

UNIVERSIDADE ESTADUAL PAULISTA “JÚLIO DE MESQUITA FILHO”
UNIVERSIDADE ESTADUAL DE CAMPINAS
PONTIFÍCIA UNIVERSIDADE CATÓLICA DE SÃO PAULO

PROGRAMA DE PÓS-GRADUAÇÃO EM RELAÇÕES INTERNACIONAIS
SAN TIAGO DANTAS – UNESP, UNICAMP E PUC-SP

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War is peace: the US security discursive practices after the Cold War

São Paulo

2018

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Tese apresentada ao Programa de Pós-graduação em Relações Internacionais San Tiago Dantas da Universidade Estadual Paulista “Júlio de Mesquita Filho” (Unesp), da Universidade Estadual de Campinas (Unicamp) e da Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP), como exigência para obtenção do título de Doutor em Relações Internacionais, na área de concentração “Paz, Defesa e Segurança Internacional”, na linha de pesquisa “Estratégia, Defesa e Política Externa”.
Orientador: Prof. Dr. Samuel Alves Soares.

São Paulo

2018

Universidade Estadual Paulista "Júlio de Mesquita Filho"
Instituto de Políticas Públicas e Relações Internacionais – Biblioteca
Graziela Helena Jackyman de Oliveira – CRB 8/8635

M921 Motta, Bárbara Vasconcellos de Carvalho.
War is peace : the US security discursive practices after the Cold War
/ Bárbara Vasconcellos de Carvalho Motta. – São Paulo, 2018.
238 f. : il. ; 30 cm.

Orientador: Samuel Alves Soares.
Tese (Doutorado em Relações Internacionais) –
UNESP/UNICAMP/PUC-SP, Programa de Pós-Graduação em Relações
Internacionais San Tiago Dantas, 2018.

1. Estados Unidos – Política militar. 2. Segurança internacional. 3.
Estados Unidos – Relações exteriores. 4. Kosovo (Sérvia) – História – Guerra
civil, 1998-1999. 5. Golfo Pérsico, Guerra do, 1991. 6. Afeganistão, Guerra
do, 2001-. 7. Iraque, Guerra do, 2003-2011. 8. Análise crítica do discurso –
Aspectos políticos. I. Título.

CDD 355.033573

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São Paulo, 31 de agosto de 2018.

Aos meus pais, Ricardo e Rosana, que me viram mudar e ainda assim me reconheceram.

À minha avó (in memoriam), Maria, o começo de todas as coisas.

AGRADECIMENTOS

Aos meus pais, Ricardo e Rosana, pelo apoio incondicional e pela torcida sempre festiva. À minha mãe, pelas ligações de madrugada, por ser constância quando eu, muitas vezes, vacilei nas minhas decisões e por ser o que há de mais indispensável na vida.

Ao meu orientador, Samuel Alves Soares, pelos questionamentos, pela sua dedicação, pelo seu tempo, mas principalmente pelas lições que vão para além da tese.

Aos demais professores do PPGR San Tiago Dantas, pelas conversas, pelos conselhos e pela convivência.

Aos professores Carlos Gustavo Teixeira Poggio Teixeira, Christina Soreanu Pecequilo, Thiago Moreira de Souza Rodrigues e Stefano Guzzini por aceitarem compor a minha banca. Ainda, ao professor Stefano Guzzini, pela disponibilidade em ouvir meus questionamentos ao longo de todo o tempo de pesquisa e pelo auxílio no contato com o orientador de Doutorado Sanduíche.

Ao Professor Daniel Nexon, pela orientação ao longo do Doutorado Sanduíche na Georgetown University.

Aos amigos da nossa sólida família UFF, a primeira turma de muitas outras que ainda estão por vir.

Aos amigos do GEDES, Raquel, Livia, Cairo, Kimberly, Jonathan, Clarissa, Giovanna e Patrícia, pelas discussões, pela companhia, mas principalmente pela amizade que ameniza as agruras do percurso acadêmico e, muitas vezes de forma inadvertida, me ajudou a manter a sanidade mental.

Ao Matheus, pela companhia, pelas ironias e por fazer da minha volta ao Brasil um processo menos sofrido.

Ao Diego, pela amizade desde o mestrado. Por ser aquele disponível a opinar, questionar e pensar comigo muitas das questões que estão nessa tese; mas, principalmente, por ouvir, sempre livre de julgamentos e com uma palavra de conforto, as minhas idiossincrasias.

Ao David, por cuidar do meu bem-estar quando eu não conseguia cuidar de nada que não fosse a tese. Pelo companheirismo, por acolher as minhas dificuldades, e por me ensinar, efetivamente, que o paraíso são os outros.

À Graziela de Oliveira, pela dedicação, pelo empenho, pelo profissionalismo, mas

sobretudo pela amizade

À Giovana Vieira e Isabela Silvestre, pelo auxílio indispensável ao longo dos anos de mestrado e doutorado.

À Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado de São Paulo, pelo financiamento dessa pesquisa, projeto 2014/14071-0.

Eis o meu pobre elefante
pronto para sair
à procura de amigos
num mundo enfastiado
que já não crê em bichos
e duvida das coisas.
Ei-lo, massa imponente
e frágil, que se abana
e move lentamente
a pele costurada
onde há flores de pano
e nuvens, alusões
a um mundo mais poético
onde o amor reagrupa
as formas naturais.

(Carlos Drummond de Andrade)

RESUMO

Como uma estrutura geral, o objetivo mais amplo desta tese é contribuir para o aprofundamento do debate em Relações Internacionais acerca da interconexão entre identidade e resultados políticos. Mais do que focar em como as articulações de uma identidade são realizadas por agentes específicos, esta tese está interessada em avançar o argumento de que a identidade "faz" alguma coisa e, portanto, tem através das práticas discursivas a capacidade do que chamei de 'causalidade-na-constituição'. Dessa forma, proponho a elaboração de um modelo para avaliar como os dispositivos de uma identidades podem ser mobilizados em contextos políticos, mais especificamente nos processos de tomada de decisão de política externa dos EUA. Neste sentido, através da avaliação dos casos empíricos da construção das narrativas nos EUA para (des)legitimar as intervenções no Kosovo (1998/1999), a Guerra do Golfo (1999/1991), Afeganistão (2001) e Iraque (2003), apesar da intenção geral de desenvolver uma visão mais ampla do debate sobre política externa dos EUA após a Guerra Fria, esta tese também visa avaliar a força representacional da identidade como fonte de ordem para o âmbito nacional e propor um gradiente, de momentos de menor a maior insegurança ontológica, através dos quais pode-se visualizar a capacidade dos pontos de ancoragem da identidade para 'reassentar' a identidade e colocá-la de volta no lugar.

Palavras-chave: Política externa norte-americana. Segurança Internacional. Sociologia Política Internacional. Identidade

ABSTRACT

As a general framework, the overall objective of this thesis is to further develop the interconnection between identity and political outcomes. More than focus on how articulations of identity are performed by specific agents, this thesis is interested in advance the argument that identity ‘does’ something and, therefore, has through discursive practices what I called a *causality-in-constitution* capacity. First, I propose a model to evaluate how identities’ dispositions can be deployed in political contexts, more specifically in US foreign policy decision-making processes. In this sense, through the evaluation of the empirical cases of US narratives to legitimate the interventions in Kosovo (1998/1999), the Gulf War (1999/1991), Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003), despite the general intention of this thesis to develop a bigger picture of the US foreign policy debate after the Cold War, it also aims at evaluating the representational force of identity as a source of national order and propose a gradient, from moments from less to more ontological insecurity, through which one can visualize identity’s anchor points capacity to ground identity and put it back in place.

Keywords: United States Foreign Policy. International Security. International Political Sociology. Identity

RESUMEN

Como una estructura general, el objetivo más amplio de esta tesis es contribuir a la profundización del debate en Relaciones Internacionales acerca de la interconexión entre identidad y resultados políticos. Más que enfocar en cómo las articulaciones de una identidad son realizadas por agentes específicos, esta tesis está interesada en avanzar el argumento de que la identidad "hace" algo y, por lo tanto, tiene a través de las prácticas discursivas la capa de lo que llamé de 'causalidad la constitución'. De esta forma, propongo la elaboración de un modelo para evaluar cómo los dispositivos de una identidad pueden movilizarse en contextos políticos, más específicamente en los procesos de toma de decisiones de política exterior de los Estados Unidos. En este sentido, a través de la evaluación de los casos empíricos de la construcción de las narrativas en los Estados Unidos para (des) legitimar las intervenciones en Kosovo (1998/1999), la Guerra del Golfo (1999/1991), Afganistán (2001) e Irak (2003), a pesar de la intención general de desarrollar una visión más amplia del debate sobre política exterior de los EE.UU. después de la Guerra Fría, esta tesis también pretende evaluar la fuerza representacional de la identidad como fuente de orden para el ámbito nacional y proponer un gradiente, de momentos de menor a mayor inseguridad ontológica, a través de los cuales se puede visualizar la capacidad de los puntos de anclaje de la identidad para 'reasentar' la identidad y colocarla de vuelta en el lugar.

Palabras clave: Política exterior norteamericana. Seguridad Internacional. Sociología Política Internacional. Identidad

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1 INTRODUCTION

E pluribus unum. Like a lot of 20th-century kids, I learned that phrase from “The Wizard of Oz.” For most of their history, American movies have responded to crisis and conflict with visions of harmony. The consistent message from Hollywood — through the Great Depression and World War II, the civil rights movement and Vietnam, Roosevelt and Nixon and Reagan and Obama — has been that we are all in this together.” (...) “Now, we seem to have become a nation of outsiders and the idea of E pluribus unum — “Out of many, one” — often feels strongest in, well, Marvel movies, which turn into war stories. War, of course, suggests one kind of universal value — we’re all in this together against a shared enemy — that often seems otherwise missing in these Divided States of America. (DARGIS, Manohla; SCOTT, Anthony).

As I went through the American discourses in the United Nations Security Council to legitimate the US intervention in Iraq I often questioned myself what politicians meant when they used such words as ‘democracy’, ‘freedom’, ‘justice’, and etc, especially when they meant different things by them. More interesting to note was that, even when those words were used with different connotations, they had the capacity to move the debate, organize the contingent arguments in a comprehensible narrative and, especially, to rally some audiences behind it. Despite the range in meaning that those words might assume in a debate, they all produce a feeling of common origin and, hence, a sense of harmony. However, considering those words as mere dispositions that were forceful enough to establish an ‘operational narrative’ to legitimate one’s actions was only half-way explanation as why they were (and still are) so important in US decision-making processes. Their intimate relationship with the American ‘we-ness’ was the crucial component that moved me to jump from the question ‘how narratives shape and establish US decisions’ to ‘how identity, through its narratives, gets translated into specific political practices and US foreign policy decisions’. The necessity to bring identity to this account came with the perception that both language and the self (even if the self is a state) have an intrinsic relationship; a relationship that precludes one to fully exist without the other. Besides, when one assumes the non-epiphenomenal character of language, its relationship with identity is one of circularity: one produces and is at the same time produced by the other.

