitate the assignment and reassignment of national forces to subordinate operational multinational organizations.

These EASF components would have the Secretariat for day-to-day processes and the PLANELM in Nairobi to coordinate civil and military actions in an administrative role. The

logistic support element could be made up of national support elements and the LOG-BASE of the EASF.

The Council of Ministers of Defense and Security appoints the Commander of EASF Headquarters. It is always an officer (Colonel or General) from a member country and seconded by other nations' officers (BAYEH, 2015). The Commander results from a rotating designation annually (in alphabetical order in the EASF). In case of emergency - or when a mandate is sought to deploy to EASF (which has never happened to date)- when the AU mandates the AU's Peace and Security Council (PSC), it is responsible for the appointment of the Commander of the HQ. Each member State second officers to the EASF Force HQ for two years (DESMIDT, HAUCK, 2017; EASF, 2011). On the EASF military component, there are always inequalities in the contributions of troops. For example, in 2014, Ethiopia and Rwanda pledged to contribute motorized battalions, while Comoros and Djibouti were each contributing just a squadron or company (NKALA, 2014).

Addressing the profound factors behind the formalities that affect internal relations in EASF, we must emphasize the linguistic-cultural heterogeneity of its ten member-states. It is not a minor factor when analyzing issues such as intercultural interoperability between national units. In principle, EASF has three official languages, English, French, and Arabic (MWIKALI, 2018). According to the advisors we interviewed, in terms of interoperability challenges for EASF, “there are two quite obvious ones, which have not been reached really. The first is language. Some member-states are English speaking, but others are French-speaking: Comoros, Djibouti, Seychelles. So, there is a language issue it would be resolved [...] Cultural interoperability is very different in each culture in terms how we work, how we operate, mostly” (INTERVIEWEE 3, 2020, p. 4). According to other advisor, “when you put francophone and anglophone troops sometimes they cannot talk well. So, before interoperability, the basic assets at a national level it is this” (INTERVIEWEE 2, 2020, p. 2).

The cultural heterogeneity in East Africa can be understood as a combination of factors linked to their diverse colonial legacies and the autochthonous identities found there. On the one hand, there are former French colonies, such as Comoros, Djibouti, or Seychelles. On the other hand, former British protectorates, such as Uganda or probably the most important, Kenya, still maintaining close relations with its former metropolis. The trend is where the French were the colonizers, the French language attained official status; where the State was under the British Empire, English became official. When the colonizers were mixed, as in Somalia, Italian and English reigned supreme for some time (BRETON, 2004; OWINO, 2006).

Further, due to its proximity to the Arabian world, East Africa has populations (and militaries) that speak Arabic and where Islamic and Christian communities, among others, coexist. In turn, diverse autochthonous languages are spoken across the borders. East African countries (including Sudan) would have more than 420 autochthonous languages (OWINO, 2006; BRETON, 2004). For instance, Batibo (2005) counts the number of languages as follows: Burundi - 3; Eritrea - 11; Ethiopia - 78; Kenya - 56; Rwanda - 3; Sudan - 134; Somalia - 12; Tanzania - 124 and Uganda - 34. According to Owino (2006), this results in double counting. For example, 'Somali' given to Somalia is spoken in five other countries; Dholuo is spoken in a wide geographical scope as wide as parts of the Sudan, Ethiopia, Uganda, Kenya, and Tanzania. This is mainly explained by the criteria of political borders imposed by Western powers: "Nobody seemed to think of considering linguistic or ethnic areas, nor former kingdoms when delimiting the zone's influence" (BRETON, 2004).

Mumma-Martinon (2010) contends that "given the Eastern African Region ethnic, cultural and religious diversities as well as the anglophone-francophone divide, substantial friction between (and even within) EASF itself may be unavoidable". It is also asserted that such diverse cultures affected the progress of EASF (KIMATHI, 2010). Such problem would be general in the AU peacekeeping forces. Feldman (2008, p. 268) noted that "military commanders might find themselves not only having difficulty of communicating with their counterparts from other nations, but also even with their own troops, as many individual African nations have numerous languages spoken within their borders".

It is challenging to create a well-integrated force having such diverse linguistic backgrounds. In this connection, Bayeh (2014) points out the negative effect in AMISOM. There are French, English, Arabic, and Amharic speakers in the mission, which creates an interoperability problem. These heterogeneous forces with their own language face an obstacle in exchanging and using the information in their joint operation. In this way, EASF's limitations are not only about "lack of political will". Integrating more profoundly and with more interoperability also encounters cultural resistance to modern institutions that seek standardization by reducing their identity differences. We will return to this question at the conclusions of this investigation.

Another point is interoperability at the operational and tactical level, and here the standardization of doctrines, planning procedures, and national equipment and systems are crucial. In terms of peacekeeping doctrine, as shown before in the normative isomorphic analysis, it is visible that EASF has made significant progress on training and UN operational

concepts. However, for military advisors, these advances are always relative. According to the advisor of the EU:

On EASF, we can consider that, in the late quarter, was available to plan and conduct operations conducted by HQ missions. So, the standardization will be at the level of the staff, but there is not in the field of the fight; there is no standardization of all training procedures between countries, of course (INTERVIEWEE 2, 2020, p. 5).

The same officer points out that they have had a good surprise, for example, in how Uganda has operated in the same way as Ethiopia's troops. Still, this surprise is due precisely to that "EASF does not get into the level of the harmonization or standardization" (p. 5). There would be a lack of standardization across the AU and its different regional blocs and looking at the EASF. "ASF is nearly 15 years old. In my opinion, we are strongly supporting AU at least in the way of spirit to standardize all the processes in the last 15 years. So, it is a lot of time. It is really complicated to standardize at the scale of the continent everything. And, of course, every different organization is bringing its own way of thinking and on way of doing" (INTERVIEWEE 2, 2020, p. 2).

One of our interviewees said that groups of African countries have grown around capabilities in radios, systems, and pieces of equipment from the British system or French systems or the Russian systems, and there is not guaranteed to be capable with any way similar or interoperable (INTERVIEWEE 4, 2020). Another of the officers interviewed was more optimistic in this regard. These differences in equipment issues would be relatively less significant given that organizations like NATO and the US have been providing all on vehicles, weapons, or similar calls. In this sense, regional blocks could work quite well. Some states are having achieved requirements. Some nations have expertise in some areas, and other nations do not have it (INTERVIEWEE 3, 2020).

The main challenge of EASF would be on command control procedures and how the EASF contains the information with different national radio systems and different operational procedures. As one interviewed stated, "Two headquarters may not necessarily be able to share start-thought processes and employ that. A member state may have dedicated its processes to planning long processes, and other member-states would teach its officials different processes. So, putting on those side-by-side in one headquarters does not necessarily mean you have an effective headquarter. [...] Trying to bring together men in the same mission, with different processes and systems that do not necessarily work come to able to other" (INTERVIEWEE 4, 2020).

According to one of the officers interviewed, “now is the time to look at these challenges because they are not deploying. You need to work out with other and doing training [...] Only with common processes exercises next year [for March 2021] we are hopefully trying to look at some of these issues. But I think, to be honest, interoperability is perhaps something that EASF has not given, and they are lost efforts too but might want to achieve in the future” . (INTERVIEWEE 3, 2020, p. 6).

3.7 Closing remarks

At least since 2003, based on NATO command relations and SHIRBRIG's rapid deployment concept, the AU and regional organizations developed a specific idea of force for the African Standby Force. As we described in EASF, any progress or limitations in this regard do not escape the evaluation of several external organizations, outside consultants, and donor groups that demarcate a set the goals of a heteronomous organization. These groups seek to assert their normative authority through different resources they transfer - various technical, military, and financial resources whereby the EASF exists according to central standards.

In the context of these coercive isomorphic pressures - and their latent *dressage* logics - the internal members of the EASF, have sometimes shown some resistance to those standards. It is reflected in our interviews where African soldiers frequently resist some practices of forcing failures and expose themselves to more significant training pressures with the presence of the Nordic military advisers. Military advisers understand it as a problem, usually expressed in military exercises. Furthermore, we observed a critical component of intercultural and linguistic diversity among the ten EASF member-states. Such cultural heterogeneity constitutes a form of resistance (or challenges) to the requirements of interoperability, homogenization, and standardization in the idea of a modern multinational military organization.

Overall, external dependence and isomorphism find each other; both result in the current guidance of the EASF. The relative lack of own resources in East Africa generates military dependency (financial, technological, or doctrinal) as well as organizational isomorphism (based on coercive pressures). In turn, mimetic pressures in AU, as the attraction of African leaders (as the former president Mbeki or Gadhafi) to European models of integration, not only generate diffusion of normative standards but ‘renew’ the dependence on the doctrines and organizational models of the broadcasting center (e.g., US/NATO military).

In this way, military isomorphism and dependence are phenomena that are co-generated and feedback by intersecting and consubstantiating in a specific place (EASF). This possibility points to the *iso-dependence* attribute in this military organization as well as the subordination to central powers according to geo-cultural standards.

We will include more final considerations on the complex African case in the last section of this thesis. Moreover, we will review this case according to the comparative relational model with the Southern Cross Force and the Peninsula Shield. In this direction, the next step proceeds to the chapter of the South American case.

4 SOUTH AMERICA: THE SOUTHERN CROSS COMBINED JOINT FORCE

How countries pay attention to their own, regional or global security issues vary largely according to their nation-building processes. Among geo-cultural factors, these include others such as border formation and regional hegemony projects. According to Aron (2001), conflict and war - or the risk of them occurring - are critical elements in forming nations and states, often structuring their social cohesion and shaping their foreign policies. In the case of the relationship between Argentina and Chile, the fact that both countries share more than 5,000 km of borders along the lengthened, mountainous Andes has made their bilateral history the expression of a series of borderline disputes and complex negotiation processes. Several controversies were fixed in the historical memory of both nations, such as the arms races of 1898 and 1902, including the impending conflict of December 1901, the dispute for *Laguna del Desierto* (Desert Lagoon), and the Beagle Crisis in the Patagonia region. The history of the conflict dates back to 1888, seven years after signing the *Tratado de Limites* (Treaty of Limits) (FAUNDES, 2009; ITURRA, 2014). The latter (Beagle Crisis) almost led to war on December 22, 1978. Few moments before the confrontation, Chile and Argentina avoided it by accepting the mediation by Pope John Paul II (MONCAYO, 2008).

Argentina and Chile's mutual interests in freezing their controversies led to a "conflicts transformation process" from the mid-1980s onwards (ORSO; CAPELETTI, 2015). With the signing of the Peace and Friendship Treaty of 1984, a confidence-building process began in a virtuous cycle that has lasted over 30 years and transformed their relations. In other instances, we have studied the evolution of diplomatic relations between Chile and Argentina.⁷⁹ Here we will limit to say that their foreign and security policies started to have at high levels, bilateral mutual trust measures (MTM), which ultimately led to the establishment of a permanent binational military instrument: the so-called *Cruz del Sur* Combined Joint Peace Force (ARANCIBIA-CLAVEL, 2007; FAUNDES, 2009; RUZ, 2008).

Considering that it consists of a "joint" force, including elements of the three components of Armed Forces, and "combined" because it has personnel and means from both countries, Southern Cross Force represents an ambitious integration project and an unprecedented initiative in Latin America. As can be seen in the logo of the Binational Force (figure 8 below), the *Cruz del Sur* is projected from South America to the world, which is

⁷⁹ See, for instance: ALVES, V.; WACHHOLTZ, M. The Binational Cruz del Sur Peace Force and the evolution of trust between Argentina and Chile. **R. Esc. Guerra Nav.**, Rio de Janeiro, v. 24, n.1, p. 14-39. Jan/abril. 2018.

consistent with the original intentions of Argentina and Chile to propose an instrument for the crisis management deployable in any region under the auspices of the UN.

Figure 8 – Logo of the “Southern Cross” Combined Joint Peace Force, created by Argentina and Chile



Source: Unknown author – Licensed under public domain, available on Wikimedia Commons.

Southern Cross Binational Force has not been exempted from isomorphic pressures around central models of forces and some signs of external dependence on central countries and external organizations. The first part of this chapter describes common historical patterns that conditioned Chile and Argentina in the path that led to the creation of the Southern Cross Force. We analyze a posteriori the Southern Cross as a *regional translation* of central models, including variables of dependency, inter-organizational cooperation, and operational concepts.

4.1 Beyond the Andes: Argentina and Chile through common patterns

The trust achieved in the defense area between Argentina and Chile is today more institutionalized than that existing, for example, among important strategic partners in South America, such as Argentina and Brazil. However, contemporary bilateral relations between Brazil and Argentina were not characterized by territorial disputes that would threaten the preparation and eventual emergence of war (JANUÁRIO; SOARES, 2020), as happened with Argentina and Chile. The historic Brazil and Argentina geopolitical rivalry has been replaced since the creation of MERCOSUR by close cooperation and dense, diversified dialogue ().

Nonetheless, not only conflictive borders connect the histories of Argentina and Chile. There are other common patterns, especially in the identity construction of both nation-states.

In principle, both countries have common colonial roots as constituencies of the Spanish Crown. Yet, they were administered by different dependencies: the *Virreinato del Rio de la Plata* and the *Capitanía General de Chile*. During the 19th century, the postcolonial construction of the nation-states on both sides of the Andes was characterized by continuing solid implantation of the Spanish language and Catholicism as the State's official religion (in Chile at least until 1925). Some authors point out the phenomenon of "settler" states in Chile and Argentina because that process did not occur without the assimilation, elimination, or dispossession of different *pueblos originarios*, some of these shared between their borders - such as the Mapuches, Tehuelches, Pehuenches, among others (see, for example, FREEDMAN, 2018; GOTT, 2007). However, one language and one dominant religion have permeated the political elites and the armed forces of Argentina and Chile, which has favored reciprocal understandings and even a level of "cultural interoperability" for contemporary cooperation.

At the level of Argentine and Chilean armed forces, there have been far-reaching parallelisms between their historical processes of militarization. Positioned as peripheral emulators in world military culture, Chile and Argentina have been characterized by simultaneous emulations of common military models - first Iberian, French, Prussian, and finally North American (BELTRAN, 1970; BUITRAGO, 2003; CODESIDO, 2016; DÍAZ, 2020; FISCHER, 2008; CLAVEL, 2002; SOPRANO, 2021). In principle, both countries register the simultaneous nationalization of their armed forces and the strong Iberian tradition linked to the European geopolitical doctrines of the Darwinian style of the 19th century (BUITRAGO, 2003; INSULZA, 1990). Based on an organic conception of the state, the Iberian tradition was characterized by proposing the military function as an instrument of national defense and the intervention in societies characterized by instability and centrifugal forces such as "caudillismo". The military was perceived as more potent than the other instances to stabilize the domestic order and educate the masses in the conscience of belonging to a "homeland". Following Sotelo (1977), the nationalization of the army during that period was part of the more profound process of incorporating primary exporting economies of Chile and Argentina into the capitalist world economy - according to the integrating geo-culture of the centrist liberalism.

Driven by conflict hypothesis with regional neighbors between the late 19th and early 20th centuries, both countries embarked on liberal policies of professionalization of their armed forces.⁸⁰ If France had significant theoretical influence since the political independence

⁸⁰ Broadly, in both cases, military professionalization process consisted of the separation of civil powers and military capabilities, bureaucratization, creation of military schools, introducing the *sprit de*

processes – for instance, as a model of military command - after its military defeat against Prussia in 1871, the Prussian paradigm was essential in these processes. In this period, numerous German military instructors acted in (new) military schools in Chile and Argentina, and Chilean and Argentine soldiers were sent to training centers in Germany (BELTRAN, 1970; CODESIDO, 2016; CLAVEL, 2002; FISCHER, 2008). In particular, the Chilean army emulated the Prussians in its structure, values, educational system, and spiritual aspect and adapted to it from the "formal" point of view. According to Fischer (2008), in the 1880s, the uniform of Chilean soldiers was similar to that of the French. Later, as a result of the "Prussification", the Prussian uniform appeared on Chilean soldiers.

In 1900, they introduced the Prussian pointed helmet on some units, the so-called *Pickelhaube* - later also imitated the Argentine army - which was the symbol of German military influence in South America for a long time. Soprano (2021), in a study on the conceptions of "military history" in the Argentine Army, analyzes how these conceptions were informed by readings of canonical military strategy and historiography of the time, primarily Prussian (Clausewitz, Moltke, der Goltz, Schlieffen, etc.). This German legacy can be seen in their use of two critical analytical categories: the "decisive" or "main" battle and the "annihilation" of the enemy.⁸¹

As military professionalization did not develop without the assistance of similar external human capital, it was a particular isomorphic process to both sides of the *Cordillera*. On the other hand, the sale and transfer of European military technologies spread the mechanization of warfare and contributed to modernizing the nascent peripheral states (SOTO, 2008). The continuous renewal of expensive armaments purchased (battleships, guns) placed a heavy burden on primary exporting countries, with minimal capacities for industrialization, much less

corps, mandatory military service and the technical formation of its armed forces. Chile was the first among Latin American countries to introduce mandatory military service in 1900. His neighbor, Argentina introduced it in 1901.

⁸¹ In the South American context at the early 20th century, the growing influence of the Prussian military had broken the monopoly previously held by the French model, although British prestige remained in the field of naval forces. Through military cooperation and the influence of Imperial German, during the 20 years prior to World War I, there was a radical change in the selection of military models to be followed by the Latin American countries and in their suppliers of armament. The formerly dominant French monopoly influence was reduced in the early years of the 20th century to the Peruvian "enclave", surrounded by neighboring countries supported by Chilean and Prussian military missions. On the other hand, Uruguay and Brazil, continued during the Inter-Wars period, close to the French model by hiring French training missions. For more details, see, for example: SVARTMAN, E. O exército brasileiro e a emulação dos modelos francês e estadunidense no século XX. **R. Esc Guerra Naval**, Rio de Janeiro: v. 22 n. 2, p. 361-380, May/Aug. 2016, and: CLAVEL, P., A (ed.). **El Ejército de los chilenos 1540-1920**, Santiago, Editorial Biblioteca Americana, 2007, p. 273).

when countries such as Chile and Argentina entered the arms race (SOTELO, 1977). Despite the development of the nascent defense industry in both countries by 1930, there was no way to sustain an autonomous process of militarization vis-a-vis European countries.⁸²

These European military diffusers began to be replaced just after World War II by the rise of the US as the leading western broadcasting center. In times of the Cold War, the opposition between "Christian dogma" and "communism" was erected as a cornerstone from which the US spread new doctrines and knowledge that moved away from the concepts of conventional warfare (SOPRANO, 2015; POCZINOC, 2017). The doctrinal idea synthesizing a "new militarism" in the American hemisphere was "national security" (BUIRAGO, 2003). Argentina and Chile ascribed as one of its most prominent emulators of the National Security Doctrines, encouraging the creation of force models focused on "social stabilization" - influenced by counterinsurgency doctrines of French precedent (VARAS, 1987; SOTO, 2008). Since 1950, Argentina and Chile received military training in defense schools in the US, later in the Panama Canal Zone, in the School of the Americas, and at their own countries, contributing to the dissemination of the national security doctrine among member states of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (TIAR). Training and coordination through the Inter-American Defense Board (IADB) and the Military Aid Pact, which established the transfer of technology, instruction, and war material, are also registered in this line (KRUIJT, 2017; WEIFFEN, 2010).⁸³ Using the National Security Doctrine, the US manages to unify the actions of the different South American dictatorships, including Augusto Pinochet in Chile (1973-1990) and the National Reorganization Process in Argentina (1976-1983). Since 1975, in addition to having implemented a consistent model of liberal economy, the "antissubversive" action of these governments was coordinated through the so-called 'Condor Plan' (SOTO, 2008).

⁸² Argentina and Chile, had, from 1930 onwards, a military industry that produced from rifles to tanks and planes - technological capabilities to develop state-of-the-art equipment. High costs and difficulties in exporting them were the main barriers to the continuity of their development and to reducing the technological gap - which had marked a technological distance difficult to reverse. See, for instance, in: BATTAGLINO, J. O Brasil e a criação do Conselho de Defesa Sul Americano: uma convergência de vantagens. **Nueva Sociedad** (especial em português), p. 79-90. Dec. 2009.

⁸³ The IADB was founded in 1942 with the purpose of coordinating the defense of the Americas during the Second World War. It is based in Washington D.C. and according to its statutes, conducted by a military representative of the United States. In contrast to TIAR, it has not been incorporated in the OAS structure. For a long time, the IADB did not have much significance, as the member states did not want to equip it with operational capacity. See more details in: WEIFFEN, B. The Inter-American security system: changes and challenges. **Carta Internacional**, v. 5, n. 1, p. 21-37. Sept. 2016. Available at: <https://cartainternacional.abri.org.br/Carta/article/view/527>. Accessed on: 21 May 2020.

This cycle of national security dictatorships only entered a crisis in late 1980. Especially since the end of the Cold War, the broadcasting center of international security begin to promote the desecuritization of the ideological foundations of the National Security Doctrine. From the center to the peripheries, through a series of intermediary transmitters such as the UN, NATO, OAS, among others, the military approach to "national security" begins to be overtaken by more "complex", "multidimensional" conceptions, with the emergence of "human security" as an innovative concept focused on the individual rather than the state for conflict management. In parallel or because of the above, a "re-democratization" begins in several Latin American countries. The US stops supporting military regimes and understands that they were no longer tolerable (BUITRAGO, 2003; VARAS, 1987).

According to Saint-Pierre (2012), a new UN version of "multidimensionality" reappears on the American continent as part of the package presented by a confluence. On the one hand, the Washington Consensus with its concern for reducing the size of the state. On the other hand, the intent to doctrinally recompose the American continent as a US security area. With this objective, the convening of the Conferences of Defense Ministers of the Americas (CDMA) is formulated as a forum to discuss issues in the area to try to approve a hemispheric security agenda in which a standard list of threats to the entire continent (OEA, 1993). The list of proposed threats more or less respected those raised by the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security (Palme Commission) since 1982 (UN, 1983). However, the priority order basically responded to the North American needs - denoted in terrorism, drug trafficking, failed states, asymmetric conflicts, hybrid conflicts, environment, underdevelopment, among others.

The influence of these "new threats" in Latin America was functional to the national military reforms during 1990 that needed to redefine roles, missions, and new 'reasons for being' for the armed forces in the post-Cold War order. It was also a context of influences of greater internationalization in collective security mechanisms in UN, EU, NATO, among others. However, compared with other regions, Latin America has had some relative absences as a cooperative security region. Latin American countries have not had regional institutions with the capacity to coordinate lasting and stable international military cooperation for conflict management - as observed, for instance, in the EU, the AU, or even the GCC in recent years. In the Cold War order, there are have been permanent coordination mechanisms such as TIAR and OAS, although under the leadership of the US.

In the Post-Cold War period, in MERCOSUR, for example, some Brazilian military studied central models such as EUROFOR, the Franco-German Force, and NATO on the possibility of creating a “Defense Force of the Southern Cone” (BRAGA, 2000; RABELLO, 2006). Later, within the framework of the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR by its acronym in Spanish) since 2008, former president Chavez of Venezuela defended a proposal for a ‘collective security mechanism’ (“OTAN del Sur”) (TANAKA ABDUL-HAK, 2013). Another similar proposal was presented by the Director of the Center for Strategic Scholars of the South American Defense Council (SDC), Alfredo Forti (2014), who stated that the conditions for the creation of a “South American Military Force” would be in place.⁸⁴ However, these ideas and many others have been distant from an institutionalized practice, and even more so with the deepening crisis of UNASUR in the last decade with different member countries that have withdrawn support or even suspending their membership (BRAGATTI, 2019).

Given this vacuum, two relevant implications are observed. In the first place, the UN has played a dominant role in the international socialization of the Latin American military with “new” parameters of conflict management.⁸⁵ On the second, these parameters have been developed in regionally dispersed manners. Regarding the first, many governments since 1990 have been putting the UN front-and-center of their foreign policy, stressing the importance of collective security. The exponential growth of Latin American forces' participation - especially Chile, Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay - in the UN peacekeeping system in this period, through humanitarian operations, mine-clearing, civilian-military cooperation on surveillance of human displacements, migrants, natural disasters, electoral processes, among others, reflected a renewed socialization with broadcasting centers (ARROYO, 2013, ROSS, 2004; AGUILAR, 2011). In general, the UN has a particular capacity to promote global standard procedures among the countries that cooperate within the framework of its operations, and it has made it possible to create a conceptual base on which to standardize an operational culture for Latin American armies. At the systemic level, taking theoretical terms of Sahlin and Wedlin (2008), the UN has been an intermediary transmitter in a *mediation-mode* of diffusion of operational isomorphism between the broadcasting center and the Latin American Armed Forces.

⁸⁴ This would find its reasons for being in the need to operationalize an “outward deterrence” to protect the natural resources of the countries of the region.

⁸⁵ These parameters refer to the now widely accepted standards for peace operations: preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping post-conflict, peacebuilding and peace enforcement missions. Then, updating principles and covering “complex” or “second generation” operations in Brahimi Report 2000 and later in Capstone Doctrine in 2008, among other concepts (BRAHIMI, 2000, ARROYO, 2013).

In this trend, the lack of a Latin American epicenter of coordination has not prevented the emergence of various bilateral and multilateral cooperation initiatives on peace operations. Nevertheless, taking concepts of Sahlin and Wedlin (2008) again, at the regional level, such initiatives have been developed in what calls *chain-diffusion* mode, that is, different initiatives copying the same message - or standard - but without recognizing a formal regional origin of diffusion - as can happen currently, for example, in the EU or AU. Among a variety of dispersed initiatives on peace operations, multilateral cooperation such as MINUSTAH was influential in the region to deepen interconnections and camaraderie among the battalions and commands staff that met there. MINUSTAH has been considered the first project of a properly combined sub-regional participation in a peacekeeping mission in the region because of the leadership of South American countries in the mission. Still, it cannot be said that there was an integrated force (LLENDEROZAS, 2007; NETO, 2010, 2013).

The creation of the SDC and the UNASUR in 2008 have also set significant precedents - despite its institutional fragilities. Furthermore, institutions like the Latin American Association of Training Centers for Peace Operations (ALCOPAZ,⁸⁶ in Spanish) and some limited experiences of the UNASUR Regional Combined Exercises since 2011 stand out on the path of regionalizing doctrines and standards in peace operations. Other initiatives include combined engineering companies, such as “Chiecuengcoi” between Chile and Ecuador, cooperation between countries in various combined operations, and developing bilateral doctrines based on UN peacekeeping standards (NASCIMENTO, 2014, NETO, 2010)

The defense cooperation between Argentina and Chile in the path that leads to the construction of the Southern Cross Force was developed as a piece in those regional chains. In this framework of socialization, the following section addresses that bilateral process. It will be a previous step before analyzing isomorphic pressures in the Binational Force.

4.2 Building a Binational Force

Since 1990, the civilian character of the Chilean and Argentine governments favored the practice of the ‘Annual Presidential Summits’, started with Carlos Menem and Patricio

⁸⁶ In August 2008, ALCOPAZ was created. Its objectives are to promote exchange and contact between personnel and instructors of different training centers for peace operations in the countries of the region. The association was an Argentine initiative and obtained location in Buenos Aires. Currently, training centers of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Guatemala, Peru, and Uruguay participate as founding members. The association also aims to adopt a common position among the countries of the region vis-à-vis the International Association for Peace Training Centers (IAPTC) (NASCIMENTO, 2014).

Aylwin, and continued during the early years of the 21st century by several presidents (COLACRAI, 2004; LORENZINI, 2017; ARANCIBIA-CLAVEL, 2007). Because of these policies, economic cooperation and physical integration were deepened, and mutual trust measures (MTM) in the areas of security and defense. The policies of both countries established measures such as the transparency of defense expenditures, bilateral consultation mechanisms like the Permanent Security Committee (COMPERSEG, its acronym in Spanish) in 1995, and a clear and precise legal framework for the use of force, with a central space for participation in UN peacekeeping operations.

Both countries develop an essential part of the defense cooperation in the scope of UN peacekeeping missions, such as the participation of Chilean Marine Corps since 2001 in the Staff of the Argentine Task Force that is part of the United Nations Mission in Cyprus (UNFICYP) (ARGENTINA, 2010). This exchange, which has been maintained over time, in turn had an important dynamizing effect since it allowed the personal knowledge in the lower ranks of Officers, NCOs and troops, bearing in mind that each deployment lasts six months (GIORGI, 2010; VILLAVERDE, 2010). Other experiences include combined exercises as MERCOSUR countries participating in the “Cruz del Sur Operations” between 1996 and 2000 to test military doctrines by training under UN parameters and the Araucaria exercises for joint action in situations of natural disasters (NETO, 2010, 2013).

Since 2005, an important decision has been complementation between different national training centers in peace operations (CECOPAC, in Chile and CAECOPAZ in Argentina) through the establishment of coordination measures, courses, profiles and common positions in specialized forums., some of them later in line with ALCOPAZ and the Peace Operations Training Institute (POTI) (NETO, 2010; NASCIMENTO, 2014).

However, a decisive precedent when thinking about the inspiration of Chileans and Argentines to create a binational peacekeeping force was the military cooperation in MINUSTAH. In fact, in the preliminary agreements of the consultation meetings of the General Staffs of both countries during 2005, both parts highlighted "the organization of the elements currently deployed in Haiti", considering the cooperation between Argentine and Chilean Battalions there, their similar modes of organization and training according to the Un Rules-of-engagement.⁸⁷ In this sense, the Chief of Staff Southern Cross, in our interview, told us: “[...]”

⁸⁷ For instance: “Act of meeting Vice Minister of Defense of the Argentine Republic and Undersecretary of War of the Ministry of Defense of the Argentine Republic. Point 1”; And, the "Act of Bilateral Agreement between the Ministries of the Defense of the Republics of Argentina and Chile for the creation of a Combined Peace Force", Point H.

From the technical point of view, in these scenarios, it has been possible to identify common aspects between Chile and Argentina that have started Southern Cross later [...] Southern Cross is a result of these experiences" (INTERVIEWEE 7, 2020, p. 2).

Such experiences stimulated the learning of coordination methods between civilian defense ministries and command components (the so-called 2x4 mechanisms, later transformed into 2x7 and 2x9) as well as parameters of types and size of troops to interoperate that Chile and Argentina took into consideration at the time of designing the Southern Cross Force. In the words of the former Chief of Staff Southern Cross in our interview: "I believe that the knowledge we have from having crossed paths in different military activities between Argentines and Chileans was the beginning of what gave Southern Cross" (INTERVIEWEE 5, 2020, p. 1)

Shortly before MINUSTAH began, in October 2003, on a series of dialogues between the Ministries of Defense of both countries in COMPERSEG, Chile presented a proposal called "Measures to develop force training to fulfill Peacekeeping Operations and joint participation in Future Peace Operations" (GARCÍA, TIBILETTI, 2008). It was analyzed by the Argentine Ministry of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Armed Forces, and the Foreign Ministry.

As a result of these corporations in peace operations and dialogues, on August 29, 2005, the Ministers of Defense of both countries signed a 'Protocol of Understanding' in which it was agreed to create a Bilateral Working Group to promote a qualitative leap to developing a combined peace force in the short term. This group held four meetings, still in 2005, to define stages, work schedule, doctrinal alignments, and the character of the Force (FAUNDES, 2009; CALAFELL, 2011; RUZ, 2008).

A decisive step for the Southern Cross's constitution took place on December 27, 2005, in Santiago, with the signing of the "Act of Bilateral Agreement between the Ministries of the Defense of the Republics of Argentina and Chile for the creation of a Combined Peace Force" (ARGENTINA, 2005). This agreement establishes a binational political management mechanism and criteria for forming a Combined Joint Chief Staff (CJCS) that works on the organization, equipment, composition, standards, and functioning. In the initial part of the document, the ministers of defense of Argentina and Chile highlight that the initiative "will contribute to the effort carried out by the United Nations Organization to preserve world peace and enhance the spirit of understanding between both nations" (2005, p. 1).

The results of the bilateral work during that year allowed the subsequent signing of a new agreement in Buenos Aires, on December 4, 2006: the "Memorandum of Understanding

between the Ministry of the Defense of the Argentine Republic and the Ministry of the National Defense of the Republic of Chile regarding Southern Cross Combined Peace Force" (MOU, 2006). This document established the terms and conditions for the use of the Force under the mandate of the UN, following the procedures of the United Nations Standby Arrangements System (UNSAS) (MOU, 2006, B-1). That means the use of the Force would take place with an official request from the UN and with the approval of both countries (DPKO, 2017). Also, a Security Council resolution for its deployment is considered a condition, with a response capacity within 30 to 90 days, once the Security Council mandate or resolution is known (MOU, 2006, B-1).⁸⁸ The MoU contained the following guidelines and definitions: the creation of CJCS, with a one-year operation in each country with rotating headquarters in the cities of Buenos Aires and Santiago; organization of land, air, and naval components, ready to deploy from May 2008 (MOU, 2006, A-1). The last date was not met, but the CJCS began its activities in January 2007, with its initial headquarters in Argentina. The *Cruz del Sur* Force was initially established with a reduced structure, 12 CJCS officers, which would facilitate rapid missions.

The force design was structured around three essential principles (MAC-KINNON; PÉREZ, 2008):

- a) combined and joint;
- b) following the "Haiti" model;
- c) balanced.

Together, these principles give the necessary breadth for the three elements of each country's armed forces to participate, obeying the principle of combined action (CALAFELL, 2011). The key issue is that it was a structure where the search for balance is related to the political purpose of the initiative: to make the international community available to an effectively binational force (FAUNDES, 2009; PERCOCO, 2014).

