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within the US administration. While it is tempting to view the US decision to invade Grenada as part of a wider neoconservative, Cold War Reagan doctrine, Williams highlights the point that the factors leading to this decision were much more complex, involved a variety of actors and were driven by a number of considerations. I would highly recommend this book to anyone with an interest in the Caribbean, US relations with Latin America and the Caribbean, and US foreign policy making.

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Sean W. Burges, Brazilian Foreign Policy after the Cold War (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2009), pp. xiii + 229, $65.00, hb.

This book reflects important work and displays innovative characteristics in dealing with fundamental themes in Brazilian foreign policy, particularly during the 1990s, over the course of President Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s two-term administration. It takes up historical elements of the formulation of Brazil’s international positions and extends to the government of President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, and concentrates on Brazil’s difficult relations with the South American region. The tension that permeates the book is determined by the search for the answer to the question of ‘what foreign policy strategy Itamaraty implemented between 1992 and 2002 to continue preserving and protecting national autonomy amid the changing pressures created by the end of the Cold War and the acceleration of globalization’. The use of analytical instruments formulated by Susan Strange, particularly the notion of structural power and its supporting idea of economic security, form the skeleton of the book. Still on the theoretical plane, the concept of consensual hegemony, based on Gramsci, emerges as fundamental.

The book is underpinned by thorough research, including 58 interviews, though most were not used directly by virtue of the confidentiality agreed with interviewees. At the same time, Burges came upon difficulties in consulting the Ministry of External Relations archive. Chapter 1 reviews the fundamentals of Brazilian foreign policy, concentrating – as Burges does throughout – on relations with South America. He shows how the action of the Cardoso government had clear elements of historical continuity, but what is more directly revealed is the tendency to hegemony, though not with a strong character. On the contrary, hegemony would seek to be consensual, a result not of leadership but merely of the weight of objective facts. At the same time, Burges presents hegemony as the object of a construct with roots in the past, but which was intensified during the period covered by the book. To this end, Burges relies on statements made, among others, by President Cardoso after leaving office. Approaching this question requires more depth and the examination of documents, which the author has attempted, though unsuccessfully. According to Burges, on Brazil’s part there exists a quest for recognition of a singular role in the region, with the avoidance of any accusation of hegemonism or imperialism as the constant backdrop. Explaining the search for this balance constitutes the work’s central tension. This concern leads the author to the discussion in Chapters 3, 4 and 5, grounded in the analytical instruments adapted from Strange.

With regard to ideas, Burges shows that although they are not enough in themselves, they are indispensable for the construction of any type of hegemony, in line with Gramsci’s formulation. Regionalism, the search for an open integration, would
have been the path to strengthen the Brazilian position while not paying the price of
explicit leadership. The discussion contained in Chapter 4, on economic integration
and Brazil’s role, clearly demonstrates the author’s efforts, but also his weaknesses.
The chapter makes it clear that over the course of the Cardoso government, ex-
changes between Brazil and the other South American countries did advance, but
modestly. This was important in some cases, particularly in those of Argentina and
Bolivia, but as the author states, more important than the facts are the conclusions.
Burges shows that there was a concern for encouraging the economic action of
companies with a view to exchanges, investments and the strengthening of bonds.
He uses Hirschman’s ‘fifth column’ expression, showing how the government’s
capacity to promote this action by itself did not ensure the achievement of the
desired results. The Cardoso government sought to strengthen the hegemonic logic
by means of the introduction of real instruments that would make integration viable,
with the Initiative for the Integration of Regional Infrastructure in South America
standing out. In this case, even though the business sectors took part, the takeoff
originated in the government.

The chapter relating to how the security theme might contribute to the con-
struction of consensual hegemony more accurately characterises the book’s central
arguments. Brazil was only partially successful on this theme. It obtained good
results due to the region’s peaceful characteristics, without inter-state conflict. In the
case of the Peru–Ecuador conflict, the results of the joint action taken by certain
countries, including Brazil, were positive, but the strong reiteration of the precept of
national sovereignty, always applied, may have ended up hindering actions in the
security field that might have made Brazil stand out more. Burges believes that more
decisiveness would have been necessary in terms of incorporating new issues, par-
ticularly those connected with transnational crime. He points out that the reasons
for not evolving in this direction are of different orders, one of them being the
difficulty in shouldering the costs of hegemony. The reason for this difficulty needs
to be discussed: was it due to an absence of interest, or was the task impossible?
This analysis signals one of the book’s conclusions: Brazil was able to obtain con-
sensual hegemony in part, but at the same time, this hegemony was not sustained by
additional funds or by significant alterations in important aspects of Brazil’s external
behaviour.