Here, the artificially produced gap between constitutive *versus* causal explanations in International Relations (IR) debate is questioned. If it was imperative to take a side, I could not have followed through with this thesis’ debate in the way I propose it. In my perspective, the interconnection of identity and political practices is one of *causality-in-constitution*, that is, as political discourses heavily assented in an identity vocabulary constitutes identity by process of reification and transformation, they at the same time shape the debate in a way of producing the

necessary conditions, hence causal, for certain political practices and foreign policy actions to take place. Nevertheless, since the notion of causality used here is not one embedded in the positivist debate, specialists might locate this work in the constitutive side of explanations.

In general, if the knowledge that identities matter is reasonably consolidated in International Relations (IR) works (WENDT, 1999; BIALLY-MATTERN, 2005; MCSWEENEY, 1999, among others), the evaluation of how identities matter and in what way they work to set the boundaries of political actions is still a work-in-progress. In constructing national identities, this process of ‘remembering-while-forgetting’ is crucial for translating and resignifying meanings to a vocabulary that is intelligible to all citizens. In this exercise of abolition of the “clear chronological divisions”, and of the establishment of “temporality regimes that throw the past and the foundational moments to the area of the myth” (SCHWARCZ, 2008, p.12), the naturalizing concatenation of the historical past of each subnational communities, groups, and classes is useful to create a certain sense of homogeneity; that is, to erect a common base on which feelings of belonging are based. Defying criteria of diachrony and synchrony in the historical course, identity is, in each generation, reworked in the submission of memory to narrative constructions (ANDERSON, 2008). If more than imagined, nations are invented, they also need to be felt so that an emotional legitimacy that goes beyond the political-territorial legitimacy is established. In these *quasi*-relations of kinship between the individual and the community, the ideational factors and the identity language that convey them are important precisely because of their nature of timeless transversality among past, present, and future.

According to Anderson (2008), for instance, the Declaration of Independence of the United States itself - a document narrated by the Americanist historiography as the synthesis of the American nationalism - does not give independence a justification that emphasizes the American people, or that brings any reference to the existence of an American nation¹. Also, regarding another historical moment, there is, in the interpretation of the facts about the American history, an “enormous didactic industry [that] works incessantly to remember/forget the hostilities of 1861-65 as a great ‘civil’ war between ‘siblings’, instead of (as they had been for a short time) two sovereign

¹ The United States declaration of Independence only defines objectively the political-administrative separation of the colonial territory from its metropolis at that time and, therefore, according to Anderson (2008), it cannot be, a priori, seen as constructor of the idea of a nation. The sensation of national belonging throughout this process and later processes takes place through narratives that take them to the level of founding myths and create, in the individual consciences, subjective links of connection to a common historical past.

national states” (ANDERSON, 2008, p. 274), so that the element of rupture present in the American Civil War is not highlighted and, therefore, the idea of a national whole could be advanced. The examples of this kind of *guided anamnesis* for the elaboration of a national scene are diverse, not only in didactic texts but also in literature, for example. Besides the processes of forgetfulness, the national identities are also constructed by processes of memories and reaffirmation. From this warp of objective and subjective layers, any evaluation of US foreign policy that does not consider its identity as a constituent factor of the way the United States sees itself in the world and relates to it is made incomplete.

A brief overview of IR theoretical approaches reveals to us the presence of some axes of dichotomizations. The agent-structure is one that pervades the whole IR theoretical composition, and, because of its importance, theories’ ontological claims will usually contribute to informing their epistemological assumptions. In the idealism-realist inception debate of IR, despite realism commitment to “structural rather than agentic theorizing, like all structural theories they (...) presuppose some theory of what is being structured, human or organizational agents, and of their relationship to social structures” (WENDT, 1987, p. 337), both theories essentialize human agents characteristics as they fix psychological assumptions of individuals: while idealists focused on the liberal nature of individuals, making the case that as humans could be improved and their goodness could be brought out, so the international relations could follow the same path, realists stressed the evil and selfish nature of individuals justifying their perspective of the also selfish behavior of international politics.

The neo-neo debate in IR then changed qualitatively the assumptions on the structure formation. Although still in an individualist register, the new debate moved from the determinism of a generalized human condition, and a subjective characteristic, to a determinism assented in a material, and objective, systemic structure. If realism and idealism were reducible to psychological fixed properties of individuals, treating the state as almost the embodiment of human characteristics, the neo-neo debate, especially the neorealist branch, put aside the ‘humanization’ of states and understood the international system as reducible to material properties of states in the distribution of capabilities². Apart from the conceptualization of states interests, the neo-neo debate

² On the structural component of neorealism, see WALTZ, Kenneth (1979) in *Theory of International Politics* KEOHANE, Robert (1983) in *Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond*. On the critique of neorealism structuralism, see ASHLEY, Richard (1984) in *The Poverty of Neorealism*.

explored little the social structures within the state realm, mainly because they were not causally significant to explain the international system. And because of this characteristic, the neo-neo debate has little contribution to advance the theorization on identity. In the spectrum of more structure- than agent-oriented explanations of the social world, the works on ideology produce interest, although incomplete, insights to understand identity.

Despite its different intellectual foundations, the works on ideology and political actions reintroduced the ideational component to IR theorization without essentializing the individual's human characteristics³. The use of ideology was established and appropriated by some IR works (HUNT, 1987; ADLER, 1987; BALIBAR, 1990; HOWARD, 1989; CARLTON, 1990; MACLEAN, 1988; BANNING, 1986). In Adler's work, he justifies his use of ideology affirming that "ideas and ideology, which are specific types of ideas, do matter" as "they are real and causally relevant because they have real consequences" (1987, p.10). Evaluating Brazil and Argentina's path in overcoming technological dependency, he uses the concept of 'ideology' in its "weak meaning" (BOBBIO, 1998, p.595), that is, as a system of ideas and values that orients political action. Although ideology in this sense could be thought to work interchangeably with identity⁴, by removing ideology from its structural component and focusing majorly on agents' ideologically cognitive formation (and adaptive and nonadaptive behavior), Adler does not account for unobservable effects of ideology and presupposes that agents are consciously driven by it in their actions. Even though the concept of ideology is usually appropriated by structuralist theories, Adler in this agent-structure debate tilts the scale to a more agent-oriented explanation. Ideology in this loose sense - or at least without the dense Marxist theoretical discussions that usually follows it - is also sometimes conflated with the notion of nationalism. Identity, ideology, and nationalism surely have points of intersection in their common usage to understand the relationship between ideas and political practices; nonetheless, they have nuances of their own. While nationalism can be interpreted as one form of ideological thinking and practice, and one possible way of expressing

³ Or, at least, without essentializing individual's human characteristics in the same way as realism and idealism. Humans are not necessarily bad or good, but driven by the capitalism economic logic which compels them to exert one class domination over another. If through socialism a society can achieve communism and put to rest capitalism social hierarchy and the subjugation of the proletariat, then what drives domination is the economic structure and not necessarily individual's innate characteristics.

⁴ See Hunt (1987) in *Ideology and US Foreign Policy*. He often even uses the word identity with similar meaning he conveys on ideology. Nonetheless, he interprets ideology as a set of ideas and values that inform foreign policy in a specific moment's history. Ideology, then, in Hunt, is not as encompassing as the sense of identity I want to explore in this thesis. His example on Kenan's and Williams' use of ideology is representative of this interpretation.

a country's identity, identity might encompass one or many political ideologies but is not substituted by them.

In this debate on ideology in a broad sense, the term 'ideology' sometimes carries with it a dogmatic and even prejudiced meaning, as something deleterious necessarily used by a ruling class to exert domination over the lower class. Plus, depending on how the concept of ideology is appropriated, it might lack the same relational nature as the one conferred to identity (for instance, ideology might not involve so much a meaning of differentiation between the 'self' and the 'other'). It thus renders fragmented the evaluation of the social fabric and tilts our analysis to perceive identity as formed in one segment of society (and then imposed over the other segments) rather than something that is in some extent socially shared by every member of a given society.

Also, the word 'ideology' is sometimes used to denote a skeptical evaluation of other's ideas and opinions, as a conscious disguise of one's intentions and calculated action to lure someone else into deception⁵. If translated to 'identity', this common-sense notion of ideology would bring some problems to an identity-driven analysis. Like ideology, identity would be regarded as a cloak of real intentions. So when presidents, congress representatives and politicians, in general, were to justify certain actions on identity grounds - or invoking identity's ideas - they might be perceived as using a rhetorical move to dupe his/her audience. This generates two major concerns: the dichotomization between language and practice and the quest for intentionality. Even if one actor does not mean what he says, regarding identity with this ideology connotation downsizes the importance of language because either language has no role to play in evaluating one's actions since what matters is the pre-linguistic subjective interests that are not verbally shared, or language has merely a subsidiary role, the role to conceive one's real motives. Still, even when refraining to separate language and practice, and acknowledging that regardless of intentions language has an active role to play, there is in this identity-ideology notion the underlying

⁵ Kennan's use of ideology in his book *American Diplomacy* reflects, in some extent, the use of ideology as a deleterious trace in decision-making. By comparing US Foreign Policy and the "Sources of Soviet Conduct", he affirms the "soviet power as we know today is the product of ideology and circumstances" (1951, p. 76). The US Foreign Policy, however, might have been naïve, inconsistent, or mistaken but not ideological or, in other words, it did not suffer from the distorting effects of ideology in its decision-making process. In fact, Kennan was part of the Cold War Liberals which advanced the notion of an "end of ideology", a notion further explored in the 1979 Dittberner's book *The end of Ideology and America Social Thought*. This debate was popular in the US during the 1950s, gathering important social scientists, as the ones associated with the Congress for Cultural Freedom like Daniel Bell, Seymour Martin Lipset and Edward Shils. In general, they tried to popularize the idea that ideology was detrimental to modern societies.

assumption of purposeful action - as if one always consciously instrumentalize identity's ideas in order to achieve an outcome. The intentionality behind invoking identity's ideas is an open question, for one actor might use them consciously or unconsciously. However, most uses of ideology either places it as a conscious belief system used by a group to achieve an outcome or places it in the realm of an unconscious shared understanding that exerts some obscure force.