Later, on November 22, 2010, Chile and Argentina signed a new Memorandum (MOU, 2010) to incorporate the experiences and lessons learned since signing the first Memorandum. This MoU (2010) includes a series of elements respecting the previous records. It creates a Common Negotiation Team to negotiate in a coordinated manner the conditions of deployments with UN (MOU, 2010, A-7); the updating of the Chain of Command through the institution of the Binational Military Authority (BMA) and the Binational Commander (BC) (MOU, 2010, D-1); and the prediction of the use of modularized organizations in an independent way (MOU,

⁸⁸ The UNSAS changed its name in 2014 to the Peacekeeping Capability Readiness System (PCRS), which is a system managed by DPKO of the interaction process between the UN and the countries that have stand-by troops (reserve) to ensure promptness and speed, when necessary (DPKO, 2017).


2010, C-5). Another critical issue was the possibility of third countries joining the Force, with the prior approval of the UN and the founding members of the Force (MOU, 2010, p. 5).

The DPKO officially recognized the Southern Cross Force in December 2010, and its availability was ratified by the former UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-Moon, in June 2011, when he and Argentine and Chilean representatives signed a tripartite MoU (2011). This agreement enshrines the operational availability of the Force; that is, the UN started to consider the Binational Force as a Reserve Force in the UNSAS, ready to be used, in conditions to be quickly employed in an operation.

4.2.1 Organizational structure

The organizational parameters of the Force are provided for in the MoU (2010). As stated in our report of Southern Cross Force (2020a, 2020b, 2021), activities and even some operational changes of the Binational Force in recent years are adapted to the MoU of 2010. Regarding its basic structure, it is essential to consider that the peace force comprises the political, strategic, operational, and tactical levels (as shown in the Figure 9 below). Here, we point out that all its levels are organized in a combined way. The Southern Cross creates different levels of decision and execution, with the Bilateral Group of Political Directors (BGPD) as the highest level of the decision within the Force.

Figure 9 – Southern Cross Force organizational structure



Source: ARGENTINA, 2010, p. 234.

The BGPD constitutes a civilian body that carries out executive control of joint military activities. The BGPD consists of two representatives of the Ministry of Defense and two representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of each State. Its purpose is to analyze, advise, and evaluate all aspects of the binational force's activity, channeling the binational political decision-making process for its employment (MOU, 2010, A-1). The BGPD fully mediates the decision-making process between the national level and the UN to make the Combined Force deployment feasible and to see that it complies with the parties' national legislation for such purposes.

At the military-strategic level, the binational military leadership falls to the Binational Military Authority (BMA) (MOU, 2010, D-1). It is a collegiate authority, made up of the Chief of the Joint Staff of the Armed Forces of Argentina and the Chief of the Joint Staff of Defense of Chile. The BMA provides for driving and control to the Combined Joint Chief of Staff (CJCS). This team advises the BMA on military decision-making on the organization, equipment, training, and operations of the Southern Cross Force. At the same level is the Binational Commander (BC). The primary function of BC is to advise the CJCS. The party that acts as headquarters will have the responsibility of assigning to the BC; a position may be held by the Armed Forces Operational Commander for the case of Argentina and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, for Chile, maintaining in each case the dependence on corresponding National Military Authority (MOU, 2010, B-2).

The CJCS is the primary advisory and assistance body concerning the planning, enlistment, budget, and coordination of the combined Force (MOU, 2010, B-2). A particular function of this body is advising the Chief of the Joint Staff of Argentine Armed Forces and the Chilean Chief of Staff of the National Defense in everything related to the mission, organization, and use of forces under the UN mandate and as the parameters and procedures of the UNSAS. The constitution of the Force establishes that the Headship is exercised by the host country, while the non-headquarters government designates the officer in charge of the Deputy Chief.

The Force has around 1350 officers. The land component is composed by joint means of the Armies and Navies of Argentina and Chile. Its units are two mechanized infantry battalions and one logistic battalion. The naval element consists of units of Navies of both countries, with an oceanic patrol ship equipped with a helicopter onboard and a corvette. On the other hand, the air component is made up of two helicopters from the Chilean Air Force, two helicopters from the Argentine Air Force, two helicopters from the Army of Chile, and two

helicopters from the Army of Argentina. Finally, Southern Cross contains a combined company of engineers, a combined military hospital-level II, a combined medical unit for rapid employment, and modular combined units (CHILE, 2012; MOU, 2010; MOU, 2011).

It was a succinct description of the structure of the Southern Cross Force. In a later section of this chapter, we will detail inter-organizational cooperation, operational procedures, military material, and actual changes in each of these levels. However, before it, the following section contemplates the broader perspective on the isomorphism dimension around the Binational Force.

4.3 Isomorphic pressures

The isomorphism dimension has affected the Southern Cross' formation. In principle, *mimetic* pressures (DIMAGGIO, POWELL, 1983) have been present as Argentina and Chile have agreed to identify themselves with the same central model, considered 'successful' or necessary for their own binational formation. As the first standardization in the occasion of the mentioned "Act Bilateral Agreement" of December 2005 (ARGENTINA, 2005), Argentina and Chile planned that: "for the command relations and functionals of the Combined Peace Force, those defined by NATO will be used" (see: Considerations and Tasks for 2006, item G). Else, in the MOU (2010), points out that the glossary of all military terminologies used there between Chile and Argentina have been taken "*from documentation available from the UN and NATO*" (MOU, 2010, ANEX 1-6). These are clear indicators of *mimetic* pressures that not only responds to an identification with a Western reference but also to the interest in adopting international standard procedures and languages that facilitate the eventual incorporation of new members-states into the Southern Cross Force.

Following to the NATO and North American doctrines on 'multinational operations' ('coalition' or 'allied') - we have especially taken the publication Joint Staff - US (2019) and AJP 01 NATO (2017) – there are some basic issues to have "correct and appropriate" command relations and management coordination of joint/combined components at the operational level. Mutual understanding, patience and trust between the different contingents are highlighted. One aspect that strengthens the command is that different nationalities that contribute troops to the force are well represented in the combined staff, in terms of quantity, quality and experience of staff officers. This makes it easier for the commander to be imbued with the particularities of

the operational procedures of each nation, as well as to achieve greater efficiency in the planning of operations, by knowing the capabilities and particularities of each country.

On the other hand, it is essential to note that Argentina was a member until 2003, and Chile had the status 'observer' in SHIRBRIG. After the first peacekeeping mission of SHIRBRIG in Eritrea in 2000, the UN Brahimi Report (2000) singles out it as a role model for similar regional arrangements, and the negotiations on the Southern Cross since 2003 followed these suggestions. According to a report from the Chief of Cabinet of Ministers of Argentina (2007), “this force [Southern Cross] would adopt the SHIRBRIG model, which is the only brigade-size force operationally available and in a position to provide the UN with rapid reaction capabilities according to conceives the Brahimi report” (OBSERVATORIO..., 2007, p. 13).

According to our interview with the former Argentine representative at the Bilateral Group of Political Direction (BGPD) between 2013 and 2015, Michelle Bachelet, former Chile's Defense Minister in 2003, proposed to Argentina a project of forces of these characteristics. Moreover, several researchers agree to indicate SHIRBRIG as the conceptual basis of Southern Cross (AITA, 2020; PERCOCO; 2013; VÁRNAGY, 2010; VILLAYERDE, 2010).

We note that Southern Cross has sought to conform to the vanguard concept of standby force initially proposed by the governments of the Netherlands, Denmark, although mainly made explicit by the government of Canada:

[...] based on the principle of linking all of the levels of the UN system, especially an operational headquarters and groups provided by member states at the tactical level, for the purpose of deploying a force as rapidly as possible for a brief period, either to meet an immediate crisis or to anticipate the arrival of follow-on forces or a more traditionally-organized peacekeeping operation (CANADA, 1995, p. 52).

As SHIRBRIG, Southern Cross conforms to the UNSAS, which means that their deployments require approval from the Security Council and their governments. Southern Cross is *On-call*, with troops not stationed together. It remains under national control when not deployed and must attend training and capacitation to ensure cohesion in some training structures following the UN Core Pre-deployment Training Materials (CPTM, 2017), among other doctrinal sources. Here it is possible to describe *normative* injunctions. Our interview with Coronel former Chief of Staff of the Southern Cross Force – describes the commanders of committed units permanently in simultaneous courses at their national training centers in peace operations (CAECOPAZ, Argentina and CECOPAC, Chile) (INTERVIEWEE 5, 2020).

These centers bring the latest update of UN standards for training and exercises, a process in which the Combined Joint Chiefs of Staff also participates since 2007 and especially in courses that begin in April of each year. From here it is possible to observe that mimetic and normative pressures converge, given that Southern Cross follows professional training programs similar to what SHIRBRIG followed when it was still operational.

Further, as an anecdote that illustrates this identification with Western models, we can share a reason given by a Southern Cross official at CECOPAC (2021) for not sharing more detailed information with our research: “[...] Israel has its success because of how closed it is and how intelligent it is. Sharing information is more delicate when a force is binational because one compromises international politics issues [...]” (oral communication).⁸⁹

Military officers from CECOPAC (2021) explain to us that Southern Cross officials mainly conducting pre-deployment training, “like the peacekeepers going to Cyprus [UNFICYP]” (oral conversation). However, both are different organizations. CECOPAC courses (and CAECOPAZ in Argentina) are linked to Southern Cross only in training matters, and when a mission area is defined, a Chilean officer told us. “When this training takes place, it is the Southern Cross staff who raise their voices [...] The training modules and UN standards for the missions to be deployed are applied here. It consists of a training system based on stages. The CECOPAC takes the UN training modules to transmit them to the members to be deployed. When Southern Cross Combined Joint Chiefs of Staff comes, it has an office housed in CECOPAC” (2021) (oral conversation).⁹⁰

These routinized practices are decisive in the normative standards that affect peacekeepers linked to the DPKO, in general, and Southern Cross, in particular. The training/education standards presented by the Binational Military Authority report (2020) mention up to 8 UN manuals for the training of Cruz del Sur personnel (See ANNEX B – TRAINING STANDARDS FOR THE “CRUZ DEL SUR” COMBINED FORCE).

An issue that should be highlighted here is the relationship between UN standards and the combined doctrine produced between Argentina and Chile (CHILE, 2019). In principle, the UN is not characterized by creating doctrines and standards at the combined level. As our interviewed explained to us, the UN does not use to standardize combined doctrine for multinational forces, but it influences the standardization at the level of the ‘specific doctrine’

⁸⁹ Commodore officer, at Centro Conjunto para Operaciones de Paz de Chile (CECOPAC). Santiago: phone conversation with Matías Ferreyra, 1 Jun. 2021.

⁹⁰ Conversation with a First Corporal and a Commodore officer, at Centro Conjunto para Operaciones de Paz de Chile (CECOPAC). Santiago: phone conversation with Matías Ferreyra, 1 Jun. 2021.

of employment for different resources and personnel that serve UN missions. "Specific doctrine" refers to the principles of work of each separate force (navy, army, air). On the other hand, Argentina and Chile develop their own national "joint doctrines" (which includes three components of force) and "combined doctrines" (between their different national forces) from their bilateral military experiences that are homologated in doctrinal bodies (INTERVIEWEE 5, 2020). In addition, it should be noted that there is combined military doctrines between Argentina and Chile beyond the specific framework of the Southern Cross. In this sense, our interviewed pointed out: "We have been working since 2007 based on the latest UN doctrine to update our combined doctrines and our employment doctrines based on the UN doctrine" (INTERVIEWEE 5, 2020, p. 3, proper translation).

Such evolution has been registered, in part, in 11 manuals on regulations, commands, logistics created between Argentina and Chile in 2011. In short, Argentina and Chile are characterized by producing their own combined doctrine for Southern Cross but following UN normative standards. It is clear from all these observations that the equalization of professional criteria, that is, normative isomorphism, is closely related to measures of efficiency, performance, and effectiveness of possible operations.

However, some kinds of isomorphic pressures are notable for their relative or absolute absence (DIMAGGIO, POWELL, 1983). On the one hand, there are no evident signs of *competitive* isomorphism on Southern Cross as Argentina and Chile have not developed a relatively 'tiny' binational force to compete or rival in realistic terms with other forces. Instead, the project is inserted in a bilateral logic that goes beyond Southern Cross, as a political instrument for the generation of trust and common positions between two countries that have experienced various controversies in the past.

On the other hand, we did not detect explicit signals of *coercive* isomorphism. In other words, we do not find, in the relative short terms of the Southern Cross creation, evidence of formal signs of central powers (advisors, donors, organizations) forcing the organization materially to emulate a particular model or standards of combined forces. However, it is possible to argue about more indirect (structural) indicators of coercive or semi-coercive pressures, considering the long-term dependent conditions of Argentina and Chile in their military modernization processes. For example, since 1990s, Chile has developed a militarization strategy based on the acquisition of western weapons that prioritizes interoperating with US and NATO in various peacekeeping operations, training, and other

missions, which has deepened technological dependence, especially with the US military industry (BATALLAME, 2009; CALLE, 2007; CHILE, 2021, p. 26).

Argentina, on the other side, considering the period in which Southern Cross began to be gestated (2003/2004), the country came from the 1990s of “carnal relations” with the US, consecrated in obtaining the title “Major non-NATO ally” in 1997 and its possible benefits in terms of access to new weapons and technology (REFICCO, 1998). Both national guidelines have had different implications and it will be detailed in the next section according to the dependence perspective. However, we can anticipate here that these long-term dependent orientations may have generated semi-coercive pressures on NATO-based standards for the Southern Cross force.

On the other hand, it is important to note that Southern Cross is not a “new model” of forces from what has been shown so far. Instead, it is a *regional translation*, combining experiences from central countries (NATO command functionals, SHIRBRIG standby concept) and the Chilean and Argentine experiences in recently combined UN peacekeeping (as Cyprus and Haiti).

Nonetheless, despite being a peripheral translation, there are tendencies among military and officials bringing Southern Cross close to the figure of an *emulous* in its strict sense: an actor who, by emulating, also intends to surpass those he took as a reference. For example, according to Argentine Lieutenant Commander Calafell (2011), about Southern Cross:

Its composition constitutes a novel element not only in the regional but also global context, since in addition to being of a combined nature, as may be the case of previous experiences in the European sphere such as SHIRBRIG, it is also joint in nature. These attributes provide a manifest advantage [...] by forming a more comprehensive scenario than that existing in previous similar experiences (p. 125).

On the other hand, one of our interviewed, points out to us that Southern Cross, considering its complex levels of integration, would surpass other binational experiences of integration, including European ones, such as the Franco-German Force.

The Franco-German Force meets when necessary, otherwise, they do not have coexistence, they do not have detachments [...] Southern Cross is not a mere gathering of forces, but a meeting, a meeting that implies learning from the strengths and weaknesses of the other, through political and military interaction (INTERVIEWEE 6, 2021).

In this sense, it is not hard to find analysis classifying Southern Cross almost as a *sui generis* experience on military integration. Such *emulous* character is reinforced due the fact that SHIRBRIG has stopped operating in 2009 and it has helped dilute the appreciation about

that initial reference from almost 20 years ago. For similar reasons, it is not usually analyzed the isomorphic pressures considered here, even less their connections with external dependence. It is precisely the object of the next section.

4.4 Dependence perspective

Now that isomorphic pressures have been analyzed, it is time to contemplate the perspective of external dependence around Southern Cross. In principle, some kinds of external resources generating dependence, as typified in the First Chapter, may have a null or insignificant impact on Southern Cross. On the one hand, indicators of *operational* dependence are impossible to find due to the absence of deployments in real crisis scenarios where the Force could require external supports to meet your mission goals.

Concerning *financial* dependence, it has not been relevant, at least formally. As our report from Southern Cross and the same MoU (2010) that organizes the Force point out, the member states assume the logistics and maintenance of the force's staff, training, and equipment. Self-financing is a principle established and fulfilled by Chile and Argentina.

However, the mimetic and normative pressures analyzed before allow to understand not only how it generates organizational isomorphism but it is also linked to *doctrinal* dependence. Furthermore, there have also been indicators of *technological* dependence, mainly concerning the military hardware used in Southern Cross, resulting from external acquisitions by Chile and Argentina.

4.4.1 Doctrinal dependence

Starting with the perspective of doctrinal dependence is essential to note so far, the Southern Cross's progress, although significant, has not had a real alternative umbrella to the UN. Although some authorities have expressed ideas in regionalizing the Southern Cross orbit in Latin American or South American organizations (SCUTICCHIO, 2015; INTERVIEWEE 6, 2021), the UN remains a monopolist doctrinal framework for Southern Cross developments. It is a notorious difference comparing, for example, to the Africa Standby Force, which conforms not only to the UN peacekeeping concepts but also to the Doctrine of Peace Support Operations developed by the AU - conceptually different from the UN peacekeeping (DE CONING, 2017).

Although the UN has the most experience in authorizing and conducting such operations, it has never possessed a monopoly on them worldwide (BELLAMY; WILLIAMS, 2005). In recent years, various non-UN actors have conducted peace operations, often without the Security Council's authorization. In Africa, for instance, since 1990, regional organizations have conducted peace operations: the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), under the mantle of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), and by the African Union (AU). In addition, in 2003, following NATO's departure, the EU conducted Operation Concordia in Macedonia and followed it on with a police mission, Proxima. In the Americas, the US has led a multinational force into Haiti after the departure of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide in 2004 (BELLAMY; WILLIAMS, 2005, p. 157).

These experiences in the world allow us contrasting the dependent situation of Southern Cross Force on the UN - more doctrinaire or normative than economic or financial. As determined by the MOU (2010, C-2), the personnel designated for missions "must be in a position to satisfy the requirements of the UN in relation to: combat hierarchy/role, experience, psycho-physical aptitude, education / training and knowledge of languages". That reflects that Argentina and Chile didn't perform independent capabilities standards for Southern Cross. Still, they acquired them mainly by UN training materials and pre-deployment manuals (CAECOPAZ, 2021; VILLAYERDE, 2010, UN, 2010). Like other UN peacekeepers in the world, Chilean and Argentine officer internalize training structures, CONOPS, ROEs, and operational procedures following the UN Core Pre-deployment Training Materials (CPTM, 2017) UN Infantry Battalion Manual (UNIBAM, 2012) Code of Personal Conduct for Blue helmets produced by DPKO / DFS, the Integrated Training Service (ITS), among others.⁹¹

Those 'intangible' external resources are signals of doctrinal dependence. Further, Southern Cross officers manifest doctrinal dependence when they deliberate on their progress and performances to the extent that they internalize those UN materials. The "constant

⁹¹ As we mentioned before, the training / education standards presented by the Binational Military Authority report (2020) mention up to 8 UN manuals for the training of Cruz del Sur personnel: These are: 1. United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, Principles and Guidelines. 2. Core Pre-Deployment Training Material (CPTM). 3. United Nations Peacekeeping Missions Military Maritime Task Force Manual. 4. United Nations Infantry Battalion Manual. 5. United Nations Peacekeeping Missions Military Aviation Unit Manual. 6. United Nations Peacekeeping Military Engineer Unit Manual. 7. "Manual genérico del Batallón de Infantería (V)". 8. "Guía para subalternos en OPAZ (1997)".

updating" of officers "to the newest of UN" indicates incessant dependence on an IGO that influences their times, self-perceptions, and activity cycles.⁹²

Moreover, as we observed in the previous chapter, these materials entail more than transferring information (FLASPOLER, 2019). In the practices of peacekeeping training, liberal norms of security geo-culture become cosmopolitan standards of conduct and technical skills - based on the promotion of universalism, minimal use of force, impartiality, human rights protection, political dialogue, mediation, pluralism, interculturality, etcetera. In this context, UN materials point to doctrinal dependency and a form of geo-cultural socialization that mitigates the epistemic autonomy of emulators around the Southern Cross.

Furthermore, Argentine and Chilean peacekeepers do not use to perceive those implications as a significant issue. On the contrary, the naturalization of UN dependency prevails as a necessary, productive process, even claimed as an evolutionary parameter. As pointed out by the Commander of the Southern Cross General Staff, in our interview:

The work together with the UN [...] has led to the identification of common procedures, idiosyncrasies that put us on the same starting line, and this paves the way a lot, achieving a more adequate, intelligent, and efficient work for the postulates and objectives imposed by the UN when we work together (INTERVIEWEE 7, 2021, p. 2).

Nonetheless, it is essential to remember that doctrinal military dependence does not originate 'from' the Southern Cross project but 'before' in the armed forces of its member states. As shown, there have been long-term trajectories in the military formation of Chile and Argentina characterized by external doctrinal influences, and currently, the US, NATO, and UN have been most influential in the periods of the building of the Southern Cross.

Regarding the US/NATO doctrinal influence today, it has been explicit in Chilean Armed Forces. In the last years, Chile has kept excellent relations in the military field with the US - "privileged" relations, as president Sebastián Piñera claimed (CHILE, 2018). In the context of close and continuous bilateral ties, Chile has consolidated a naturalized dependence on North American military doctrines, extending to permanent joint training in Chilean territory in a stable and lasting way. In this path, for example, in 2012, the US has financed and helped build a complex of military operations in urban areas (MOUR), at the naval base of Forte Aguayo, in Concón, 90 km from Santiago (BALBINO, 2018). The complex of 8 buildings was used for training purposes, following the US military doctrine, involving police training,

⁹² For instance, the DPKO/DFS Senior Management Team (SMT) approves the Outline of Strategic Peacekeeping Training Priorities every three years, based on the advice of the DPKO-DFS Working Group. See details in:

convoy movements, crowd control, and aero-mobile tactics. In addition, the military is prepared to deal with natural disasters and emergencies, specifically for UN peace operations. The agreement also allows US troops to enter Chile when either "the Chilean Army feels overworked by an emergency situation with natural disasters", or when humanitarian support with a military component is necessary, or when "national emergency scenarios cause a state of exception and suspension of constitutional guarantees" (BALBINO, 2018).

Around 2013, the US government had already allocated US\$ 45 million in police and military support for Chile. The cooperation between the two countries also involves joint exercises, exchanges, Chilean participation in the training of the US National Guard, and military purchases of almost US \$ 1 billion in 20 years. In addition, Chile has already sent 4,000 soldiers to the former School of the Americas, the current Institute for Security Cooperation in the Western Hemisphere (WHITNEY, 2012).

In October 2014, a ministerial order from the Ministry of Defense provided for the mandatory use of the NATO Cataloging. This meant the insertion of the Chilean Armed Forces in the NATO codification system of supply items and military equipment as a condition for the development of interoperability in combined forces (CHILE, 2019, p. 11).

In the Argentine Armed Forces case, current US military influence might seem less evident than in Chile. In the last two decades, Argentina has developed more autonomist orientations in foreign policy concerning the US, and there has been no continuous military cooperation between Argentina and the US. In particular, the Peronist governments of Nestor Kirchner (2003-2007), Cristina Fernández (2007-2015), and the current of Alberto Fernández have expressed the principle of diversifying security cooperation with other global powers (China, Russia, India) (MORASSO, 2016). However, in Mauricio Macri's government (2015-2019), the trend has gone the other way. At the beginning of his presidency, Macri said that Argentina needs to modernize its armed forces for the 21st century. In this direction, it has had several attempts at military cooperation with the US. Briefly, it involved tenders for the purchase of millions of dollars in military armament; a commitment of joint task forces with the ACD (Administration for the Control of Drugs); the entry of US troops into Argentina for joint exercises in 2018, and a request for inclusion of Argentina in the State Partnership Program of US Defense Department (BALBINO, 2018).

Broadly, as stated by José Díaz (2020), who served as Officer of the Command Corps of the Argentine Navy and Advisor to the Minister of Defense of Argentina: "the current doctrinal body of the Argentine Armed Forces is the result of the progressive incorporation and

adaptation of some concepts and guidelines of the military doctrines of countries such as the United States, France, Germany, etc.)". Likewise, the Argentine Military Doctrine also presents concepts elaborated by the Argentine Armed Forces themselves, not only from their participation in the Malvinas War but also through the various and successive deployments of Argentine military contingents Blue Helmets in UN peace missions.

It is possible to describe more impacts of these Chilean and Argentine trends on Southern Cross's development. However, we will approach this better not from the doctrinal perspective but the technological dependence.

4.4.2 Technological dependence

A significant part of the military hardware of the Southern Cross has been more the product of external purchases than of an autonomous local industry in Chile or Argentina. Southern Cross military materials have derived mainly by contributions by Chile and Argentina resulting from acquisitions with central economies. Thus, from the technological perspective, Southern Cross has manifested some indicators of external dependency.

According to the MoU signed with the UN (2011), both countries must provide the UNSAS with human and material resources to be used in peace operations. On the other hand, both countries must maintain a balance in each of their components and the optimization of the means and resources destined to the binational Force (MOU, 2010).⁹³

These memorandums describe the nature of the weapons and equipment to be made available to the UN but do not describe their specific quality. However, Colonel Aita (2020) within the framework of his doctoral research on Southern Cross, obtained access to the Binational Directive of 2014 which contain the Tables of Organization and Equipment of the Force (TOE), both in the full version as modular. These TOE contain precise and detailed information on weapons, communication and computer materials, battle vehicles, ships, aerial elements, optical equipment, engineering equipment, among others (AITA, 2020, p. 187). On the other hand, we have found information on military purchases for Southern Cross published

⁹³ According to Aita's research (2020), Argentina issued the Armed Forces Chief of Staff Directive Nr 01/07 in 2007, dealing with the equipment plan for the Binational Force, and the Armed Forces Chief of Staff Directive 06/11, in 2011, about the organization of the binational Force. At its end, Chile issued Ministerial Disposition No. 1, in 2008, which dealt with the equipment and readiness of the Southern Cross Force, and Ministerial Disposition No. 2, also in 2008, dealing with the readiness of the Southern Cross Force.

in various media in recent years (WMZ-551B1..., 2018; AMORÍN, 2017; BETOLLI, 2015; GARCÍA, 2019).

In this way, it is possible to describe the primary military materials available on its three components - land, naval, and air - to indicate external technology acquisitions. However, in order not only to describe but also to understand them, we will address how these indicators have been embedded in the national strategies of Chile and Argentina for the modernization of their defense systems.

Regarding the land component of Southern Cross, it consists of a combined Land Task Force (LTF) equipped with mechanized means, that is, armored combat vehicles on wheels (ACVW) by both countries (MOU, 2011).

- The Argentine Battalion has a series of ACVW 6X6 Norinco and ACVW 6X6 Guarani models. In turn,
- The Chilean Battalion has ACVW 6X6 Mowag and ACVW 4X4 PVP Panhard types.

On the Argentine side, the signature of the MoU (2006) was why the Argentine Army generates the necessity to have an ACVW, since these were not available until then (BETTOLLI, 2015). In 2008, Argentina opened a public tender to acquire these armored vehicles (WMZ-551B1), produced in Beijing by the China North Industries Corporation (Norinco). The result was the acquisition of four vehicles for 2.6 million dollars, a contract that also included spare parts, the transport of the cars, and the training of the technicians and personnel who would use them (WMZ-551B1..., 2018). Currently, those armored vehicles are part of the Southern Cross contingent and were also used by the Army and Navy personnel that made up the Argentine Joint Battalion deployed in Haiti to provide humanitarian aid. On the other hand, the VBCR 6x6 Guarani were produced in Brazil and acquired by Argentina in 2012 especially to equip the Southern Cross Force (ARGENTINA..., 2015). It shows the commitment of the Argentine government to provide the Southern Cross with adequate equipment and maintain the balance agreed in the MOUs (AITA, 2020).

In Chilean armored vehicles, the Mowag 6x6 was made for a long time under the authorization of the Swiss parent company, Mowag GmbH (Motor Car Factor), by the Chilean company *Fabricas Maestranzas del Ejército* (FAMAE). These were used for more than ten years in MINUSTAH (GARCÍA, 2019) and currently, it is also used by the Carabineros officers in Chile. The other model, the 4X4 PVP Panhard, is an all-terrain vehicle manufactured by Panhard General Defense, linked to the French armed forces. The car is primarily deployed in patrol and surveillance missions (CARABINEROS..., 2015).

Considering the naval component, Southern Cross has a Naval Surface Group composed of two main naval units (AITA, 2020, p. 188; PERCOCO, 2014, p. 89):

- a Meko 140 Corvette (by Argentina) and,
- a maritime zone patrol (MZP) with an embarked helicopter (by Chile).

The Meko Corvette corresponds to six multipurpose corvettes designed by the German company Blohm+Voss for the Argentine Navy in the 1980s. Under license, they were built in Argentina at the Rio Santiago shipyards of the *Astilleros y Fábricas Navales del Estado* (AFNE), located in Ensenada, Argentina (NAVAL TECHNOLOGY, 2020). In the case of the Chilean ships, their design was developed by the German company Fassmer to satisfy the requirements of the Danubio IV project of the Chilean Navy. On the other hand, the helicopter onboard is the AS365 Dauphin ("dolphin" in French) initially manufactured by the French company *Aérospatiale*, and since 1992 by the Eurocopter Group (PELAEZ, 2017).

Both vessels were produced in Argentina and Chile, respectively. Aita (2020, p. 189) highlights that the Chilean MZP, built in the Talcahuano facilities in southern Chile, contemplated the original construction project of the same type in Chile and Argentina, which would facilitate cost reduction and standardization of equipment in the Southern Cross Force. However, the project never received financing from Argentine authorities.

Finally, on the air component of Southern Cross, it consists of a combined helicopters unit (MOU, 2010; AITA, 2020; PERCOCO, 2014). It comprises:

- two Argentine units: the Huey II and BELL 412 models, and
- two Chilean units: AS-330 Puma and Bell UH1H.

The Huey II (by Argentina) is a medium-sized military utility helicopter developed by the American manufacturer Bell Helicopter for the US Armed Forces regarding the Argentine units. The second element, the BELL 412, is a twin-engine utility helicopter built by the same US company. Finally, about Chilean ships, the AS-330 Puma is a multipurpose helicopter manufactured by the Eurocopter Group, while the BELL UH1H is manufactured in the US. As with the Guarani armored vehicles, two BELL 412 helicopters were acquired by Argentina in 2013 and 2014, primarily to equip the Combined Force (AITA, 2020).

One of our interviews, in particular, with the former Argentine representative of the BGPD, who has participated in bilateral meetings with Chilean staff in 2015, highlighted that there had been a significant difference in material between the two Armed Forces (INTERVIEWEE 5, 2021). In this connection, Percoco (2014, p. 94) highlights difficulties related to the growing gap in military *hardware* between Argentina and Chile. While Chile's

national expenditure represents around 1.80% of its GDP, in the Argentine case it does not exceed 0.71% of the same (DATOS MACRO, 2019). Most defense systems and equipment that Argentina has are obsolete and/or maintenance-free, dating back 25-35 years, with technology developed in the sixties and seventies (SARNI, 2013 *apud* PERCOCO, 2014, p. 94). On the other hand, Chile's budget is being invested in a modernization plan with tanks (Leopard II), M-113 transports in different configurations, Marder vehicles, airplanes (F-16), missiles, frigates (Type 23, Type L and Type M), submarines (Scorpene), a large logistic ship, a French amphibious landing ship (Foudre) and state-of-the-art technologies (SARNI, 2013 *apud* PERCOCO, 2014).

Such technological differences between the two forces directly affect the possibilities of interoperability of the forces of combined units. One interviewee stated that these differences have represented “the main friction” between the two countries around the Southern Cross - due to possible Chilean interpretations that Argentina's lack of political will to fulfill military standardization commitments with Chile (INTERVIEWEE 6, 2021). However, the truth is that Argentina has had real difficulties in financing the modernization of its armed forces. In this sense, numerous scholars have pointed out that since the end of the last military dictatorship (1976-1983) and the defeat in the Malvinas War in 1982, there has been a deep and persistent divorce between society and everything related to the military world, which persists (BATAGLINO; 2015, EISSA; 2020; IRIONDO; DE LA VEGA, 2019). The Defense did not remain unscathed by these socio-cultural changes characterized by their disinterest in modernizing military forces, relegating the National Defense in the government agenda.

In the Chilean case, more robust modernizations policies were possible, in part, due to the strong presence that military forces have had in the government since the last part of the 20th century and the economic boom derived from the increase in the international price of copper (CALLE, 2007; MALAMUD; ENCINA, 2006). This financial bonanza has made it possible to increase the budget allocated to the defense area, guaranteed by the Secret Copper Law sanctioned during the Augusto Pinochet dictatorship. A percentage of income from mineral exports must be automatically allocated to military expenditures.⁹⁴

Actually, Chile has chosen to follow a purchasing strategy strictly linked to interoperating with the US and with the NATO countries (CALLE, 2007; CHILE, 2020).

⁹⁴ Since 1990s, numerous weapons acquisition plans began to take shape, such as the Alcázar Plan, which was carried out in the early 2000s and continued by programs for the purchase of various weapons in 2005 under the Ricardo Lagos government and which are at least until 2014 (MALAMUD; ENCINA, 2006; BATALLAME, 2010; BALBINO, 2010).

Likewise, the choice of units used by NATO countries, especially about artillery and the Air Force (F-16 fighters), indicates their intention to become increasingly integrated into the NATO - US operations groups through peacekeeping operations, joint training, or in the format of coalitions (BALBINO, 2018; BATALLAME, 2010).⁹⁵ This process coincides with the maturation period of the Southern Cross project.

Indeed, the Chilean strategy has simultaneously sought to interoperate with Southern Cross, on the one hand, and with NATO, on the other. However, the latter has greater weight in Chile precisely within the framework of its broader modernization strategy. Considering the mentioned in the previous section on semi-coercive isomorphism and globally unavoidable technological dependence, it is not surprising now that especially Chile has agreed that Southern Cross adopt command chains and functionals according to those defined by NATO (ARGENTINA, 2005).

