A crítica ontológica incompleta de Tony Lawson aos métodos dedutivistas em Economia
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Data
2019-02-12
Autores
Siqueira, Álvaro Martins
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Universidade Estadual Paulista (Unesp)
Resumo
Neste trabalho de conclusão, o objetivo principal é analisar a crítica feita pelo autor britânico Tony Lawson aos métodos dedutivistas ou matemático-formalistas que caracterizam a maior parte da pesquisa feita em Economia nos últimos 80 anos ou mais. A hipótese a ser investigada é a de que o autor não realiza uma crítica ontológica dos métodos que critica. A confirmação dessa hipótese traz problemas, pois esse tipo de crítica é fundamental à concepção teórico-filosófica da qual o autor faz parte, o Realismo Crítico. Ao final da análise será possível confirmar que Lawson indica elementos muito importantes para entender a ascensão do projeto matematizante na Economia, mas o autor não realiza uma crítica ontológica completa dessas concepções. Em geral, esse caráter incompleto está diretamente relacionado ao tipo de abstração feita por Lawson, que isola (em determinado nível, por abstração) as práticas teóricas da academia (especificamente em Economia) e acaba por ofuscar a conexão desse tipo de prática com uma concepção totalizante de sociedade. Para se chegar a esse resultado será preciso, no primeiro capítulo, defender que a crítica feita por Lawson ao dedutivismo a partir do Realismo Crítico é válida e, portanto, a presente análise é pertinente. No segundo capítulo, para investigar a hipótese levantada, será preciso, ao mesmo tempo, defender a importância de uma crítica ontológica e mostrar a partir dos textos do autor que ele não realiza esse procedimento. No último capítulo, para compreender as consequências do caráter incompleto da crítica de Lawson e também para uma tentativa de contribuir no debate, apresentamos uma concepção marxista a partir de György Lukács que pode oferecer importantes contribuições para o avanço da crítica levantada por Lawson.
In this work, the main objective is to analyze the criticism made by the British author Tony Lawson to the deductive or mathematical-formalist methods that characterize most of the research done in Economics in the last 80 years or so. The hypothesis to be investigated is that the author does not perform an ontological critique of the methods he criticizes. The confirmation of this hypothesis brings problems, since this type of criticism is fundamental to the theoretical-philosophical conception of which the author is part, Critical Realism. At the end of the analysis it will be possible to confirm that Lawson indicates very important elements to understand the rise of the mathematical project in the economics, but the author does not realize a complete ontological critique of these conceptions. In general, this incomplete character is directly related to Lawson’s type of abstraction, which isolates (at some level) the theoretical practices of academy (specifically in economics) and, with this blurs the connection between this specific practice and a totalizing conception of society. In order to achieve this result, it will be necessary, in the first chapter, to defend that Lawson’s critical realist critique of deductivism is valid and, therefore, the present analysis is pertinent. In the second chapter, to investigate the raised hypothesis, it will be necessary, at the same time, to defend the importance of an ontological critique and to show from the author’s texts that he does not perform this procedure. In the last chapter, in order to understand the consequences of the incompleteness of Lawson’s criticism and also in an attempt to contribute to the discussion, we present György Lukács’ Marxist conception, that can offer important contributions to Lawson’s criticism.
In this work, the main objective is to analyze the criticism made by the British author Tony Lawson to the deductive or mathematical-formalist methods that characterize most of the research done in Economics in the last 80 years or so. The hypothesis to be investigated is that the author does not perform an ontological critique of the methods he criticizes. The confirmation of this hypothesis brings problems, since this type of criticism is fundamental to the theoretical-philosophical conception of which the author is part, Critical Realism. At the end of the analysis it will be possible to confirm that Lawson indicates very important elements to understand the rise of the mathematical project in the economics, but the author does not realize a complete ontological critique of these conceptions. In general, this incomplete character is directly related to Lawson’s type of abstraction, which isolates (at some level) the theoretical practices of academy (specifically in economics) and, with this blurs the connection between this specific practice and a totalizing conception of society. In order to achieve this result, it will be necessary, in the first chapter, to defend that Lawson’s critical realist critique of deductivism is valid and, therefore, the present analysis is pertinent. In the second chapter, to investigate the raised hypothesis, it will be necessary, at the same time, to defend the importance of an ontological critique and to show from the author’s texts that he does not perform this procedure. In the last chapter, in order to understand the consequences of the incompleteness of Lawson’s criticism and also in an attempt to contribute to the discussion, we present György Lukács’ Marxist conception, that can offer important contributions to Lawson’s criticism.
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Palavras-chave
Realismo Crítico, Crítica Ontológica, Metodologia Econômica, Critical Realism, Ontological critique, Economics methodology