To use ideology in its "strong meaning" (BOBBIO, 1998, p. 595) with all its supportive (neo)Marxist theoretical body of knowledge is also not enough to understand identity within the analytical purposes of this thesis. Despite Marxism long-lasting contributions to the social sciences - mainly its holistic orientation in evaluating social phenomena and the dialectical proposition of the relationship between collective agents and their social world -, its emphasis on the primacy of the economic sphere and the later developments of this primacy led Marxism to some reductionisms that impaired its holistic proposition (MOUZELIS, 1980, p.173)

In Marxist thought, as in the German Ideology (1998), a country's identity can be understood to follow the ideological conformation of the ruling class, since it not only detains the material means of production but also controls the production and reproduction of ideas⁶. In this effort to express its own ideas and interest as the communal ideas and interest, the ruling class is the one with capacity to construct the sense of a national identity. However, the ruling class is not forever the same and as it changes, its ideas and interests might also change. In this sense, if identity and ideology are given the same status, we can only understand a country's identity within the grasps of a specific historical time and within the specific control of one ruling class. Identity then is only a snapshot of a country's whole existence. And even though the contingent aspect of identity is crucial not to fall into the trap of objectifying it as an immutable structure, the US identity - and even all identities - has a degree of stability and continuity even within moments of change. Maybe the effort to evaluate how in the passage of one ruling class to another a core of ideas is perpetuated

⁶ Other Marxist works instead of reducing the reproduction of ideas in the practices of a dominant class, constant lobbying for its interests, place this same reproduction in the creation by this class of an institutional state framework which in itself, regardless of from what social strata its personnel might be, will promote policies that safeguard the bourgeoisie's interests. In this agent-structure relationship, rather than posing the agent as the one who feeds the process of reproducing and reaffirming one ideology, the analysis tilts the scale to a structural explanation, in which the causal effects of ideology is perceived through institutional conformations and not by agents' practices per se. In this set up, if we use ideology and identity interchangeably, identity's effects in foreign policy practices would be perceived as the feature of an institutional arrangement, like in the properties of a day-to-day management done by all powerful agencies as the Pentagon and the CIA or state's bureaucracies as the White House and Congress. And although institutions do have a role to play in reproducing a country's identity, the structure-driven institutional explanation is only half explanation, posing agents as mere puppets in this process.

might be one interesting analysis for someone that is interested in cutting through the layers of society, rather than regarding identity as an encompassing sense of belonging regardless of class divisions, but this is not the objective of this thesis. And by this I don't mean to dismiss the notion that identity might be understood as a form of control done by an elite or a ruling class⁷ by means of symbolic and material power, nor to regard the state as a unitary entity with no divergencies whatsoever even in matters of what country's nationals understand by their identity; or putting it bluntly, of what Americans understand of American identity. Besides, Marxist approach suffered from appropriations that presented the social relations in two extremes: either an ultra-voluntarism that "sees social classes as omnipotent and omniscient anthropomorphic entities" or "by emphasizing systemic-structural constraints to the extent of portraying agents as mere puppets of economic, political, and ideological structures" (MOUZELIS, 1980, p.173).

Back to Marx, the disadvantage of using ideology is not only due to a temporal specificity of its meaning. The proposition that exists a "real" reality from and towards which ideology is constructed and the agent-structure balance on where to locate the analysis, depending on how one further develops the theory to his/her purposes, are also important issues. In Brief terms of Marxist theory, the superstructure, formed by issues related to morality, law, the political system and etc, is subordinated to a base composed of the material conditions that inform the modes of production. To describe the link between the base and the superstructure, Marx brings the concept of ideology as the notion that helps to explain the connections between intellectual understandings and behaves. In this theoretical setup, ideology works through the reproduction of a false consciousness; that is, in simple terms, the reproduction of an 'image' of the real world. What first counts to derive the explanation is the material reality and ideology, as with the metaphor of the camera obscura used by Marx, is only a distorted reflection of this reality in the minds of a group's individuals. In this sense, using the Marxist concept of ideology would bring to identity a component of confrontation between the mental extrapolations of the mind and the external reality (MARX, 1998; CASSELS, 1996). And for the purposes of this thesis, the question whether identity has a correlation with reality or is a mere distortion or simplification of it is not an interesting question. For instance, it

⁷ Some researches (ZEHFUSS, 2001) have criticized Wendt's work on the grounds that the relationship he proposes among identities, interests and forms or anarchy is one that, in some ways, take states and their identities as given. In my effort to problematize the domestic realm, some might criticize that the option to not focus on classes or different internal groups might produce an analysis that homogenize the internal differences in interpretations over US identity. However, when one assumes the possibility of identifying a 'national' identity, this inevitably proposes a minimum common ground that harmonizes domestic divergences.

does not matter if the US identity as a democratic nation clashes with some events, e.g. the use of slave labor, in US history; what matters is how discursive practices built democracy as an important element of US identity.

In this debate over the material foundations of ideology, one possible critique to a work that derives identity from ideology is the role of history. As reality lies outside ideology, being it only an image of this same reality, so history also resides primarily in the material world and not in its ideological conformation. In other words, ideology is informed by history but has not a history of its own (ALTHUSSER, 2014). Even if identity is a distortion or a simplification of reality, when evaluated from the discursive practices that produced this same distortions and simplifications they become part of this supposed ‘reality’, thus negating the distinction between external and internal worlds. Plus, by following discursive practices and the use of, in this case, US identity’s core ideas, from this moment forward called identity’s anchor points, a nomenclature I shall explore further in the next chapter, history is brought back to the analysis as an important component. The genealogy of US identity’s anchor points presented in this chapter is an attempt to take history seriously as it presents a brief historical overview of them. In the agent-structure debate in Marxism and Marxist-oriented theories, regardless of the relative importance on more agent- or structure-driven explanation and of the kinds of properties in agents or structures that are understood as causally relevant, the material component has an important role to play, especially in economicist approaches. Nonetheless, class practices are informed by other components than the material and economic ones.

For all the pros and cons of an ideology-identity approach, the option for the term identity without the ideology connotation is based on the understanding that it best accommodates our purposes of analysis, as identity, as previously mentioned, is necessarily relational and constitutive. Thus, identity confers a meaning of transversality throughout the entire social fabric, regardless of classes, as it defines a common base of identity traces existing in a community, even if the interpretations and uses of these identity traces vary. Besides, it is not only a matter of meaning but also a matter of theoretical adequation to this thesis purposes. The three main critiques to works on ideology and political practices - temporality, the importance of a material reality and the explanations that find either the agent or the structure the causal significant part for the analysis. As a last remark, I do not intend to underestimate the importance of ideology-driven explanations

and descriptions of social arrangements; however, in this analysis, it would conceal more than it would clarify on the ideational components of US identity.

The works on ideology have an intersection with belief systems approach since writers of the latter sometimes blur the lines and overlap belief systems with ideology. One of the first works to explore this debate was developed by Kenneth Boulding in 1956, who proposed the concept of ‘the image’. The argument behind the concept of ‘the image’ is that individuals have an image of the world through which they read exterior information (or messages, in Boulding’s words) and, therefore, “behavior depends on the image” (1956, p.6). This same image is determined “as a result of all past experience of the possessor of the image” (1956, p.6), so “part of the image is the history of the image itself” (1956, p.6), and according to how in the interactions between the individual and the world, these messages reach one’s image. This approach presents two interesting contributions to its intersection with IR: its consideration of the material world and the relation between language and the image construction. While Boulding advances a perspective that privileges perception over materiality, affirming “that are no such things as ‘facts’ (...) there are only messages filtered through a changeable value system” (1956, p.14), he also places discourse as a way to make human image public and develop common images. So even in a still positivist⁸ understanding of the connections between ideas, values, and practices, Boulding’s work helped to bring emphasis to the perceptions of those individuals responsible for political decisions and to the social aspect of language in constructing and sharing those same perceptions. Boulding’s theoretical apparatus was, therefore, largely used by researches with interest in the cases of international conflict (SMITH, 1988). The concept behind ‘the image’ was then used, for instance, to evaluate the US-Soviet Union relations, developing one argument that existed between them a powerful mirror image (BRONFENBRENNER, 1961) specially between Khrushchev and Kennedy, through which both leaders perceived each other in a similar fashion, thus explaining the endurance of the conflict.

⁸ Although Boulding has a fairly non-positivistic (non-empiricist) evaluation of the interactions between messages and the image, not posing the existence of a real external world from which one’s image might be accurate or not, he inserts himself in this debate as he tries to develop a “really adequate theory of behavior” (1956, p.18), thus privileging a general theory that could be applied to any case than one informed by the contingent aspects of the subject-object interaction. Still, other appropriations of this theory, as the works of Bronfenbrenner, enhanced the positivist aspect of the theory and its concept of the image, affirming that the US-USSR images of each other were based on a distortion of reality, thus presenting ‘the image’ as something that could be interpreted in confrontation with an external reality.

Another approach, the concept of belief systems, was later developed by Ole Holsti. This theoretic model accounted that “the relationship between ‘belief system’, perceptions, and decision-making is a vital one” because “a decision-maker acts upon his ‘image’ of the situation rather than upon ‘objective’ reality, and it has been demonstrated that the belief system - its structure as well as its content - plays an integral role in the cognitive process (HOLSTI, 1962, p.244). Following the works on ‘the image’ and on ‘belief systems’ a third approach combined these two theoretical insights into the concept of operational code. Briefly, it advocated that through evidence, the analyst could infer the beliefs of an individual or a group and then set up a picture of its perspective of the world. The work of Alexander George on operational codes and political leaders’ decision-making divides the code into two elements: the instrumental beliefs and the philosophical beliefs. While the instrumental beliefs encompass those that allows an actor to achieve its goals, the philosophical ones are related to the general assumptions one makes of the world.

Besides the two main theories of the first IR theoretical debate which part from the assumption of a determined human nature, these approaches tried to operationalize the link between actions and beliefs. The already mentioned work done by Holsti (1962; 1967), and later by Holsti and Rosenau (1986), had the objective of empirically investigate the content of a leader’s belief system and to show how it can affect this same leader’s decisions. Using the case of the beliefs of US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, Holsti went through all Dulles’ available public statements, newspapers, memoirs written by people that worked with him and questionnaires sent to his closest associates to establish the connection between the Secretary’s beliefs and US foreign policy towards the Soviet Union. In Holsti’s model, the belief system “has a dual connection with decision-making. The direct relationship is found in that aspect of the belief system which tells us ‘what ought to be’, acting as a direct guide in the establishment of goals” and, in this sense, “the indirect link (...) arises from the tendency of the individual to assimilate new perceptions to familiar ones, and to distort what is seen in such a way as to minimize the clash with previous expectations” (HOLSTI, 1962, p.245). In schematic terms, Holsti model of belief systems is presented as the following:




FIG. 1. The dual relationship between belief system and decision-making.

The adequacy problems of Holsti's approach to the evaluation of identity can be to some extent generalized to the whole evaluation of identity through the cognitive research-IR intersection. First, even though perceptions are taken into consideration, Holsti does not question how those 'images' and, therefore, the belief system, is constructed. Even if it is almost impossible to find the inception moment when one's belief system is created, the belief system and its images are presented as a pre-given stable feature, through which information is filtered, evaluated, and a decision is achieved. Besides the one-sided character of this interaction between the individual and the world, Holsti's belief system presupposes that all information will be translated in purposeful actions; even if information will be translated into behavior, this is no guarantee that all behavior will be the outcome of a rational decision. When it comes to using this model to evaluate international politics, the "relationship of national images to international conflict is clear: decision-makers act upon their definition of the situation and their images of the states - others as well as their own" and "these images are in turn dependent upon the decision maker's belief system, and these may or may not be accurate representations of 'reality'". Thus it has been suggested that international conflict frequently is not between states, but rather between distorted images of states" (WRIGHT, 1957, p. 266 apud HOLSTI, 1962, p. 244). Despite the consideration of perceptions to explain international conflict although and their importance so the approach can account for unobservables to IR analysis, those perceptions are usually presented in confrontation with the existence of a material reality.