Argentina's defense policy does not contain such levels of militarizing incentives. However, beyond political wills, Argentina has suffered structural limitations. According to Iriondo and de la Vega (2019), currently, the weapons systems that the budgets of the great powers can acquire are unattainable for a country like Argentina. However, that does not mean that Argentina is condemned to defenselessness. Argentina cannot allocate a significant percentage of its GDP to defense; therefore, its armed forces should be relatively small but with a great operational capacity (IRIONDO; DE LA VEGA, 2019)

In this sense, Southern Cross is only a tiny part of the comprehensive defense strategy of both countries. Furthermore, changes in foreign policy orientation have impacted even critically the idea of the Southern Cross project. In particular, during the Macri government, in 2017, the Argentine embassy in Washington, together with the United States, required equipment and armor to equip the Southern Cross. The list titled *Equipment required from the*

⁹⁵ As part of this transformation, Chile has made important purchases of new materials in recent years. According to sources from the Lockheed Martin company cited by CALLE (2007), Chile has acquired F-16 CD aircraft equipped with intermediate-range air-to-air missiles guided by radars of the AIM-120 AMRAAM type, short-range air-to-air missiles, and guidance. Infrared Python IV, 250 and 500 kg laser-guided GBU bombs. Two Franco-Spanish Scorpene submarines, join the fleet between 2006 and 2007, with SM 39 Exocet7 missiles. Until 2010 (Battalame, 2010) Chile received two Dutch L-Class and M-Class frigates. The fleet renewal process in that period was completed with the acquisition of three used British frigates. On the other hand, in full advance of the pandemic in Chile, in 2021, the United States Pentagon approved and notified Congress the sale of missiles to Chile (up to 16 Standard Missile-2 (SM-2) Block IIIA missiles, equipment support, spare parts and training for \$ 85 million). This would also have been the first military sale of the Joe Biden government, along with the communications equipment for NATO. See details at: <https://www.reuters.com/article/eeuu-chile-armasidESKBN2A60CR>

US for the Combined Peacekeeping Force “Cruz del Sur” (Reduced Force) includes Taser guns, anti-tanks, grenade launchers and various explosives - commonly used in warfare battle tanks - among other materials such as ambulances, ammunition, bell barracks, communications material (AMORÍN, 2017). At the time, these programs were strongly criticized by the opposition in Argentina for different economic and political reasons, and, in the end, these purchases were not carried.

For Southern Cross, beyond the dimension of technological dependence, this attempt of acquisitions by the Argentine government was a particularly critical event in doctrinaire terms. It is because the mentioned warfare arms purchase meant turning the Southern Cross into a “shock force” , or a “counter-insurgency force” , contrary to the non-repressive concept on which it had been created. In this way, such policy would have run counter to the operational nature of Southern Cross. We will explain this mission concept in the last sections.

In conclusion, there are some clear signals of external dependence on Southern Cross - not financial and operational, but doctrinal and technological. Such indications do not escape the long-terms conditions of dependent militarization on peripheral states: sustained less in a local base of defense industries than in the purchase of arms and normative standards from central countries. However, it is worth highlighting some developments in terms of binational technological autonomy, specifically in relation to simulation and communications systems for combined training in Southern Cross. Since 2007, Argentina and Chile have put into practice the Computational Simulation System for Training in Peacekeeping Operations (SIMUPAZ⁹⁶, in Spanish), and currently new simulators were developed, more specific to Southern Cross, taking advantage of the know-how and highly trained systems analysts from both countries (INTERVIEWEE 7, 2021). Even the patent of that current simulator, created in the War Schools in Argentina, was recently purchased by the United States, which is interpreted as a sign of substantial progress (INTERVIEWEE 5, 2020).

In general, at the political/strategic level, Argentina and Chile's officials show convictions and perspectives on the importance of consolidating a properly binational project. Further, both countries are establishing their medium and long-term goals for Southern Cross and their bilateral relations in South American and the world. That is important in terms of the

⁹⁶ SIMUPAZ was first used in 2007 in the context of the XXVII Conference of American Armies that took place in Montevideo, Uruguay, as part of a combined peacekeeping exercise. The software features a command-and-control component and a geographical information system, and it is intended to perfect decision-making skills for commanders who carry out peace missions in accordance with the standards defined by the United Nations. See more details in: https://dialogo-americas.com/application/files/9515/0854/3954/Dialogo_SPED-2017_SPA_lowres.pdf

principle of “local ownership” - or the so-called “autonomy of the decision” - around the Southern Cross project: that is, the relative capacity of its formal members to conduct internal processes of changes despite unavoidable dependences on technological resources.


4.5 Interorganizational interactions

Now that we have addressed central issues of isomorphism and dependence around the Southern Cross, it is time to delve deeper into the topic of inter-organizational cooperation in the context of our analytical framework. How do binational interactions occur at different strategic, operational, and tactical levels between the national forces of Argentina and Chile? This question acquires relevance as empirical content used in the typological-comparative framework, especially concerning three variables that make sense in a comparison (*inter-organizational strategies, multinationalism, and operational partnerships*).

Some of these issues have already been addressed. At the political-strategic level, it has been noted that binational interactions in the BGPD and CJCS perform staff personnel in a balanced way. The same occurs in the description of equipment and military hardware in operational components. But it is necessary to delve into the theoretical basis of interactions and their forms in exercises and deployment concepts.


Considering that Argentina and Chile have followed command relations and functionals defined by NATO (ARGENTINA; CHILE, 2005), we can observe that Southern Cross military commands are close to the theoretical model of “*integrated command structure*” presented in the US Joint Chief Staff doctrine manual on ‘multinational operations’ (US, 2019, II-6). Here the General Staff is of combined nature in its entirety, constituting the strength of this model (See Figure 10, below).

An “*integrated command structure*” is characterized by having a commander, appointed with the agreement of all the participants of the multinational force, and a general staff made up of personnel from all nations and various commands and staff of different levels, both operational and tactical, also made up of the contribution of personnel and material resources of all contributors to the multinational force. In this way, it provides advice and assistance with a high degree of knowledge of the particularities of each component. In the figure below, the solid line shows the chain of command between the commander and the component forces. The dotted line shows a coordination relationship.

Figure 10 - Integrated command structure

Source: US Joint Staff, 2019, II-6.

In the particular structure of Southern Cross, the organization of the Force establishes that the leadership of the Combined Joint Chiefs of Staff is exercised by the host country, while the officer who covers the post of Deputy Chief is appointed by the non-host country (MOU, 2010). The other positions to be filled in the CJCS are designated by the Chief and the Deputy Chief of CJCS, maintaining the ownership of two Chief Officials as heads of the different Departments for each country. The total composition of the General Staff comprises 6 officers and 5 non-commissioned officers of each nationality. The following Figure (11) illustrates the CJCS organization chart. The specific tasks and functions of the different Sections and Departments are detailed in Annex E of the MOU (2010, E - 1).

Figure 11 - CJCS organization chart

Source: own adaptation based on MOU, 2010.


Southern Cross fits this “integrated” model at all organizational levels. Thus, at the tactical level, the constitution of the military force comprises joint and combined forces with operational commands organized in the land, air, and naval components, being formed by human and material resources from Chile and Argentina in a balanced and complementary way. In addition, it has a Level II Hospital and a Company of Engineers combined (CALAFELL, 2011; MOU, 2011). At the units’ level, the documents about the use of components, in their entirety or by modularized forms, clearly specify that the Force must be employed as a unique element, without any segregation of its units, making it clear that the contribution of each country must be balanced both in material as in personal (MOU, 2010; UN, 2011). We can then make a succinct description of this integration in its three components, land, naval, and air:

a) Land component

In relation to the land component, Southern Cross adopts the organization of a combined Land Task Force (LTF) (MOU, 2010). This component comprises a substantial part of the total personnel and material of the Binational Force, around 1000 persons, out of a total of 1340 soldiers. The figure below depicts the organization of the LTF. It is composed of a Chilean Joint Mechanized Infantry Battalion: this unit consists of two companies of Mechanized Infantry and a Navy Company.

On the other hand, it contains an Argentine Joint Mechanized Infantry Battalion, composed of two mechanized subunits and marines. This integration between land and naval forces, highlighted in the figure, gives the battalions their joint character (AITA, 2020).

Figure 12 - Organization chart of Land Task Force




Source: MOU, 2010.

The land component comprises a General Staff, a command, and a logistics company, all furnished by personnel from both countries, as shown in Figure 12. The LTF is a robust body but with a well-defined structure that facilitates integration between its components and favors the fulfillment of missions.

b) Naval element

The organization of the naval component may vary as to the means involved depending on the operation to be developed in the UN framework. The host country of the CJCS of the Binational Force will appoint a Captain of the Navy / Captain of the Frigate. The contribution of means from both parties must be balanced and defined by the respective governments for each situation. The non-host member-state will designate the 2nd Commander / Chief of Staff of the Naval Component. The naval component is designed combined and may even act independently of the land and air components. The Naval element is formed by a Chilean vessel and a corvette from Argentina with one helicopter on board, totaling 160 soldiers (MOU, 2011). Figure 13 shows the basic formation to be adopted when employed.

Figure 13 - Organization chart naval component




Source: MOU, 2010.

c) Air element

The air unit is conceived as a single element, without the possibility of segregation of its constituent units. Once the participation of the Air Component in a UN mission has been agreed, a Senior Officer will be appointed as its commander. The member country that is not the headquarters of the CJCS will be in charge of appointing an Aviation Commodore or

Colonel (AITA, 2020, MOU, 2010). The host Party will designate the 2nd Commander of the Air Component. The Operational Commanders of the Armed Forces and the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall exercise operational control of the respective national units. This enlistment will take place in the countries of origin. See the flow chart in figure 14.

Figure 14 - Combined Air component



Source: AITA, 2020, p. 131.

According to Aita (2020, p. 131), the organization of the air component shows that the structures of the Chief of Staff, “*Ayudantía y Registratura*” (Adjutancy and Registration), “*seguridad aeroespacial (SAE)*” (aerospace security), “*Operaciones de vuelo*” (flight operations) and the “*Unidad de Apoyo Base*” (base support unit) work in a combined way in possible missions. Air units, in turn, will perform their tasks individually, while operating under the sole command of the air component commander. They will also carry out the supply and maintenance of the aircraft, these being the responsibilities of the unit commander. The base support unit offers the necessary support for the entire logistical support and for the internal security of the component (AITA, 2020).

To understand binational interactions, it is also important to note their differences and changes in the “employment stages” of the Southern Cross Force (MOU, 2010). All the activity of the Force is understood within three stages:

- Preparation of the Force: in which the formation of the forces, their enlistment and training are considered, ending with the presentation of the troops to the UN in 2011;
- Stand-By: in this stage, the training of the forces continues, and the post of Binational Commander is created;
- Use of the Force: this stage is made up of three phases: pre-deployment, deployment and operation, and withdrawal. In the mission area, the Force Commander exercises operational control over the components used.

Currently, the Force is on the standby stage, which implies the ability to deploy the combined Force at any time under the agreements adopted between the parties and with the UN. At this stage, the host Party will be responsible for appointing the Binational Commander (BC). The BC will act as the Coordination Authority, relating to all those Commands that have interference over the means of the binational Force and preparing the implementation of the orders through the respective national chains of command.

Once the BGPD has agreed on a date for participation in a peace mission, the pre-deployment phase will be entered. The BGPD will carry out the coordination so that the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of both countries communicate to the UN the decision on the deployment. At the beginning of the pre-deployment phase, the BC will remain in office for at least the first 6 (six) months of the use of force phase.

From the deployment and operation phase, the BC, advised by CJCS, is responsible for the operational command and control over all the deployed components and supervising the use of the forces by the Force Commander. The decision to end the permanence of the peacekeeping force in any mission will be evaluated and resolved by the BGPD, following the provisions of this MOU and the political authorities (MOU, 2010).

4.5.1 Exercises

What the MoU determines in terms of combined procedures, interoperability and communications have not been applied automatically. Yet, it had a complex maturation process and worked through cabinet exercises and field training exercises in all these years. Following one of our interviewees, considering the “joint” nature of the combined force, Argentina and Chile took several years to develop exercises with the three components (land, air, and naval) (INTERVIEWEE 6, 2021). The first field exercise was carried out was in Bahia Blanca, Argentina, in 2012, but only with land and air elements (FINALIZÓ..., 2012;

IMPORTANTE..., 2012). In 2013, Argentina and Chile carried out an exercise on the ground and with just one of the three components, the land one (Exercise "Cruz del Sur I"). The same year, a combined field exercise was developed only between naval forces in Punta Arenas, Chile (FUERZA DE PAZ..., 2013). The following year, November 2014, Argentina and Chile did a field exercise with two branches - land and air ("Cruz del Sur II") (BRIGADA ANFIBIA..., 2014).

In September 2015, in Bahía Blanca, Argentina, Southern Cross did field exercises with the three components (air, land, and naval) for the first time. This was called "Exercice Cruz del Sur III" , carried out at the *Base de Infantería de Marina Baterías*, where 1,136 men and women trained jointly and in combination (CONJUNTEZ..., 2015). The training was developed under a fictitious political and geographical situation for the components of the Southern Cross to train, emulating a restoration of order in the same way that it would be carried out in compliance with the UN mandate. The corvette ARA, "Gómez Roca" of the Argentine Navy and the OPV "Fuentealba" of the Chilean Navy –with the support of the multipurpose ARA "Punta Alta–, armored cars, two Argentine helicopters, two Chileans and more than 1100 troops deployed, were the soul of the exercise; added to a large number of generators, tents and transport vehicles (CONJUNTEZ..., 2015).

It was probably the most important combined field exercise carried out to date. Later, since 2016, more minor exercises predominated - cabinet exercises and training of specific components of Cruz del Sur. Among them, the exercises of one of the Cruz del Sur battalions on techniques of food distribution, convoy escorts, and urban patrols under UN procedures stand out (MILITARES..., 2016).

In 2017, soldiers from both countries were trained for a week in cabinet exercises at the Simulation and Experimentation Center of the *Escuela de Armas*, Campo de Mayo (LA FUERZA..., 2017). The following year, in August 2018, in the same local, a verification practice was carried out on instruction and training of personnel from the BIM2 company that is part of the combined joint Marine Infantry Battalion (INSTRUCCIÓN..., 2018). In October of the same year, at the Army War Academy in Santiago, a cabinet exercise was carried out that integrated the commands of the forces assigned to Cruz del Sur (SE REALIZÓ..., 2018).

In October 2019, in a cabinet exercise held in Campo de Mayo, for the first time in 12 years, Cruz del Sur worked with a modularized Argentine-Chilean battalion with an Argentine-Chilean command. Previously, they worked only with an Argentine battalion and a Chilean battalion, which implied an army component command (INTERVIEWEE 5, 2020). More than

a hundred members of the Armed Forces of both countries interacted in these exercises (EN BUENOS AIRES..., 2019). In addition, the exercise included an air unit - previously, there was only an air contingent command - and a naval component command was also maintained with the two naval units. Moreover, a binational engineering company was worked for the first time. This was made up of the 10th Argentine Brigade of the 601 Engineering Groups and a high-level Chilean unit in Chile.

According to the former Chief of Staff of the Southern Cross in our interview, these exercises allowed interoperability to be further deepened. On the other hand, both countries worked with three simulators from the three schools of war (army, naval and area) for the first time. This was an advance in technological terms, given that SIMUPAZ had already become obsolete five years ago since Argentina and Chile did not use it except as a messaging system. The new simulator would be better suited to the specificities of Southern Cross (INTERVIEWEE 5, 2020).


In terms of military integration, in all these exercises, it is sought that the Chiefs of the General Staff issue orders to both Chileans and Argentines, without distinction of nationality. Beyond the requirements of interoperability, the goal is to work as a single team. According to one of our interviewees, they seek to speak “the same language” (INTERVIEWEE 7, 2021). If there is no integration at the highest levels, “the head” as a metaphor for a vertical body will hardly be at the lower levels, responsible for the action and execution of the organism's operations.

4.6 Operational concept

So far, the variables analyzed have made it possible to understand various adaptations of the Southern Cross to the global inter-organizational field of multinational peace forces. However, these also influence other aspects related to its mission and operational concept in the operational area. Military isomorphism can be both organizational and operational. The study of this dimension constitutes a previous step that considers one of the objectives of the comparative analysis - that will be developed in the fifth chapter, relative to *operational profiles*. In addition, this section will be the occasion to address the challenges of deployment in Southern Cross.

Within the scope of military capabilities, the Southern Cross must be able to develop a broad set of capabilities but limited to a particular range detailed in the MOU (2010) and which

continue to be improved over time, based on the needs in the UN, in the evolution of conflicts and the political will of its members-states. The overall concept of employment is to provide a UN presence in a crisis area to prevent the escalation of violence and to assist, monitor, or facilitate a ceasefire. The combined force's action is limited to the second stage of deployments in a conflict zone, to be sent between 30 and 90 days after the Security Council mandate was approved. According to the Argentine Defense White Book (2010), Southern Cross is conceived as a transitional element between a first deployment phase by an international or regional coalition, in a theater of “Chapter VII” operations of the UN Charter, and a subsequent mission that includes mandate of stabilization, reconstruction, and peacekeeping. The idea is that it is a kind of “bridging force” during a three to nine months period (which can be extended to one year). The following figure illustrates the deployment sequences.



Source: VÁRNAGY, 2010.

Its concept is not of a “shock force” (or peace-enforcement, contra-insurgency operations) (FAUNDES, 2009). Following UN Rules-of-Engagement (ROE), the MOU (2010) determines specific situations for the use of lethal and non-lethal force related to its mission objectives. However, the idea is that Southern Cross provides safe areas to people and groups whose lives are in danger from the conflict, ensuring humanitarian emergency aid operations, and collaborating in specific activities that require reinforcements of the security of a developing mission, for example, granting protection in elections. Considering these tasks, one of the officials interviewed in this work highlights that: “today the humanitarian component is more important than the properly military component. In other words, it has a greater need for study and development to solve conflicts (displacements, famines, immigration). The force must be prepared to respond to all this lack of circumstances in the military and humanitarian order” (INTERVIEWEE 7, 2021, p. 2).

The main tasks to be performed, when undertaken in operation by three brands of the Southern Cross, are: (1) provide a military presence to the UN in a crisis area, relieving the first international or regional forces; (2) prevention of conflict escalation; (3) assist and monitor a ceasefire; (4) secure an area that allows for the subsequent deployment of other UN forces; non-combatants; (5) collaborate in humanitarian aid operations; (7) assign staff to headquarters, contact officers and military observers in peace missions, among other specific activities of interdiction, transport protection, patrol and surveillance, area escort and control, personnel and material transport, rescue and evacuation of non-combatants.

The military experiences of Chile and Argentina in MINUSTAH in Haiti have served to outline the operational concept of the Southern Cross. It is observed, for example, in the 2019 cabinet exercises. Here a situation of the deployment of Cruz del Sur was simulated on an island in the Caribbean, called "Jaitúa", a fictitious Central American country, but very similar to Haiti (BUENOS AIRES..., 2019). According to one of our interviewees: "In the context of the conflict in Haiti, I practically dare to say that Southern Cross was a force designed for such scenarios. In these scenarios, it is necessary to bear in mind the needs that the UN identifies in a given place and time" (INTERVIEWEE 7, 2021, p. 2).

However, our Southern Cross report also points out that such conflicts mutate and evolve with different characteristics that make it necessary to continue reading it. "There comes, precisely, the starting point of this organization and also the requirement for the organization to continue its evolution in possible scenarios to be required" (INTERVIEWEE 7, 2021, p. 3, proper translation). In this sense, whether Argentina and Chile do not follow changes in the reality of conflicts and events, Southern Cross may be dissociated as a tool to the need that the conflicts or the UN demand. Faced with the need for continuing transformations, Southern Cross has even revisited its initial rapid deployment concept while working to achieve the deployment objective.

According to one of our interviewees, Southern Cross has mutated to another organizational model in the last five years. The original employment concept is the rapid reaction model. However, it could be unfeasible to maintain a rapid deployment standby force due to a logistical issue (INTERVIEWEE 5, 2020). Another interview points out difficulties and high costs in the long "logistics tail" that implies, for example, sending a considerable volume of equipment and contingent to Africa, from Argentine ports, for long ocean journeys. On the other hand, our interview with the Chief of Staff of Southern Cross also highlights

common difficulties at the political level of the countries to agree on work within the genre “rapid reaction” (INTERVIEWEE 6, 2020).

One of our interviewees particularizes in the last exercises: “Today, we are working as one more contingent entering UN operations [...] In other words, in the distribution of mission areas in the UN, one of those areas would be occupied by Southern Cross” (INTERVIEWEE 5, 2020, p. 3, proper translation). It means a redefinition of the employment concept because they no longer talk about a force in all its magnitude. Instead, today Southern Cross works in the modularized form, adapting different organizations to different mission areas. According to the same officer:

[...] on this, we have developed a new scenario with Chile, on which scenarios would be suitable for the probable use of the peace force [...] We are working with a modular concept, in which each country would contribute by maintaining a binational element as the MoU brand, in more and fewer contributions (INTERVIEWEE 5, 2020, p. 3, proper translation).

Based on these changes, Argentina and Chile have upgraded the peace force and updated concepts more in line with what the UN needs. In this sense, the peace force is not currently required to be deployed as a whole. “What marks the MOU is that employment is binational, the magnitude, we can agree both countries. In that engineering, it is the one we are working on now” (INTERVIEWEE 5, 2020, p. 3, proper translation). Such concept has already been put into practice in the combined exercise carried out in October 2019, where Argentina and Chile work - for the first time in 12 years - with a modularized Argentine-Chilean battalion, with an Argentine-Chilean command, an air unit, and a naval unit, more in line with what is currently being worked in the UN.

Regarding possible deployments, reports from the Chilean Ministry of Defense highlight the carrying out of a study of possible employment scenarios of the Binational Force (CHILE, 2015, p. 16). In September 2014, a meeting of the BGPD was held in Buenos Aires, at which time an agenda for monitoring deployment scenarios was agreed upon, common criteria were approved, available information was exchanged, and it was agreed to maintain scenario monitoring as a permanent mechanism of dialogue. In the same vein, the BGPD Meeting Acts (ARGENTINA, CHILE, 2013, 2015) that we found indicate the construction of primers of lists of possible deployment scenarios.

One of our interviewees stated no significant political differences between Argentina and Chile on UN peacekeeping. Moreover, they have sustained some critical perceptions about some “contradictions” in the current UN peace operations (INTERVIEWEE 6, 2021). At a

UN meeting in 2014, in Salvador de Bahia, Brazil, to discuss the Ramos Horta Report (one of the latest normative updates on UN peacekeeping), “we did a very strong political work, which was to try to avoid peace enforcement at the UN, as this constitutes an adequate mechanism for conflict resolution and instrument of neocolonialism” (INTERVIEWEE 6, 2021, p. 3, proper translation). Since most UN operations are carried out in Africa, it raises the colonialism issue because many of the existing African conflicts are legacies of post-colonial situations. “For the great powers, these are second-order or third-order military conflicts, and they have sought to outsource cheaper human resources for peace operations from Third World countries, and this is a problem for us” (INTERVIEWEE 6, 2021, p. 3, proper translation). In this way, there would be contradictions between the profile of UN operations in recent times and the concept of employment of Southern Cross, away from counter-insurgency and missions “that imply supporting the repressive apparatus of the State” .

Finally, a relevant fact has been the proposal made by the former General Secretary of UNASUR and former president of Colombia, Ernesto Samper, in April 2015, suggesting the participation of the Southern Cross in the process of pacifying the conflict between the Colombian government and the Forces Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) (SCUTICCHIO, 2015). Such proposal appears in contexts in which circles of dialogues between the conflicting factions were going through one of its worst moments. However, the exchange continued to exist. It was necessary to have an external arbitrator identifying irregularities and tension points before they escalated in such a circumstance. One of our interviewees, who worked in the Argentine government, points out that Argentina and Chile lost a “historical opportunity” to deploy in Colombia, as a propitious political moment in the region supported that initiative (INTERVIEWEE 6, 2021). When the peace agreement with the FARC was imminent, the issue of FARC disarmament remained. Early 2015, the government of Colombia wove the idea of a Latin American force to control the FARC disarmament and consulted on the possibility that Cruz del Sur could participate in this task. Contacts began to be made via diplomacy between Argentina, Chile, and Colombia. In Argentina, “the president and military commanders liked the idea. The Foreign Ministry was more conservative” (INTERVIEWEE 6, 2021, p. 6, proper translation). The Colombian army would provide security, and the mission will be on the VI Chapter UN umbrella, but the possibility of deploying as a Latin American mission was also analyzed. However, changes in governments (mainly in Argentina) and other complexities of the Colombian conflict prevented the idea of deploying a binational contingent there.

In summary, some operational conditions would currently be in place for the peace force to be deployed. As one interviewed argued: “deployment is not a matter that passes through Southern Cross, but by governments [...] The important thing, I think, is that for the region and the world, we continue working, and this continues to advance” (INTERVIEWEE 5, 2020, p. 7, proper translation). Another of our interviewees stated: “I dare to say that 12 years have passed since the creation of Southern Cross, and 12 years in the world framework is a short time to have achieved the level of interaction reached. A force that works, trains, coordinates, and has effects. It is a very good result” (INTERVIEWEE 7, 2020, p. 6, proper translation). Therefore, there would be essential advances from the operational level downwards to achieve deployment in the short or medium term.

4.7 Closing remarks

Chile and Argentina have histories with common denominators, significantly with Hispanic roots' colonial and cultural legacy. Moreover, their armed forces have been characterized by following common military models - first Iberian, French, Prussian, and finally North American. Complex and sometimes conflictive relations were built between both countries if we consider the adversarial situation in 1978, with clearly threatening postures in their bilateral relations. Considering the history of bilateral relations, *Cruz del Sur* must be understood as an instrument of mutual trust measures - MTM - which help to suppress perceptions of reciprocal threat. In this sense, *Cruz del Sur* goes beyond the current operational needs of UN peacekeeping operations.

The organizational structure of the binational force reflects that strategic interest. As one interviewee said, both countries try to integrate "at the minimum levels" (INTERVIEWEE 7, 2021, p. 4). Argentina and Chile presented themselves as capable of generating the highest and most complex levels of institutionalized cooperation and joint action plans by delegating functions to a combined military instrument based on command structures and multiple binational decision-making instances.

In this chapter, we found indicators of *mimetic* pressures in the modeling of Southern Cross: the identification of national representatives and officials with SHIBRIG and NATO command concepts models, even as practical options to facilitate the binational integration and cooperation. On the other hand, we highlighted the *normative* pressures whereby Southern Cross is not updated outside the UN standards. We detected interlocking elements of doctrinal

dependence and normative pressures of the Southern Cross with the UN and DPKO. The recurrent criteria for training and acceptability of force preparation, even the mission concept, always require the UN's metrics, manuals, and standards. The UN peacekeeping has been helpful as a platform that facilitates a common language between Argentina and Chile and legitimizes their procedures at the internal level of each country. Operating outside the UN would mean a greater level of complexity and uncertainty that both countries prefer to avoid so far. That shows that even pragmatic actions in constructing integration mechanisms and combined doctrines can require a certain epistemic subordination to larger external organizations, a frequent signal of *iso-dependence* in peripheral military organizations.

Chile has followed a military modernization strategy that seeks to simultaneously adapt its defense system to interoperate with NATO and Southern Cross. In that context, the technological dependence in terms of the acquisition of armaments and equipment in the US and NATO allies (the broadcasting center) promote isomorphic pressures in terms of concepts, procedures, and command relations as well as military equipment that Chile intends to use in the process of cooperation and military interoperability with Argentina.

Like many peripheral countries with primary-export economic structures and relatively little military industrialized, Argentina and Chile need to import military equipment from central countries to equip the Southern Cross Force with modern systems and armaments. Despite these restrictions in terms of technological autonomy, both countries manifest considerable levels of independence in terms of financial self-reliance and management of the binational force. Besides, both countries have shown a serious interest in developing a more autonomous Southern Cross, with communication and computer training programs and simulations based on innovation systems and local professionals.

Although *Cruz del Sur* Peace Force is relatively small – in terms of military personnel, operability, and equipment - and still lacks participation in an actual operation, its formation constitutes the most ambitious and advanced military integration instrument in Latin America. Under the orbit of the UN, both countries place a brigade specifically prepared to carry out the proper tasks of a peacekeeping operation. Indeed, both Chile and Argentina have positioned themselves as examples of multinational military cooperation, even as an *emulous* that surpasses many institutional models and integration experiences from central countries.

5 ARABIAN GULF: THE PENINSULA SHIELD FORCE

In recent years, different initiatives and projects in the Arab world indicate a significant interest in creating regional instruments of military cooperation. Among Arab countries in the Middle East region,⁹⁷ defense cooperation processes are becoming increasingly relevant. Projects for reviving an old 1950 Arab League concept for a unified military Arab force occurred at the March 2015 Summit in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt (FAROUK, 2019). Encouraged by the initiative of the Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, Arab member-states discussed the possibility of creating a rapid reaction instrument to counter growing challenges from Yemen to Libya and to deal with groups deemed terrorists and other shared threats. Egyptian Foreign Minister said that a new conference about the project would be voluntary, meaning no one country would be compelled to take part and would have the flexibility to adapt to the process at different stages. However, like other similar initiatives in the past, this latter has also not prospered so far (ALBASOOS, 2018; MOURAD; BAYOUMY, 2015).

Recently, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries - Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) - have agreed to create a 'unified military command' with headquarters in Riyadh. Besides, the US administration of Donald Trump has also encouraged an "Arab NATO" project - with the Gulf countries plus Jordan and Egypt - that does not coincidentally exclude the Islamic Republic of Iran and other Shiite representations of the region (ANTHONY, 2014; SAIDY, 2014).

So far, all of these initiatives constitute more projects on paper than actual, established institutions. However, a force established more than 30 years ago between the GCC countries, the so-called (Jezira) Peninsula Shield Force (PSF), remains the only element of such genre that has come off the paper with a degree of institutionalization and operationalization between Arab countries. Known as "the military arm" of the GCC, the PSF has been considered the most critical move toward a collective bargain in the Gulf region (GUZANSKY, 2014). The PSF has

⁹⁷ From a geographical point of view, we can understand the Middle East region as Western Asia. This region contains a variety of relatively heterogeneous states and societies distinguished by factors related to the ascription to the Islamic world and its different demarcations in the religious and interconfessional dimensions. Alternatively, the Arab world provides ethnic-linguistic criteria to identify several states that comprise the Middle East. Countries such as Saudi Arabia, Iraq, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Turkey, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Oman, Afghanistan, Kuwait, Yemen, and Israel are within the region. For more details on these topics, see: PAREDES RODRÍGUEZ, R. **La incidencia de las fuerzas profundas en el proceso de construcción identitaria de Irán, Irak y Afganistán**. Cuadernos de Política Exterior; Rosario: CERIR. 2005.

achieved some "success", including establishing a permanent Headquarters staff, nearly Hafar Al-Batin, Saudi Arabia, and periodic combined exercises (GCC, 2014; GCC, 2009). Unlike the Southern Cross or the African Standby Forces, the Peninsula Shield Force had modest military deployments in real crisis scenarios. Nevertheless, several analysts criticize that these Force would be more a "skeleton", barely integrated, a more 'symbolic' arrangement than an effective deterrent mechanism in the defense needs of its members (LEGRENZI, 2006; BOWDEN, 2017).

As the official emblem in the figure 16 illustrates, the GCC countries have been guided by the concept of a protective "shield" for the Arabian Peninsula, which has been consistent with the broader environment of a strong "dissuasive culture" against its regional adversaries.

Figure 16 – Logo of the Jezira (Peninsula) Shield Force



Source: QRMOO, 2019 – Licensed under CC BY-SA 4.0, available on Wikimedia Commons.

Among various dimensions of analysis, PSF has represented the interest of the GCC countries in reducing the strategic dependence on central countries as 'security suppliers' in the regions through the more remarkable combinations of their armies. The GCC countries have developed the PSF in a context of strategic dependence and isomorphic socialization, mainly with the US and NATO allies (ALSIRI, 2015; KAWACH, 2002; KRYLOV, 2018; KUFFEL, 2000; SAIDY, 2014). In this chapter, we first provide a brief historical synopsis of the center-peripheral relations considering the times of the so-called "Pax Britannica" and the emergence of the US as a dominant actor in security and defense issues in the Gulf. The chapter describes the formation of the GCC and Peninsula Shield Force in that context. Subsequently, we analyze isomorphic pressures, external dependence, operational concepts, and inter-organizational interactions around the PSF.

5.1 From the "Pax Britannica" to the US rule in the Gulf

Just like "Africa", the word "Middle East" is also a European invention. The term may have arisen in the 1850s in the British India Office. Nevertheless, it became more popular after Alfred Mahan, an American naval strategist, wrote the neologism in a review in 1902 to design the region between Arabia and India. Mahan pointed out the strategic importance of the region and its center, the "Persian Gulf".⁹⁸ Mahan denominated the area around the "Persian Gulf" as the "Middle East" and as the most important passage for Britain to control the Russians from advancing towards British India (KOPPES, 1976, p. 95). As can be observed in the naming word itself, orientalist knowledge is complicit with the workings of Western power; it is "middle" and "eastern" only in proximity to Europe (YAMAHATA, 2018, p. 4).