In the last chapter, in which President Lula’s first term is analysed, it is considered
that the country’s regional policies changed from a more economic to a more pol-
itical slant that did not hamper resistance to Brazilian hegemony. According to the
author, the Lula government enhanced actions aimed at ensuring energy resources
for the country. These actions play a double role. They guarantee such resources,
ever more important for Brazilian development, and allow the attainment of a key
objective for a policy of hegemony and integration: the improvement of regional
infrastructure, creating solid and stable links. Hence, the degree of interdependence
among the countries of South America is raised. Burges extends this interpretation
to the 1992–2002 period, arguing that this is a tactic that seeks to avoid the cost of
hegemony or of leadership, a cost that might be necessary to provide an initial
stimulus to integration.

This manner of interpreting Brazilian foreign policy explains Burges’ choice of
theoretical instruments. The idea of consensual hegemony is related to the author’s
interpretation that the government has managed to achieve partial success in its
hegemonic objective. In Burges’ eyes, one is not dealing with hegemony in the
traditional sense of the term, but with guaranteeing the stability necessary for a stronger international action such as participation in important global fora. Segments of structural power were achieved through the force of ideas.

The book captures well a crucial question. From the governments of Fernando Collor de Mello and Itamar Franco onwards, a new idea started to be constructed, an idea consolidated during the Cardoso and Lula administrations: the idea of South America. The idea was strengthened over time, including as a consequence of the creation of NAFTA, with Mexico’s full participation. This notion and perception of South America did not exist before; it is a fact that belongs to the 1990s. Until then, the powerful ideas in the region were those of America and of Latin America. This is a construct that Burges picks up, and it demonstrates an important sort of hegemonic success. The countries have incorporated it in consensual fashion; they were taken to it by the capacity to exert a certain strong structural power in the realm of ideas. The countries of the region, at least most of them, have made this concept their own, have incorporated it and, in some cases, have developed it autonomously.

This book brings forth innovative elements for analysing Brazil’s regional politics. It is polemical and is, in itself, proof of the interest elicited by Brazilian foreign policy, with its limits and contradictions. Maybe Burges exaggerates some aspects, but he does raise new questions that must be studied.

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As the global economy ground to a halt in 2008, there could have been no more timely a book than Fernando Ignacio Leiva’s *Latin American Neostructuralism: The Contradictions of Post-Neoliberal Development*. In the author’s words, the book is ‘an effort to formulate an effective antidote’ (p. xix) to the pragmatic turn of progressive economic thought in Latin America. The book relays a fascinating account of Latin American neostructuralism in the 1980s and 1990s, its relation with classic Latin American structuralism from the 1950s and 1960s, as developed by the United Nation’s Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLA/CEPAL hereafter CEPAL), and the latest developments in Venezuelan ‘twenty-first century socialism’ and Bolivian ‘Andean-Amazonian capitalism’.

More than providing an ‘antidote’, however, Leiva develops a full-blown political, economic and symbolic critique of both neostructuralist economic thought as embodied by CEPAL, and its specific applications in selected countries in the region. His arguments deserve close attention, not only because of the method of their exposition but also because of their boldness: ‘the genuine followers of Raul Prebisch and Celso Furtado, the true heirs of structuralism and CEPAL’s original transformative zeal are not to be found at the Santiago headquarters … [but in] Venezuela and Bolivia’s efforts to relaunch a reform-oriented and anti-imperialist development project’ (p. 232).

Leiva’s critique zooms in on power relations and the sanitised vision of ‘systemic competitiveness’ espoused by CEPAL since the 1990 publication of *Changing Production Patterns with Social Equity Change*. The new structuralist paradigm, as