In general, the presented IR approaches that bring insights from psychology end up leaving little room for agent's cognitive change. Works that try to infer some general law and ways of establishing predictability falls into the trap of presenting one's mental dispositions as a stable, sometimes fixed, characteristic of the self. With this understanding of beliefs, those models infer that "any actor with a similar preference structure placed in the same situation would inevitably have made the same choice" and although "individual agents might be preserved (...) agency is sacrificed" (JACKSON, 2006, p. 6). By doing this the social component in a belief systems formation and functioning is almost reduced to zero, and the individual detached from society as he/she basically reacts to it according to his/her cognitive setup, but is seldom affected by it. From the point of view of the agents under investigation, they are "less active producers of their situation than passive consumers of it", while from the perspective of the researcher, there is no room for a creative interpretation but merely an accurate reproduction of it (JACKSON, 2006, p. 6). To advocate for a kind of stability, however, is not necessarily the problem, as patterns of practices are usually identifiable in international politics. One overall critique to this approach is that it does not further develop the sources of this stability or either locate this same source of stability in the internal dispositions of an individual cognitive formation. In this division of one's personal world to the exterior world, the subjectivism-objectivism dichotomy remains.

The starting point here is properly based upon a problem, located in the area generally of 'internal' mental states (beliefs, predispositions, intentions and so on), a notoriously difficult set to unpack, especially in respect to their causal relationship to behavior. This view, then, examines belief systems as a fundamental human, and logically necessary, precondition for behavior in general, including ideological behavior. The supposition was that belief systems could stand as an independent variable in relation to any given ideologically-based behavior dependent upon it, although the content of both would be specific, as held and practiced. (...) [In these approaches], mental states must be constructed as essentially internal to the individual, and therefore subjective, with behavior located essentially in the public domain, and therefore objective. The validation of this method, then, is necessarily a function of reality testing, that is, beliefs may be assigned true or false value (...) which is not itself dependent upon beliefs (MACLEAN, 1988, p. 71-72)

Comparing the possible ways to understand the relation between ideas and political practices, both approaches - the one on ideology and other on belief systems - falls into two axes of reductionisms. Their analysis places the causal explanations on either agent- or structure-primacy and emphasizes material versus ideational components. The attempt to overcome the objectivism versus subjectivism debate in de social sciences influenced later the post-positivist debate in IR. As Bourdieu affirmed in his book *The Logic of Practice*, "the very fact that this

division constantly reappears in virtually the same form would suffice to indicate that the modes of knowledge which it distinguishes are equally indispensable to a science of the social world that cannot be reduced either to a social phenomenology or to a social physics” (1992, p.26). While this dichotomy is deleterious to the whole IR debate, its reflections on the study of identity seem to be more pronounced. First, identity is something that resides in a relation - a relationship with a place, with past and present events, with others, etc. Even if we approach the identity from a psychological point of view, one’s identity is not constructed merely based in her/his relations with her/himself, but also in her/his relations and perceptions with the ‘external’ environment and the influence this ‘external’ world exerts on oneself. Though the intersection between IR and psychology and the works on ideology produced some interesting insights, they are not enough for the purposes of this thesis.

If approaches that tilts the scale to either the agent or the structure are not sufficient to account for an interpretation on US identity and its foreign policy practices, this thesis will recur to Bourdieu’s structuration theory conceptualizations of habitus, field, capital, and doxa. Chapter one will discuss the applicability of Bourdieu’s concepts to develop an interpretation of identity’s constitutive and causal effects on political practices and this theoretical appreciation will be followed by an attempt to establish an analytical typology that aims at producing a step by step tool to go from identity’s general anchor points to their evaluation in empirical cases. Plus, in chapter one, I will be presented a brief genealogy of what I selected as the most important, at least the most important to the foreign policy field, US identity’s anchor points.

The following chapters will focus on the empirical evaluation of how the mobilization of identity’s anchor points shaped the foreign policy debate in a way that precluded certain options and paved the way for the US interventions abroad. The chapters organization will not follow a chronological order, though. Despite the general intention of this thesis to develop a bigger picture of the US foreign policy debate after the Cold War, another objective is to evaluate how identity’s dispositions were able to ground or fix identity in moments which the US international status was questioned, hence transporting the US from ontological insecurity back to ontological security. Regardless of the foreign policy explanatory key to characterize US participation abroad - isolationism *versus* internationalism; unilateralism *versus* multilateralism; exemplarism *versus* vindicationism - or how it is perceived by the American public - the leader; the hegemon; the (benevolent, indispensable, among others) superpower -, there is a minimum national consensus of

who the United States is. And in this national consensus, the US is always exceptional. No matter what connotations or in what set of combinations the anchor points are presented to justify action or inaction abroad, they always develop the notion of America as an exceptional nation.

The American exceptionalism is then important to understand the ossified truth in American identity of the US as ‘the’ most important actor in the international environment. And because of its importance, it is also perceived as the source and the guarantor of international order. So in moments of international disorder or at least in moments when other actors contest the present international order, the exceptionalist pillar of US identity navigate on shaky grounds thus running the risk of breaking down. In those moments the answer to the question “who is the United States” does not seem so obvious anymore. To maintain a favorable status quo, the US needs to teach others and re-learn itself of its relevance, and frame the international environment in these lines. The processes of teaching, learning, and framing are not a mere consequence of interests⁹ but are first manifestations of the power politics of identity and they might be conducted through language or communicative power, and through physical violence. In the foreign policy field, especially due to its close relationship to both international and domestic environments, both forms identity’s power politics are deployed. While language in the discursive practices that deploy identity’s anchor points is a form of identity’s power politics used in both national (debates in Congress, presidential speeches, etc) and international (diplomacy) environments, physical violence is used in the international one. Following this discussion, if identity constructs shared understandings, expectations, and behaviors, the ontological security - security as being and not merely security as survival (MCSWEENEY, 1999) - is the possibility of a stable relationship between one’s identity and the external environment. Therefore, besides proposing one possible analytical model to evaluate an identity-in-play through discursive practices, this thesis has also the objective to evaluate the representational force of identity as a source of national order and propose a gradient, from moments from less to more ontological insecurity, through which one can visualize identity’s anchor points capacity to ground identity and put it back in place. In this sense, the organization of the empirical chapter will not follow a chronological order, instead they will be presented in the following manner: Kosovo intervention of 1998/1999, The Gulf War of 1991, the intervention in

⁹ For a thorough discussion over the difference between a source or order and a contributing factor for a given order, see Bially-Mattern (2005).

Iraq in 2003 and the intervention in Afghanistan in 2001. The chapter on Kosovo will focus on how the intervention was constructed nationally in a sense of US responsibility towards Europe in the post-Cold War conflict years and how this responsibility was intrinsic to US international role. The chapter on the Gulf War will focus on how the narrative towards the intervention has gained new contours to a more existential discourse. The chapters on Iraq and Afghanistan will show a 'line in the sand' between the narratives before and after 9/11. Although all narratives have an ontological security component, the narratives about the interventions in Iraq and in Afghanistan escalate this component to different and more extreme levels.

2 BUT DOES IDENTITY REALLY MATTER? AMERICAN ANCHOR POINTS AND THE IDENTITY-IN-PLAY MODEL

The future is only an indifferent void no one cares about, but the past is filled with life, and its countenance is irritating, repellent, wounding, to the point that we want to destroy or repaint it. We want to be masters of the future only for the power to change the past (Milan Kundera - The book of love and forgetting)

Cheerfulness, the good conscience, the joyful deed, confidence in the future - all of them depend, in the case of the individual as of a nation, on the existence of a line dividing the bright and discernible from the unilluminable and dark; on one's being just as able to forget at the right time as to remember at the right time; on the possession of a powerful instinct for sensing when it is necessary to feel historically and when unhistorically. This, precisely, is the proposition the reader is invited to meditate upon: the unhistorical and the historical are necessary in equal measure for the health of an individual, of a people and of a culture (Nietzsche - Untimely Meditations)

It is impossible and even meaningless the effort to find the *causa prima* of identity, especially within the social arrangements that conform it in a class or a group. As one goes back in time to locate a nation's, for the matters of this thesis, identity, every historical event trace back to another event that traces even further back to another moment in history. Like Nietzsche pointed out, identity is constructed in a dialectical process of remembering and forgetting, of feeling historically and unhistorically or, in other words, of appropriating history to think present events and even consider the possibility of predicting the future, and dismissing past events to overcome them, without ever losing sight of history's role in this process. Identity is then a constant conversation between one's present self with its past versions and thoughts, repainting or destroying this same past, as Kundera would have put it, to accommodate the present and be the master of the future. With the social body is no different, except for the challenge of understanding this process in collectivities.

The human sciences have tried to explain the construction of identity and its repercussions through multiple approaches - either directly using the word 'identity' or through different expressions that convey similar meaning. The demarcation of identity's boundaries, however, runs the risk of falling either to the extreme of generalism, losing explanatory validity, or to the error of considering too many specificities, thus making it impossible to abstract it away from a specific context and travel across cases. Even more problematic, a work that focus on a nation's identity and its respective effects in foreign policy decisions might fall into the trap of locating the analysis in the extreme of objectivism or the extreme of subjectivism, either considering identity as an

immutable structure, and a source of identifiable regularities, or solely as the feature of one's own mind; or, still problematic, either looking to the 'real' world as a source of validity of an identity and dismissing subjective components as only individual features and thus not logical or stable enough for a scientific analysis, or, on the other hand, considering the subjectivity of political actors' minds and behaviors through an objectifying method of analysis (e.g. statistical analysis on political values) to predict intentionality.

The possibility of pending to one of these extremes is long an issue in the *sciences humaines e sociales*, and not merely a problematic dichotomy when one pursues the path of understanding identities and its repercussions. Because IR takes much of its influence from the general debate of social sciences, the dualist division of the body and the mind, the realm of the subject and the thing was brought into the development of the study of international relations. Basically, many features of the positivist-post-positivist debate in IR intersect here as, for instance, the ontological agent-structure debate and the epistemological dualist debate between ideational and material components and how to treat them in the 'scientific' analysis. As one theorizes over identity formation and identity's effects, some theoretical developments are in order to avoid falling in dichotomized, black and white explanations. Since the most important aspect of this thesis is questioning not why identities matter but how they matter, and how can we see them in play through decision-making process, the following theoretical discussions shall help building my arguments over (a) proposing one possible analytical model to evaluate an identity-in-play through discursive practices; (b) the representational force of identity's vocabulary as a source of order¹⁰ to the US, and a means of going from moments of ontological insecurity back to ontological security.