These elements indicate how profoundly the center-periphery relations have shaped the history of the Middle East in the modern world-system (WALLERSTEIN, 2006). The peripheralization of this region began between the 18th and 19th centuries. The expansion of colonialism and imperialism into the area reflected a combination of superior Western technological, market, and military power, which penetrated and eventually reduced the Middle East to an economic periphery of the core. These were the prolegomena of a fragile interstate system through a process of inter-imperial competition and boundary drawing (HINNEBUSCH, 2003, p. 14).

Even after formal independence, central powers continued to interfere in the Middle East. The region's strategic transit routes, oil resources, the creation of Israel, and the fragmentation of the areas that made up the Ottoman political structures all drew in external powers (HOURANI, 2003). As such, colonial practices and their often-harmful consequences have provoked a persistent reaction expressed in two main trends: Arab nationalism and Islamic movements in the attempts to build regional states and 'radical' movements to assert autonomy and revert dependence relationships (HINNEBUSCH, 2003; WALLERSTEIN, 1999, 2006). Arab nationalism was born in the first decades of the 20th century, although it did not fully develop until the interwar period as a reaction to the colonial partition of the region agreed by the European powers and the Sikes-Picot agreement at the end of the First World War.⁹⁹

⁹⁸ This is the denomination that Iran currently prefers.

⁹⁹ In particular, thinkers of Syrian origin, who have seen how their historical Syria was divided and artificial borders were imposed, were central in the development of Arab nationalism. Edmond

Wallerstein (1999, 2006) initially regarded Islam as one of the anti-systemic movements within the world-system. Islamic movements (or Islamism, political Islam, or Islamic fundamentalism, terms that he uses interchangeably) would be among the latest resistance movements against the system. It is partly due to its counter-secular struggles against the normative imaginary of the modern state (MADI-SISMAN; SISMAN, 2018).¹⁰⁰

By the early 1950s, most Arab states were nominally independent. However, they remained subordinated to the old imperial powers owing to the continued rule of client elites needing Western protection from domestic threats and the economic dependency of the region on central economies (HINNEBUSCH, 2003, p. 22).

In the Gulf region, the British Empire, through protection treaties with Arab states, retained the capacity to intervene militarily when their interests were threatened. From 1820 until its withdrawal in 1971, UK was dominant in the Gulf region. Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, and the Trucial States - by then made up of seven emirates - relied on London for their defense and external affairs (ALLDAY, 2014; GAUSE III, 2010). Kuwait would not gain complete independence from the British until 1961. Oman obtained formal independence in 1951, although de facto dependence on the UK transcended that period. On the other hand, Saudi Arabia declared its independence in 1928, but until the 1970s, the British were pivotal support to its national security.

However, in 1967 the UK formally declared its intention to abandon its colonies and protectorates in the Gulf (GAUSE III, 2010). When the UK withdrawal became effective in early 1970, it had critical and lasting implications for the state's building in the Arab Gulf. The British withdrawal was not carefully planned and implemented, leaving the new states vulnerable to other global, regional, and local powers (RADICONCINI, 2018).¹⁰¹ As such, it

Rabat, a prominent Christian leader of the Syrian National Bloc, wrote *Unité syrienne* et becoming Arab, in which he defined the Arab nation as “one that comprises all the Arabic-speaking peoples of Asia, united by the solidarity created by the Islamic religion. in the process of transformation into nationalist solidarity” (ÁLVAREZ-OSSORIO; 2009, p. 41).

¹⁰⁰ Wallerstein argues that Islamic movements are destined, like other anti-systemic movements to be incorporated into the world-system sooner or later. In other words, Islamic political movements follow the same patterns that previous anti-systemic movements followed. See: WALLERSTEIN, I. Islam, the West and the World. *Journal of Islamic Studies*, v. 10, n. 2, 1999. Also: MADI-SISMAN, SISMAN. *Immanuel Wallerstein, Islam, Islamists, and the World-System Theory*. Ali Vural Ak Center for Global Islamic Studies. 2018.

¹⁰¹ The UK government intended to leave the area according to a schedule set by Prime Minister Wilson — pushed by domestic politics considerations — rather than by pondering a proper cost/benefit analysis of the implications of such a decision for the future of the region. For more details, see: GAUSE III, G. F. *The International Relations of the Persian Gulf*, 1. Ed. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010, p. 18.

had two immediate impacts. The first was military, involving the recall of about 6,000 British ground troops stationed at the British bases in Bahrain and Sharjah - one of the historical states that formed the UAE. The second aspect was the termination of the old special treaties of protection (AL-MUBARAK, 1976).¹⁰²

The British government's actions to develop Westphalian states were not entirely carried out, leaving the small Gulf states without enough forces to claim the monopoly of force over their territory (RADICONCINI, 2018). The British troops left the UAE without the time needed to establish autonomous and professional security forces. Established in 1971 as a federation of seven emirates, the UAE was a model encouraged by the UK to avoid falling under the influence of other major powers in the region, such as Iraq and Iran. However, the federal forces of the UAE, called the “Union Defense Force”, were overshadowed by competing military units of the emirates. There were distrusts in decentralized command structures that generated several obstacles to develop military capacities in the UAE.

The armed forces of Bahrain and Qatar were primarily organized to play an internal policing role and with minimal military capabilities (MAINUDDIN; AICHER; ELLIOT, 1996). If they had an army, it remained tightly controlled by various emirates or the tribal loyalty groups. According to Alsiri (2015), until a decade before creating the GCC and the Peninsula Shield Force in the 1980s, most new nations did not have regular militaries. In addition, the new states had a relatively small population to form labor-intensive forces and face more populous neighbors like Iran or Iraq. The number of trained personnel capable of operating advanced weaponry was relatively small compared to the levels of military modernization seen up to that time.

After the British retreat, the United States took a primary role in preserving order in the Gulf region (DARVISHI, JALILVAND; 2011; GAUSE, 2009, p. 21). Being home to the world's largest oil reserves, the US saw it in its strategic interest to keep Arab Gulf states in its field during the Cold War. Therefore, the US has always been on the Arab Gulf's side against all threats (DARVISHI; JALILVAND, 2010; KHATIB, 2017). The US and the Arab Gulf countries, especially Saudi Arabia, have enjoyed a longstanding, positive relationship (KHATIB, 2017). Overall, US policy in the area was based on containing Iran's military

¹⁰² The attitudes of the Gulf states toward the British decision to withdraw varied. Some states as Bahrain and Qatar opposed the withdrawal; others like Saudi Arabia and Kuwait support the decision. See more details in: AL-MUBARAK, M. **The British withdrawal from the Arabian Gulf and its regional political consequences in the Gulf**. 1976. Thesis (Doctorate) - Graduate Council of the North Texas State University, Texas, 1976.

prowess and reinforcing defense partnership with Arab Gulf countries within the broader perspective of interests surrounding disputes with the USSR, protecting Israel and its capitalist interests in the Middle East (KHATIB, 2017; EHTESHAMI, 2018).¹⁰³ After the fall of the Shah of Iran in 1979, the US initiated several policies from which it sought to combat Iran's influence. In 1980, Ronald Reagan reiterated the commitment to defend Saudi Arabia. After the Iran-Iraq war, they kept their commitment to maintaining the GCC states' security; besides, European countries as France and UK had been active “security suppliers” (AL-ALKIM, 2000; SALIM, 2015). By the 1988 armistice, 27 American ships in the region provided security for Kuwaiti oil tankers flying the US flag (DARVISHI; JALILVAND, 2010; SCOTT, 2016).

These developments catapulted GCC countries firmly into Western alliances and sealed earlier accords (KÉCHICHIAN 2007). The control of strategic resources as hydrocarbons for the industrial world economy has made it possible to modernize and urbanize Gulf countries' social structures. Indeed, during the oil boom in the Cold War order, the OPEC countries and other Arab countries became the only Global South region identified by significant intra-regional flows of capital and labor, generating new interdependencies (HINNEBUSCH, 2003). The oil states transferred about 15 percent of their capital surpluses to the non-oil Arab states in development and defense aid, while nationalist policies opened the latter's state-dominated economies to external Arab investment.¹⁰⁴ It approaches Gulf countries to some geo-cultural standards of modern societies. However, Gulf monarchies have not developed self-sufficient defense industries and technological architectures. Central security support did not lead to a self-sustaining indigenous military industry but rather on “doubling down” on weapons sales while gradually increasing the western military presence in the area (RADICONCINI, 2018, p. 4).

Based on reports submitted by their Defence Ministers at the beginning of the 1980s, the GCC leaders stated that the GCC could not build, train, and equip a defense force capable of repelling aggression, not least because of lack of workforce (ALASFOOR, 2007, p. 116). Hence, they decided to depend on a highly effective but sophisticated defense, centerboard, a

¹⁰³ However, the geopolitical presence of the US in this region precedes this period. For instance, the US helped confront the wave of Arab nationalism in the fifties, supporting the coup to the democratically elected Iranian prime minister, Mohammad Mosaddegh, in favor of the monarch Reza Pahlavi in 1953.

¹⁰⁴ According to Hinnebusch (2003, p. 45), by 1989, there were 252 joint companies or projects with \$17.9 billion in capital (another \$12.3 billion if firms with non-Arab partners are counted). There were also Pan-Arab development funds with an additional \$24.2 billion in assets. The World Bank calculated that in the period of 1976–89 Arab governmental and fund development assistance to needy Arab countries was around \$5.1 billion/year, totaling \$70.8 billion.

land-based anti-aircraft, and a marine missile defense network. During installation and initially, for its operation, the system would require the support of a considerable number of Western technicians and advisers. It caused significant soul-searching within the GCC states, which frequently refused to allow any foreign bases on their territory. However, the system was accepted but only with reluctance because there was no alternative method of organizing regional defense in a short time (ALASFOOR, 2007, p. 116).

This abbreviation of strategic time, the urgency to give consistent management responses, indicates broad isomorphic pressures based on uncertainty. It foresees a situation in which the search for alternative military models, or means not conventionalized by central countries, constitutes more risk in the short and medium-term, an element of insecurity, rather than a perspective of autonomous development of regional security.

According to the dependence theory, the basis of the central power political penetration in the Gulf area is a network of economic dependency that keeps the region subordinate to the advanced capitalist core. As Hinnebusch (2003) pointed out, Arabian Gulf economies exhibit many of the classic dependency features. They are mainly exporters of primary products, often dependent on a single export such as hydrocarbons. In terms of the international economy, their raw materials are neither processed nor accumulated significantly high value. Their human capital remains technically inefficient and relatively unprofessional. Their economies depend on the core countries to incorporate technology and manufacturing. Around these relations, class interests and ruling elites are ordered from the local level to those in the core. In military terms, dependency has created an oligopolist trade and weapon investment linking Gulf monarchies to the central economies (mainly US military industry) rather than each other, delaying regional investments in an autochthonous military sector. That relations have promoted different capital-intensive dependence on weapons, S&T transference, military education, human capital, military facilities, together with diplomatic protection and strategic alliances in the last decades (ALASFOOR, 2007; CHERKAOUI, 2020; DARVISHI; JALILVAND, 2010; MARTINI *et al.*, 2016; SAMAAAN, 2017, 2021). We will discuss details of the military dependency in Gulf states and PSF later. However, before that, we will address the institutional building of the PSF and the GCC.

5.1.1 The GCC and PSF formation

In the years following the end of the Gulf region's "Pax Britannica", numerous efforts were undertaken by the various Gulf states (including Iran and Iraq) to form a regional alliance. Nevertheless, the Gulf state's inherent mistrust of one other, including territorial and border disputes, paralyzed cooperation discussions in the meeting rooms. As the 1980s began, however, the Iran-Iraq war acted as the most critical catalyst for greater cooperation in security and creating the GCC and later the PSF (AL JABRI, 2017; ALASFOOR, 2007; KRYLOV, 2018).

Gulf countries began to continuously strengthen cooperation in the economy, trade, society, culture, and security. On May 26, 1981, the six Arab Gulf states concluded a joint conference in Abu Dhabi to establish the GCC. For the founder members, it was another demonstration of Arab unity. Indeed, the creation of the GCC was the reflection of mutual interests, the similarity of their monarchical regimes, a common official religion (they share a Sunni version of Islam, except for Oman, related to the Ibadi Islam). Further, they share the Arabic language and a common Bedouin tribal tradition (BOWDEN, 2017). As stated by its member states, the GCC establishment resulted from processes that took place before, now reached on the search for general integration.¹⁰⁵

The GCC is far from a complete federal or confederal structure. Nevertheless, the first Secretary-General of the GCC Bishara described the GCC as follow: "The GCC philosophy is that it is a confederate structure whose aim is total unity, we move on the basis of this perception" (ALASFOOR, 2007, p. 36). The GCC is organizationally composed of three principal bodies: the Supreme Council, a Ministerial Council and a Secretariat-General. However, the GCC is unlike the EU. The GCC has no Budget (only operational Budget), no Parliament, and no Court of Justice (ALASFOOR, 2007, p. 37).

Agreements on military and security cooperation, however, have been slow. The treaty that established the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in 1981 did not create a defensive alliance nor included an explicit commitment in the defense area (AL MAKHAWI, 1990). In early 1982, after an unprecedented series of meetings in Riyadh between ministries of defense and ministries of the interior of GCC countries included defense cooperation for the first time. The

¹⁰⁵ See the GCC Charter in: GCC – Gulf Cooperation Council. **The Charter**. Riyadh. Available at: secgen-gulfcc.org/gcc/en-us/AboutGCC/Pages/Primarylaw.html Access: 20 May. 2021.

countries agreed to create a Military Committee within the GCC secretariat and promote the principle of collective security (MAINUDDIN; AICHER; ELLIOT, 1996; FABANI, 2018).

Official sources of the GCC pointed out that a meeting held in Riyadh on 29th February 1982 “was the beginning of the security coordination and cooperation among the GCC States[...]. The declaration of the meeting stressed the unity and interconnection of the security of the GCC states and the collective security principle by stating that "The GCC security is an integral whole, and any attack on any Member State means an attack on all other states” (GCC, 2009, p. 31).

In a meeting of Chiefs of Staff, the parameters and obligations of each country for a possible “joint military force” were discussed. Subsequent discussions between the chiefs of staff and defense ministers focused on combining air defense capabilities and coordinating defense procurement to facilitate their military buildup (KUFFEL, 2000).

An objective, expressed by the Sultan of Oman and the Kuwaiti defense minister, was establishing a “Peninsula Shield Force” capable of dealing with any external threat to any GCC members (GUZANSKY, 2014, p. 642). Indeed, the Arabian Gulf is one of the few regions in which international military cooperation has been sustained mainly by the need to face a series of conventional external threats to its states. The region faces various more or less conventional security threats. Nonetheless, what mobilized the Gulf monarchies, prompting them to give life to a subregional body, was the search to ensure their sovereignty in the face of a series of threats they had to deal with (FABANI, 2016; KOCH, 2010; SALIM, 2015). In essence, these kinds of threats have not changed since the British Empire abandoned its protectorates and colonies in the region.

According to an official book of the Information Center of the GCC:

The decision to form Al-Jazeera Shield Force was one of the oldest decisions in the field of military cooperation. The decision was issued on 23 Dhul-Hijjah 1402 H. (10 October 1982) then followed other decisions for the development of that force to become a mechanized infantry with full fire and fighting logistics. Studies for the development and modernization of this Force have continued and the Force has been renamed as "Al-Jazeera Shield Joint Forces" (GCC, 2009, p. 29).

In moving toward an integrated command structure, the GCC began working on a joint strike force by mid-1983 (ALASFOOR, 2007). They decided that a joint military exercise, the first of its kind, could be carried out to reinforce the Peninsula Shield proposal. In October of 1983, in the western desert of Abu Dhabi, the GCC Supreme Council issued an order to carry out the first military exercise with around 5000 troops under the joint command and called

“Peninsula Shield I” . It consisted of maneuvers typical of an attack operation in which lethal ammunition was used against defined targets. A second combined exercise, “Peninsula Shield II” , took place in October 1984 in Hafr Al-Batin (King Khalid Military), Saudi Arabia, not far from the border with Iraq and Kuwait, this time with 8000 to 9000 soldiers from all the GCC countries. According to official statements, these combined maneuvers sought to test communication systems and the effectiveness of their support methods under a hypothetical scenario in which national forces should act side by side on the battlefield (KUFFEL, 2000; FABANI, 2012). That year, the joint exercises included parachute landing for rapid deployment (ALASFOOR, 2007).

These initiatives and exercises were in line with the necessity for assessing the fitness of their forces, to unify the training methods, weaponry, and the ability to cooperate in logistics, command, control, and interactions among units (KUFFEL, 2000). Furthermore, the objective of the exercises was to deliver a symbolic message by demonstrating that the GCC countries were committed to their defense and sovereignty and would regard an attack against one as an attack against all (AL JABRI, 2017). The PSF deputy commander proclaimed that the exercise proved that the force “could participate in defense of any country under external threat without the need for external forces” (GUZANSKY, 2014, p. 317).

At the fifth GCC Defense Cooperation in the Arabian Gulf conference, which took place at the end of 1985 in Kuwait, the member states again announced their decision to establish the so-called Peninsula Shield Force.

Some military leaders of the GCC provided substantive information in interviews, for instance, with Lieutenant General Shaykh Khalifah ibn Zayid Al-Nuhayyan, the Deputy Commander in Chief of the UAE Armed Forces, on October 24, 1983. In response to whether the maneuvers of the GCC Peninsula Shield a direct response to Iranian threats were to close the Strait of Hormuz, he said:

The idea of creating a unified defense system for the GCC was not born in the past few weeks. Indeed, it has been the subject of long studies since the GCC was established, and its aim is to pool the real sources of strength of the Arab Gulf states in accordance with a strategy that ensures the maintenance of peace and defense of the people and the land. The “Peninsula Shield” maneuvers are a step toward the realization of this strategy and have nothing to do with current developments in the area [...] Steps toward military cooperation will continue to be taken in accordance with the study plans, whose ultimate aim is to establish a joint military command. During the next month there will be joint air maneuvers by Saudi Arabia and Kuwait as a first stage, and joint air maneuvers by Oman and the UAE as a second stage (SCOTT, 2016, p. 28).


Despite these statements on the evolving process of GCC military cooperation, the Gulf countries were aware of their weaknesses and dependence on external forces. The Sultan of Oman publicly stated these weaknesses when he admitted that they “do not have the military capability to deal with Iran [...] the joint maneuvers do not indicate an army capable of protecting the security of the Persian Gulf” (GUZANSKY, 2014, p. 643). Likewise, it was suggested that its command rotates among the member-states. However, an agreement was not reached on this matter (FABANI, 2012).

In recognition of the fact that Saudi Arabia contributes the majority of the force's soldiers, as well as the fact that the Force's headquarters is in Hafar Al-Batin, Saudi Arabia, the GCC decided that the commander should always be Saudi and should be designated for a period of four years. The force's deputy commander and general staff must be composed of different countries and rotate once every two years. Member-states determined that unanimous agreement within the GCC Supreme Council's scope should always be required to deploy the PSF (ALSIRI, 2015).

The initial formation of the organizational structure and the strategic scope of the force was not exempted from various obstacles and debates among its member partners. One of the critical issues was determining who and how the PSF commando would be formed, mainly due to the current distrust between the smaller states of the alliance and particularly towards Saudi Arabia. The latter has assumed a predominant role within the GCC and has the largest military forces among the members of the sub-regional body (FABANI, 2018, p. 112).

The joint command structure of the PSF remains under the Supreme Council¹⁰⁶ of the GCC and the advice of the Supreme Military Committee, which is composed of the respective Chiefs of Staff of the Armed Forces and holds regular meetings (TAPIA, 2021, SAIDY, 2014). The standing part is essentially made up of land forces. It does not have naval and air forces integrated into its joint command structure. However, PSF has naval and air liaison offices to link with navies and air forces of individual states during exercises or operations (See Figure 17). Organically, PSF was located separately along with other commands (air, naval, among others) within the framework of GCC. According to Alsiri (2015) and Kuffel (2000), the PSF has maintained two structures: one on paper at the PSF headquarters and the standing force based at Hafr al Batin.

¹⁰⁶ The Supreme Council is the highest authority of the GCC, and consists of the six heads of state, or their deputies in case any of the former should be unable to attend for any reason. The Council meeting annually in ordinary session, and emergency session if demanded by two or more members (GCC, 2009; ALASFOOR, 2007).

Figure 17 – PSF command structure

Source: own elaboration.

The PSF Headquarters Staff has the mandate to plan for any joint military activities involving the Force. According to Kuffel (2000, p. 13), the staff is able to concentrate on plans, logistics, and coordination issues.

The member countries would have an obligatory contribution in the infantry, artillery, signals, armor, combat support, and engineers. It is important to note that prior to the definitive formation of the PSF, in the framework of the III Summit of Heads of State of the CCG in 1983, the possibility of advancing in the construction of a rapid reaction force (RRF) of the bloc began to be discussed. The Gulf leaders received with optimism that idea; however, at that time, no agreement was reached on the matter.

The military requirements for each country have changed frequently, and not all member partners make the same type of contribution. Some initially contributed brigade-size troops (Saudi Arabia), battalions (Kuwait) while minor partners such as Bahrain and Oman sent companies (GUZANSKY, 2014). Table 2 below represents the PSF forces on paper in 1999 to the one that existed in 1986. The 1986-1999 increase from a brigade-size to a division-size. After different experiences, mainly since 1990, the countries have discussed increasing their contributions. The strategic weaknesses showed during the first Gulf War were particularly traumatic for the Gulf countries. PSF would have deployed to Kuwait borders; however, Gulf countries rely on a Western-led international coalition to protect themselves without fulfilling any relevant role. Then the principle of collective security previously wielded was relegated to the merely discursive sphere when one of the bloc's member states needed its application after being attacked (FABANI, 2018, p. 112).

Table 2 – PSF Troop Contributing Countries in two times

Country	Year	
	1986	1999
Saudi Arabia	1 brigade	2 brigades
Kuwait	1 battalion	2 battalions
Qatar	1 company	1 battalion
United Arab Emirates	1 battalion	1 brigade
Bahrain	1 company or less	1 battalion
Oman	1 company or less	1 battalion

Sources: own elaboration based on Kuffel (2000), and Guzansky (2014).

Since then, GCC countries have been discussing the idea of creating a larger Arab army, more suited to deter their rivals. It was reflected in the 1993 decision of the GCC Supreme Council to increase the PSF troops (KUFFEL, 2000). Before that, the Sultanate of Oman was the country that most raised the flag of rebuild military power. At the GCC summit in December 1990 in Kuwait, the rulers commissioned Sultan Qabus to propose a plan by constructing a unified GCC military force, with 100.000 soldiers from the citizens of the six GCC countries under an integrated command (MASON, 2014; SALIM, 2015).

Nevertheless, this plan did not materialize. Partner-members like Riyadh refused the idea of building a "unified Gulf army", alleging social and logistical problems, the problems of command and control, which should be taken into account, and places of concentration of units of this army among other restrictions. In the defense ministers meeting in Kuwait of the GCC (14 November 15, 1992), the members officially decide to maintain the "Peninsula Shield". Sheikh Ali Salem Al-Sabah, Kuwaiti Defense Minister, announced the decision to develop a Gulf military force through the "Peninsula Shield", which links command and control through the Joint Command (SALIM, 2015).

Member-partners has participated in military exchanges, as well as the unit level and individual training. The PSF maintains three activity levels: unit training, annual PSF training, and "Peninsula Shield exercises" (ALSIRI, 2015). The unit-level movement occurs in a classroom-like environment within the base at Hafar al-Batin. The training includes religious instructions, as well as capacitation in science and arts. The annual training exercises affect the PSF forces at the base and any additional points that individual countries may provide. The member-states do not send a full complement of the PSF-dedicated troops for the training (LEGRENZI, 2006). The annual exercises rotate from one member country to another but receive limited press on each country's shares, purposes, or budgets.

The Peninsula Shield exercises constitute the core of the PSF training. The activities involve joint arms events incorporating GCC air forces and navies (GCC..., 2013; GCC..., 2021; MUSTAFA, 2012; RAO..., 2019; GULF..., 2013; JOINT..., 2019; QATAR..., 2020; GCC, 2019). Regardless of the extent of the exercises, further analysis criticized that those exercises have remained ineffective and irregular overtime or do not possess a high level of military competence because of the decentralized command structure and the force stems from its lack of strategy for amelioration (KUFFEL, 2000; KRYLOV, 2018, SAIDY, 2014; KAWACH, 2002).

GCC military cooperation has present several changes during the 21st century. On 1 December 2001, the GCC heads of state decided to expand the PSF from 5,000 to 20,000 troops (KAWACH, 2002). By 2002, PSF would have had only 6,500 soldiers stationed at Hafr Al-Batin while other selected troops would be on alert at home as reserve units in an emergency (CALDERWOOD, 2009; KAWACH, 2002). Qualitative changes over the years accompanied such decisions. Since 2006, under the principle of “decentralized forces and centralized command” (KOCH, 2010), a senior GCC official meeting in Abu Dhabi agreed to expand capabilities in a rapid reaction apparatus with a more significant number of mechanized and joint elements, and where each national force would remain in its national territory although under joint command (KHAN, 2006; KAHWAHI, 2008).

According to Fabani (2012, p. 35), although it was not clear what the new legal status of the PSF would be, the objective was that it was for the force only to retain an ‘administrative structure’. For that reason, Gulf leaders stipulated that a central command would be formed under the aegis of the General Secretary in Riyadh that would be in charge of appealing to the military units of each State when faced with an emergency it was necessary to resort to them.

However, authors like Alsiri (2015) and Saidy (2014) understand that the headquarters in Hafar Al-Batin would not be just an administrative structure. The standing elements in Hafar Al-Batin would consist of a Saudi brigade unit and a composite brigade with forward elements that would host military units from the other GCC countries.

Overall, these organizational changes from the 21st century allow us to understand GCC countries' interest in adapting the PSF to the models of rapid reaction force (RRF) and standby models. According to the General Mutlaq Bin Salem al-Azima, former commander of the PSF, in an interview, the agreements concluded between 2006 and 2007 were “the true beginning of the joint-Peninsula Shield force. It is well-known that there are rapid response troops and special force” (A TALK..., 2011). Another relevant innovation occurred after the intervention

of PSF in Bahrain in 2011, as member-states established another headquarters in Manama, named “Advanced Command of the Peninsula Shield Forces” (TOUMI, 2011).¹⁰⁷

Currently, PSF is going through some organizational changes in line with the evolution of the GCC security architecture. Since 2013, GCC countries have been developing the project of a unified military command (ALAJMI, 2015; ANTHONY, 2014; SAIDY, 2014). That contemplates the development of a unified maritime command, and it includes planning and managing joint air, naval, and land military operations and military telecommunication (FAROUK, 2019; YASAMIS, 2015). Given the lack of official information, it is unclear how the PSF connects to the new project. The unified military command became “operational” in 2018 when the GCC appointed a Saudi military commander with headquarters in Riyadh.

According to Arab analysts, PSF would become integrated with the GCC's joint naval and air elements (KISHK, 2019). The latest official news dates from January 2021, when GCC Leaders in the 41st summit changed the name of "Joint Peninsula Shield Forces Command" to "GCC Unified Military Command" (GCC..., 2021). However, no significant progress has been made so far, nor is its actual scope clear. Before that, Bahrain's foreign minister Khalid Al-Khalifa clarified some axes: "We want to create a central command that coordinates between all sub-commands and makes them work under one umbrella. But, the new structure won't replace the Peninsula Shield forces" (STOP..., 2012). That is important because it ensures (at least formally) the continuity of the PSF as an institution upon the Gulf Cooperation Council. In addition, as we show, several annual military exercises have been carried out in the last decade under the name of the Peninsula Shield.

5.2 Isomorphic pressures

In the previous section, we have described the essential elements in the formation and structure of the PSF. Following our research objectives, it is now necessary to conduct our study from the perspective of isomorphic pressures in PSF's regional and organizational context (DIMAGGIO; POWELL, 1983). In principle, the phenomenon of *mimetic* isomorphism has been present around PSF. Furthermore, *competitive* and *normative* pressures have had a specific incidence in internalizing organizational and professional models based in central countries.

¹⁰⁷ No reports or publication have specified the size of the Gulf force to be stationed in Bahrain.

5.2.1 Mimetic pressures

Since the Gulf countries obtained their political independence, they have been characterized by following Western models of military modernization, mainly the US and UK as the reference points of identification for their formations. It should not be surprising then, as Col Al-Shaluani, a former member of PSF staff, stated in an interview that the joint command is modeled "after an American Army's staff" (KUFFEL, 2000, p. 9). After several decades of socialization and close military cooperation with Western countries, it is possible to argue that Gulf countries are developing a specific cultural identification with the western models and their standards of excellence.

Various experts and scholars have analogies with NATO since the agreements in 2013 to build a 'GCC unified military command' - to which the PSF has folded (ALAJMI, 2015; ANTHONY, 2014; HELLER, 2020; SAIDY, 2014). The reputational capital of NATO is recognized in one of the statements of General Mutlaq Al-Azima, the former PSF Commander, which said: "The Gulf Cooperation Council forces are the best forces after NATO, and we hope that the hour will not come during which we may have to show the true prestige of the Shield forces" (AL-AZIMEA..., 2020). The general mentioned also made statements with the same kind of recognition to NATO in an interview in 2011: "we [the GCC military forces] have military forces that no state or institute in the world can compete with, with the exception of NATO" (A TALK..., 2011).

The prestige of the Western alliance is solidly established among the Gulf countries, and its current military cooperation mechanisms would be reflecting that influence. According to Samaan (2017, p. 4), a scholar in the UAE, NATO is "today the most integrated military structure for regional security that provides a realistic assessment on the making of a collective defense system". Following Samaan (2017), the GCC unified command might look like NATO's Allied Command for Operations (ACO) based located in Mons, Belgium, commanded by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR). ACO is responsible for planning and executing NATO military operations and operates at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. The ACO and the GCC command express the dominant role of the most significant defense contributors to the alliances: the US and Saudi Arabia. In the same way that Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) traditionally is held by a U.S. flag officer, Saudi Arabia plays a central role in the GCC united command.

The Arab Gulf's identification with NATO can also be observed in other initiatives. Since 2015, the US has promoted an “Arab NATO” idea of a collective security mechanism, including the GCC countries plus other Sunni governments such as Jordan and Egypt (ROUF, 2019; TIME..., 2015). “It is an American idea that has been approved by the Arab Gulf countries, but it didn’t take shape yet. I expect such a NATO to be successful, but we are still at the beginning”, explained in 2018 Maj. Gen. Hamad bin Abdallah al-Khalifah, the commander of the Royal Bahraini Air Force (HELOU, 2018). That project can be understood in the context of strategic interests in the administrations of Barack Obama and Donald Trump on building a new regional security architecture - such as the Middle East Strategic Alliance (MESA). Among several objectives, MESA seeks “deepen[ing] interoperability” to share the burden of protecting U.S. allies in the region (FAROUK, 2019; TIME..., 2015).

The “Arab NATO” and MESA project is compatible with determinations to reduce the U.S. contribution to regional security and make U.S. support strictly equivalent to what Gulf countries pay. MESA seeks enhanced interoperability of member states’ defense systems, probably through “regional capabilities centers” that would cover “the maritime, cyber, air, and missile domains” as well as border security, asymmetric warfare, and command and control. So far, joint troops and an agreement like NATO’s Article 5 are off the table.¹⁰⁸ According to the US National Defense Strategy of 2018, interoperability between allies entails “operational concepts, modular force elements, information sharing, and equipment that accelerate foreign partner modernization and ability to integrate with U.S. forces” (FAROUK, 2019). However, no significant progress stands out around MESA or Arab NATO. As with other projects with Gulf countries, agreements on paper are often far from an institutionalized practice.

5.2.2 Competitive pressures

As we have already mentioned, since the inception of PSF, Gulf states repeatedly linked it to the need to deter a series of threats from neighboring. Focusing on these threats is the key to understanding an essential factor generating military isomorphism: the *competitive* pressures (FARRELL, 2005; GOLDMAN, 2006). In the Gulf states context, ‘competitive’ refers to traditional security dilemmas and uncertainties with regional adversaries that justify military cooperation and military modernization. Military races in *realpolitik* terms have represented

¹⁰⁸ See more details, in: FAROUK, Y. The Middle East Strategic Alliance has a long way to go. **Carnegie Middle East Center**. Beirut. 9 p. February, 2019.

powerful mechanisms among Gulf states to adopt the 'best' military practices, weapons, and standards models. Besides, *competitive* pressures can explain the GCC orientation by collective defense mechanisms inspired by US/NATO than UN models.

The Iran-Iraq war in 1980 was a primary reason for concern for establishing the PSF, and it was later justified when Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990 (GUZANSKY, 2014). However, the main threat in the current perception of various GCC countries, mainly Saudi Arabia, is the Islamic Republic of Iran. Although that rivalry precedes the Iranian revolution of 1979, that worsened after that. The Saudi royal family found a significant threat in the Islamic state model established by Ayatollah Khomeini. However, it was not so much the objective of exporting the revolutionary Islamist model, but the risk that Iranian revolutionary ideas would spread among the Shiite minorities living in the kingdom, in the other Sunni monarchies of the Gulf and the rest of the region, under the influx of a Persian power with grand regional ambitions (AL JABRI, 2015). Nadav Safran (1985), a renowned scholar on politics in Saudi Arabia, argues that the Saudi Kingdom tried to use fears of Iran and its growing hostility towards the Gulf states as an impetus to put the GCC 'a more avowedly defense organization' (p. 376).

