SUPREME FEDERAL COURT LIKE VETO PLAYER: AN ANALYSIS FROM THE WORK OF GEORGE TSEBELIS
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Data
2019-01-01
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Coorientador
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Univ Estado Rio Janeiro
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Resumo
This article has as its theme methodologies for examining constitutional courts in the field of constitutional law, in interdisciplinary reading with political science. In detail, studies on the operation and performance of the Federal Supreme Court in Brazil, considering the design of the Federal Constitution of 1988. The problem deals with the possibility of identification of the Supreme Court as a veto player, having as methodological theoretical reference the work of George Tsebelis. The hypothesis considers possible such a methodological option, and aims to identify its analytical potential for understanding the relations between the powers of the Republic in the contemporary Brazilian state. The method used is bibliographic, with institutional analyses, resulting in the conclusion of the broad possibility of application of such a theoretical milestone, as well as the need for some precautions to improve their analytical potential in relation to the power Judiciary.
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Português
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Quaestio Iuris. Rio De Janeiro Rj: Univ Estado Rio Janeiro, v. 12, n. 3, p. 212-233, 2019.