2.1 Beyond IR turns: structuration theory and identity

¹⁰ As Bially-Mattern (2005) who presented identity as a source of international order. Here, the narrative constructions of identity in foreign policy decision-making, as they work in the intersection of the national and international realms, they are presented as a source of domestic order. In the process of developing justifications for foreign interventions, the constructed narratives are presented in the inside/outside, self/other register, thus building or breaking US identity to both audiences. Because part of US identity was and still is constructed around the notion of promoting international order, as Bially-Mattern emphasizes in her work, narrative building on foreign policy interventions are a good source to see the US identity in play. Still because the international order is part of US identity, in moments of international 'unsettleness' or disorder, US foreign policy narratives seek international order not only for the international sake, but also for the sake of the American national order. In this sense, showing the US as a crucial actor for the international order has a domestic effect: either presenting itself as a team player or a ruthless leader, the engagement abroad help fixing US identity back in place.

I could locate this thesis in the so-called ‘identity turn’ (BIALLY-MATTERN, 2005; ADLER; BARNETT, 1998; MERCER, 1995; WENDT, 1992; 1996; 1999) in IR; but I could also, with no difficulties, locate it in the ‘sociological turn’, the ‘linguistic turn’ even, or in the ‘practice turn’. With the risk of falling into eclecticism¹¹ as an attempt to prevent falling into rigid dichotomies on the analysis of US identity, I shall resort to insightful ideas from different ‘turns’ in the IR debate. As the IR theory debate becomes every time more interdisciplinary, one might feel the need to find its niche of theoretical counterparts and pledge allegiance to one ‘IR turn’ as to insert her/himself in this debate. However, a body of knowledge (sociology, philosophy, linguistic), a feature of international relations functioning/organization (identity, relations, agents, structures) or even methods of analysis (practices, process) are only choices on what best helps us understanding and interpreting IR events, but they are not a religion. Hopefully, I can sew properly those insights from different IR turns and compose a coherent argumentative body.

At first sight, identity is permeated by a series of contradictions. It is a stable yet plastic ‘thing’; an outcome of the national socio-historical process and the cause of a national sense of belonging; it comes from the agent but at the same time has a degree of independence that affects collectivities; it is a form of structure, but one that is not immutable; it has a relationship with the ‘material’ world but the narration of this same ‘material’ world is what gives its meaning, through process of simplifications, resignification, and interpretation. For all these supposed contradictions, identity has an organic nature, and, to not run the risk of removing it from its organicity, a shift towards some theoretical developments is in order. First, on epistemological grounds, there is no possible true or false theory on identity and its influence over political practices. What is possible, and what I try to offer here, is an interpretation over US identity and its repercussions on American foreign policy that might help us to understand the ‘feel for the game’ in US decision-making process. Plus, an epistemology assented on materialistic and empiricist verifications of knowledge will present identity as a mere function of the external world, and agents and their practices as only actors that confirms or defies it, but not with a creative capacity. The notion that “identity shall not endure if its ideas are not validated in the outside world” is, in the least, misleading. Its deterministic way to approach identity reinforces the kind of object/subject division I want to avoid.

¹¹ But as Bourdieu (apud WACQUANT, 2014, p.125) would advise, it is deleterious to build one’s work around scholastic conventions that sanctify canonical authors and stay fixed to closed conceptualizations as if this would necessarily mean a scientific rigor. He advocated, instead, for a epistemologically disciplined eclecticism throughout his life work.

There is no ‘really real’ objects to confront identity with and, in the pole between ideational and material components to derive an explanation, this thesis privileges the former over the latter.

If identity does not reside only in the agent and it is not at the same time a structure (in the structuralist point of view), all theories that work through this dichotomization will only understand one angle of identity and not approach its complete pervasiveness in the social world. In this sense, the structuration theories because of their attempt to deal with the agent and the structure as mutably interdependent, without one’s primacy over the other, shall help produce a holistic interpretation of identity and its practices. They try “to avoid (...) the negative consequences of individualism and structuralism by giving agents and structures equal ontological status”, because “far from being a mindless synthesis of the "best of both worlds," (...) the structuration project requires a very particular conceptualization of the agent-structure relationship”. This conceptualization “permits us to use agents and structures to explain some of the key properties of each as effects of the other, to see agents and structures as "co-determined" or "mutually constituted" entities” (WENDT, 1987, p.339).

The denomination ‘theory of structuration’ was coined by Giddens (1984) but with him several other intellectuals developed theories that placed the same weight in agents as well as in the structure¹². Theorists like Philip Abrams, Roy Bhaskar, Pierre Bourdieu, and Derek Layde¹³ are also part of this structuration theory tradition, although the works from Bourdieu and Giddens are usually more often considered in IR than the other authors. The choice of approaching identity through Bourdieu’s sociological works and not Giddens’ was due to two main reasons. First, Giddens establishes four main levels through which empirical research should be conducted - the hermeneutic investigations of frames of meaning, the investigations of practical consciousness, the identification of bounds of agent’s knowledgeability and the identification of the principal institutional components of a social system - and affirm that all should be considered for an analytical equilibrium but, depending on the researcher’s intentions, one level could be given more emphasis than another (GIDDENS, 1984; THRIFT, 1985, p. 615). Here, the main concern is because of Giddens’ division, one could inadvertently fall into a trap of reifying either agent or

¹² From the structuration tradition or not, some theorists developed mediating notions that could bypass the agency and structure distinctions, as the micro-macro relation in a ‘system-institution’ notion (GIDDENS, 1984), the habitus (BOURDIEU, 1992); position-practice system (BHASKAR, 1978; 1998), the actor-network nexus (LATOUR, 2005), among others.

¹³ Following Thrift’s (1983) categorization, they all along with Giddens can be identified as the five most important structuration theorists.

structure components. Plus, through his methodological bracketing, he affirms he does not “think it's conceivable to suppose that all forms of social analysis are able to produce a wholly rounded account which would connect agency and structure in a systematic and satisfactory fashion” and thus “it [is] necessary to make a distinction between the theoretical stance that one has about that and the methodological limitations which doing particular forms of research involves one in” (GIDDENS, 1984, p.127). In Bourdieu's theory, as I shall present in this chapter, the heuristic key habitus/field seems to propose a solution for Giddens' concerns without imposing methodological limitations to the mutually constituted theoretical stance over the agency-structure relationship.

Second, and most important, Giddens' dissociation of practical consciousness from discursive consciousness might bring more problems than solutions to this thesis' analysis. Practical consciousness, in Giddens' work, is the day-to-day processes of routinization through which agents build their stocks of ‘mutual knowledge’ “incorporated in encounters [that] is not directly accessible to the consciousness of actors”¹⁴ (GIDDENS, 1984, p. 4) while discursive consciousness “means being able to put things into words (GIDDENS, 1984, p. 45). In his attempt to overcome Freud's triad of super-ego, ego and id, this stratification model that separates practical from discursive consciousness puts discursive consciousness as potentially non-routinized and not constitutive of knowledge in agents' mode of socialization. And although Giddens through the concept of the duality of structure presents the possibility of intersections between practical and discursive consciousness and does not set a rigid bar between them, affirming the “line between discursive and practical consciousness is fluctuating and permeable, both in the experience of the individual agent and as regards comparisons between actors in different contexts of social activity” (GIDDENS, 1984, p. 4), this division is still problematic. Even if practical consciousness is “what actors know (believe) about social conditions, including especially the conditions of their own action, but cannot express discursively” (GIDDENS, 1984, p. 375), what agents know is undoubtedly informed and constructed by routinizations of language (among other routinizations), regardless of their capacity to consciously explain it with words. In this sense, an evaluation of identity using Bourdieu's concepts of habitus, field, doxa and the status given to language will

¹⁴ As Bourdieu (1992) affirms, in a different context, the establishment of a practical consciousness detached from discursive consciousness and unconsciousness might present the objects of knowledge not as constructed through practices but as passively recorded by agents in their process of building ‘stocks of mutual knowledge’.

better serve this thesis as language has an important role and the ontological presupposition of mutually dependent agent-structure relation is not detached from its methodological standpoint.

Bourdieu's structuration theory relies mostly in the concept of habitus, an "heuristic device" that "refers to a person's taken-for-granted, unreflected - hence largely habitual - way of thinking and acting" (LEANDER, 2009), and because of its "habitual" component, the habitus is the notion responsible for the mediation between the agent and the social structure. The use of the word habitus was not first coined by Bourdieu *per se*, although he is the one who further developed this concept in a social theory framework. Habitus comes from the Latin past participle of the verb habere, which means 'to possess or be in a certain state' and through the works from Aristotle, to Thomas Aquinas and Husserl the concept gained new incorporated meanings that culminated in Bourdieu's theorization. First, with Aristotle, the roots of habitus are found in his notion of 'hexis' which means an acquired, yet entrenched, stable disposition of moral character that, by guiding one's desires and feelings, orients one's actions (ARISTOTLE, 2004; WACQUANT, 2016; RODRIGO, 2011). Later with Thomas Aquinas, it "acquired the added sense of ability for growth through activity, or durable disposition suspended mid-way between potency and purposeful action" (AQUINAS, 2002; WACQUANT, 2016, p. 65). And with Husserl it was incorporated on works on phenomenology, in which the notion of habitus meant the kind of life-world experiences that, although forgotten in their moments of constitution, in "no way disappears without a trace" and this "retention reverberation" (possessed "in the form of a habitus") (HUSSERL, 1973, p. 122) is the link between past or 'habitual knowledge' (SCHUTZ, 1973) and future actions¹⁵.

This digression is important to understand what becomes of habitus in Bourdieu's works. In synthesis, for Bourdieu, the habitus is a set of dispositions formed by conative, cognitive and emotive components acquired and "carried out collectively in practice through mimesis and osmosis" (WACQUANT, 2014, p. 126) or, in other words, every component in the forging of habitus is developed through a process of collective interaction. The habitus is then the agglomerate of dispositions organized in a system of durable and transposable structured structures (by effects of past social environments) and structuring structures (regarding present emotions, actions, and perceptions), guiding practices through the "unchosen principle of all choices" (WACQUANT, 2016, p.67) in a systematic character "that can be objectively adapted to their outcomes without

¹⁵ For further developments on the topic of individual experience, "perceptual consciousness" and the 'lived body on the literature on phenomenology, see Merleau-Ponty (1983; 2012)

presupposing a conscious aiming at ends or an express mastery of the operations necessary in order to attain them” (BOURDIEU, 1992, p.53). In summary, the habitus informs practices that are not the result of strategic intention but are “objectively 'regulated' and 'regular' without being in any way the product of obedience to rules, they can be collectively orchestrated without being the product of the organizing action of a conductor” (BOURDIEU, 1992, p. 53). With the conceptualization of habitus, Bourdieu deals with the question of how the social environment is largely stable, despite its variations, without coining an explanation that reinforces the agent-structure dichotomization and the division between modes of conscious and unconscious practices. In fact, Bourdieu emphasizes “that the world is not transparent to social agents; that they have followed a trajectory and occupy a location in a resilient distribution of efficient resources independent of their will and consciousness”.