Many challenges regarding the strategic location of states remained unattended. Strategic oil facilities located on the Gulf borders and in the desert remained vulnerable to attack. Any aggression on these facilities could paralyze the region's oil infrastructure, despite efforts to achieve a certain degree of redundancy. These challenges were instrumental in developing a more significant military capacity to protect territories with remote economic infrastructures. In this context, *competitive* pressures allow understanding reasons on why a group of states whose political regimes being hierarchical, centralized, and personalistic, and which, precisely because they possess these particularities, are even more reluctant than other states to delegate quotas of power, decided to cooperate in a sensitive field like that of security (FABANI, 2016).

A historical step in this direction was the Manama Summit in December 2000 (GCC, 2009). The GCC member-states signed a Mutual Defense Pact, considered the second most significant achievement in military cooperation after establishing the PSF (SAIDY, 2014). On this subject, the agreement obliged all six states to provide military assistance to help each other, mirroring the 4th and 5th articles of the NATO Treaty's collective security. Else, the Mutual Defense Pact established a Joint Defense Council and a Military Committee and codified what is now the pillar of the GCC's military doctrine: that all the council members would be secured as an "indivisible whole" (YENIGUN, 2015, p. 36). According to official GCC documents,

member-states [...] “confirm their intention to defend each other collectively based on the concept that an attack on any member State means an attack against all of them, and that any danger threatening any of them means a threat to all of them [...] The agreement also provides for the continued development of the Al-Jazeera Shield Force [...] (GCC, 2009, p. 29).

As the perceptions of insecurity have worsened during the 21st century, regional military cooperation in the Arabian Gulf has deepened. Indeed, the perception of loss of Sunni influence in Iraq, the fear that the insurrectionary upheaval sparked under the Arab Spring, the potential threat of a so-called ‘Shiite crescent moon’, also the threat of Islamic State (ISIL) and a potentially nuclear-capable Iran were factors that led GCC countries to develop intense diplomatic activity and strategic alliances in the 21st century.

As shown in the previous section, since 2006, the Gulf countries have begun to develop “rapid deployment” schemes with a more significant number of troops for the Peninsula Shield. Moreover, they started to discuss other more integrated forms of military cooperation as the project of a “unified military command” planned since 2013 (FAROUK, 2019). In parallel, their ties of assistance and purchase of arms to industrialized countries have intensified. The GCC countries registered an increase in purchases of weapons - fighter planes, fifth-generation fighter planes, missiles, Anti-missile systems, helicopters - while a reduction was identified in other parts of the world when compared to the volume registered in the 2009-2013 and 2014-2018 periods (SIPRI, 2019; OS 5..., 2019).

According to a report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) coordinated by Anthony Cordesman (2018), the arms race between Iran and the Arab Gulf forces would be favoring the latter in recent times. Many Iranian conventional military forces are equipped with aging, battle-worn, and mediocre weapons that make it something of a military museum. Iran has not had good access to modern weapons since the fall of the Shah, and the Arab Gulf forces are generally equipped with the most modern and effective weapons available from the U.S. and Europe and would be supported by the U.S., Britain, and France in any serious warfighting contingency. This report is entitled, “The Arab Gulf States and Iran: Military Spending, Modernization, and the Shifting Military Balance”. It is based on official open-source reporting and research centers like the International Institute for Security Studies (IISS) and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). It notes the critical role of the US and European forces like those of Britain and France in shaping the balance in the Middle East, as well as the emerging role of Russia, but focuses on the detail trends in Iran,

Iraq, and the Southern Arab Gulf states - Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE (CORDESMAN, 2018).¹⁰⁹

Some key events have triggered these advances: the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the impact of the so-called Arab Spring since 2011. Further, it is essential to understand that two great fields of forces and international alliances confront each other in the Middle East. Following the analysis of Alain Gresh (2012), we can argue that "cleavage opposes a "pro-North American camp": Saudi Arabia, Qatar, UAE, Kuwait and Israel, mainly. And a so-called "field of resistance": Iran, Syria, Hamas in Palestine, and Hezbollah in Lebanon" (p. 1). The rivalry between those fields is a relative consequence of alignment or confrontation patterns with the interests of the US or Russia. However, it is linked with regional and relatively autonomous cleavage, corresponding to the strategic rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran. That rivalry was girded in the militarization and Islamization of various conflicts before and after the Arab Spring, the civil wars in Syria and Yemen, and the Shiite-Sunni fracture that divides the region.

One of these events refers to the war in Iraq in 2003, where the US defeated the Sunni government of Saddam Hussein. According to Reva Bhalla's details (2012), the last decade had allowed Iran to seize Baghdad from Sunni hands and put Mesopotamia under Shiite control. "In the Saudi perception, there is no question that Iraq now, as fractured as it is, is in Iran's sphere of influence, while Iraqi Sunnis have been marginalized. Iran's achievements in Baghdad changed the regional balance of power, creating a Shiite crescent moon that stretches from western Afghanistan to the Mediterranean coast" (2012, p. 1).

Indeed, GCC leaders reevaluated their security systems, motivated by long-standing and concrete appreciations of Iran as a hegemonic power (KÉCHICHIAN, 2007). In this context, military cooperation between Gulf countries has constantly been deepening. One of their expressions was the mentioned proposal in 2013 of a future 'unified military command'. It is supposed to eventually number several hundred thousand men, with Riyadh alone fielding 100,000 troops. A separate plan has also been discussed, linking several Sunny Gulf states, Egypt, Jordan, and Morocco - not as an integrated force but as a looser military alliance, which could eventually be the Arab NATO with the US (GAUB, 2014).

Nevertheless, Gulf countries encounter other competitive challenges in a relative lack of personnel and proficiency to operate with sophisticated weapons and modern military

¹⁰⁹ The report is available on the CSIS web site at: https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/181212_Iran_GCC_Balance.Report.pdf. Accessed on 12 Sep 2020.

operations. U.S. and European industrial, military power can guarantee the transference of sophisticated armaments. However, it cannot compensate for Arab dysfunctions, divisions, unprofessional staff, and a plan to standardize equipment and education programs. Their understanding has been that professional capabilities are better developed with the assistance of central countries, and they should acquire capacitation and education in their military institutions. It leads us to the next section to understand incidences of *normative* pressures around PSF.

5.2.3 Normative pressures

Reports from security analysts point out that military education in the Arab Gulf countries has been outdated in the last decades, even with criteria dating from World War II (SHEIKH; FAYEK, 2018). Gulf countries would have lacked soldiers with the necessary skills and proficiency. Even illiteracy within Gulf soldiers in the last decades has not been uncommon. Indeed, a former American military advisor to Saudi Arabia witnessed soldiers signing for their pay with a thumbprint because they could not sign their name (KUFFEL, 2000, p. 13). The ability to read and write directly affects training and mission readiness by limiting methods of training. It also adversely impacts the capacity of the army to maintain its arsenal, much of which is highly sophisticated and imported from the US, Great Britain, and France (KUFFEL, 2000, p. 13).

The rising military power of regional adversaries, the increasingly unpredictable nature of terrorist activities, and the ever-developing threat of cyber-attacks have required GCC militaries to upgrade their human capital capabilities. However, as Sheikh and Fayek (2018) argued, it is difficult to “buy” military human capital as Gulf countries can buy military equipment.

In the last years, Gulf countries have invested in education and training programs that relied widely on western capital human. Significantly, the reliance on countries as US or British military education to improve tactical and strategic skills of Arab officers has expressed isomorphic *normative* pressures. That is observed in the adoption by Arab militaries of fundamental concepts and ideas embraced by Western trainers, for instance, how Western advisors define national security, professions, and the very purpose of armed forces (AKBULUT, 2016; BESHAR, 2015; MARTINI et al., 2016; SAMAN, 2017, 2019, 2021).

The Peninsula Shield Force components have received training from Western advisors in this context. In 2003, for example, approximately 100 United Arab Emirates (UAE) Sailors and Airmen participated in coalition forces' chemical, biological and radiological (CBR) training conducted by U.S. Navy members.¹¹⁰ The UAE forces have come to Camp Patriot, Kuwait, supporting the Gulf Country Council (GCC) protective resolution related to the Peninsula Shield Force. Lt. Cmdr. Edan Antoine, Camp Patriot coordinator for CBR-defense training and supplies, conducted the hour-long refresher. Here US coordinator and the UAE students discussed and walked through the various steps taken in mission-oriented protective posture (MOPP) levels (CAMP..., 2003).

The Arab states' need to train local militaries by outsourcing it to Western trainers is not a new phenomenon (SAMAAN, 2017, 2019, 2021). The US military training mission to Saudi Arabia opened its office in Riyadh in 1952. The fact that this support still exists in 2021 questions the ability of these countries to act with strategic autonomy in the field of military education. Both the UAE and Saudi Arabia rely closely on cooperation with the US Department of Defense for their military reforms. The UAE Presidential Guard and the Saudi National Guard receive training, respectively, from the US Marine Corps and the US Army (SAMAAN, 2021). British influence is also significant, mainly in Qatar and Oman. The Qatar Joint Command and Staff College initially relied on a partnership with a faculty team detached by King's College in London. The courses delivered to Qatari officers were a slightly modified version of the advanced command and staff course that King's already provides to the UK Defense Academy in Shrivenham (SAMAAN, 2021). In Oman, the UK opened a new military base in 2018 with about a hundred officers whose primary goal, among others, is to support exercises and joint training activities with the Omani armed forces.

According to Samaan studies (2017; 2019), one of the main developments has been the proliferation of new War Colleges and National Defense Colleges in Gulf countries (in Qatar, the UAE, Oman, Bahrain) in the last decade. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia has launched a reform project to create a defense university inspired by the U.S. National Defense University. Military education in these schools aims to turn officers into strategists able to connect their operational and tactical skills with their geopolitical environment and political authorities' higher objectives. Whether in Riyadh, Doha, or Abu Dhabi, military colleges have followed a Western

¹¹⁰ For more details, see: Camp Patriot helps train Peninsula Shield Forces. **Defense-Aerospace**. 2003. Available at: www.defense-aerospace.com/article-view/release/17307/cbr-training-for-uae-troops-in-kuwait.html Accessed on: 20 may 2021.

model, meaning that Gulf officers study policy analysis and Western writings on strategy, including the classical theories of Clausewitz, Machiavelli, or Thucydides.

Through these new institutions, the Gulf countries seek to train a generation of professionals and leaders to act on international strategic challenges and increase the decision-making autonomy of their states (SAMAAN, 2019). Gulf countries are also trying to centralize their military education colleges at the GCC level. In 2015, GCC leaders announced plans for a joint GCC Defense College hosted by the UAE. Indeed, they had discussed the idea as early as 1984, seeking to emulate the NATO Defense College, which engenders a collective military identity among officers of the Atlantic alliance (SAMAAN, 2019).

The central countries' normative influences are not merely sustained. It is growing, including an organization like NATO (BESHR, 2015; MARTINI et al., 2016; ROUF, 2019). In 2017, Kuwait inaugurated a regional training center for NATO that now brings officers from the region and their counterparts from the alliance. The value of NATO as a defense education and training provider, including the field of international military education, is evidenced by the enduring interest of Gulf partners for the various activities (exercises and courses) offered by NATO programs (MARTINI *et al.*, 2016; BESHR, 2015).¹¹¹ One of the leading programs for Arab countries has been the Istanbul Cooperative Initiative (ICI), launched in 2004 in Turkey (NATO, 2019). It was relevant to create an educational assistance structure for Arab countries (AKBULUT, 2016).

So far, four out of six members of the GCC have established bilateral agreements with the ICI: Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). ICI members have access to a wide range of selected military exercises and training activities in defense planning and transformation, budgeting and planning civil-military relations, training anti-terrorism, non-proliferation of WMD, border-security, disaster management, among others. ICI countries have not only been participating in such training programs, but they have also contributed to NATO operations. For instance, UAE and Bahrain contributed to ISAF, whereas Qatar and Kuwait have contributed in one way or another to NATO's efforts in Afghani-Qatar and the UAE also participated in Operation Unified Protector (UOP) in Libya in 2011.

Even though Saudi Arabia and Oman have so far declined to access the ICI formally, personnel from the two countries have attended courses at the NATO Defense College in Roma,

¹¹¹ The NATO School in Oberammergau, Germany, and the NATO Defense College in Rome, Italy, play primary roles to that purpose, but there are many other initiatives opened to partners such as the Defense Education Enhancement Program and *ad-hoc* training teams deployed by the Allied Command for Transformation.

and both Oman and Saudi Arabia have engaged in a political dialogue with the Alliance and participated in issue-specific meetings - such as on antipiracy, military cooperation or education” coordinated by NATO.

5.3 External dependence

Regional military cooperation in the GCC countries has not developed without the extensive influence of western technocratic capital and military standards. Beyond the isomorphism perspective, Western normative references and active support on educational and training programs in the Gulf region entail elements of *doctrinal dependence* on understanding defense systems and military strategies. This combination between external dependency and regional cooperation conflicts with the ultimate goal of strengthening autonomous capabilities in GCC countries (GCC, 2011). With the support of Western human capital, the Gulf countries have tried to develop higher levels of strategic autonomy (SAMAAN, 2019). There is an apparent paradox here since the extensive assistance calls that principle into question, even the “local ownership” principle in organizations, namely the members' ability to internally conduct their organizational changes according to their proper parameters and perspectives. These principles are tensioned once the normative identification entails a permanent invitation to the foreign view to disseminate its evaluations at Gulf military organizations' strategic and operational levels.

Doctrinal dependence has been sustained by Arab military personnel, political leaders who sign defense pacts with central countries, and by the “lobby” of academic experts cited here - who naturalize the understanding of organizational deficiencies and capabilities in Gulf military arrangements based on the NATO experience (ALSIRI, 2015, KUFFEL, 2000; SAIDY, 2014; SHEIKH; FAYEK, 2018). Doctrinal dependence deepens a deficit in terms of the *epistemic autonomy* of the GCC countries since they understand that others provide the solutions and know-how. The power of the US and NATO in “conduct the conducts” is evident and could permeate the GCC commands' internal decision-making processes. Not surprisingly, in Arabic newspapers (Al Hayat and Ashar Al-Awsat), senior Gulf officials, requesting anonymity, have admitted that the new unified command would be coordinated between GCC member states and the US-led international coalition against terrorism (BESHR, 2015).

Strategic dependence has been consolidated since the end of the Gulf War in 1990. The inability and impotence of Gulf leaders to deal with Iraq's aggression against one of its member

states represented a turning point for regional cooperation (FABANI, 2012). PSF did not intervene as it would have been expected in the invasion of Kuwait. At that time, the GCC member-states limited themselves to condemning Iraq's actions without coordinating an effective joint military effort. Who then intervened to liberate the tiny emirate was an international force of more than 30 nations, led by the US (AL-ALKIM, 2000). After the war ended, the GCC members felt secure again signing a series of defensive cooperation agreements with central countries, increased arms sales, joint exercises, air and naval bases in the region (ALBASOOS, 2017; SCOTT, 2016). The significant presence of Western military bases in the Arabic Peninsula has been one factor that deepened external dependency. Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and Oman host US military bases, while the UAE provides the French Navy with a base in the capital. Kuwait has signed defense agreements with the UK, US, and France; Qatar has defense agreements with France and hosts US Central Command; the UAE has signed defense agreements with France and the UK. Bahrain and the UK agreed on setting up the British Royal Navy's Naval Support Facility (CHERKAOUI, 2020; FABANI, 2012).¹¹²

According to Alasafoor (2007, p. 116) data, the GCC embarked on a shopping spree in the 1990s for high-technology weapons. The revenues earned from oil exports enabled members of the GCC to acquire additional weapons. Saudi Arabia bought the best weapons and built defense programs, such as the Delmon eye project, to link Saudi air defense control with Kuwait and Bahrain, thereby contributing to Bahraini and Omani defense.

If we consider the types of dependency that we argue in our theoretical framework, it is not easy to find significant indicators of *financial* dependence in Gulf military organizations. Robust financial capacities have characterized them based. Besides, Gulf countries stand out worldwide for their military weapons purchases. In the 2016-2020 period, Saudi Arabia was the world's leading arms importer, and together with the UAE and Qatar, they accounted for 17.8% of global arms imports, and the US supplied more than 50% of the material (SIPRI, 2020). In this context, we understand the self-perception of strategic superiority that the already mentioned commander of the PSF, Al-Azima, stated in an interview: "I would not be exaggerating to tell you that the GCC [military] forces are, after NATO, the best. No country

¹¹² The continued presence of US in the Gulf after the Gulf War II has had a profound impact on some Gulf countries. It has decreased their domestic legitimacy acceptability amongst their own people as the leaders found the only way of their political life survival is depending on the West. For more details, see: DARVISHI, F, JALILVAND, A. Impacts of U.S. military presence in the Arabic countries of Persian Gulf: security shield or reduce of legitimacy. **Geopolitics Quarterly**, v. 3, n. 4, p. 167-180, Winter 2010.

has F-15s, Tornados, Mirages, and Typhoon jets, as well as the various different kinds of modern tanks, and all forms and varieties of naval craft” (A TALK..., 2011).

Nevertheless, this financial capacity - and the high volume of technology-intensive imports - is not consistent with its capacity for innovation in S&T, which is reflected in a still ‘immature’ local defense industry (BARANY, 2020). It is a topic in which their purchasing power evidences the impact of *technological* dependence, that is, the transfer of technology in the military sector.

According to Hinnebusch (2003), oil has increased the security dependency of the Gulf oil producers on central countries. “The combination of super-riches, weakness and contested nationalist credentials, especially after the Iranian revolution, turned these states to the West for protection in a more overt and intensified way than hitherto” (p. 42). As part of the continuing transaction, the Arab oil producers spent a large part of their surpluses – 32 percent of their oil revenues from 1974 to 1998 – on expensive and sophisticated Western arms purchases. These purchases deepened Saudi dependency on the US for spare parts, upgrading, and contractors to run sophisticated equipment. Expensive Western arms purchases were a Saudi way of buying protection: they made Saudi oil control acceptable in the West and deepened the West’s stake in Saudi security (HINNEBUSCH, 2003).

In the last two decades, bilateral cooperation and multilateral initiatives such as the US-Gulf Strategic Forum and the NATO's Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) have proven instrumental to support GCC's defense projects, such as the aim of an integrated joint ballistic missile defense system (AL-QAHTANI *et al.*, 2014; MARTINI *et al.*, 2016). In 2000, the GCC claimed to establish two anti-air systems inside the Peninsula Shield - "The Peace Shield" and "Cooperation Belt". The installed systems use American "AWACS" radars and US anti-air missiles (FABANI, 2012; KRYLOV, 2018).¹¹³ Saudi Arabia has purchased thousands of guided bombs (Paveway, JDAM, and others), multiple aircraft, armored vehicles, tanks from the US, UK, and other central partners (ALBASOOS, 2018). These kinds of weaponry sources can be relatively diversified and include countries such as Russia, Bulgaria, Canada, and China, but the largest share of arms always comes from the US, a trend repeated among the other GCC states.

¹¹³ AWACS, abbreviation of Airborne Warning And Control System, is a mobile, long-range radar surveillance and control center for air defense. The system, as developed by the U.S. Air Force, is mounted in a specially modified Boeing 707 aircraft. Basically, the system consists of a set of aircraft that carry radars at height in order to detect any threat approaching the fleet.

According to the Cordesman report (2018), all the Arab Gulf states currently spend far more of their economies on military forces than the 2% of GDP goal set by NATO, and far less than the 3.11% the IISS estimates is spent by the U.S., the 3.10% spent by Russia, and the 1.26% spent by China. Furthermore, three such states – Iraq, Oman, and Saudi Arabia – spend more than 10%. While Qatar and UAE lack the integrity and transparency to report meaningful data on their military spending, it is likely that both obligated close to 10% or more in 2018 – driven by a surge in Qatari arms buys and the UAE's war in Yemen (See more details in ANNEX C – Military expenditures of Gulf countries and US arms sales).

In the Global South dimensions, the Gulf states have achieved superiority in military equipment and high-tech defense systems but at the cost of high technological (R&D) dependence. Further, the ability to buy highly complex weapons does not mean knowing how to use them effectively. Technology transfer can only be efficiently carried out if the purchaser has the necessary skills and knowledge compatible with the technology to be absorbed (PIRRÓ E LONGO, MOREIRA, 2015, p. 4). As explained before, such competence refers to the adequacy of the human capital in the recipient - in this case, Arab soldiers. As an illustrative example, from 1974 to 1998, Saudi arms purchases were followed by a massive and intimate American penetration of the Saudi military: sophisticated weapons systems required extensive Saudi–American military planning and a large (30,000–100,000-man). US training mission provided one US military advisor for every six Saudi soldiers (HINNEBUSCH, 2003, p. 42).

Besides, a specific military technology presupposes a particular type of military organization. Since a specific armament presupposes specific professional skills, the symbiosis between profession and technology also conditions a specific organizational form. Hence, technological dependence interconnects with the isomorphic dimension around NATO and US structures mirrored by the GCC defense organizations. For these reasons, the GCC-US cooperation has always sought a “comprehensive approach” to strengthen the defense capability of the GCC states by promoting standardization and interoperability according to US/NATO parameters.

Finally, we can observe forms of *operational* dependence around GCC forces. As we argued in Chapter 2, such dependency can be tested only in cases of forces that have a deployment in real crisis scenarios and based on indicators of external support *in situ*. In the case of PSF, the first significant deployment was in 2003 during the US invasion of Iraq, with 10,000 troops of all members to support Kuwait in the border with Iraq (DAVID, 2003). The second was in 2011 when the troops from Saudi Arabia and the UAE entered Bahrain to back

the Al Khalifa regime's crackdown against the social revolts in the context of “Arab springs” (ISLAM TIMES, 2020). There were no direct combats with armed groups in both operations, and they were without external support.

Although PSF was not explicitly invoked due to Oman's absence, several eventual PSF capabilities were used in the Arab ad-hoc coalition that intervened in Yemen since March 2015 (endorsed by UNSC on 'Chapter VII'). The so-called operation “Decisive Storm” fighting the Houties showed a lack of capacity to set up a theater infrastructure to deploy intervention units. So, they turned to the US, UK, and Turkey for logistics and the US and Israel for intelligence, targets, search, and rescue (ARTEAGA, 2015). Most US assistance has consisted of aerial targeting assistance, intelligence sharing, and mid-high aerial refueling for Saudi and UAE aircraft. Despite significant criticism of its involvement in the conflict, the US government repeatedly has emphasized that assistance is not directly combat-related except when in defense of US forces and the pursuit of al Qaeda and its associates.¹¹⁴

5.4 Operational concept and "culture of deterrence"

After analyzing the main components of external dependency and military isomorphism, it is time to describe the operational concept of the Peninsula Shield. Like other military organizations, Gulf states created PSF to act within specific strategic circumstances, and Arab military and commands tend to behave as they perceive these circumstances. As authors such as Soeters (2021) and Ruffa (2017) explain to us, these perceptions reflect a set of beliefs, norms, and values that denote an "operational culture" on how to understand missions, use, and scope of the force in their environments. Here we will argue precisely about the presence of a "culture of deterrence" that affects all processes of military cooperation in the Gulf.

Although the PSF mission concept and scope are not clearly publicly defined, it refers basically to 'military interventions' (ALSIRI, 2015; KUFFEL, 2000). Its mission concept seeks to protect the territorial integrity and the internal stability of the member-states. It is based on 'anticipated attacks' and deterrence through a unified defense strategy. The PSF concept refers to defensive rather than offensive strategies congruent with the asymmetries that several Gulf countries perceive in “hegemonic” adversaries like Iran.

¹¹⁴ See more details, in: SCHMITT, E, GIBBONS-NEFF, T. Before Saudi visit, Congress questions U.S. support for Yemen campaign. **The New York Times**. New York. 2018. Available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/18/us/politics/trump-saudi-yemen.html>. Accessed on: 12 may 2021.

According to analyst Omayma Abdel Latif (2009), “Saudi Arabia has traditionally opted for a calculated non-confrontational approach to counter Iran's supremacy as a regional power. However, in parallel with this more defensive approach, it has launched what one Saudi observer has described as "a hidden war" against Iran aimed at influencing the process of alliances and cooperation in the region” (2009, p. 1). In particular, in the last years, it is possible to note continuous campaign of aggressive rhetoric in the Saudi-funded media that portrays Iran as the whirlwind of the Middle East, the great threat to regional stability, and an agent of chaos in many Arab countries, including Iraq and Yemen.

The PSF is expected to be the first line of defense - a “shield” - against any aggressor and then augment itself into the chain of command of follow-on host nation forces (KUFFEL, 2000; KOCH, 2010). According to Kuffel's description (2000. p. 18), PSF could be a "force multiplier in a limited Arabian Gulf crisis" despite persistent operational limitations.

As stated in the 2000 Defense Pact, “any aggression against one member state would be deemed belligerent against all the parties involved” (GCC, 2009). But it is essential to understand that the PSF “was not designed to be the main regional power in a defensive war of any GCC member” (KRYLOV, 2018). PSF would only assist the country's army or government facing 'aggression', as we already pointed out in its deployments preventively in Kuwait against Iraq in 2003 and later in the popular uprisings in Bahrain in 2011.

In the latter case, an official GCC report gave an explanation about the deployment of the PSF: “given the regretful events witnessed by the Kingdom of Bahrain, it requested in its capacity as a GCC member State to invoke the joint defense agreement signed in the Kingdom of Bahrain on 31st December 2000. The GCC states responded to this call by sending the Peninsula Shield forces [...] and asserted that the arrival of these forces in the Kingdom of Bahrain was in line with the principles and rules of international law, and within the framework of honoring collective agreements [...] (GCC, 2014, p. 16).

According to statements by the former commander of the PSF, Bin Salem al-Azima, this force did not arrive in Bahrain to interfere in the internal affairs of the Kingdom: “our mission is to secure Bahrain's vital and strategically important military infrastructure from any foreign interference” (A TALK..., 2011). In this regard, the General Commander of the PSF alleged that in every state with internal problems, it is a priority to secure the borders. In this way, given the short distances between territories and national borders in this region, we can understand the operational concept of the Peninsula Shield relatively as a ‘border force’.

The existential threat of the Arab Uprisings to the monarchies - with the insurrections in Yemen as a model - and the “subversive activities” of Iran across the region have reinforced the urgency of implementing a high number of troops (AL-OTAIBI, 2020; AL-SAUD; KÉCHICHIAN, 2020; SALIM, 2015). The PSF former Commander Al-Azima hinted that PSF would have reached 40,000 troops, spread among the respective member states, capable of combining within one week, with the deployment of artillery and troops from its base at Hafr Al-Batin. This issue is close to the idea of turning PSF into an instrument that can provide broader solutions to the insecurities of its members (KERMALI, 2011). In 2015, two objectives were added in the context of the project of the GCC unified command: supporting post-conflict reconstruction and coordinating counterterrorism efforts (FAROUK, 2019).

All these orientations express a "culture of deterrence" around Peninsula Shield Force. By "culture of deterrence" we understand the strategic habits, practices, and values of a dissuasive nature, and therefore essentially a defensive strategy, by which the actors organize all their initiatives for military cooperation.

One way to illustrate that is by looking at the scenarios contemplated in military exercises. In May 2012, the Wam agency reported that the six nations of the PSF led in Kuwait a war game called “Islands of Loyalty” (MUSTAFA, 2012). The exercises follow a diplomatic furor due to a visit by former Iranian President Ahmadinejad to the island of Abu Musa, widely condemned by Arab and western states. Iran invaded and occupied Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tunbs in 1971, just two days before establishing the UAE state and the UK's withdrawal from the region. The week before the military exercises, a senior commander of Iran's Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC) underlined the islands' strategic importance to Iran. He added that the republic had deployed forces and equipment to defend them this week. In this situation, PSF states seek to provide a dissuasive response to Iran through military exercises. The official media added that the PSF exercises would test its members' ability to carry out "special, limited and major missions along coasts and islands within the territorial waters". There were no further details.

Other official representatives of the Gulf states have a more offensive notion on PSF, and some have had media significance. For example, in Manama, 2009, a Bahraini lawmaker urged GCC leaders to revive the Peninsula Shield to help "eliminate the Houthi rebels" (TOUMI, 2009). Jassen Al Saeedi, an independent Salafi MP who has often waded into controversy with fellow peers, said:

There is a cancerous situation spreading in the region and we should work together to eliminate it before it reaches inexorable stages. There is no room for leniency or complacency and we must deter all those targeting the Gulf. Each of the GCC countries should contribute with its forces in tackling hot spots [...] The armed rebellion against Yemen has not come from a vacuum, but had been prepared for a long time to create a front that would strike both north of Yemen and south of Saudi Arabia. It is dangerous situation is likely to be duplicated in other GCC countries, including Bahrain. All Gulf countries should stand together to confront this danger because it is not confined to Saudi Arabia (TOUMI, 2009, p. 1).

Although not shared by all official voices of the Gulf countries, these more extreme statements express the potential reach of a force as a PSF, as well as the “deterrence culture” that is breathed in the environment of these countries. Official declarations of threats or attacks should not be confused with an offensive strategy. Precisely, the threatening posture, sometimes angry by some of the officers against Iran and other adversaries, is part of an essentially defensive strategy that broadly contextualizes the operational concept of the PSF.

5.5 Interorganizational interactions

How do units and command’ staff cooperate in PSF? As mentioned in the previous chapters, the empirical and formal description of these interactions is necessary before classifying them theoretically in the comparative chapter according to the relational variables (inter-organizational strategies, multinationalism, and operational partnerships).

The Saudi leadership is the first element that deserves attention in understanding the forms of inter-organizational military cooperation in the Gulf. Structural asymmetries between Saudi Arabia and the other partner members constrain an organizational model, command relationships, as well as several limitations and contradictions within the PSF.

With an area of 2,240,000 km², the kingdom of Saudi Arabia occupies more than 80% of the Arabian Peninsula. Compared to the other five-member states, Saudi Arabia is an outlier because of the size of its territory, population, the best-equipped and largest army and economy, as well as the influences it derives from its role as the custodian of the two holiest sites in Islam - having a status as a ‘bastion of Sunni power’ among Islamic countries (FERREYRA, 2015).¹¹⁵ These structural asymmetries make it possible to foresee that military cooperation does not

¹¹⁵ Based on the Sick, L. Potter (2002) data, Saudi Arabia possessed 86 percent of the total area of the GCC, 68 percent of the GCC population, more than 40 percent of the GCC military personnel, 56 percent of the alliance's GDP, 68 percent of GCC total military expenditures, 53 percent of its arms imports in 1995-1999, 61 percent of its main battle tanks, and 63 percent of the GCC combat aircraft.

occur between equal partners. The GCC membership is skewed in favor of Saudi Arabia. The GCC secretariat is located in Riyadh, and the Peninsula Shield has been based at Hafr al-Batin, always headed by a Saudi major general (ALRISI, 2015).

Saudi Arabia's military contribution to the force is crucial, constitutes a significant addition to the army of those countries when utilized, enables them to rely on its efforts, and reduces the troop investment of other nations in the joint force (POTTER, SICK, 2002, p. 126; ALMOTAIRY, 2011). For instance, in the PSF deployments carried out in Kuwait in 2003 and Bahrain since 2011, Saudi Arabia was responsible for the bulk of the troops sent and de facto commanded by Saudis. Approximately 3,300 Saudi Arabian soldiers, out of 4,700 soldiers, were based in Kuwait as part of the PSF (KUWAIT NEWS, 2003). In Bahrain in 2011, the vast majority of the PSF deployed was composed of the Saudi Arabian National Guard.¹¹⁶

As we know, the 'unity of command' principle is a persistent challenge in international military cooperation, and a 'leading-nation' in command structures can be a positive factor in this sense. However, such asymmetries have caused misgivings among GCC members. As smaller Gulf states tend to adapt their military strategies to the Saudi background, the Saudi leadership could promote additional restrictions on strategic autonomy for the smaller Gulf countries. Qatar has complained more than once about Saudi Arabian dominance in taking command, making decisions about structure, and providing the bulk of the force's personnel (GUZANKY, 2014, p. 650). The concern is that PSF could be used to intervene in internal affairs and that greater military integration could dilute the sovereignty of the smaller partners (SAIDY, 2014, p. 5).


At the time that PSF was created, Kuwait, Oman, and UAE insisted on a proviso that "command and control would reside in Riyadh during normal periods; however, in time when the Peninsula Shield is called upon to support a member of the GCC, command, and control would resort to the country in which the Peninsula Shield is to be utilized" (SAIDY, 2014, p. 5). According to Ulrichsen (2009), "lingering intra-regional disputes and fears of Saudi hegemony on the part of the smaller member states have hampered progress toward security cooperation" (p. 8). According to Guzansky (2014, p. 647), it was among the reasons that the

¹¹⁶ The US State Department published in October 2020 an email correspondence involving former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, which includes many details about the period when the popular movement was launched in Bahrain and the various events involved in PSF troops intervention. For more details, see: Hillary Clinton emails reveal many details on entrance of Peninsula Shield Force. **Bahrain Mirror**, Manama. 2020. Available at: bhmapiservehttp.com/en/news/59056.html. Accessed on: 10 Apr. 2021.

PSF has a decentralized command during training and operations, and it appears that it operates today as a “skeleton” rather than a self-sufficient, standing army.

Given that the Peninsula Shield Force and the GCC regional commands have followed models developed by NATO, we can inquire which type of command structure fits within Western standards. Following the US Joint Chief Staff doctrine manual on ‘multinational operations’ (US, 2019, II-6), typical command relations among the Gulf countries are close to the concept of the Leading-Nation (LN) command structure. An LN structure exists when all member nations place their forces under the control of one country (see Figure 18 below). “The LN command structure can be distinguished by a dominant LN command and staff arrangement with subordinate elements retaining strict national integrity” (II-6). US forces use the term ‘framework nation’, which is also used in NATO, the EU, and UN documents to describe a Leading Nation for an operation.

