Popper e o convencionalismo
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Data
2005-11-25
Autores
Oliveira, Amélia de Jesus [UNESP]
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Universidade Estadual Paulista (Unesp)
Resumo
Este trabalho resulta de uma reflexão acerca do convencionalismo na filosofia da ciência de Karl Popper. O mote central é dado pela tentativa de se compreender a crítica de Popper ao convencionalismo clássico e uma concomitante defesa popperiana do emprego de convenções na ciência. Primeiramente, ocupamo-nos da crítica ao convencionalismo. Com o fim de detectar os elementos que teriam levado Popper a rejeitar essa visão de ciência, procedemos a um exame da corrente convencionalista clássica, aqui circunscrita às obras de Henri Poincaré e Pierre Duhem, em suas contribuições à filosofia da ciência. Nesse exame, encontramos evidências que ensejam o questionamento da imagem de convencionalismo fornecida por Popper. A seguir, detivemo-nos na filosofia da ciência popperiana, comumente denominada falsificacionismo, cuja análise revela o importante papel nela desempenhado por certo convencionalismo. A contraposição das duas visões de ciência, falsificacionismo e convencionalismo, mostra que a visão popperiana da corrente convencionalista merece questionamentos e permite a afirmação de que o convencionalismo está muito menos distante do falsificacionismo do que Popper faz supor. Por fim, sugerimos que a análise do convencionalismo clássico não só se mostrou uma fonte para o tratamento de questões centrais da filosofia da ciência como também de abordagens esclarecedoras para a explicitação do método científico defendido por Popper.
Our research is related to the discussion of conventionalism within Karl Popper's philosophy of science. Our central aim is that of understanding Popper's critique of classical conventionalism as well as his acceptance of conventions in science. In the first part of the dissertation, the Popperian attack against conventionalism is discussed. Trying to detect the elements that ground Popper's rejection of that approach, we proceed to an evaluation of the classical conventionalist proposal, here restricted to Henri Poincaré's and Pierre Duhem's contributions to the philosophy of science. In such an inquiry, we find evidences that threaten the Popperian image of conventionalism. In the sequence, we focus upon the specifically Popperian philosophy of science, usually labeled falsificationism, and reveal the relevant role that conventionalism assumes within that philosophy of science. The resultant parallel between those different visions of science, falsificationism/conventionalism, paves the way to the conclusion that the Popperian interpretation of conventionalism is at least questionable and provides evidence to the impression that conventionalism is much closer to falsificationism than Popper would be ready to admit. Finally we maintain that the analysis of classical conventionalism, more than just a valuable tool for the treatment of central questions of the philosophy of science, provide crucial elements for the understanding of Popper's methodology of science.
Our research is related to the discussion of conventionalism within Karl Popper's philosophy of science. Our central aim is that of understanding Popper's critique of classical conventionalism as well as his acceptance of conventions in science. In the first part of the dissertation, the Popperian attack against conventionalism is discussed. Trying to detect the elements that ground Popper's rejection of that approach, we proceed to an evaluation of the classical conventionalist proposal, here restricted to Henri Poincaré's and Pierre Duhem's contributions to the philosophy of science. In such an inquiry, we find evidences that threaten the Popperian image of conventionalism. In the sequence, we focus upon the specifically Popperian philosophy of science, usually labeled falsificationism, and reveal the relevant role that conventionalism assumes within that philosophy of science. The resultant parallel between those different visions of science, falsificationism/conventionalism, paves the way to the conclusion that the Popperian interpretation of conventionalism is at least questionable and provides evidence to the impression that conventionalism is much closer to falsificationism than Popper would be ready to admit. Finally we maintain that the analysis of classical conventionalism, more than just a valuable tool for the treatment of central questions of the philosophy of science, provide crucial elements for the understanding of Popper's methodology of science.
Descrição
Palavras-chave
Popper, Karl Raimund, Sir, 1902-, Filosofia da ciência, Convencionalismo, Falsificacionismo, Philosophy of science, Conventionalism, Falsificationism
Como citar
OLIVEIRA, Amélia de Jesus. Popper e o convencionalismo. 2005. 160 f. Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual Paulista, Faculdade de Filosofia e Ciências, 2005.