Even though Bourdieu stresses the habitus’ tendency to “become stable, coherent, congruent with its operant milieu, and relatively resistant to conscious manipulation” (WACQUANT, 2014, p. 128), this should not be mistaken by a quest for invariance, especially because to advocate for the impossibility of habitus to revise itself is to remove the component of creativity from the relations between agents and the social world. Its stabilization results, then, from “powerful mechanisms of selection, on the side of the agent as well as the side of the social world, that work to ensure the minimal coherence, congruence, and persistence of dispositions” (WACQUANT, 2014, p.128). As Wacquant stresses,

the result is a compromise formation that dynamically articulates generic and specific dispositions across the life cycle into an operative set of schemata. It follows (...) that habitus is not necessarily coherent and unified. Rather, it displays varying degrees of integration and tension (...). In reaction against instantaneous mechanicalism, one is led to stress the ‘assimilative’ capacities of habitus, but habitus is also adaptation: it constantly performs an adjustment to the world that only exceptionally takes the form of radical conversion (2016, p.68).

The relation among space, temporality, and history in the notion of habitus is what permits to advocate for stability and change in the social world without reducing them to idiosyncrasies. The “malleability of habitus [is] due to its ‘permanent revision’ in practice” (WACQUANT, 2016, p.68). History, therefore, is not accounted as a mere move towards contextualization, but as something transformed into body and nature. As the habitus “carry over the whole sedimented (and ongoing) social history, individual and collective, of the agent” it enables one to understand “the body as an ‘ongoing practical achievement’ (...) and an evolving matrix of capacities”

(WACQUANT, 2014, p.121). So history is activated and made active by the encounter between past ingrained dispositions and present experiences, emotions, thoughts, and empirically identified in practices. This sedimentation identified in the notion of habitus is what “confers upon practices their relative autonomy with respect to the external determinations of the immediate present” and “this autonomy is that of the past, enacted and acting, which, functioning as accumulated capital, produces history on the basis of history and so ensures that permanence within change that makes the individual agent a world within the world” (BOURDIEU, 1992, p.56). The notion of habitus in its conceptualization of history does not only introduce temporality, as it begs for the location of practices in social time but also spatiality as it stresses the necessity to consider the social space, or “the series of nested microcosms pertinent to manufacturing the practice studied” (WACQUANT, 2014, p.131).

And Although Bourdieu does not expressly mention the existence of a “national habitus”, he nevertheless points for a state-level field of action. Fields, in Bourdieu’s conceptualization, are demarcated spheres of social action that entails a specific habitus, that is, specific ‘rules’ or modes of behavior which informs how actors establish their interpersonal relations as they seek power, influence and/or status. As Bourdieu (1991, p.230) defines, fields encompass a “set of objective power relations imposed on all those who enter the field, relations which are not reducible to the intentions of individual agents or even to direct *interactions* between agents”. The accumulation of field-relevant capital is what determine one’s position within the field, since capital is the “accumulated labour (in its materialized form or its “incorporated” embodied form) which, when appropriated on a private, i.e., exclusive, basis by agents or groups of agents, enables them to appropriate social energy in the form of reified or living labor” (BOURDIEU, 1986, p.15). Forms of capital are as many as the possibility of fields delimitations and the power relations within a field are settled through agent’s ability to render a form of capital relevant or irrelevant to a field.

Habitus and field are hence multi-scalar concepts that one can “employ at different levels of social activity (from individual to the civilizational) and across degrees and types of aggregation (settings, collectives, institutions)” (WACQUANT, 2014, p.120). When theorizing about the exchange rates among fields, Bourdieu stresses that the capacity to structure fields and set the rate of exchange within and across them is also a form of capital in itself. This so-called form of ‘meta-capital’ is associated by the author to the figure of the state. In his words, the state has “the ability to impose in universal fashion, on the scale of a certain territorial foundation, principles of vision

and division, symbolic forms, principles of classification” (2014. p. 166) and because “the different forms of accumulation of military, economic and symbolic capital are interdependent and form a whole”, “it is this totalization that makes for the specificity of the state”. “The accumulation of different kinds of capital by the same central power generates a kind of meta-capital, that is, a capital with the particular property of exercising power over capital”; indeed, “among other possible definitions, one could say that the state is meta, that it is a power above powers” (2014, p.197).

Following this conceptualization, if one can scale up the scope of field¹⁶ to the state level, it is also possible to think of a national habitus¹⁷, a set of individually shared ways of thinking and acting, that encompasses and influences, in a greater or lesser extent, specific intra-national fields and their respective doxic dispositions. As Wacquant interestingly points, the habitus is a form of “container” of social action within which each collectivity “tends to produce joint ways of thinking, feeling, and acting, and common sets of expectations”. In this sense, one could think of containers inside containers, going ‘up’ to the international level, respecting or not state’s geographic divisions, and ‘down’ to smaller social collectivities (local, regional, ethnic, religion-, linguistic-, class-based, among others).

But still one can ask how to empirically work with the concepts of habitus, field, capital, and doxa when researching about identity. First, if the conceptualization of habitus comports the delimitation of a national habitus, one can define identity as an individual but nationally oriented form of habitus. Just like the notion of habitus, identity is also formed by conative, cognitive and emotive components established in collective interaction, ingrained in social time and social space, that points towards stability without losing the possibility of change and creativity. And just like the habitus, identity is suspended between consciousness and unconsciousness and guide practices without strategic planning of intentions or merely by default. The ingrained dispositions of American identity, acquired throughout a lifetime of national socialization, are the embodiment of a national habitus; that is, still using the metaphor of habitus as a container, this form of habitus is

¹⁶ Some IR works have scale up and down the notion of fields in their attempt to offer different interpretations on practices and to encompass forms of larger and smaller collectivities. From Wacquant (1998, 2004b, 2014) works with the pugilist field, DiMaggio (1991) and DiMaggio and Powell (1983) works on organizational fields, to Go (2008) work on global fields, these are some of an extensive list of different scale approaches to the concept of field.

¹⁷ Besides the flexibility in scale of Bourdieu’s concepts, as the author often uses the notions of class and group interchangeably¹⁷ to set the boundaries of the habitus’ coherence, it is possible to think of habitus conformations that transcends class divisions (or class in the Marxist sense).

a national social container that embraces shared ideas, modes of thinking, expressing and presenting oneself to others, and that informs, as they are carried in-body, each and every individual's doxic experience towards its own country. The national habitus and its dispositions travel through time and, despite their re-representations and resignifications, still 'glue' people of different social strata, race, religion, party affiliations together just by matters of national membership. Members of the same nation, as the US nationals, are then "united in a relationship of homology, that is, of diversity within homogeneity" in which "each individual system of dispositions is a structural variant of the others, expressing the singularity of its position within the class [or the group] and its trajectory (BOURDIEU, 1992, p. 60).

The national habitus and field work in tandem and the national field instruct the other sub-national fields, which may vary indefinitely as may vary the different spheres of social life - economic, political, cultural, among other subfields. The relationship of "immediate adherence that is established in practice between habitus and the field to which it is attuned" (BOURDIEU, 1992, p. 68) is the definition of doxa. In other words, the doxic experience of the world flows from the perceived common sense, established in the "undisputed, pre-reflexive, naive, native compliance with the fundamental presuppositions of the field" (BOURDIEU, 1992, p. 68). In order to understand the common sense created by identity's dispositions and how they affect foreign policy decisions, I developed what I called identity's anchor points and the 'identity-in-play' model. The anchor points were selected through both deductive and inductive logic. Deductively, using US liberal history as a background, I selected some of the most important ideas in the *long durée* of US ideational composition, as, for instance, the anchor points "equality", "liberty/freedom", "individualism", and "democracy". Throughout the empirical research, and hence inductively, I evaluated not only how agents deployed those anchor points but especially whether my selection made sense.

The sense behind the nomenclature "anchor points" is the abstract notion that when deployed they have the capacity to 'anchor' or to 'ground' identity and discursively sustain it, reinforcing, evolving, emerging or fixing it when it's breaking down. Going back to the habitus-field key, once the anchor points were deductively selected, the objective was to make a brief genealogical account of the range of their meanings within and for the national field. With this genealogy, the intention was to present the anchor points embedded in their historical compositions, or at least to present some of the most relevant historical moments through which

they were largely socialized, hence contributing to set their range in meaning. This first approach on identity's discursive dispositions proposes a spectrum of what Americans mean when they mention "equality", "liberty/freedom", "individualism", and "democracy". In the empirical research, although the national field has the meta-capital to exert its influence within and across other fields, including the practical sense of the foreign policy subfield, the anchor points suffer a process of contingent specification when they are deployed in this subfield to justify foreign policy specific situations. The image below illustrates this point.

The Identity-in-play model

1st level: General anchor points
(the most abstract and general
expression of identity)



2nd level: Commonplaces
(anchor points shortened in
range due to specification in
contexts)



3rd level: Operationalization
(winning versions or
commonplaces that justify an
outcome)

(developed by the author)

What the image proposes is that within the national habitus-field relationship, identity's anchor points assume the widest possible range of meanings encompassed in the American *mentalité*. As they establish the vocabulary (by means of spoken language or not) around with the practical sense of the national field is sustained, at this level the selected anchor points present the most abstract and general spectrum of identity. Besides, since they cut through national subfields they assume contingent narrower ranges of meaning and are deployed differently depending on

which form of capital is more relevant to a specific subfield. At the national level, the anchor points are enacted by modes that go from ordinary daily practices to national parties, hymns, holidays, monuments, school's literature classics, and many other forms. When it comes to literature, for instance, in the *Adventures of Huckleberry Finn*, by Mark Twain, the question of contradiction between the exclusion of the black people from society, and the belief that this same American society had as a basis the ideas of freedom and equality among men, is recalled and problematized through the relation of friendship between Huck and Jim (a black character). Through the shock between change and tradition, works as this one mark a period in the United States of readjustment of the American identity as the anchor points of equality and freedom, for instance, are put into question. The works by Laura Ingalls Wilder are also illustrative of the intersection of the cultural subfield and the national one in the identity formation. Although the series *Little House* has an implicit critique against the economic policies adopted in the United State throughout the 30's and 40's, its narrative construction around the anchor point of individualism and, hence, self-sufficiency and its considerable presence in American schools' syllabus, can contribute, for instance to spread out and to reaffirm, at the beginning of individuals' social life, such ideas as atemporal and essential in the formation of Americans' social imaginary¹⁸.