Figure 18 – Leading-Nation command structure




Fonte: US, 2019, II-6.

The US doctrine manual characterizes a Lead-Nation command structure as an integrated staff and multinational subordinate forces. Integrating the staff enables the commander to draw upon the expertise of multinational partners in areas where the LN may have less experience (US, 2019, II-7). In some situations, rotational command, a variation of the LN command, allows each participating nation to be the LN in turn. To be effective, command tour lengths should be adjusted so that participating nations may alternate exercising the authority of the LN (US, 2019, II-7).

This description is relatively consistent with the PSF structure at Hafr al-Batin. The stationed military force would have about 7000 troops or more, mostly Saudis. The General Commanding is always Saudi, with some multinational representations in advanced staff

elements in the command structure (administration, intelligence, logistics, planning, among others) and the Deputy Commander occupied by rotating personnel from the other member countries (ALSIRI, 2015, KRYLOV, 2018, SAIDY, 2014) (See Figure 19 below).

Figure 19 – Current PSF Organization



Fonte: ALSIRI, 2015, p. 38.

According to its legal framework, during field training exercises and military operations, the operational command would pass to the “host country” of the activities, and the Commanding General (always Saudi) must report to it. In this way, the general commanding is always in the military base in Saudi Arabia, but in the theater of operations, the command may fall to another member state coordinating with the staff at the base (KUFFEL, 2000).¹¹⁷ According to Alsiri (2015), it would be a heterodox design compared to current US/Western standards that could potentially affect the principle of unity that a strategic command requires.

The reliance on commanding officers from the host countries causes coordination challenges between the different units at the headquarters and the operational team at the base. Furthermore, the PSF lacks a central point for storing equipment for each member-state at the Hafr al Batin facility. Consequently, this limits capacities to act as an immediate and reliable base of operations for the PSF (ALSIRI, 2015; KUFFEL, 2000). Moreover, as occurred in the military operations in Kuwait or Bahrain, it is not easy to sustain this legal structure, transferring

¹¹⁷ In 1997, the members agreed to periodic rotation of the leadership in general commanding among the members. However, the GCC Supreme Council has never adopted the policy to date.

the total operational control to a not Saudi member during deployments, due to the *de facto* gravitation of Saudi troops in such operations.

From the diagram below, it is apparent that the command structure of the PSF has only six operational staff offices in charge of administration, intelligence, operations, logistics, and planning (ALSIRI, 2015, p. 37). Further, the ranking officer in the force would not have a significant input on the command structure of the PSF - meaning units provided by each country organize differently. The PSF command structure would lack subcommittees to support different functions and rely directly on the aforementioned generals (ALSIRI, 2015).

Following Krylov (2018), this legal structure is far from being ideal simply because the Commanding General always must be a Saudi. It means that in case of conflict, he would be responsible for both lives of all the other GCC soldiers and their countries' interests. This situation is further complicated as the PSF activation requires unanimous approval of the GCC Supreme Council (the rulers of all the six states), significantly reducing the organization's flexibility. For example, the inability to comply with the consensus rule was a central reason why PSF was not deployed in the civil war in Yemen. In particular, Oman rejected the idea of deploying the PSF (KRYLOV, 2018). Some analysts explain this denial of Oman in the specific context of its foreign policy and its relative proximity to Iran (PRADHAN, 2015).

Further, Gulf countries have long been reluctant to delegate the command of their troops to another country. In particular, the minor members have expressed concerns over the placement of soldiers under the control of a Saudi general, which affects the functioning of the PSF (ALMOTAIRY, 2011; KUFFEL, 2000). The operational base at the Hafr Al-Batin lacks a centralized command structure and relies heavily on the commanding officers of the armies in respective countries. According to Alsiri (2015), "essentially, the structure indicates that the central command at the headquarters has little contact with the operational unit on the ground, instead of relying on the officers of the host countries. This indicates that the PSF lacks central command of the operational unit (p. 39).

Some scholars pointed out deep cultural factors constraining Arab military cooperation. Bowden (2017) argued that societal factors associated with the modality of Arab tribal warfare have directly impacted the history of the Peninsula Shield Force. All the individual Arab Gulf nations that comprise the GCC share a common Bedouin, tribal tradition. There would be tribal dynamics deeply rooted in the society that still govern the practice of warfare. According to the thesis of Bowden (2017), historical evidence points to a tradition of independent command over the various tribes who are reticent to delegate control of their forces to others. In Arab tribalism,

each tribe fights individually and does not seek to create treaty obligations - as observed in various Western examples. The tribal tradition has always been expressed in fierce independence and entering into transitory, non-binding alliances. That often broke down in rapid succession as defense alliances were not designed to be sustained over long periods. Bowen (2017) characterized the Bedouin tribal practice of warfare as working only for the limited goals of restoring the balance of power and ensuring that resources remain accessible for individual tribes' sheiks.

The GCC military cooperation would have followed these patterns. PSF emerged in the context of the growth of multiple threats, yet with the relative evaporation of some threats, their efforts have been less forceful. This practice undermined the willingness and ability of the Arab Gulf states to contribute troops and material to the force and thus make it an accurate and effective standing force. In this way, just shared factors have favored military cooperation (the Arabic language, confessional affinities, common adversaries, a Bedouin tribal tradition); these would also contain restrictive consequences for inter-organizational collaboration.

Regarding the various difficulties that the members of the GCC have gone through in the way of international military cooperation, the lack of a common perception regarding the understanding of the threats they face can be highlighted, as well as the lack of strategic will to overcome material and operational challenges for the establishment of an infrastructure that supports multinational military operations. To this must be added the mutual mistrust, conflicts, and diplomatic crises between several of these members. The latest example of this had occurred in June 2017 when Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Bahrain severed diplomatic ties with Qatar. They accused Doha of supporting "terrorists" and being too close to Iran, something the tiny, gas-rich state denies (VAKIL, 2021). Kuwait and Oman maintained links with Qatar, and Kuwait has tried to mediate the crisis. The diplomatic turmoil lasted for more than two years, mainly with the Saudis. In February 2019, a Qatari force arrived at King Abdulaziz Air Base in Saudi Arabia to participate in the 10th Peninsula Shield joint military exercise, suggesting the beginnings of a thaw in relations between the two countries (UNIPATH, 2020).

Given the incidence of this mistrust, different perceptions of threats as well as cultural factors in Arab relations, it is difficult to imagine that these countries develop deep levels of military integration at the operational and tactical levels or being capable of delegating the command of their troops to others member countries in exercises and operations. In an interview ten years ago, the former commander of PSF, General al-Azima stated: "our role is focused on organization and training and mixing units to form a united force to serve the strategic goals of

the GCC” (A TALK..., 2011). However, according to Alsiri observation (2015), the exercises in the last decade have not created lasting bonds for unity during actual operations and tactical levels.

The significant absence of military integration at the operational and tactical levels has been evident in PSF military operations. For instance, in Bahrain, in March 2011, the PSF sent mechanized infantry with 1200 Saudi soldiers, 500 policemen from the UAE, and several hundred troops of Qatar, and these entered and positioned separately and often in different times (HOLMES, 2014). During these operations, Saudi Arabia and UAE questioned the weak involvement of Qatar in Bahrain and Kuwait's early reluctance to send troops to the process. However, at least in the case of Qatar, some sources indicate that it was directly involved in the effort of the PSF in Bahrain (QATAR..., 2011). In March 2011, a Qatari official, Col Abdullah Al-Hajr, said Qatar had become the fourth GCC member to send troops to Bahrain, deploying several hundred soldiers. "As a Qatari force, we are receiving our orders from the head of the joint Peninsula Shield Force. There are no Qatari forces outside the Peninsula Shield" (QATAR..., 2011).

Besides, in the Saudi-led Arab coalition that intervened in Yemen since March 2015, Qatar, Kuwait, and Bahrain sent fighter jets to support the aerial campaign to restore Mansour Hadi, Saudi Arabia, while the UAE also sent armored units of ground forces. In 2016, after ousting Houthi rebels from the city of Aden, UAE special forces turned their operations against Yemen' al Qaeda, while Oman preferred the role of mediator, engaged in UN-led efforts to find a negotiated settlement to the conflict (WAHDA, 2017).

These deployments with different operational units, functions, procedures and reaction times reflect the lack of cohesion at tactical and operational levels. According to retired Kuwaiti Air Force Col. Dr. Zafer Alajmi, one of the most significant challenges in this sense is the absence of a cross-national doctrine aiming at standardizing operations and facilitating readiness through common ways of accomplishing military tasks. Although MESA's idea of creating "regional capabilities centers" covering air, sea, and ground domains could do the job, it remains off the table for now (MEZHER, 2020). In Col. Alajmi's words: "This will remain a mission impossible if Arab states don't get rid of the sense of distrust they share" (MEZHER, 2020). That stressed the importance of working on a unified culture of combat doctrines in times of crisis. Other perspectives highlight rare exceptions. For instance, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Middle East Center, Yezid Sayegh, told the Saudi-UAE intervention in Yemen "has

shown little genuine joint operations at the tactical level, combined, or at least coordinated command at the operational level, or strategic management" (MEZHER, 2020).

Arteaga (2015), Cordesman and Obaid (2004), Al-Qahtani *et al.* (2014), Alsiri (2015), and Kuffel (2000) agreed to highlight severe problems in interoperability at all levels in PSF and GCC forces in general. The member countries would not have the necessary infrastructure to implement multinational operations, which reflects the complexity and difficulties involved in developing this kind of security institution. At the operational and tactical levels, the lack of a comprehensive plan for the standardization of equipment and weapons stands out. Although the Gulf states tend to concentrate their purchases in the US, they also buy weapons and equipment from countries such as Russia, China, and a consistent standardization of their equipment has been lacking.

According to Al-Qahtani *et al.* (2014), it leads to a lack of progress in developing effective information technology and a failure to establish the Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence (C4I) and Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (IS&R) net-centric systems that could tie together the GCC member-states forces. Further, language may be a limitation. According to one GCC military officer, the armies of the GCC operate using Arabic for their verbal and written orders. The navies and air forces, however, use English, which can presumably represent additional interoperability problems in exercises and operations (KUFFEL, 2000). Finally, the frequency of meetings between the Ministers of Defense among the GCC countries is an indicator of strategic limitations hindering the deployment of the PSF. The ministers meet less frequently as compared to ministers in other areas. The rarity of the Ministers of Defense meetings would indicate the cautious approach to collective defense among the member-states (ALSIRI, 2015).

In short, from the reviewed literature, we understand that the Peninsula Shield Force has been characterized by a lack of cohesiveness, a lack of integration at operational and tactical levels, as well as a lack of appropriate combat equipment. Gulf leaders did not build an adequate “pool” of forces and materials prepared for deployments, as Western rapid reaction models suggested. All these operational limitations have become visible in concrete situations such as the invasion of Kuwait in 1990, where the Gulf countries could not face the threats (perhaps the most outstanding defensive security challenge in their history). A more recent indicator has been the Arab intervention in Yemen, where we observe the context of an operational dependency in central countries. Therefore, we cannot claim that PSF represents a fundamental tool to entrust border security, combat “international terrorism,” or deter adversaries.

5.6. Closing remarks

In that chapter, we have tried to appreciate the PSF as one of the most significant developments in multinational military organizations among Gulf countries, even in the Arab world. GCC countries have made relative progress by creating international headquarters procedures and institutionalizing a mini-bureaucracy and troops stationed with features of continuity and permanence in Hafr Al-Batin. Its main formal transformations occur from the 21st century, readapting the PSF to models of rapid reaction forces.

Analysts such as Bowden (2017), Kuffel (2000), and Legrenzi (2006) argued that the GCC members have not yet created an effective standing force, and therefore, it would be a more ‘virtual’ than ‘real’ institution. Indeed, international military cooperation between Gulf countries occurs in intermittent dynamics, overshadowed by differences of interests and perceptions of threats, including eventual conflicts and mistrust among member states. Yet, there are also strategic decisions in this intermittence, a deliberate attitude of GCC leaders in sustaining the concept and image of the PSF to the world without implying a more remarkable institutionalization of the Force. The Arab media reflect official statements about the holding of various military exercises combined with elements of the PSF in the last decade. In turn, the Force headquarters in Hafr Al-Batin continued to operate, although we do not precisely know the volume of activities, functions, and demands. More specifically, there is a significant opacity, a lack of declassified official documents on the activities, armaments, and national contributions to the multinational force. We understand that the Gulf countries deliberately practice a communication policy that seeks to maintain the data of their operational weaknesses and actual capabilities relative secrecy.

This practice around PSF does not exist outside the environment of the dissuasive culture of the Gulf countries. Even being just a ‘symbolic’ arrangement, as Legrenzi (2006) maintains, the PSF plays a strategic role in representing the strategic unity among its members in the face of external threats. The PSF represents a unity message and constitutes an identity element since it is an institution with almost four decades of existence. Besides, the low levels of operationalization of the PSF could rise if the members decide to do so due to the urgency of a given context. They have financial resources to invest in that direction. In this sense, the limited operational capabilities of PSF are also a consequence of a political will that decides not to provide the PSF a more fundamental role in regional security.

Despite the Gulf countries seeking new alternatives for military cooperation, they continue to maintain the PSF and have readjusted it to new cooperation projects such as the unified military command. The PSF is a second or third-order instrument, but one that is important to sustain. Arab countries have noted that international military cooperation tends to deepen throughout the world and that their old cooperation structures before being discarded, it is better to keep them.

As we have analyzed, Western partners have frequently assumed the role of "security suppliers" in the Gulf region. At the same time, the Gulf monarchies have been characterized by following US and NATO models of military modernization as the reference points for their collective and national defense mechanisms. Gulf countries manifested normative injunctions and doctrinal internalizations from formal education programs for the military of the Gulf countries in War schools and training centers with officials from NATO countries and the transfer of military technology through multilateral programs such as the US-Gulf Strategic Forum as well as the NATO's Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI). After several decades of defense cooperation with NATO countries, a specific cultural identification has taken root among Arab leaders with western standards of excellence. Arab and Western military specialists typically assess Arab capabilities against the NATO benchmark. That promotes the combination of normative isomorphic pressures and doctrinal dependence (iso-dependence) between the command structures of the GCC and the military expertise of NATO. Furthermore, the reliance on technological resources expressed in the acquisition of high-tech weapons and in terms of western human capital to professionalize Arab military personnel also promote isomorphic practices.

The paradox in these technological acquisitions and external assistance is that the Gulf countries seek to obtain greater "strategic autonomy"; however, they lose *epistemic autonomy* to discern and determine, in a system of their proper interpretation, about models and organizational changes. Yet, the strategic meaning of epistemic autonomy in the Gulf countries is not more relevant than the urgency of deterring potential threats. There is a strong 'culture of deterrence' in this sense. The 'autonomy problem' here is that their dissuasive practices require modern means and equipment frequently acquired from core economies.

The Gulf countries can convert abundant primary resources such as oil into acquiring sophisticated weapons and hiring Western human capital to professionalize their military. A fallacy questioned here is that possessing robust financial resources can generate strategic autonomy. If there is a "limit" to this strategy, what would it be? Wouldn't the Gulf countries

exceed a limit by which the search for strategic freedom only generates more dependence? We will return to those questions in the conclusion of this thesis. However, before that, we must go to the next chapter, where we compare the three multinational forces of the Global South.

6 COMPARING INTERNATIONAL MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS

After presenting the three international military organizations in the Global South separately, it is time to analyze them together. This chapter consists of a comparative analysis of the Eastern Africa Standby Force (EASF), Southern Cross Force (SCF), and Peninsula Shield Force (PSF). As explained before, the analysis uses a qualitative and synchronous comparison that emphasizes inter-organizational and operational differences (the "most different systems"). However, it also analyzes similarities given the common peripheral condition of the cases. In this way, we recover the scheme of the seven variables and their respective theoretically derived modes presented in Chapter 2.

As a means of summary and guidance throughout the findings, we have compiled a comparative table (table 3), containing the main findings of our study. The seven variables and their respective ideal-typical modes are not "pure" or absolute categories. Yet, while the types or modes of these dimensions intermingle in an empirical setting, the comparison highlighted the contrasts according to the relative prevalence of the modes of the variables among the three case studies. In this way, the distinction of categories expressed below results from the relational and comparative analysis of the three cases.

Table 3 – variables and modes in the three international military organizations

Variables	Southern Cross	EASF	PSF
Isomorphism	Mimetic/normative	Coercive	Competitive
	Chain-mode	Mediation-mode	Broadcasting-mode
Dependence	Doctrinal	Financial	Technological
Operational profile	Pragmatic	Semi-pragmatic	Absolutist
Intercultural strategy	Integration	Separation	Assimilation
Multinationalism	Vertical	Horizontal	Horizontal
Specialization	Simple	Advanced	Advanced
Operational Partnership	Composite	Co-deployed	Attached

Source: own elaboration.

6.1 Isomorphic pressures

As DiMaggio and Powell pointed out (1983), the typology of different isomorphic pressures is an analytic one: the types of isomorphic pressures are not always empirically distinct. For example, external actors may induce an organization to conform to its peers by

requiring it to perform a particular task and specifying the profession responsible for its performance (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983, p 150). While different isomorphic pressures intermingle in empirical settings (mimetic, normative, and coercive pressures), they tend to derive from different conditions and may lead to different outcomes. About the cases of our research, although all forms of pressures may be combined in different ways, the comparison highlighted contrasts according to the relative prevalence of the kinds of pressures and modes of diffusion among the three case studies.

In the three multinational forces of the Global South, we can observe that *mimetic* pressures have affected them once they identified with central models considered successful or necessary for the own formation. In the case of the EASF, the "Policy Framework" Document for the establishment of the core institutions of the ASF scheme stresses that "the SHIRBRIG concept acts as a very good model for the sub-regional standby brigade groups" (AU, 2003, II Annexes. Annex E-6, para.15). The AU points out the "particular utility" of SHIRBRIG's Planning Element "as it is a full-time staff with no other function than to prepare for UN missions" (AU, 2003, Annexes). The Kenyan (retired) Colonel Peter Marwa (2006), former EASF director, states: "The concept of the Standby Force was developed with the assistance of the UN [...]. The SHIRBRIG model remains the best example for our regions to learn from" (p. 126).

On the South American side, it is important to note that Argentina was a member of SHIRBRIG until 2003, and Chile had the status of 'observer' in SHIRBRIG. After the first peacekeeping mission of SHIRBRIG implemented in Eritrea in 2000, the UN Brahimi Report (2000) singled it out as a role model for similar regional arrangements and the negotiations on the Southern Cross since 2004 followed these suggestions (VÁRNAGY, 2010; VILLAYERDE, 2010). According to a special report from the Chief of Cabinet of Ministers of Argentina (2007), "this force [Southern Cross] would adopt the SHIRBRIG model, which is the only brigade-size force operationally available and in a position to provide the UN with rapid reaction capabilities according to conceives the Brahimi report" (ARGENTINA, 2007, p.13). According to a former representative at the Bilateral Group of Political Direction (BGPD), Michelle Bachelet, former Chile's Defense Minister in 2003, proposed to Argentina a project of forces of these characteristics (INTERVIEWEE 6, 2021). Moreover, several researchers agree to indicate SHIRBRIG as the conceptual basis of Southern Cross (AITA, 2020; PERCOCO, 2013; VÁRNAGY, 2010; VILLAYERDE, 2010).

In the case of the PSF in the Gulf states, Col Al-Shaluani, a former member of PSF staff, stated in an interview that the joint command is modeled "after an American Army's staff" (KUFFEL, 2000, p. 9). Moreover, many experts observe analogies between NATO and the current project in implementing a 'GCC unified military command' since the agreements in 2013 (ALAJMI, 2015; ANTHONY, 2014; AUDA, 2018; NASSER; HELLER, 2020; SAIDY, 2014). The reputational capital of NATO is recognized in one of the statements of General Mutlaq Al-Azima, the former PSF Commander, which said: "The Gulf Cooperation Council forces are the best forces after NATO, and we hope that the hour will not come during which we may have to show the true prestige of the Shield forces" (AL-AZIMEA..., 2020). According to Samaan (2017), the GCC unified command might look like NATO's Allied Command for Operations (ACO) based in Belgium, commanded by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR). Both the ACO and the GCC command have the role of the biggest defense contributors to the alliances: respectively, the US and Saudi Arabia. It is important to note that all GCC defense projects have been linked to the need to deter external threats from neighbors as Iran (GUZANSKY, 2014). Thus, a key difference has been the *competitive* pressures justifying the creation of the PSF. External interstate threats have simply not existed in the relations that motivated the creation of the Southern Cross or the EASF. In the GCC, interstate rivalries can explain the orientation by 'collective defense mechanisms' inspired in US/NATO than UN models.

The Southern Cross and EASF, both adapting to the SHIRBRIG concept, conformed to the UN Standby Arrangement System (UNSAS)¹¹⁸, which means that their deployments require approval from the Security Council and authorization by their governments. However, EASF also acts at the request of the African Union. Both forces are *on-CALL*, with troops not stationed together. When not deployed, both remain under national control attending joint training and capacitation to ensure cohesion. Both share training structures following the UN Core Pre-deployment Training Materials (CPTM), which refers to *normative* injunctions. In the case of Southern Cross, out interview with the former Chief of Staff of the Southern Cross Force – describes that the commanders of committed units attend simultaneous courses at their national training centers in peace operations (CAECOPAZ, Argentina and CECOPAC, Chile) (INTERVIEWEE 5, 2020). These centers bring the latest update of UN standards for training and exercises, a process in which the Combined Joint Chiefs of Staff also participates. In the

¹¹⁸ The UNSAS changed its name in 2014 to the Peacekeeping Capability Readiness System (PCRS), which is a system managed by DPKO (DPKO, 2017).

case of the EASF, between 2003 and 2008, SHIRBRIG has received EASF officers at its headquarters in Denmark for training and sent theirs to support the EASF Headquarters and Secretariat (KOOPS, 2009; TATSCHL, 2009). Our interviews with military advisors at EASF and ASF highlight the importance of certifying all training and exercises according to international standards, such as those provided by the International Peace Support Training Center (IPSTC), in Nairobi, which is supported mainly by central countries.

Despite similar elements between Southern Cross and EASF, there are strong contrasts as well, focusing on aspects of *coercive* isomorphism. This is due to the critical dependence on external funds from groups such as the Nordic Defense Cooperation (NORDEF), the "Friend of EASF", and the British Support Team in the EASF (FLEMING, 2015; KÁRASON, 2019), without which it simply would not exist. According to the current EASF Director, General Fayisa Getachew, "the financial status of the organisation is currently poor" (KARUHANGA, 2020). The local funds of EASF are insufficient, as only some member states have regularly assumed their membership payments. "In 2018, the member states of EASF have funded around 4% of the EASF training, with the other 96% funded by EU through the APSA [African Peace and Security Architecture], or from the UK, or the Nordic States and some third nations" (INTERVIEWEE 3, 2020, p. 4). If the EASF does not meet the goals set out, which are periodically tested - in training, exercises, and standards - they risk losing the assistance they depend on. Coercive and informal pressures are expressed in the possible denial of funds- a form of material induction. In contrast, Southern Cross and PSF have been self-sufficient since their members assume all the contributions in manpower, logistics, and materials (MOU, 2010; GCC, 2014).

Besides, the core models have not been diffused in the same way between the three regions. In Southern Cross and EASF, before they emulate the standby/rapid deployment concept, it was first endorsed by the UN, expressly in the "Supplement to a Peace Program" of Ghali (1995) and in line with the group "Friends of Rapid Reaction Deployment" led by Canada, Netherlands, and Denmark (KOOPS, 2008, CORD II, 2014). However, none of them has supported this proposal on their independent military experiences. One of the main reports on which these proposals were deliberated, the Canadian "*Towards a Rapid Reaction Capability for the United Nations*" (1995), explicitly contemplate the "current experiences" of "NATO, the United States, and France" as the "models" that contain the "primary elements" of the vanguard

concept of force (p. 18-20).¹¹⁹ The DPKO and countries such as Canada, Denmark, and the Netherlands have played a leading role in reformulating and promoting a force model based on NATO and US experiences. In this way, such actors have played important functions in the *mediation-mode* via international organizations of the global diffusion of the force model based on broadcasting center experience (SAHLIN; WEDLIN, 2008). Precisely, as *inter-carriers* between the *broadcasting center* (US/NATO experience) and the *peripheral emulators* (as EASF and Southern Cross).

However, while the AU played the role of a continental carrier in Africa, shaping the ASF Planning Element for the subregional blocks, in South America, there were no regional mechanisms with coordination capacity in the design of combined forces - as we can see also in the EU, or even in the GCC. The AU has certain binding capacities to act as a catalyst for the diffusion of peacekeeping norms. Although organisms as UNASUR in Latin America have tried to promote regional doctrines in peace operations, they have not materialized (NASCIMENTO, 2014). This indicates a direct 'global mediation' between the UN and countries as Argentina and Chile, while at the regional level tending to adopt standards in a more decentralized way, closer to a regionally *deregulated chain mode* of diffusion.

On the other hand, since 2006, the GCC member-states agreed to expand capacities on a rapid reaction apparatus with troops stationed in their respective countries although remaining under a joint command (KAHWAHI, 2008). Yet, the adoption of models here has not been by mediations like the UN. Instead, a direct military relationship can be observed in countless bilateral agreements on capacitation, training, and exercises between PSF countries and US forces (AL-SAUD; KÉCHICHIAN, 2020; CAMP..., 2003; SAMAAN, 2017, 2019, 2021), and multilateral programs such as the US-Gulf Strategic Forum and NATO's Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) supporting all GCC's defense projects (AKBULUT, 2015; MARTINI *et. al.*, 2016, BESHAR, 2015). Altogether, the way central concepts of force are diffused in the PSF is closer to what Sahlin and Wedlin (2006) call *broadcasting mode*: direct exposure to the 'broadcasting center' (i.e., the US military) that almost leaves no place for intermediations.

¹¹⁹ As described before, the report of Canada examined a number of principles (reliability, cost-effectiveness, quality) and elements (early warning system, transportation infrastructure, logistical and financial support, trained and equipped personnel) that would be necessary for an effective rapid reaction force considering central countries experiences. See: CANADA. **Towards a Rapid Reaction Capability for the United Nations**. Government of Canada p. 4, September 1995.

6.2 Dependence

As argued before, the center-periphery isomorphic trends would not be entirely understood without perspectives of military dependence. This variable addresses the following questions: How has the external dependence been in each organization? What kind of dependence has dominated comparatively in each case?

In principle, considering *operational* dependence, EASF and Southern Cross cannot show indicators because they have not still made military deployments to missions; however, there were some modest deployments in the case of the PSF. PSF's first significant deployment was in 2003, during the US invasion of Iraq, with around 10,000 troops of all members to support Kuwait on the border with Iraq (DAVID, 2003). The second was in 2011, when their troops entered Bahrain to back the Al Khalifa government against popular revolts (KRYLOV, 2018; ALAJMI, 2015). In both operations, there were no direct combats, neither was there any direct external support. However, in the *ad-hoc* coalition that intervened in Yemen in March 2015, although PSF was not explicitly involved due to Oman's absence (KRYLOV, 2018), several of its capabilities were used and here PSF was here made use of external operational support. The operation "Decisive Storm" fighting the Houthis showed a lack of capacity to set up an infrastructure to deploy intervention units. So, they turned to countries such as the US and UK for logistics and the US and Israel for intelligence and targeting, search and rescue operations (ARTEAGA, 2015; AL-OTAIBI, 2020).

Financial dependence, as we observed before, has an critical impact on the force in East Africa. The NORDEFECO, with the package Africa Capacity-Building Program (ACB), has led the main capacity-building programs for EASF, contributing more than 11 million USD since 2009, aiming to reach and sustain "Full Operational Capacity" (FOC) (FLEMING, 2015, p. 53; KÁRASON, 2019; NORDEFECO, 2014). Here, donors and stakeholders define the goals and standards, including its ability (the EASF Secretariat, for instance) to meet reporting requirements, demonstrate financial assets and deadlines according to the donor's rules (INTERVIEWEE 3, 2020; INTERVIEWEE 4, 2020). That reflects the "outside-in" perspective on capacity-building, an *externally driven process* that measures capacity as the organization's ability to satisfy its stakeholders (FLEMING, 2015). In contrast, Southern Cross and PSF have been self-sufficient in funds and conform to an 'inside-out' strategy of "capacity-development" because they define their own goals and deadlines (SIMISTER; SMITH, 2010, p. 4). It implies that it is the Binational Force - with its staff members, the "Bilateral Political Steering Group,"

for instance, or the national Ministries of Defense and Foreign Relations - that best knows what capacity already exists within the organization, what the capacity and needs are, and what needs to be done to close eventual gaps. They have not been the "recipient" of programs or subject to donors like EASF; they have more self-reliance in fund management. In this way, there is a more significant impact of *financial* dependence on the EASF.

A similar situation occurs in the case of PSF in this sense. However, the PSF countries have much greater financial capacity than Southern Cross. The Gulf countries stand out worldwide for their purchases of high-tech weapons (SAIDY, 2014; SAMAN, 2017). In the 2016-2020 period, Saudi Arabia was the world's leading arms importer, and together with the UAE and Qatar, they accounted for 17.8% of global arms imports, mainly from the US, whose weapon industry supplied more than 50% of these materials (SIPRI, 2020). But this import capacity is not consistent with their capacities for innovation, reflected in a still 'immature' autochthonous defense industry (BARANY, 2020). It is a topic in which their purchasing power evidences the impact of *technological* dependence on the PSF experiences. In this sense, bilateral and multilateral cooperation such as the US-Gulf Strategic Forum or NATO's ICI have proven instrumental to technological support of GCC's defense projects, such as the aim of an integrated joint ballistic missile defense system project (MARTINI *et al.*, 2016; AL-QAHTANI *et al.*, 2014). In the 2000s, for instance, the GCC claimed to establish two anti-air systems inside the PSF framework ("The Peace Shield" and "Cooperation Belt") using "AWACS" radars and anti-air missiles from US (KUFFEL, 2000; KRYLOV, 2018).

Contrasting to Southern Cross and EASF, the PSF experienced a higher degree of *technological* dependence. In short, while *financial* support has a relatively greater impact on the EASF and R&D dependence on the PSF, in the South American case, the primary impact, by discard, is in the form of a *doctrinal* dependence based on mimetic-normative pressures with central references around the standards of its organizational and operational structure, as well as training systems for its military personnel.

6.3 Operational profile

As shown, processes towards military isomorphism can affect organizational changes. Now, it is important to note that these changes also affect the normative scope of the use of force. To examine *operational profiles*, following Janowitz's footsteps (TRAVIS, 2018), we can

focus on the mission concepts and operational environments on which the three cases were structured.

In the Southern Cross, the mission scope conforms to a "second stage" of deployments, as a "transition element" between a first deployment phase by an international force – could be "Chapter VII" missions - and a subsequent mission (of UN, for instance) aiming at stabilization and peacekeeping (INTERVIEWEE 6, 2021; AITA, 2020; VÁRNAGY, 2010; VILLAYERDE, 2010). The concept is structured on providing modular and flexible forces to prevent the escalation of violence, monitoring or facilitate a ceasefire in a post-conflict scenario for the subsequent deployment of the UN force, providing "safe areas" to people, and ensure humanitarian emergency aid. At the time of implementation of the concept, Chile and Argentina had battalions coordinating in the UN Mission for the Stabilization of Haiti, and they relatively modeled their doctrines on these experiences. Furthermore, recently combined exercises have included fictitious scenarios on an island like Haiti (INTERVIEWEE 5, 2020).

The EASF seems to have more diverse scopes than the South American case. EASF follows the AU doctrine with six mission scenarios for peace support operations with different purposes that inform the degree of consent, impartiality, and coercion in missions (AU, 2019, 2003; DE CONING, 2017). In the first scenario, EASF should provide only military advice to a political mission. In the second, EASF would co-deploy with a UN mission. The third scenario requires a stand-alone AU/Regional observer mission. The fourth requires a peacekeeping force (PKF) for Chapter VI of the UN Charter and preventive deployment. The fifth addresses a complex multidimensional PKF mission - with low-level spoilers (a feature of many current conflicts). The sixth and most challenging scenario is 'military intervention'. In the latter situation, the EASF would be empowered to respond to grave circumstances like genocide and massive human rights violations.

Although the mission of the PSF is not clearly publicly defined, it refers basically to 'military interventions' (ALSIRI, 2015; KUFFEL, 2000). PSF is intended to be activated in response to threats to territorial integrity and cases of internal unrest in member states, based on deterrence strategies. In 2000, GCC countries signed a Mutual Defense Pact whereby all the council members commit to act as an "indivisible whole" in which 'any aggression on a member state would be deemed belligerent against all' (GUZANKSY, 2014; FABANI, 2016; YENIGUN, 2015, p. 36). PSF could be the first line of defense against aggressors and then augment itself into the chain of command of the follow-on host nation. However, PSF was not designed to be the leading regional power in a defensive war (KRYLOV, 2018, p. 9). PSF

would only assist the country's army facing aggression as a "force multiplier in a limited Arabian Gulf crisis" (KUFFEL, 2000). However, since the social revolts of the 'Arab uprisings' in 2011 against authoritarian regimes, GCC would have reinforced the number of PSF troops and reached an army size of at least 40.000 soldiers. This growth is close to the idea of turning PSF into an instrument that can provide broader responses to the insecurities of its members (KERMALI, 2011).

