O conhecimento do senso comum e os limites da inteligência artificial
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Data
2012-11-07
Autores
Pilan, Fernando Cesar [UNESP]
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Universidade Estadual Paulista (Unesp)
Resumo
Neste trabalho investigamos o papel cognitivo e epistêmico do conhecimento do senso comum no âmbito das discussões contemporâneas acerca da mente. Além disso, analisamos em que medida o conhecimento do senso comum se coloca como um limite ao alcance dos modelos mecânicos da Inteligência Artificial (IA). Com tais objetivos, em um primeiro momento apresentamos a pseudo dicotomia episteme/doxa assumida pela tradição filosófica, destacando a influência desta tradição em áreas contemporâneas de investigação da mente como a Ciência Cognitiva e a Inteligência Artificial. Como alternativa a este tipo de epistemologia dicotômica, apresentamos algumas vertentes filosóficas epistemologicamente continuístas como as propostas de T. Reid, G. Moore, J. Dewey e G. Ryle. Para estas vertentes, o conhecimento do senso comum é entendido como cognitivamente eficiente no âmbito cotidiano da vida, em especial, em atividades nas quais não temos o total controle consciente e intencional. A partir deste debate inicial sobre as capacidades cognitivas do conhecimento do senso comum, analisarmos as críticas de Dreyfus e Searle aos modelos tradicionais da Ciência Cognitiva e da Inteligência Artificial. Ressaltamos alguns argumentos destes autores que se dirigem a IA e aos limites e fronteiras que esta área encontra no que se refere à modelagem de programas capazes de manifestar conhecimento do senso comum. Defendemos que parte desta dificuldade se deve à incapacidade de tais modelos de desempenhar o papel decisivo da corporeidade nos processos cognitivos. Por fim, apresentamos a abordagem da Cognição Incorporada e Situada (CIS), a qual procura superar a dificuldade apontada ao levar em conta em seus modelos a relevância cognitiva da corporeidade, da interação organismo/mundo, a experiência...
In this work we investigate the cognitive and epistemic role of common sense knowledge in the context of contemporary discussions about the mind. Furthermore, we analyze to what extent common sense knowledge arises as a limit on the scope of mechanical models of artificial intelligence (AI). With these objectives in view, we first present the pseudo dichotomy episteme / doxa assumed by the philosophical tradition, highlighting the influence of this tradition in contemporary areas of research on the mind such as cognitive science and artificial intelligence. As an alternative to this kind of dichotomous epistemology, we present some epistemologically continuist philosophical tendencies such as the proposals of T. Reid, G. Moore, J. Dewey, and G. Ryle. In this tradition, common sense knowledge is understood as cognitively efficient in the context of everyday life, especially in activities in which we do not have complete conscious and intentional control. Based on this initial discussion of the cognitive capacities of common sense knowledge, we analyze the critiques of Dreyfus and Searle of traditional models of cognitive science and artificial intelligence. We highlight some of the arguments of these authors that are directed at AI and at the limits and boundaries that the area confronts in terms of modeling programs that can demonstrate knowledge of common sense. We argue that part of this difficulty is due to the inability of such models to play the decisive role of embodiment in cognitive processes. Finally, we present the embodied and embedded cognition (EEC) approach, which seeks to overcome the difficulties pointed to above by taking into account in its models the cognitive relevance of embodiment, world/organism interaction, and experience, among other things. Nevertheless, we argue that even with the significant advances... (Complete abstract click electronic access below)
In this work we investigate the cognitive and epistemic role of common sense knowledge in the context of contemporary discussions about the mind. Furthermore, we analyze to what extent common sense knowledge arises as a limit on the scope of mechanical models of artificial intelligence (AI). With these objectives in view, we first present the pseudo dichotomy episteme / doxa assumed by the philosophical tradition, highlighting the influence of this tradition in contemporary areas of research on the mind such as cognitive science and artificial intelligence. As an alternative to this kind of dichotomous epistemology, we present some epistemologically continuist philosophical tendencies such as the proposals of T. Reid, G. Moore, J. Dewey, and G. Ryle. In this tradition, common sense knowledge is understood as cognitively efficient in the context of everyday life, especially in activities in which we do not have complete conscious and intentional control. Based on this initial discussion of the cognitive capacities of common sense knowledge, we analyze the critiques of Dreyfus and Searle of traditional models of cognitive science and artificial intelligence. We highlight some of the arguments of these authors that are directed at AI and at the limits and boundaries that the area confronts in terms of modeling programs that can demonstrate knowledge of common sense. We argue that part of this difficulty is due to the inability of such models to play the decisive role of embodiment in cognitive processes. Finally, we present the embodied and embedded cognition (EEC) approach, which seeks to overcome the difficulties pointed to above by taking into account in its models the cognitive relevance of embodiment, world/organism interaction, and experience, among other things. Nevertheless, we argue that even with the significant advances... (Complete abstract click electronic access below)
Descrição
Palavras-chave
Senso comum, Ciencia cognitiva, Inteligencia artificial, Corpo humano (Filosofia), Cognição
Como citar
PILAN, Fernando Cesar. O conhecimento do senso comum e os limites da inteligência artificial. 2012. 100 f. Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual Paulista Júlio de Mesquita Filho, Faculdade de Filosofia e Ciências de Marília, 2012.