This digression is interesting to point that different fields present US identity's anchor points in their own specific way. In general, however, identity's dispositions in the format of discursive anchor points are, in a greater or lesser extent, whether the emphasis is only in one anchor point or in the combination of some, always present in national subfields. Anyway, as the above image proposes, to interpret how the anchor points are deployed in the foreign policy subfield, I propose two stages of specification. In the intermediary level I will borrow Jackson's (2006) terminology: the anchor points are converted into commonplaces, that is, through a process of delimitation each administration (or other agent with enough power within this sub-field), usually in the State of the Union or in important documents as the National Security Strategy, sets the boundaries within which it understands the usage in meaning of national anchor points. For instance, among the spectrum of possible meanings for the anchor point of democracy, its commonplace version presents how one administration understands and establishes it contingently

¹⁸ The series *Little House* books is significant in the construction of a narrative of the pioneer self-made man, also serving as basis for a speech against the New Deal, where the belief in the individual capacity to overcome difficulties is opposed to this new economic policy of higher state insertion for recovery from the Wall Street Crash of 1929 (FELLMAN, 2008).

to its specific moment in history. To illustrate, while Clinton seemed to deploy democracy more in a ‘due process’ meaning, that is, as a system of states’ organization, Bush emphasized this anchor point in its the transcendental and higher moral value meaning, expanding it beyond the mere ‘due process’ connotation. In this intermediary level, agents try to craft a shared meaning for a shared general (in terms of context) circumstance.

The third and last stage is the operationalization process. In this stage agents within the foreign policy subfield, usually in crucial moments as in moments of decisions to go to war or to intervene abroad, deploy the US identity’s anchor points to justify their positions. As we shall see, this whole process of narrowing down the anchor points meanings to a winning version of them (despite the actual foreign policy decision towards a situation) is not a linear one, although for methodological and didactic reasons I present it this way. Agents, as with Clinton in Kosovo, might not seize their position of authority to establish a contingent common sense around identity’s anchor points. When they do not set the debate and transport the anchor points to their commonplaces version, (i) it renders the operationalization process more difficult, since the spectrum of possible range of anchor points meanings is still largely wide, and (ii) it extends the space for divergent contestant propositions as to how to operationalize the anchor points. In general, both processes of specification and operationalization might be developed by any agent that orbits within the foreign policy subfield, e.g. the media, Congress, other members of the administration, the president her/himself. The president, however, because of her/his position of authority has a power position that enables her/him the possibility of prevalence in both processes, mainly because one’s “capacity to speak and act in the name of the state plays a causally relevant role in the success or failure to [a] legitimization¹⁹ attempt” (JACKSON, 2006, p.31)

The ‘intermediary-level epistemology’ proposed by structuration theory informs that the ontological choice should not be one that negates or falls outside the co-determinant, mutually dependent agent-structure level of analysis. Therefore, an identity-in-play model needs to be built around an ontology that resides in an in-between locus of the agent-structure relations, that is, for

¹⁹ The notion of legitimization is developed by Jackson (2006a; 2004) in his interpretation of Weber. The option for ‘legitimation’ instead of ‘legitimacy’ was to demonstrate it as a social process rather than something one beholds. Legitimation is “sociologically relative rather than transcendently absolute, and is linked firmly to the aggregate patterns of social action in a given context” (2006a, p.17). The choice of focusing on the individual in this process of legitimization is a methodological choice and not an “ontological claim about priority of individuals” (2014, p. 446). In this thesis, maybe the choice to evaluate the discursive practices might be developed further in other works as a possible way to make a further move to escape the individualist appreciation of Weber.

instance, in the discursive practices. The discursive practices are one way of expressing one's habitus, while at the same time feeding and taping into a field's structure of meaning. In other words, the discursive practices are one way of (re)constructing the symbolic capital around with the habitus-field relation exists. As discursive practices do not entirely prescind from the agent that utters a statement, collective statements form a structure of meaning that is not independent of the agent but that at the same time informs agent's further moves.

With the epistemological and ontological assumptions established, some methodological developments are in order. The overall research design of this thesis followed to some extent the practice tracing method of analysis. With empirical case studies that have as their only liaison the American foreign policy decision-making, the discursive foreign policy practices were the ontological choice because "practices are by nature repeated and patterned" and therefore "one may heuristically abstract them away from context in the form of various social mechanisms. These mechanisms are not causes per se, but theoretical constructs that allow cross-case (analytically general) insights" (POULIOT, 2016). Differently from Salter's appreciation of the 'practice turn' in which he affirms "fields analysis is a method that takes as its object the formal and informal practices within a structured, rule-governed, objective social sphere that is not pre-determined by institutional or national boundaries", for the reasons presented in this chapter on the flexibility in scale of field and habitus, even if fields are enclosed in institutional and national boundaries they still might be the locus of analysis as they nevertheless "share a logic, or a sense of the rules of the game" (SALTER, 2013. p. 85).

With this methodological key, each empirical chapter has the following specific objectives: (a) analyze the foreign policy field vis-à-vis the national field; (b) map out the legitimation process within the foreign policy subfield and evaluate how anchor points are deployed throughout this process; (c) link up the specific legitimation processes of each case study to an interpretation of US identity. Apart from the already given reasons, the foreign policy subfield is an interesting locus of analysis because its structure of competition revolves around who best 'talks identity'. Besides other forms of symbolic capital, as time in government, perceived loyalty to one party, traditional family name in politics, among others, the ability to talk identity and to narrate a foreign policy decision in identity terms is the most relevant capital in the foreign policy subfield. In this sense, it is largely common, for example, to deploy one or a set of anchor points and connect them to a past moment in US history that reinforces the meaning the agent is trying to convey, usually to display

a profound knowledge of US history and values. Apart from speeches, relevant documents, and Congressional records, this thesis also presents interviews with important actors in the foreign policy sub-field and with academics. The interviews, as they put me in contact with politicians, diplomats, academics, among others, helped to construct what Pouliot (2016, p.244) calls a ‘subjective methodology’ in which the researcher establishes an experience-distant but also experience-near relation with its object of analysis.

In general, as language is part of the social world and one can construct things with it, the anchor points can be abstracted away as a form of social mechanism that, through the process of negotiations and contingent (re)definition of their meanings, generates the necessary condition for actions to take place. Since language can produce effects, “the causal efficacy of practices rests on the meanings that are bound up in them” and “then any account of causality must go through the interpretation of social contexts and practical logics”, so “causal accounts cannot escape the interpretivist moment”. Patrick Jackson in his work proposes a mode of causality that does not treat language as epiphenomenal without falling into the positivist theorization of causal relations. What he proposes is a “mechanistic rather than nomothetic” (JACKSON, 2006, p.33) causality, one that is interested in the adequate, or sufficient claims to bring about an outcome. The establishment of a notion of causality that focuses on finding the necessary conditions for an outcome, in his view, is not feasible because it would require the evaluation of counterfactuals, which are not possible to offer in this kind of research. In my work, I shall follow his notion of causality: without splitting language as either constitutive or causal, the deployment of anchor points is constitutive of social reality while at the same time has effects on it. This explains why I avoid the artificial division of constitutive versus causal explanations and define the interconnection of identity and discursive practices as one of *causality-in-constitution*. About counterfactuals, it is impossible to present an account that, for example, narrates the 9/11 event in a completely different way.

Jackson (2006), however, affirms he is more interested in understanding how articulations of identity occur than what identity does. And although this thesis is constructed around the possible articulations of identity in foreign policy decisions, I still do not think we can separate these two approaches to identity. The Bourdieusian structuration theory and its theorization over structured structures and structuring structures might help to bridge this gap. In a possible never-ending cycle, the articulations of identity within a specific field produce (usually) a victorious version of it and this version might be consolidated in a given moment as ‘the’ US identity. This

identity (or the winning version of it) produces more or less acceptable common understandings and these same common understandings produce effects on outcomes. In the long term, the winning versions of identity (re)establish the boundaries of its anchor points. The articulations of identity, in the end, do something both to identity *per se* and to outcomes informed by these same articulations. Regarding the link of articulations of identity and outcomes, one might ask whether it makes any difference if the actor who deployed identity's anchor points believe in them or not. First, it is not possible to go inside one's mind to be totally certain of her/his convictions and beliefs. Second, the mere deployment of anchor points - cynically or not - indicates that the one who deployed them think they are forceful and valid enough to justify her/her position.

The second part of this chapter will then follow this the genealogical account of the selected anchor points. The identification of these elements does not presuppose the notion of total homogeneity in the society, since they can and are (re)interpreted and (re)worked the whole time, according to the context and the will of whom propagate them. Yet, despite these variations in usage and interpretation, what matters for this thesis is not simply their recurrence - individually or in combination - in foreign policy discursive practices, but also the identification of their range within American society, which helps us defining the realm of possible meanings they can convey (and the meanings someone can input through their disposition) to succeed in a legitimization process. Solely identifying that these ideas are always present in the characterization of the American identity, and in its foreign policy justifications is not enough; it is important to further evaluate each one historically.

2.2 The genealogy of anchor points in the U.S. identity formation

As we highlighted in the first section of this chapter, to propose a holistic understanding of the interrelation between the national habitus and field with the foreign policy habitus and subfield, first it is imperative to consider the range in meaning of these ideas, called anchor points, within the national *mentalité*. The anchor points are, in general, ideational components of US formation and, hence, US identity. The term 'anchor point' was developed with the objective to separate them from other general ideas that, however important, might not be considered crucial or basilar to US identity (re)formulations. This consideration of the anchor point's meanings is not an exhaustive one, though. Other works might offer different interpretations of their meanings and on what anchor points are relevant, either having an aim on foreign policy decisions or not. The general intention

was to present what lies in the margins; in other words, the frontier of those meanings in each anchor point, thus leaving the more nuanced appreciation to the empirical cases. The inclusion of moments in history, usage in documents, among other resorts has the objective to illustrate and contingently insert these ideas. In the IR theoretical debates, however, the role conferred to ideas and political practices are presented and understood in distinct ways.

For the traditionalistic theories, when they do not assume identities and interests as given factors, the ideas are identified as an intervening variable that explains the behavior variation of the States that goes beyond explanations assented on the effects of power, interest and institutions variables. For instance, the work of Keohane and Goldstein (1993) considered ideas as a clarifying element for changes of power and interest in State policies. This evaluation imprecision lies not only on the understanding of ideas as a *variational* element in behaviors but mainly on the disregard that these interests and institutions are, inevitably, generated by ideational components. Wendt (1999) takes part in this discussion when he considers that ideas have a constitutive role in the material capacities on which the traditionalists base their premises, and a causal effect on the States' behavior, as he follows a systemic level of analysis. With the material conditions being secondary and subject of interpretation through an ideational framework, the action of the States derives, according to Wendt, from a process of construction and sharing of a cognitive structure of individual identities that shapes and directs these agents' behavior. This way, in his book *Social Theory of International Politics*, Wendt's objective is to dialogue mainly with the mainstream theories about the importance and the capacity of the international system to construct and shape identities and interests, disregarding, in this proposal, the domestic factors in the formation of identities.