The Arab army size contrasts with the EASF, which could currently reach a maximum number of 5,800 troops (OLUOCH, 2018; NKALA, 2014). Also, the Southern Cross, whose Land Task Force (LTF), its major unit, has around 1000 troops (AITA, 2020). But the greater operational contrast is between PSF and Southern Cross since this latter does not even conform to a "shock force". The most frequent missions for Southern Cross would support relatively "safe" or low-risk operations (FAUNDES, 2009). Instead, the EASF adapts on paper to combat forces in high-risk scenarios - and progressively in "stabilization operations" against terrorist groups (CONING; GELOT; KARLSRUD, 2016). In turn, the Southern Cross has a more "persuasive", *pragmatic* profile and it could be subject to fewer temporary pressures of reaction, being sent to the zone of conflict until 90 days after a mandate, while EASF in 5 and 6 scenarios must deploy between 15 and 30 days (AU, 2019).

Although EASF and PSF contemplate possible combats operations - with lethal equipment and in peace-enforcement missions - the latter is closer to the *absolutist* profile because of its primary function of 'military interventions' with more robust and more advanced units and weapon systems. The EASF could be localized in a middle way, as a '*semi-pragmatic* profile' between Southern Cross and PSF, due to its different degrees of use of force in more or less 'mild' pre-defined scenarios.

The three *operational profiles* reflect what their regions and organizational cultures demand. In East Africa, in the last years, there were numerous internal struggles, separatist and ethnic disputes, and sometimes terrorist violence (BAYEH, 2014; TLALKA, 2013) in countries leading the ranking of the "Fragile States Index" (2019), opening doors for more *absolutist* approaches of management - contra-insurgency, contra-terrorism, "stabilization" operations, and so on (DE CONING, 2017). In the Arabic Gulf, these approaches are even prominent given the hypotheses of conventional interstate conflicts - even nuclear - with Iran, interconfessional and ethnic rivalries, "terrorism", and the frequent perception of the 'enemy' and "aggressors" in the region (AL-SAUD; KÉCHICHIAN, 2020; SALIM, 2015). In contrast, South America has been a relatively more stable region in terms of interstate peace

(BATAGLINO, 2017) and cohesion of states, which are relatively "weaker" than "failed" states (MEJÍA, 2014).¹²⁰ On agendas with less humanitarian gravity (such as drug trafficking, organized crime, and intra-State social violence), 'pragmatism' is more likely (peacebuilding, post-conflict strategies, among others).

6.4 Intercultural strategy

After becoming aware of differences in operational profiles, it is time to focus on inter-organizational and intercultural strategies considering the challenges provoked by intercultural interactions in missions, exercises, and operations. How do the three cases stand on the classifications provided by Soeters and Tresch (2010)?

In principle, in ethnic-linguistical terms, the ten active member-states of the EASF have a more heterogeneous background than the other cases, which directly affects its organizational strategy. As noted in the chapter on EASF, they have many communities with autochthonous languages spoken across their borders and different colonial legacies (BATIBO; 2005; OWINO, 2006). Former French colonies, such as Comoros, Djibouti, or Seychelles, have French as the official language. On the other hand, in the ex-British protectorates, such as Uganda and Kenya, the English language became official. Furthermore, East Africa has populations (and militaries) that speak Arabic, and religion-wise Islamism and Christianity, among other religions, coexist. Given these diversities, intercultural challenges within EASF may be unavoidable (MUMMA-MARTINON, 2010). Feldman noted that "military commanders might find themselves not only having difficulty of communicating with their counterparts from other nations, but also even with their own troops, as many individual African nations have numerous languages spoken within their borders" (2008, p. 268). Furthermore, a true *integration* strategy (SOETERS, 2018) is hard in EASF because of old mistrusts and rivalries between leader members. As one of our interviewees (2020) told us: "Never, you will never have Ethiopian troops on the command of Kenyan troops, never".

Other interviewees highlight these challenges ex-post-facto in the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM). Although this is not an EASF mission, several of its members have participated in that since 2007, being French, English, Arabic, and Amharic speakers. This

¹²⁰ Alda Mejías suggests an analysis on possible differences between some African states and Latin American states based on the differences between "failed" and "weak" states. For more details, see: Mejía, S., A. Estado y crimen organizado en América Latina: posibles relaciones y complicidades. **Revista Política y Estrategia**, n. 124. Academia Nacional de Estudios Políticos y Estratégicos. 2014.

linguistic diversity in the units showed typical communication challenges that became more serious if it happened at the tactical level (INTERVIEWEE 3, 2020; INTERVIEWEE 4, 2020; INTERVIEWEE 2, 2020). Indeed, the main criterion has been the "division of areas" in which each nation is responsible for a specific area or sector. Thus, strategies in AMISOM have developed close to the *separation* mode rather than *integration* mode, also called "federalization" (SOETERS, 2021). For instance, during a period, the regions of Banadir and Lower Shabelle (sector 1) were under the command of Ugandan troops; Lower and Middle Jubba (Sector 2) under Kenyan forces scope; Bay, Bakool, and Gedo (sector 3) comes under Ethiopian command; and the Hiiraan and Galgaduud regions (Sector 4) under Djiboutian command, among other sectors, with periodical replacement of tasks and areas between nations (WONDEMAGEGNEHU; KEBEDE, 2017).¹²¹

According to Soeters (2021), the positive aspect of this strategy is that it tends to create a sense of territoriality, a feeling of ownership among soldiers, enhancing responsibility for the space assigned, feeling connected to home (same language, same food), and avoiding communications challenges at the tactical level between nations (SOETERS, 2021). On the negative side, this separation has generated coordination problems among the troop-contributing countries in AMISOM to comply with central command and control decisions in implementing the concept of operations (CONOP). These observations are coincident with Simon Mulongo, deputy to the AU Commission to AMISOM in 2018. "AMISOM operates in a "contingent-centric" environment where everything—from troop deployment to equipment—is mainly controlled by the troop-contributing country and not the mission". As a result, force commanders do not have complete leeway to direct their own forces, which can delay or even hamper operations (AFRICAN CENTER FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES, 2018).

These lie in the nature of the *federation* model, often guided by the interests of national units, the lack of centralized command, and the risks of losing oversight of what is happening outside one's 'own' territory (SOETERS; TRESCH, 2010). In the EASF case, experts warn of difficulties similar to AMISOM's in eventual deployments. EASF's current command and field exercises have, particularly, the aim of training this 'political level' of negotiations between countries and AU for entry and control of troops in missions (INTERVIEWEE 1, 2020).

In the Southern Cross case, Chile and Argentina share a colonial history with Spain as a common metropolis, with a solid insertion of the Spanish language and Catholicism as the

¹²¹ For more details, see: AU – African Union. **AMISOM Military Component: mission profile**. Available at: <http://amisom-au.org/missionprofile/military-component/>. Accessed on 12 May 2021.

dominant religion. These factors have formed their national identities, which is reflected in their armed forces. For example, both countries have the "Virgen del Carmen" as 'patroness' of some of their national units, and since 2020 they have also enthroned her as 'patroness' of the Southern Cross Force (INTERVIEWEE 5, 2020). According to our informer from South America, these elements indicate cultural affinities between two countries that facilitate integration: "From the Southern Combined Force, when the staff returns to their country, they affirm how similar we are" (INTERVIEWEE 5, 2020, proper translation). In this sense, Argentina and Chile can adapt better to the *integration* strategy. It is reflected in its design of mixed operational and tactical units and in simulated exercise systems ('SIMUPAZ') in which they promote and provoke to work without distinction of flags (INTERVIEWEE 5, 2020). Argentina and Chile highlight the importance of effectively conform balanced, combined, and joint units, integrating binational battalions, companies of engineers, among other subunits (INTERVIEWEE 6, 2021; INTERVIEWEE 7, 2021). According to Soeters (2018), *integration* is the most ambitious way of obtaining cooperation among militaries of different nations. However difficult, at the operational level, a crisscrossing system through which cooperating militaries are assigned alternating minority and majority positions in different units that belong together seems the way forward to improve multinational cooperation.

PSF's homogeneity also stands out comparatively. Its six member-states have Arabic as an official language. Except for Oman, they all share the Sunni tradition of Islam, among other identity factors, as a common Bedouin tribal tradition (BOWDEN, 2017). However, the GCC membership is skewed in favor of Saudi Arabia because of its territory size, population, economy, the best-equipped and largest army, and the political influence derived from its role as the custodian of the holiest sites in Islam (KRYLOV, 2018). The Saudi contribution to the PSF constitutes a crucial addition to the army of the other member-states, enabling them to rely on its efforts and reduce their troop investment (GUZANSKY, 2014). Thus, these asymmetries have favored an *assimilation* strategy in which the smaller countries tend to adapt their military strategy to Saudi Arabia. Indeed, the Peninsula Shield Headquarters is based in Saudi Arabia and is always headed by a Saudi general. Then, the Deputy Commanding is a position rotating every two years across the other five members (ALSIRI, 2015).

The positive side of *assimilation* is that it favors leadership of command. However, the potential loss is that it might generate mistrust and frictions among the smaller countries about Saudi dominance in making decisions, providing the bulk of the PSF's personnel and fears of interventions in internal affairs (GUZANSKY, 2014). For this reason, as the study of Said

(2014) points out, at the time that Peninsula Shield was created, Kuwait, Oman, and UAE insisted on a proviso that "command and control would reside in Riyadh during normal periods; however, in time when the Peninsula Shield is called upon to support a member of the GCC, command and control would resort to the country in which the Peninsula Shield is to be utilized" (SAIDY, 2014, p. 5). It was among the reasons and concerns that the PSF has a decentralized command, and "it appears that the joint force operates today as a 'skeleton' rather than a self-sufficient, standing army" (GUZANSKY, 2014, p. 647).

6.5 Multinationalism and specialization

Organizational strategies have implications in the two connected variables of "multinationalism" (horizontal/vertical) and "specialization" (simple/advanced) (SOETERS, MANIGART, 2008, p. 3). The two questions here are: how vertical (deep) can the interactions between units be in the combined forces? How specialized are their units in the distribution of operational functions?

In the case of EASF, as observed yet, real integration is unlikely to occur at the tactical level. Interactions among national units are of a more 'superficial' type of *horizontal* multinationalism with communication procedures by the EASF Headquarters and the Planning Element about "where some will do it and where others will do it" (LIGAWA, 2015; INTERVIEWEE 1, 2020). Regarding "specialization," EASF aligns with the so-called *advanced* cooperation, dividing areas or tasks into eventual missions. In their last combined exercises, we can observe battalion and company personnel interacting in the same simulation scenario of operations (close to the idea of *vertical* interactions). However, according to our informer from East Africa, a fundamental goal in these exercises has been training the political and strategic level such as negotiations, mandates, rules-of-engagement and admitting a country in crisis for the entry of troops because in practice, the current dynamic - as observed in AMISOM - aims to divide operations into areas of responsibility by nation (INTERVIEWEE 1, 2020; INTERVIEWEE 2, 2020). Therefore, it would not be necessary for troops to interact simultaneously on the same ground. In this way, coordination between national forces is at the strategic-operational level of EASF, not at the tactical level ('horizontal multinationalism'). As an officer interviewed explained to us:

Each national brigade participating in the EASF has its own doctrine and practical application in the field. There is no interference "from above" in terms of how the troops will behave, how they will solve the problems in the field, how they will achieve the objectives that are given to them, except what

is called the limits that are imposed on any battlefield, the ROE (INTERVIEWEE 1, 2020, p. 5).

In contrast, *Cruz del Sur* conforms to a more *vertical* (deeper) integration in binational battalions and company units. It aligns with the so-called *simple* specialization - units operating in the same scenario, at the same time, fully integrated. As mentioned before, the political representations of the Binational Force made explicit the strategic importance for building mutual trust between the two countries of acting effectively in a combined format, in a single time and place of operations, with a balanced number of units and quality of human and material resources, of land, naval and air (INTERVIEWEE 5, 2021; INTERVIEWEE 6, 2021; INTERVIEWEE 7, 2021).

On the PSF side, according to its former Commander in an interview, Gral. al-Azima: "the focus is organization and training and mixing units together to form a united force to serve the strategic goals of the GCC" (A TALK..., 2011). Peninsula Shield would not stop seeking deeper integration. However, the exercises do not create lasting bonds for unity during actual operations (ALSIRI, 2015, p. 31). Moreover, the operational units at the base lack a centralized command structure and rely heavily on the commanding officers of the armies in respective countries (ALSIRI, 2015, p. 32), which promotes *horizontal* multinationalism. For instance, in Bahrain in March 2011, the PSF sent mechanized infantry with 1200 Saudi soldiers, 500 policemen from the UAE, and several hundred troops of Qatar, and these entered and positioned separately. There was a degree of *specialization* in which land operations were distributed while Kuwait sent their navy to patrol the borders of Bahrain (HOLMES, 2014; QATAR..., 2011).

Considering more current multinational operations of the GCC countries, for instance, the Saudi-led Arab coalition that intervened in Yemen in 2015, Qatar, Kuwait, and Bahrain offered fighter jets in support of the campaign to restore the legitimate government of Yemeni President Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi, while Saudi Arabia and UAE contributed armored units and ground forces (WAHDA, 2017). In 2016, after ousting Houthi rebels from the city of Aden, UAE special forces turned their attention to Yemen's al Qaeda, helping to drive its fighters from the city of Mukalla, while Oman preferred the role of regional mediator, actively engaged in ongoing UN-led efforts to find a negotiated settlement to the conflict (WAHDA, 2017).¹²²

¹²² Following Marcelle Wahba (2017), former president of the Arab Gulf states Institute in Washington, while deemed "the Saudi-led coalition," the intervening coalition was led in practice by Saudi Arabia and the UAE, with a de facto division of labor: Saudi Arabia led the air campaign in the north, while the UAE led the ground offensive in the south. Both Saudi Arabia and the UAE contributed to efforts to train and equip local militias, although these efforts were dominated by the UAE in the south.

These different contributions represented trends to a division of functions in current multinational operations among Gulf countries.

Following to Soeters and Manigart (2008, p. 3), if these two dimensions (multinationalism and specialization) are crossed, we can obtain four distinct forms of multinational military cooperation: as "simple horizontal" the authors point to the current example of Eurobody; as "Advanced horizontal" we can designate here the Eastern Africa Stanby Force and the Peninsula Shiel Force. "Simple vertical" is close to the Southern Cross Force. Finally, "advanced vertical", there are no examples to date, but perhaps someday.

6.6 Operational partnerships

Finally, the comparison can be complemented with the perspective on 'operational partnerships' on the formation of command and units during deployments (DANIEL, WILLIAMS, SMITH, 2015). The focus here is at the operational level rather than the strategic level, on how it is - or could be - the formation of operational commands and units in eventual deployments. As mentioned, 'operational partners' can be *junior*, *senior*, or *equal* partners. There are four types of operational partnerships (attached, embedded, co-deployment, and composite) based on distinctions across the following two main questions: a) Does the partnership use truly integrated/multinational command structures? b) Does the partnership feature integrated/multinational operational units?

On the EASF side, there are inequalities in the contributions and size of troops. For example, in 2014, Ethiopia and Rwanda pledged to contribute motorized battalions, while Comoros and Djibouti were each contributing just a squadron or company (NKALA, 2014). However, they operated as *equal* partners in the EASF framework, conforming to the co-deployment" type of operations: separate operating units from different countries that operate as part of a multinational command structure (See Figure 20). The Council of Ministers of Defense and Security appoints the Commander of EASF Headquarters. It is always an officer from a member country and seconded by other nations' officers (BAYEH, 2014). The Commander results from a rotating designation annually (in alphabetical order in the EASF).

In case of emergency - or when a mandate is sought to deploy - if the AU mandates, AU must appoint the HQ Commander who will be seconded by other nations' officers (BAYEH, 2014). As described in the chapter of EASF, the legal framework of the EASF – as the MOU (2005) and policy framework (2014) - does not compromise the member-states in pre-assigned

troops for deployments. In an emergency, the contributing countries would sign a memorandum of understanding with the EASF where their troops will be deployed (LIGAWA, 2015). It is similar to when East African countries signed a memorandum with AU to send troops to AMISOM. As Capt. Ligawa (2015) points out: if the EASF has reassigned a specific contingent to a new area of operations, it has to make an official request to that particular troop-contributing country, involving numerous diplomatic chains and protocols that might take a relatively long time before it is affected. Furthermore, troops are not entirely under multinational command, and countries still dictate where and how they would be deployed. All these procedures favor in practice the tendency to co-deployments of operational units.


On the Southern Cross, its members are *equal* partners, of course, and they conform to the *composite* partnership: 'troops from the two countries form combined joint units, serving under a multinational command structure made up of officers from both countries' (DANIEL; WILLIAMS; SMITH, 2015). As detailed in the specific chapter of the case, Chile and Argentina rotate, contributing the command and personnel and seeking integration of subunits. The country that serves annually as headquarters designates the Binational Commander (BC) (MOU, 2010, Annex D-2). The BC supervises the deployment under the responsibility of the Force Commander for fulfilling the mission. As to its land component, the Land Task Force (LTF) components must always be combined, with no possibility of separation. This contribution comprises two mechanized battalions, counting on their respective General Staff, company, and a logistics subunit (See Figure 21).

Finally, in the PSF, in case of authorization for deployment by the GCC Supreme Council, formally, the host country receiving the assistance assumes the operational command, and the Commanding General (always Saudi) should report to the Chief of Staff of the host country (ALSIRI, 2015). However, an unequal dynamic is likely to emerge in practice as Saudi Arabia is a *senior* partner among several *junior* partners. For instance, the PSF deployment in Kuwait in 2003 was primarily a Saudi force, contributing 70% of the troops (GUZANSKY, 2014), and the command was *de facto* under its leadership. In Bahrain, 2011, Saudi Arabia sent the bulk of the PSF (mechanized infantries) with small troop contributions from other members, and the PSF temporary headquarters, set up in Manama, had a Saudi Force Commander in charge (A TALK..., 2011).

In practice, PSF tended to conform to the *attached* partnerships in which the *senior* partner is responsible for bringing the *junior* partners on board (see Figure 22). According to some analysts, this legal structure is far from ideal because the Commanding General always


has to be a Saudi (KRYLOV, 2018; ALSIRI, 2015). In case of conflict, it means that Saudi Arabia would be responsible for both lives of all the other GCC soldiers and their countries' interests. This situation is further complicated as the Peninsula Shield activation requires the consensual approval of the GCC Supreme Council (the rulers of all the six states), which significantly reduces the organization's flexibility.

Figure 20 - Co-deployment – EASF: integrated command, separated units




Source: own elaboration.

Figure 21 - Composite - Southern Cross: integrated command; integrated units



Source: own elaboration.

Figure 22 - Attaché – PSF: one nation command, non-integrated units



Source: own elaboration.

6.7 Closing remarks

This chapter demonstrates that isomorphic pressures, diffusions, and military dependence have different primary incidences in the three cases. Regional dynamics and strategic cultures interfere in such processes, changing interactions, organizational and operational profiles.

The chapter showed that the member-states of Southern Cross and EASF had been inspired by the same rapid reaction force model (SHIRBRIG); they have also followed some common training standards in UN peacekeeping and framed in what was called UNSAS until 2014. Both cases have followed similar normative references around the more *pragmatic* operational profiles of UN peacekeeping and pre-established UN cooperation procedures that facilitate understanding between nations in a globally recognized operational culture. However, in both cases, the central model of force was internalized by different diffusion mechanisms. In East Africa, we observe a significant *mediation-mode* of military diffusion between regional organizations - mainly the African Union - and extra-regional organizations driving capacity-building programs supported by central countries (e.g., ABC programs). In South America,

multilateral relations between Argentina, Chile, and the UN channeled the diffusion of the force model was, in a regionally uncoordinated South American context close to what Sahlin and Wedlin (2008) call *chain-mode* diffusion.

On the other hand, the isomorphic pressures have been relatively different. The EASF experience highlights the *coercive* pressures in the permanent negotiations with donor groups and external military advisors. In Southern Cross, by contrast, *normative* and *mimetic* pressures have prevailed around its organizational and operational structure and training systems.

In Peninsula Shield, the persistent *competitive* pressures in the context of insecurities of the Gulf countries have generated a preference for US/NATO models of military alliance with operational profiles more *absolutist* than pragmatic. As observed, this region contains the widespread “Hobbesian” practice of actors who need to show themselves, at least potentially, “armed to the teeth” against adversaries like Iran, albeit in a prominently deterrent-defensive strategic logic. We have shown that the dissemination of military models of NATO countries occurred several years ago in a context of military cooperation and direct exposure of Gulf countries to the broadcasting center, what we called the *broadcasting-mode* of diffusion.

In turn, the chapter noted that external dependency characteristics are significantly different in each case. In EASF, we found the structural dependence of all relevant resource types in military organizations. However, in comparative terms, the African force has manifested a critical deficit of self-generated financial resources, leading to dependence on external donors and advisors who permanently control allocated funds. From the perspective of the ‘local ownership’ principle, the EASF has the least organizational autonomy to conduct its internal processes. Southern Cross and Peninsula Shield have demonstrated greater capacities for self-management of economic resources and, in this sense, greater strategic autonomy in the conduct of their organizations. The robust financial base in Arabian Gulf states has been functional to center-periphery transactions that promote technological dependence in their militarization programs. Argentina and Chile have also constituted economies dependent on external military technologies, and in fact, various equipment and armaments for Southern Cross have consisted of external acquisitions. Nonetheless, the Arab force stands out globally in terms of superlative purchases of high-tech weapons. In short, while financial support has a relatively more significant impact on the EASF and R&D dependence on the PSF, in the South American case, the primary impact, by discard, is in the form of a doctrinal dependence based on mimetic-normative pressures on central references.

On the other hand, the forms of inter-organizational interactions within each combined force showed significant differences. EASF is characterized by an intercultural strategy based on the *separation* of its operational units in eventual operations with parallel command structures coordinated mainly at the political and strategic level by the EASF's headquarters. In this sense, its multinationalism is *horizontal*, with characteristics of *advanced* specialization of its units and potential modalities of *co-deployment* in operational partnerships.

Southern Cross presents an inter-organizational strategy based on *integration* in its command structures and between its units at the operational and tactical levels. Its multinationalism is *vertical* and more profound, with tendencies not to divide functions in possible military deployments and thus also *composite* operational partnerships.

Finally, Peninsula Shield shows an inter-organizational strategy based on *assimilation* around a leading nation (Saudi Arabia). The study indicates a *horizontal* form of multinationalism where interactions at the level of the strategic commands predominate and with *advanced* specialization in their functional assignments. The operational partnership in this case, is *attaché* given the subordinate way in which smaller units from member countries are incorporated into the operational command, which is mainly made up of the Saudi military.

Overall, EASF involves greater heterogeneity among a more significant number of active member-states. EASF faces more complex challenges given the pressures of intercultural diversity on which it built. Interculturalism invites us to reflect on an inverse relationship, at least for some cases: the more significant heterogeneity (number) of members, the more complex the "depth" in the interaction in an international military organization. In this sense, interculturality affects international military organizations, both in its tendencies towards homogeneity and those towards heterogeneity.

These are the final considerations of the comparative chapter. In the next and last section, we share a series of reflections and final considerations on the thesis as a whole.

7- CONCLUSION

As an overall framework, a research question about the factors that promote and constrain autonomous practices with multinational military forces in the Global South has been the starting point of this thesis. After analyzing organizational, contextual, and historical variables for each case study, it is possible to differentiate between factors that ‘constrain’ and ‘promote’ regional practices. However, the three cases inexorably develop within global inter-organizational fields of military crisis management, where center-peripheric isomorphic pressures and interdependent relationships simultaneously constrain and promote specific organizational and operational formations. As observed in chapter 6, isomorphic pressures, diffusions, and military dependence have different primary incidences in the three cases. Regional dynamics and strategic cultures interfere in such processes, changing interactions, organizational and operational profiles. Further, the meaning of what "autonomous practice" or "strategic autonomy" implies may differ between the three regions studied.

Our research sought to evaluate the central hypothesis by analyzing empirical indicators on the impacts of 'external dependence' and 'organizational isomorphism', and how these phenomena could interweave in the formations of multinational military forces. The data collected was quite extensive; however, it is imperative to warn of relative limits amid research achievements. It is always possible to increase more evidence and data material of higher documentary quality, for instance, through fieldwork at the forces' headquarters and a more significant number of official interviews. Still, we believe we have effectively analyzed more explicit and implicit indicators of various interconnections between isomorphic pressures and dependence on external resources.

Chapter 3 on the EASF described how member-states critical lack of financial resources promotes financial dependence on external programs; simultaneously, the lack of such resources has been functional to coercive isomorphism. If member-states do not adopt military and organizational standards in the way that donor and advisory groups recommend them to do, they run the risk of losing the support and resources the organization needs. As a consequence, coercive and semi-coercive pressures lead to the internalization of international standards. In turn, the adoption of external standards feeds back to the doctrinal dependence on the skills and knowledge of external advisors for more efficient execution of certified procedures. Moreover, since the origins of the African Union, there have been elements of political identification and cultural attraction among African leaders (e.g., Mbeki, Gadhafi) with the regional integration

model of the European Union. Besides, AU official documents and statements from the African military validate the reputational capital of the NATO and SHIRBRIG arrangements as normative references for the conceptual formation of the EASF. In the long run, identification and socialization with such external models have generated other doctrinal, economic, and technological forms of dependency.

Chapter 4 also showed how external dependence and isomorphic pressures could mutually feedback in the formation of the Southern Cross Force. The Binational force expressed doctrinal dependence in the systematic follow-up of training manuals, standards operating, and reports from UN expert panels (e.g., Brahimi Report that proposes a standby force model). Such a form of dependence has intermingled with mimetic and normative pressures whereby Argentina and Chile have found international legitimacy to sustain the mission concept of the binational force. In turn, Argentina and Chile have adopted terminologies and command relations based on NATO and the UN, which indicates not only conceptual/doctrinal dependence but also normative pressures by which the peace force was inserted within operational pre-established and internationally recognized procedures that streamlined the binational military understanding and even the eventual entry of third countries. On the other hand, Chile has followed a military modernization strategy that seeks to simultaneously adapt its defense system to interoperate with NATO and Southern Cross. In that context, the technological dependence in terms of the acquisition of armaments and equipment in the US and NATO allies promote isomorphic pressures in terms of concepts, procedures, and command relations as well as military equipment that Chile intends to use in the process of cooperation and military interoperability with Argentina.

In chapter 5, the analysis pointed out competitive interstate pressures in the Arabian Gulf that encourage military modernization programs based on Western organizational models. After several decades of defense cooperation with NATO countries, a specific cultural identification has taken root among Arab leaders with western standards of excellence. Arab and Western military specialists typically assess Arab capabilities against the NATO benchmark. That promotes normative isomorphic pressures and doctrinal dependence between the command structures of the GCC and the military expertise of NATO. Furthermore, the dependence on technological resources expressed in the acquisition of high-tech weapons and in terms of western human capital to professionalize Arab military personnel also promote isomorphic practices. Arab military personnel begin to think and act similarly to the western. As observed, the efficient adoption of certain weapons and technologies presupposes a kind of

military organization and specific professional skills that also require external educational support. Therefore, dependence on technology can also lead to normative pressures.

These seemingly discrete, dual-oriented linkages between external dependency and isomorphic pressures, though not necessarily reciprocal, give sense to identify the phenomenon we propose to call *iso-dependence*. As explained in the introduction, this concept refers to an attribute of peripheral military organizations as well as a perspective of analysis that assumes that organizational isomorphism and external dependency constitute a *congenital* process: that is, both could be generated together as a consequence of the divergent evolution of central and peripheral actors in the security geo-culture. As defined in the introduction, *iso-dependence* refers to actors who cannot develop without emulating standards coming from the center. The concept denotes peripheral emulators that mimic, not because they choose to do so, but because they need to incorporate core models to develop themselves within the system. As their organizational autonomy is limited vis-à-vis central actors, the pressures of emulating, translating, or editing core models are unescapable in their formations. In this way, isomorphic pressures and external dependence compose two faces of the same subordination process of peripheral military organizations in the one-way street of global military isomorphism.

The research revealed that the diffusion of central force models could generate not only homogenization but also change patterns; more precisely, what we call here, metaphorically, a *fractalization* effect within global military isomorphism: *a central model whose pattern is repeated at different scales with different orientations*. In the post-Cold War era, NATO allies reformulated standby force and quick-reaction force concepts. Within the framework of the UN, a group of countries close to the *broadcasting center* also redesigned proposals for standby force models - SHIRBRIG – whose primary elements were based on military experiences of central agents such as the US, France, and NATO. As the study showed, peripheral countries with multinational standing forces emulated and edited these force models. Because of different translations, a similar standby force standard was repeated in all the studied regions but with different dimensions and orientations. In the figure below (22), triangular fractals represent the repeating force pattern, the rapid reaction force (RRF) model. The largest black triangle symbolizes the US and NATO (the broadcasting center) as the dominant experience of military diffusion, then the chain of other intermediaries and peripheral emulators that translate the RRF reference.

Regional fractalizations of the RRF model have generated "new" designs of forces with some specific attributes that could inspire other 'fractals', other future military cooperation experiences.

Figure 23 – Fractalization effect in RRF model diffusion



Source: own elaboration.

In the AU, the "five forces-in-one" design of the ASF stands out. Within the same standard procedures and coordinated in a Continental Planning Element by the AU Commission's Peace Support Operations Division, this multi-block model of standby force constitutes a unique design only found in Africa. Furthermore, it is the only case among the three studied with significantly multidimensional components (military, police, and civilian personnel). Based on the principle of subsidiarity and federalization of operational efforts, its organizational design could inspire military integration processes in other regions in the world.

As to the Southern Cross Force, officials, national representatives, and academics frequently highlight the experience of binational military cooperation as almost unique in the world. The complex and vertical levels of military integration between Argentina and Chile to form an effective joint and combined force would surpass other similar integration experiences, including European ones. It is not hard to find evaluations of Southern Cross almost as a *sui generis* experience on military integration and, in this sense, as an *emulous* that surpasses even the models it initially took as a reference.

On the Peninsula Shield, a particularity lies in the ability to articulate structural asymmetries among member-states in command relations that always preserves the Saudi leadership but in the theater of operations allows, at least formally, to delegate the operational command to the junior partner-states. In this way, the PSF seeks to guarantee the rights of its

minor states. Else, within the period of our analysis, PSF is the only standing force in the Global South that has experienced deployments of military units to intervene in real crisis scenarios.

The three case studies represent the interests of their member-states in the search for greater "strategic autonomy" and "self-reliance" in international crisis management. Nevertheless, they all used dependent strategies on know-how, technological and human capital from other security organizations to materialize this aim. Hence, there is an apparent paradox of autonomy. They seek to generate greater autonomy through external dependence and organizational emulation. Peripheral countries have needed resources generated in core countries to promote strategic autonomy and organizational development. A question here is: to what extent can external dependence on core countries be functional to developing genuine strategic autonomy in national and international military organizations in the periphery? In what circumstances does this way of seeking "self-reliance" begin or cease to be a mirage, a peripheral illusion? What is or should be the limit?

In principle, "autonomy" has different dimensions. It is a polysemic concept. We distinguished at least two relevant notions in strategic studies. We have the idea, the most widespread, of "strategic autonomy" as the "freedom of strategic action" (SAINT-PIERRE, 2015) on the use of the capabilities (not only military) of the state. The scope of the concept would be contemplated by what Beaufre (1998) calls "Grand Strategy" or by what Liddell Hart calls "Strategy" (1982): "the art of distributing military means to fulfill the ends of policy". Such concepts always presuppose latently or explicitly some degree of decision-making autonomy by those who determine political objectives, "the concentration of purpose".

On the other hand, the principle of "epistemic autonomy" developed in this work: referring to actors governed by self-elaborated (their own) knowledge. "Strategic autonomy" and "epistemic autonomy" indicate different dimensions of organizations' agency capacity or the "local ownership" principle. They are different ideal types that the actors may observe or not, always in relative terms. The essence of "strategic autonomy" lies in the margin of decision-making maneuver from using own inputs. The importance of "epistemic autonomy" lies in the self-generated knowledge (expertise) by which an actor orders himself. Both notions can also find each other. Epistemic autonomy could have a strategic meaning; that is, it could have implications on the strategic capabilities of a state or military organization. Strategic autonomy can also be a principle that asserts one's own perspective and interpretation to decide in the proper strategic environment.

However, this encounter between epistemic and strategic autonomies is not always possible or plausible. In the three regions studied here, defense cooperation and conflict resolution mechanisms are governed by the idea of developing one's own abilities, even with acquired knowledge and standards. Hence, the practice of creating "your own abilities" could dispense with the imperative of using "your own knowledge". Such issues extend to the broader perspective of how minor, peripheral, or Global South countries generally develop their military capabilities. Modern states tend to assume that updated defense systems and modern military means are necessary to increase strategic autonomy, even knowing that a small group of countries at the center define transformation standards, modernizations models and master its more advanced technologies.

Some questions arise in the field of strategic studies. Is it possible that strategic and epistemic autonomy run in different tracks? Should strategic autonomy and epistemic autonomy demand each other in a genuine project of state or organizational empowerment? Could the two dimensions follow different paths in certain situations? Is it possible to genuinely develop strategic autonomy at the cost of the relative loss of epistemic autonomy? How can peripheral countries develop epistemic autonomy through the permanent use of institutional models they did not create? To what extent is it possible to preserve the ability to make strategic decisions by appropriating the knowledge of others? Under what conditions does the emulation of ideas and models influence the structuring of strategic interests? What hypothetical limit does the emulation of external knowledge not compromise the local decision-making capacity?

The paradox of autonomy in peripheral countries lies precisely in the progressive use of modern military means and organizations whose primary standards are performed by others. The verification of this paradox reinforces the perspective of iso-dependence in peripheral organizations. Despite the relative limitations in peripheral areas, they can develop local defense industries, technically develop their professionals, and increase their levels of strategic autonomy in certain issues and situations by specific military means. However, their modernization programs are usually governed by standards and models of external references. The problem of "strategic dependency", as Saint-Pierre (2015) calls it, extends beyond technological acquisitions, technocratic dependence, or the use of sophisticated military technologies that are not produced nationally in peripheral economies. The problem of peripheral military dependency extends to the systematic use of modern force institutions (a form-of-Force) whose fundamental standards others recurrently define.

However, a subordinate position does not necessarily preclude the strategic benefits of dependent modernization. Even non-Western great powers, such as China or Russia, emulated Western military parameters in particular moments in their histories of military modernization. Today, they have become 'strong states' using geo-culturally established capacities and showing severe challenges to the geostrategic influence of the western center. So, military dependence sometimes can provide a context for strategic opportunities (even in the long run). A dependent development of military structures could provide security patterns and geo-cultural conditions to develop a civilian society, organize territory protection, and guarantee fundamental societal relations. The safety of a socio-cultural order is also a condition for developing cognitive capabilities, doctrines, and systems of representation of the strategic environment. The analytical challenge is that military dependence requires analyzing specific situations and their possible effects in other positions of the same actors. Could a dependent strategy generate conditions for the development of strategic autonomy? The answer is: it depends.

As observed in the Arabian Gulf, the countries seek to generate greater strategic autonomy through external technological and pedagogical assistance, which further creates dependency. However, the aim of technological independence has not been more critical than other urgent interests, such as deterring potential threats for the GCC countries. There is a strong 'culture of deterrence'. For these countries, it is more important to have, for instance, logistical capabilities to monitor commercial traffic and piracy in the Strait of Hormuz or anti-missile shields to protect oil districts than to question the impacts of external dependence on western countries. Deterrence is an existential value more urgent than autonomy. They understand autonomy within these limits. Their 'dissuasive culture' requires modern means and technologies acquired from other countries in the international market. They would be protecting their relative strategic autonomy from neighbors like Iran, but they would be unprotecting it from their Western allies. However, "what is urgent" may be more decisive than "what is important" for these countries. In addition, we can question the sometimes-fallacious idea that possessing abundant economic resources promotes strategic autonomy at the military level. Wouldn't the Gulf countries exceed some limits by which the 'strategy of buying strategic capacities' only generates more subordination to central countries?

Overall, the experience of an endemic epistemic subordination can entail an "organizational taboo" in peripheral military institutions. It should not always be easy for peripheral military institutions to readily recognize that their conventional functions of the

"defense of sovereignty", among others, have systematically depended on foreign countries' values and means. There is sometimes a contradictory relationship between the claim to ownership, the "defense of the homeland" as a typical claim of corporate pride, and the constitutive inability to develop their organizations, discipline their bodies, and normalize their skills without the guidelines of central references. In 'realistic' terms, those powerful states that could represent a conventional threat to sovereignty in peripheral countries are the same ones that provide means to organize the national defense. This contradiction between the claim for one's own and the endemic epistemic subordination is precisely the possibility of a taboo. Indeed, external dependence is naturalized rather than problematized in military institutions. Besides, military isomorphism by the common idea that 'we are similar' favors the naturalization of dependency within the world military culture.

As we have argued, emulating is not a choice but a necessity. Soldiers often show pride in how well they can mimic the best practices in exercises and training. However, they are not the cause, the "culprit" of these *dressage* logics, but rather an epistemic consequence, a driver of major geo-cultural influences. Overall, the geo-culture of security largely dominated and fashioned by centrist liberalism constitutes a persistent challenge for generating a new and durable *locus* of epistemic autonomy. It does not allow (or tends to prevent) thinking from other places of enunciation, from different social experimentations about the use and organization of the force beyond the structures of the liberal state. Here is essential to rescue the perspective of the epistemic asymmetries in the modern world-system. Peripheral postcolonial states have managed to develop specific strategic capacities but at the "cost" of acquiring models and concepts in the epistemic center of the geo-culture. In this way, the idea of one's "own", the urgency to claim one's "own" perspective (e.g., "African solutions for African problems") may be more an illusion, a mirage, a way of dignifying the subalterns, of recognizing the symbolic rights they once had, rather than a plausible empowerment strategy, a possibility.

As shown in the EASF, the construction of a multinational military force also requires compressing the impact of intercultural and linguistic diversity among staffed members. The processes of standardization and interoperability between national units require diluting as much as possible such differences to favor the classical principle of unity of command and effectiveness in military operations. In this sense, cultural and linguistic heterogeneities frequently represent a 'setback' in international military organizations. Although East Africa has hundreds of local languages, EASF staff must work with two or three colonial languages.

The official languages of the EASF are historical colonial languages, English, French, and Arabic, although the first two dominate.

What about the autonomy of local cultures in this context? What about the popular representation of numerous communities in a force expected to be an "African solution"? The colonial construction of borders and the state structures in this area already ignored its cultural diversity. In the same direction, these multinational arrangements today presuppose that intercultural and linguistic diversity can be an obstacle to building a modern conflict resolution tool. Western military advisers constantly emphasize this. Does not the progressive rationalization of these modern organizations constitute another challenge for the cultural preservation of certain minorities? It does not mean that there is no cultural resistance within these projects. In general, the more superficial (horizontal) degree of military cooperation and the so-called 'separation strategy' in EASF is an effect of this intercultural heterogeneity that cannot be subsumed within larger organizational standards. Besides, the African military is often reluctant to expose themselves to more significant pressure in military exercises and to force errors to detect 'sources of improvement' in the eyes of external advisors. As one of our interviews reflected, these are "cultural factors" that they will try 'to resolve' in the future.

The impact of cultural factors calls into question some materialistic or economic analyses. Following the dependency theory, the peripheral situation would determine a series of relative deficiencies, weaknesses in its state structures, and dependence on industrial and technological goods from central countries, promoting subordinate economic processes with more limited capacities of modern instruments of force (national or multinational). Yet, the relative lack of adequate economic structures would not necessarily be a primary reason for the limitations in operationalizing models of force emulated from central countries. Our study showed that following single-causal (economic) explanations is insufficient to address that problem. Culture, and what constructivism usually call "intersubjective" factors, the expectations, values, and beliefs that are generated and regenerated in the mutual relationships, as well as structural asymmetries and hegemonic interests between member-states, may reinforce specific ideas that can be direct or indirect conditioning factors of international military cooperation. Thus, multinational military forces are a complex phenomenon.

As Soeters (2019) said, international military cooperation is here to stay, and it is likely to become increasingly more important in the future. As has been stated, it will not come without serious challenges, both in the center and peripheries. The most common problems include political definition and control difficulties, command relations, and the optimization of

scarce resources in operations (e.g., logistics). For these reasons, research into multinational military cooperation remains a prerequisite.

However, new research agendas could address a variety of relatively understudied dimensions. Some issues deserve more studies, for instance, intersections with the gender perspective. Peace studies and feminist perspectives increasingly focus on how the 'militarized masculinities' influence peace-building conditions and organizational dynamics. Where are the women in international military integration? In this direction, it is essential to choose suitable analytical tools and concepts for case studies and comparative perspectives on female participation, LGBT+ identities, and restrictions on gender equality in multinational military environments. We have not prioritized this topic in our analytical model for the Southern Cross, EASF, or PSF. However, it indicates that study variables can be expanded and address other, no less relevant issues.

One issue that postcolonial studies often address is the hierarchy of race and ethnocultural groups in modern society. There may be incidences of these hierarchies within international military organizations whose scope or impact can be complex. In the context of the EASF, we have observed that white external advisors have been training and guiding the military disciplining of black troops. It is not a fortuitous fact. We will hardly find the inverse dynamics in which black troops train white troops in military cooperation processes.

Other specific topics on international military organizations are cost-sharing perspectives and "complementarity" studies. It is possible to study the whole panoply of needs, how limitations are overcome through cooperation and complementation, the convergence of efforts and skills that impact operational performance. Another subarea of study is the domestic consequences of participating in multinational forces, the changes of perception in the military and national elites, the effects on foreign and national policies.

At the level of national contingents' commands, new analysis can address the complexities of planning and executing combined operations, the process of building combined doctrines; to do fieldwork and understand concrete routines in a multinational command, the micro-dynamics by which a specific norm, decision or doctrines begins to be internalized and discussed in different phases, producing differences, encounters, and disagreements.

Logistical problems deserve particular attention due to the eventual divergence of doctrines, habits, and various supporting materials. Comparative perspectives with new typologies and classifications may include logistics processes at national and multinational

levels. Another relevant issue is resource management, learning methods in constructing a common language, and the intercultural resistance to the internalization of foreign standards.

Here we have developed 'South-South relational knowledge'. We have understood from seven variables how Southern Cross is comparing to PSF, or how PSF is in relation to EASF and vice versa. However, it is possible to build other comparative perspectives. Cross-regional comparisons can also be in North-South analysis, including European organizations such as Euro-body, SHIRBRIG, NATO forces, and more discrete experiences (e.g., recent developments between Baltic countries). New studies could also compare the Western military experience with the multinational experiences of great powers like Russia and China.

In this thesis, we have worked with synchronous comparisons, but it can also be gainful to use diachronic comparisons (different periods of analysis in the same case study) and evaluate the evolution of multinational forces over time. On the other hand, once the standing international forces of the Global South make a series of military deployments, we will have new important topics for study. With qualitative and quantitative methods and comparative perspectives, further research may consider eventual deployments' effectiveness and degrees of efficiency, learning processes, and organizational implications of such implementations.

One aspect of understanding a range of consequences of iso-dependence in multinational forces is to focus on individual variables. How does the internalization of foreign values alter the cognitive perception of the military subject? What are the psychosocial consequences of the emulation of external military norms in the behaviors and ways to learn realities? It would be productive to combine psychosocial methods with strategic studies, organizational studies and build qualitative and quantitative approaches to understand the impact of internalization on self-perception and perception of specific strategic environments.

New research could be oriented to build a theory of international military organizations. We have created an analytical framework that can help imagine new ways of producing comprehensive analysis or point out ways for a greater systematization in theoretical explanations. Although we oriented the relevance of some variables to the Global South cases (e.g., external dependence), the analytical model also could encompass other experiences worldwide. If the context of problematization changes, the variables, concepts, and typologies may also change. It may be a fertile idea to rethink and resize the chosen variables and typologies (and add others) within a more monolithically integrated analytical scheme. Since we have synthesized concepts from various scholars with different analytical concerns, the next step may be to create an integrated theoretical framework from a single conceptual base of

origin. The objective may be to understand better multinational forces' generic aspects and conditioning factors, their implications, and interconnections between specific dimensions and typologies.

There may be other kinds of events not easily observable. It is possible to formulate new propositions and questions and rethink, for instance, relationships between heterogeneity/homogeneity among member-states and its impact on an organization and how organizations constrain specific cultural differences over time. The analysis could also address a new understanding of forces and operational profiles (beyond the absolutist-pragmatic dichotomy). There may be other perspectives to classify types of force in the world-system. A more integrated and comprehensive theoretical framework could more rigorously address fundamental questions: How are multinational forces created and developed? What are its phases, conditions, and possible arrangements? How does each case study behave with its intrinsic dynamics? Have we already realized all of them? Probably not.

More broadly, we could extend the analysis of *iso-dependence* and tripartite relations among *broadcasting centers*, *inter-carriers*, and *recipient emulators* to other latitudes and disciplines. Such concepts can be helpful to understand diffusion dynamics of management standards and ideas in areas such as economics, private sector, markets, public administration, academic systems, climate change, environment, natural disaster management, control technologies, among other areas. We have an illustrative example of the current crisis generated by the pandemic of the SARS-CoV-2. In this context, public health systems have been showing asymmetrical dynamics of diffusion of crisis management standards. Politicians, scientists, and health professionals have gone from the initial improvisation and learning about the virus in the first months of 2020 to the dilemmas between management models (e.g., lockdown or herd immunity), and then to the standardization of management concepts (e.g., risk areas, quarantine, isolation periods). Knowledge about infectious, virology, health crisis management and vaccination campaigns have been dominated by a small number of public and private actors and their research systems - in the US, Russia, China, EU -. These have operated as broadcasting centers of the primary references for the global management of the pandemic within heterogeneous networks of IGOs (e.g., World Health Organization) and regional and private health organizations that functioned as inter-carriers in connection with global peripheries. Peripheral countries have frequently tried to legitimize the need to emulate extraordinary measures – like restricting individual freedoms - by mirroring external references where the management would have been successful or effective. When the “crisis of crisis management

mechanisms” occurred, concepts and tools were revised and re-disseminated in center-periphery dynamics. Models have become in editable references and, therefore, subject to fractalization effects.

Finally, returning to the area of international security, new research could study more profoundly the potential of China and Russia in generating alternative conflict management standards. Recently, Russia and China have developed new initiatives to create military alliances with many minor countries in Asia - some of these around the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. It would be essential to observe whether these new alliances effectively could generate new standards or security management paradigms that the peripheral actors effectively adopt as an alternative to the Western broadcasting center. Currently, the presence and influence of the US continue to be prominent in the processes of military cooperation among Asian countries. A current indicator of that is the multinational Indo-Pacific military exercises Cobra Gold held in Thailand. They are among the largest annual exercises of their kind. Twenty-seven nations (Asian and Western) have participated in the 2020 yearly exercise (WILLIAMS, 2020).

How have China and Russia dealt with the western broadcasting center? Have these powers the competitive capacity to establish alternative forms of military modernization and conflict resolution standards for peripheral areas? Could these powers become a broadcasting center or an effective alternative to the western center?

Except for change, nothing is immutable. This thesis identified a series of actors who have occupied and lost central positions. Broadcasting centers in the security geo-culture have a life cycle and replacement dynamic. Any epistemic or cultural hegemony can succumb and give rise to other forms considered alternative or peripheral. Who will be the following broadcasting centers? How will its normative and ideological contents be? We shouldn't lose the ability to imagine new conditions of possibility. However, within the times of the world-system transcends a security geo-culture whose contradictory dynamics will continue to define and spread a field of axioms, knowledge, and forms of forces.

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INTERVIEWEE 1. Institutional and operational development, external support, and military training in the EASF: Interview with a Brazilian Military Attaché in Addis Abeba [1 Jun 2020]. Online interview given to the doctoral research of Matías Ferreyra. Interviewer: Matías Ferreyra. Addis Abeba, 3 Jun 2020. Digital audio record (74 min). Transcription in Word file, p. 1- 9.

INTERVIEWEE 2. Institutional and operational development, international cooperation, and military training in the EASF: Interview with a French Military Advisor of the European Union to African Union [3 Jun 2020]. Online interview given to the doctoral research of Matías Ferreyra. Interviewer: Matías Ferreyra. Addis Abeba. Digital audio record (49 min). Transcription in Word file, p. 1-10.

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INTERVIEWEE 4. Operational capacities, international cooperation, and military training in the EASF: Interview with a Military Advisor of British Support Time for AU [9 Jun 2020]. Online interview given to the doctoral research of Matías Ferreyra. Interviewer: Matías Ferreyra. Addis Abeba. Digital audio record (46 min). Transcription in Word file, p. 1- 9.

INTERVIEWEE 5. Institutional development, operational capacities, and military training in the Southern Cross Force: Interview with a former Chief of Staff of the Southern Cross Force [18 Nov 2020]. Online interview given to the doctoral research of Matías Ferreyra. Interviewer: Matías Ferreyra. Santiago, Chile. Digital Audio record (66 min). Transcription in Word file, p. 1-8.

INTERVIEWEE 6. Institutional development, operational capacities, and military training in the Southern Cross Force: Interview with a former Argentine representative in the Bilateral Group of Political Direction (BGPD) of the Southern Cross Force [2 Jun 2021]. Online interview given to the doctoral research of Matías Ferreyra. Interviewer: Matías Ferreyra. Rosario, Argentina. Digital audio record (64 min). Transcription in Word file, p. 1- 9.

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CONTACT with a Corporal First officer, at Centro Conjunto para Operaciones de Paz de Chile (CECOPAC). Conversation with Matías Ferreyra. Digital audio records (27 min, 7 min). Santiago, June 1, 2021.

APPENDIX A – INTERVIEW TOPICS AND QUESTIONS ON THE EASF

Doctorate thesis research. Graduate Program in International Relations San Tiago Dantas
(Unesp, Unicamp, PUC-SP)

Institutional and operational development, external support, and military training in the EASF

Introduction

This interview takes place within the framework of a doctoral research project whose object refers to multinational military forces from the Global South. In this context, we understand that your professional experience may be helpful for some objectives of this research project. Given your position, working with the African Union in Addis Abeba, close to Eastern Africa Standby Force (EASF), we believe that your perceptions could be helpful to understand several issues surrounding multinational forces on African Union. This conversation will be recorded, and we will deal with three topics about the Africa Standby Force (ASF) and especially the EASF: 1) institutional and operational development; 2) international cooperation and external support; and 3) military training and integration.

1 Institutional and operational development

- a) The AU and Africa's Security and Peace Architecture were created at the beginning of the 21st century to refound the previous Organization of African Unity (OAU), with more robust collective security objectives among African states. The ASF - following the “rapid reaction force” model - has been a central piece in this process. However, these initiatives have not yet reached full operationalization. In turn, other regional initiatives have emerged, such as the ACIRC (African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises). In this general context, what is your opinion about the advances and limitations for applying the “rapid reaction forces” model by the UA countries?
- b) EASF had come a long way since its establishment in 2007 and attained Full Operational Capability (FOC) in 2014, well before other regions. However, compared to the years of the Force establishment 2003-2007, the current conflict context in East

Africa has deteriorated in the past years. Do you think that EASF has contributed in any way to regional security since its creation?

- c) Considering that the ECOWAS brigades have already had some experience in actual operations, could we think it is more developed than EASF?
- d) Some of the nations that make up the EASF are larger (Ethiopia, Kenya, and Sudan) and some smaller nations (Djibouti, Comoros, Burundi, Seychelles). How does this difference affect the conformation of the regional force?

2 International cooperation and external support

- a) Different organizations such as the UN, NATO, and the EU, among others, participate in economic and technical assistance networks with AU. NATO, for example, has a contact office in Addis Ababa with AU headquarters. Also, the last time EASF is working in the standardization of its doctrine to operate in line with UN missions. In this sense, which of these organizations do you think have been most relevant for developing doctrines and operational concepts in African forces such as EASF? Do you perceive differences or similarities between the assistance of these organizations?
- b) Bilateral donors and military advisors currently play a crucial role in the capacity development of the EASF. Amongst the Nordic military advisors, there is the perception that the current way of working is achieving results. Do you think that this assistance puts the autonomy of the organization at risk?

3 Military Training and integration

- a) According to scholars and analysts, EASF in conducting a joint field exercise is on the right track. EASF would have successfully completed multinational Field Training Exercises. Do you agree with this proposition?
- b) Some reports noted that no training exercises of the EASF itself had taken place since the Full Operational Capability was reached in late 2015, which was seen as part of the

lack of proactiveness of the EASF members states. Do you agree with this “lack of proactiveness”?

- c) Pieces of training could enable States to have similar standards regarding the preparation of forces. Do you think there is a significant degree of standardization of doctrines and military equipment among the EASF national armed forces?
- d) An essential aspect of multinational forces is the requirement of interoperability between national units to obtain synergy in operations. Do you think that EASF military units have significantly met that requirement? How is it possible to get Full Operational Capability and, at the same time, lack interoperability?

I appreciate your availability, time and support for my research work.

Matías Ferreyra

PPGRI San Tiago Dantas (Unesp, Unicamp, PUC-SP).

APPENDIX B – INTERVIEW TOPICS AND QUESTIONS ON THE SOUTHERN CROSS BINATIONAL FORCE IN (SPANISH LANGUAGE)

Investigación de tesis de doctorado. Programa de Posgrado en Relaciones Internacionales San
Tiago Dantas (Unesp, Unicamp, PUC-SP)

Desarrollos actuales, cambios organizacionales y entrenamiento militar en la Fuerza
Binacional Cruz del Sur

Introducción

Esta entrevista adquiere relevancia en el marco de un proyecto de investigación de doctorado cuyo objeto refiere a las fuerzas militares multinacionales del Sur Global. En este contexto, consideramos que su percepción profesional puede ser de gran provecho para objetivos de investigación. Dada su experiencia y posición de oficio ejercida en la Fuerza Conjunta Combinada “Cruz del Sur” (FCC Cruz del Sur), entendemos que posee elevada comprensión de diversos aspectos operaciones y organizacionales. La conversación será grabada y abordaremos tres tópicos: 1) desarrollo institucional y operacional; 2) interacción de personal y unidades nacionales; 3) ejercicios y entrenamientos militares.

1 Desarrollo institucional y operacional

- a) La FCC Cruz del Sur, oficialmente a disposición de la ONU desde el año 2011, suele ser considerada una las experiencias de cooperación militar internacional más relevantes en el contexto latinoamericano dado que se ha constituido acabadamente una Fuerza de Paz conjunta, binacional y con estructura de comando permanente. Algunos analistas señalan que un ciclo virtuoso de relaciones diplomáticas y generación de confianza mutua entre Argentina y Chile fue una clave para la creación de FCC Cruz del Sur. Además, se señala que experiencias previas de cooperación en misiones de paz, como en la MINUSTAH, en Haití, fueron importantes, por ejemplo, para propiciar la cooperación y camaradería entre las Fuerzas Armadas de Chile y Argentina.
- ¿En qué medida considera usted que esas experiencias previas de cooperación militar y diplomática han contribuido al desarrollo de la FCC Cruz del Sur?

- b) Entendemos que la Fuerza Cruz del Sur ha procurado adecuarse al concepto de “fuerza de reacción rápida”, “fuerzas en standby” y en formatos modularizados. ¿Cuáles son las principales complejidades que caben esperar de esos modelos de fuerza para el desarrollo de una organización militar como la FCC Cruz del Sur? ¿Cree usted que la experiencia argentino-chilena ha conseguido adaptarse a los requisitos de ese modelo de fuerza?
- c) La Fuerza Binacional aún no ha sido desplegada en escenarios reales de crisis. En el año 2015, declaraciones en organismos como el Consejo de Defensa Suramericano sugirieron que la Fuerza Cruz del Sur podría ser empleada en el marco del proceso de paz en Colombia, o incluso en Haití. ¿Como explica usted esta falta de despliegues y cuáles los caminos a seguir en este sentido?

2 Interacción de personal y unidades nacionales

- a) A diferencia de otras Fuerzas de Paz Combinadas en el mundo, la interacción internacional de personal y unidades militares en la FCC Cruz del Sur ocurre no solo a nivel del comando estratégico sino también en integración en niveles operacionales y tácticos, con batallones y compañías, entre otros elementos combinados. ¿Concuerda con esa proposición? ¿Cuál es su reflexión acerca de la originalidad en el diseño de la FCC Cruz del Sur en el contexto mundial?
- b) El intercambio de personal y cooperación entre centros de entrenamiento conjuntos de operaciones de paz - CAECOPAZ, de Argentina o CECOPAC, de Chile - han contribuido en la adopción de doctrinas en operaciones de paz de acuerdo a estándares de la ONU. ¿Como usted percibe el rol de la ONU en la generación de doctrinas en misiones de paz? ¿Es posible encontrar diferencias doctrinarias entre estándares de la ONU y los de Chile y Argentina?
- c) ¿Como ocurre la integración de las unidades militares nacionales y en el Comando? ¿Los miembros de las fuerzas chilenas y argentinas están efectivamente integrados en unidades mixtas en un Comando binacional o trabajan como unidades separadas dentro del mismo Comando?

3 Ejercicios y entrenamientos militares


- a- La Fuerza Cruz del Sur realiza ejercicios combinados anualmente. La última ejercitación de gabinete se realizó en octubre de 2019, en el Centro de Simulación y Experimentación del Ejército Argentino, en la Guarnición Militar de Campo de Mayo, donde interactuaron más de un centenar de efectivos de las Fuerzas Armadas de ambos países. ¿Podría contarnos como han sido esos ejercicios de simulación? Por ejemplo, sobre los entrenamientos de pre-despliegue, con programas de computadora en simulaciones, como el SIMUPAZ (Sistema computarizado de entrenamiento en Operaciones de Paz).
- b- Los ejercicios militares ayudan en el aprendizaje de aspectos complejos en fuerzas combinadas como el desarrollo de la interoperabilidad, procedimientos comunes de comando, control y comunicaciones. ¿Cuál ha sido el alcance de estos requerimientos – ya sea en los niveles estratégico, operacional o táctico - entre las fuerzas argentinas y chilenas? ¿Ha habido una evolución significativa en la integración de procedimientos y en doctrina combinada que permita una mayor interoperabilidad entre las Fuerzas Armadas de ambos países?

Agradezco a usted la disposición, el apoyo y el tiempo otorgados a este trabajo de investigación.

Matías Daniel Avelino Ferreyra

PPGRI San Tiago Dantas (Unesp, Unicamp, PUC-SP).

ANNEX A – EASF PARTNERS AND EXTERNAL SUPPORT



Source:

EASF - Eastern African Stanby Force. **Annual Report 2016: Beyond Full Operational Capability**. 2017. p. 25. Available in: <https://www.easfcom.org/index.php/en/publications>. Accessed on: 12 Oct. 2021.

ANNEX B – TRAINING STANDARDS FOR THE “CRUZ DEL SUR” COMBINED FORCE

AUTORIDAD MILITAR BINACIONAL



FUERZA DE PAZ COMBINADA “CRUZ DEL SUR”

ESTÁNDARES DE ADIESTRAMIENTO/ENTRENAMIENTO PARA LA FPC “CRUZ DEL SUR”

I. ANTECEDENTES GENERALES.

Los estándares de adiestramiento/entrenamiento son considerados como los conocimientos básicos necesarios para iniciar la Etapa Intermedia de nivel Conjunto, para ello cada Institución deberá certificar que cada Unidad puesta a disposición para integrar la FPC, ha alcanzado dichos niveles y capacidades considerando lo estipulado Manuales de las Naciones Unidas para cada Componente y a la Doctrina Binacional para cada Fuerza.

II. PUBLICACIONES DE REFERENCIA

A. Derecho Internacional de los Conflictos Armados (DICA).

B. Manuales Doctrinarios de la FPC “Cruz del Sur”.

1. DC 13 – 01 “Organización y Funcionamiento de la FPC “Cruz del Sur”.
2. DC 13 – 02 “Operaciones de la FPC “Cruz del Sur”.
3. DC 14 – 01 “Logística de la FPC Cruz del Sur”.
4. DC 20 – 01 “Fuerza de Tarea Terrestre de la FPC “Cruz del Sur”.
5. DC 20 – 02 “Componente Naval de la FPC “Cruz del Sur”.
6. DC 20 – 03 “Componente Aérea FPCC Cruz del Sur”.

C. Manuales ONU.

1. United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, Principles and Guidelines.
2. Core Pre- Deployment Training Material (CPTM)
3. United Nations Peacekeeping Missions Military Maritime Task Force Manual
4. United Nations Infantry Battalion Manual.
5. United Nations Peacekeeping Missions Military Aviation Unit Manual.
6. United Nations Peacekeeping Military Engineer Unit Manual.
7. Manual genérico del Batallón de Infantería (Vol. I y II).

8. Guía para subalternos en OPAZ (1997).

D. Medidas de Seguridad en operaciones aéreas, terrestres (Desplazamientos pedestres, motorizados y mecanizados) y navales.

III. ESTÁNDARES DE ADIESTRAMIENTO/ENTRENAMIENTO DEL COMPONENTE TERRESTRE.

A. Adiestramiento/Entrenamiento convencional de las unidades y personal:

1. Operaciones Ofensivas y Defensivas.
2. Emboscada/Contraemboscada.
3. Marcación de HZ.
4. Preparación de trabajo de carga aérea (incluye VERTREP).
5. Embarque y desembarque desde HELO.
6. Procedimiento a bordo de medio de transporte Mecanizado / Motorizado.
7. Procedimiento Radial.
8. Procedimiento de Identificación.
9. Reconocimiento.
10. Patrullaje.
11. Primeros auxilios.
12. Lectura de Cartas y empleo de GPS.
13. Empleo del equipamiento de comunicaciones y equipos de visión nocturna.
14. Entrenamiento físico.
15. Capacitación básica en materia de procedimientos ante minas y explosivos.
16. Técnicas de protección y combate con armas de fuego.
17. Aptitudes para la conducción de vehículos motorizados y mecanizados y su mantenimiento.
18. Fast Rope.

B. Referido a temas operacionales de Naciones Unidas.

1. Puesto de Observación (Técnicas de Observación).
2. Puestos de Control.
3. Enlaces y Negociación.
4. Patrullas.
5. Reportes e Informes.
6. Convoy y escolta de convoy.
7. Control de muchedumbres.
8. Comunicaciones ONU.
9. Acordonamiento y búsqueda.
10. Seguridad de instalaciones.
11. Operaciones helitransportadas.
12. Uso de la Fuerza y ROE's.

C. Logísticos.

1. Procedimientos de planificación.

2. Higiene y saneamiento.
3. Sostenimiento de la Fuerza.
4. Procedimientos técnicos individuales y colectivos según TOE.
5. Documentación ONU (Soporte Médico para OPAZ – 2ª Ed. 1999).
6. Conocimiento y manejo del flujo empleado en OPAZ para desarrollar y satisfacer requerimientos logísticos.

IV. ESTÁNDARES DE ADIESTRAMIENTO/ENTRENAMIENTO DEL COMPONENTE NAVAL.

- A. Entrenamiento en puerto y en el mar de acuerdo a los estándares nacionales.
- B. Manejo de ROE's.
- C. Manejo de la Convención de las Naciones Unidas sobre el Derecho del Mar.
- D. Apoyar operaciones terrestres.
- E. Proteger instalaciones.
- F. Proteger tráfico marítimo.
- G. Efectuar operaciones SAR.
- H. Interdictar buques de interés.
- I. Conducir operaciones de estabilización.
- J. Incrementar las capacidades de la nación anfitriona (Capacity Building)
- K. Evacuar personal.

V. ESTÁNDARES DE ADIESTRAMIENTO/ENTRENAMIENTO DEL COMPONENTE AÉREO.

- A. Búsqueda y salvamento (SAR).
- B. Evacuación aeromédica (MEDEVAC).
- C. Evacuación de heridos (CASEVAC).
- D. Realizar vuelos de reconocimiento aéreo.
- E. Realizar enlace aéreo.
- F. Transporte e inserción / extracción de tropas (Operación con guía).
- G. Traslado de carga.
- H. Traslados VIP.
- I. Procedimientos Radiales.
- J. Vuelo VFR (Diurno) e IFR.
- K. Dirección Finder.
- L. Uso de ROEs.
- M. Transmisión remota de información.
- N. Operación de gancho o tecla (grúa).
- O. Vuelo nocturno.
- P. Uso de Visores Nocturnos.
- Q. Transmisión remota de información.
- R. Uso de Night Sun.
- S. Conocimiento y aplicación de SOP para la C.A. (FPC – 2011).

Source:

ARGENTINA, CHILE. Estándares de adiestramiento/entrenamiento para la FPC “Cruz del Sur”. **Autoridad Militar Binacional**, Buenos Aires, 2020.

ANNEX C – MILITARY EXPENDITURES OF GULF COUNTRIES AND US ARMS SALES

It is data from Cordesman's (2018) research on military spending in 2017 and efforts in terms of the GDP of the Gulf countries based on IPRI and IISS. In addition, we add a table with official indicators of the United States Congress taken by Cordesman on the historical evolution of the US sale of arms (no more than some types of individual sales) for countries of the Gulf. The second figure is particularly striking in showing the major levels of increase in U.S. arms sales and deliveries since 2001, and the high rate of further increase after 2010.

Estimate of Gulf Military Effort in 2017

	SUS 2017 Millions			% of GDP		
	IISS	SIPRI	IHS Janes	IISS	SIPRI	IHS Janes
Iran	16,035	15,548	16,201	3.75	-	3.85
Bahrain	1,480	1,397	1,544	4.37	-	4.95
Kuwait	5,710	6,831	7,107	4.83	-	4.95
Oman	8,687	8,687	9,901	12.08	-	11.51
Qatar	6,120	-	5,676	-	-	3.38
Saudi Arabia	76,678	69,413	52,098	11.30	-	7.66
UAE	30,000	-	19,760	-	-	-
Total GCC	128,675	-	95,086	-	-	-
Iraq	19,271	7,416	7,783	10.00	-	4.23
Total Arab	147,946	-	102,869	-	-	-

Total U.S. Arms Sales in SUS Billions

Country	Agreements			Deliveries		
	1950-2017	2001-2017	2010-2017	1950-2017	2001-2017	2010-2017
Bahrain	3.226	1.518	0.667	2.616	1.454	0.509
Kuwait	17.631	10.044	6.654	12.547	6.023	3.250
Oman	3.868	3.675	2.598	1.942	1.758	0.982
Qatar	24.902	24.896	24.865	0.687	0.680	0.670
Saudi Arabia	173.229	92.723	76.038	105.883	32.479	21.813
UAE	22.022	21.759	10.620	6.418	6.415	5.505
Total GCC	244.880	154.615	121.262	130.093	48.809	32.729
Iraq	18.361	18.349	13.649	10.678	10.665	9.085
Iran	10.716	-	-	10.705	-	-

Source:

CORDESMAN, A. **The Arab Gulf States and Iran: Military Spending, Modernization, and the Shifting Military Balance.** Center for Strategic and International Studies. Washington, DC: Second Working Draft, 12 Dec. 2018. 229 p.