Although Wendt's (1999) contribution has been crucial to expand the theoretical field of international relations, and mainly for confronting the rationalist evaluations in its low problematization of identities, when evaluating the agents' behavior at the structural level, the author does not hold the internal process of socialization in his analysis. Although not reifying the question of interests, as seen in traditionalist theories, the author, in his structural perspective²⁰, ends up providing a partial clarifying picture on the question of identities. The present chapter,

²⁰ Wendt's objective, in his proposal of a *sociological move* in international relations, is to understand how the identities and the interests are constructed by the international system; that is, the author stems from a systemic approach to the State, which, for purposes of our analysis, interest us and offers partial explanations about the North American identity.

therefore, aims at approaching this gap on the conventional constructivism, at the same time stressing the need to “show how the identities are constructed inside the States, and how these identities inform the foreign policy”²¹ (MERKE, 2007, p.12); here, the specific case of the United States foreign policy.

Although the dividing lines between conventional constructivism and critical constructivism, and between critical constructivism and post-structuralism are tenuous, one differentiation between the constructivist approaches lies on the concern by its critical proposal to reach identities’ core by means of a discursive and historical evaluation of their formation, and its link with security policies. If both constructivisms negate that the foreign and security policies are only a consequence of national objective interests, the conventional constructivism usually points to the existence of relations of causality among identities, norms, and interests, as supported by Katzenstein (1996); that is, if norms and behaviors are not only derived from rational choices but are, overall, results of a social construction that is shared among agents, the conventional constructivism would help understand how and what is the impact of these social constructions, translated into ideas and identities, on the States and on the international system. This way, the conventional constructivism only goes halfway in understanding identities and their relationship with political practices. First, the type of causal image it establishes for identities widely restricts the possibility of considering that there is a space for social action for the agents in the construction, sedimentation and even change of a given identity. Second, it does not problematize the constitutive aspect of identities. If on the one hand, the notion of the constitutive role of identities may seem more fluid and therefore more difficult to be empirically examined, on the other hand, it converges to our proposal of an organicity of ideas that consubstantiate an identity and the identity-foreign policy relationship. As developed before, the perception that identity has a constitutive component as at the same time exert effects on practices, this thesis will bridge this gap developing the notion of *causality-in-constitution*.

Regarding the theoretical divisions between critical constructivism and poststructuralism, although the relation between the historical-discursive construction of identities and their reverberations in security foreign policies is a point of contact between both approaches, Waever

²¹ In the original: “mostrar cómo las identidades se construyen al interior de los estados y cómo esas identidades informan la política exterior”. Our translation.

(2004) points out that the poststructuralists are more likely to evaluate language games and identity narratives through empirical perspectives from which they construct linguistic generalizations, such as Western versus Eastern; civilized versus barbarians, among others, to establish the divisions and differentiation between the self and the other. Thus, although we focus on a more traditional object of analysis, which stems from the notion of a state entity and its foreign policy, poststructuralism, through its linguistic matrix, without abandoning the consideration of historical contexts, and because of its relational and constitutive notion of identity, offers us a more complete and complex theoretical framework for understanding the imbricated relationship of ideas and identity in the formation of the American doxic experience, and its reverberation in US foreign policy.

Yet another element brought by poststructuralism that allows us to advance in the analysis of the American case is the absence of divisions among the understandings of theory and practice since for poststructuralism the theory itself is also identified as practice. This element allows us to see the discourse more clearly as an act with the capacity to have meaning and performative force in its enunciation and to have effects on political actions. This comprehension of the discourse contributes, in its turn, to the evaluation of foreign policy discursive practices as a consequence and as a contributing constructor of the national identity.

As pointed out, as long as the theory itself is part of the reality, poststructuralism also allows, as Campbell highlights (1990), that the two complementary faces of the foreign policy are identified and evaluated. The first face lies mainly in the ideational and identity field, because it refers to all the relations of alterity, to practices of differentiation, and/or to modes of exclusion that are present in the process of relating and acting politically in relation to the other in the acts of foreign policy. This way, it is mainly responsible for constructing and offering the ways of interpretation used to deal with the international environment. In its second face, irrelevant without the first, and characterized by Campbell (1990) in capital letters, the Foreign Policy is the technical-bureaucratic means that allows the reproduction of an identity in constant conformation due to the foreign policy relations.

Therefore, this *persona ficta* that aggregates individuals into a state identity is constructed by practices of socialization as they establish the boundaries of belonging and exclusion; the barriers of “who we are” and “who we are not” to delimit who the other is and what is our relationship with it. The foreign policy in small letters, translated into a Foreign Policy, especially

in the construction of the comprehension of security, is permeated more by ideational elements rather than material ones. As identity is not always consciously recalled in the routine of political practices, it is necessary to unveil the ideational basis that supports it. Thus, our effort in this chapter is to present some facets of US identity's anchor points; to make a first move towards exposing what does not need to be said, but sometimes is, and is established - with even a certain degree of stability - cognitively in the American imaginary.

Entering the world of ideas that constitute an identity is crucial to understand and evaluate, how those anchor points are deployed towards a specific outcome. In the United States identity, its construction took place with an organic combination of values that, although individually present in other countries, when seen together in the American context assume an organicity that establishes a 'structured structure' and a 'structuring structure' of shared stable expectations and behaviors that guides²² individual and collective practices in, for example, the foreign policy subfield. To view this identity-in-play in the empirical cases, it is first necessary to approach the individual meaning of its anchor points. Recapitulating the theoretical considerations made in the first part of this chapter, with this brief genealogy I intend to establish the boundaries of identity's anchor points in order to account later for the contingently inserted foreign policy discursive practices and how these anchor points are turned into common places and then operationalized in the ability to 'talk identity' within the foreign policy subfield. Following the model 'identity-in-play' presented before, this section approaches the first level, in which I present the anchor points in their most abstract and general conformations.

As the US is one of the most important nations to adopt and further develop Liberalism's body of knowledge, the selection of what were the most fundamental ideas to US identity followed the great pillars of Liberal thought: liberty, equality, individualism, and democracy. Other ideas, such as nationalism, religion, and justice orbit around those anchor points, contributing to compose their meaning in US past and present narratives. The option to focus on anchor points and how they

²² The choice of the verb 'to guide' in this part is not random. When we refer to identity and its reflexes in the internal and external behavior of a country, there is a need to make sure that our assessments and propositions do not become too deterministic and therefore empty of meaning. The identification of identity characteristics does not allow the categorical anticipation of actions, but rather disseminate how the existence of a cultural system that promotes structures of meaning influences, but also constrains, supports and changes, and creates, as well as resignifies the directions of a political conduction. That is, the empirical evaluation of the performance of identity can only be better understood after the facts occurred; about the future, it only offers clues of possible actions and reactions.

are deployed in discursive practices does not exclude the possibility of referencing agents, according to their importance to the anchor point discussed.

2.2.1 Liberty/Freedom

The idea of liberty is propagated as one of the main anchor points of the American national field, especially when its presence and valorization in the social relations are considered in close relationship with the consolidation of a democratic system. Exactly because of its relevance in the (re)constructions of US identity, as we will see in the empirical cases of this thesis, the notion of liberty/freedom tends to be often deployed by the political agents to justify the most diverse foreign actions. It is possible to infer from liberty/freedom several adjectives that it can have in the American imaginary. As interpretations of this idea are also multiple, they are not always consensual. They might, for instance, oscillate between these meanings: (i) liberty/freedom as an absolute and non-negotiable right in contraposition to liberty as something related to the individuals' capacity to exercise it, thus opening space for government's action in order to ensure minimum conditions of freedom; (ii) liberty/freedom as an always continuous process that is subject to adaptations, interpretations and refinements in opposition to liberty as a closed and complete principle, with a fixed and static historical purpose; (iii) liberty/freedom seen as a distant source of inspiration and a main value that has an end in itself versus liberty as a secondary and instrumental value that provides a source of details and procedures to ensure specific results; (iv) liberty/freedom as a unique, agglutinating culture versus liberty/freedom as a principle that allows the coexistence of several cultures; (v) liberty/freedom as a notion that engenders and celebrates social reforms in contrast with liberty understood as a principle that challenges, opposes and resists social changes (FOLEY, 2007).

Studies about the US historical constitution tend to oscillate between seeing the centrality of the anchor point of liberty/freedom either as a consequence of the old continent's ideas that had converged and emerged on a new land, or as a product of a *sui generis* American experience. In the first case, the notion of liberty/freedom was brought to the US in conjunction with a set of an illuminist intellectual body of knowledge that gathers momentum in Europe during the 18th century. An idea coined and developed in the old continent and adapted in a new land, the emphasis on the notion of liberty/freedom was strengthened by the influence of the works of philosophers

like Locke, which defended the construction of a society assented on politics of consent and on a form of government guided by the voice of the majority. Although Locke (2005) when writing the *Two Treatise of Government* praised the Glorious Revolution and, hence, advocated for the right of resistance and for a form of government that combined the monarchic principle, embodied in the Crown, the oligarchic principal, in the figure of the House of Lords, and the democratic principle, with the House of Commons, when in contact with the American environment was reworked in adaptation to this new land. His thoughts were reproduced, for instance, in the settlers' resistance towards the colonial British politics, which, in their view, undermined their liberties. The emancipation from the British government and the perception of liberty/freedom as a fragile principle, among other factors, helped to create in the US a practical science that ensured its applicability and efficiency and the conditions for the development of a form of government based on democratic standards.

On the other hand, in the proposal of liberty/freedom as a consequence of the extraordinary American experience, the emphasis on the inexistence of a rigid bond between the individual and the State, either because the constant expansion of the national frontier allowed individuals to experience liberty/freedom²³ in its entirety, or because the federative arrangement among states downsized the Union's centrality, these loosened relations between the individual and the state conferred to the imaginary on the American national formation a sense of emancipation towards the rigid structures and impositions extant in Europe. As Hartz stresses, the separation of Europe and the US is a consequence of "the curious failure of American historians, after repeating endlessly that America was grounded in escape from the European past, to interpret our history in the light of the fact" (1995, p.4). Either way, as the following citation of Hartz is illustrative, with or without the division between Europe's and US history, both perspectives on the centrality of the anchor point of liberty/freedom pose the US experience as extraordinary. In Hartz words, the study of US history in conjunction with European history "is not to deny our national uniqueness, one of the reasons curiously given for studying America alone, but actually to affirm it" (1995, p.4)

These two perspectives can be, in a certain way, related to the division in (at least) two meanings that the term liberty/freedom has in political science: the negative and the positive liberty.

²³ For further information concerning the debate on the origins of the idea of freedom in the United States, see Rossiter (1953), Lienesch (1983), Storing (1981), and Robbins (1959).

Regarding the former, the influences of the Age of Enlightenment and of the republicanism that came from Europe contributed to demarcate “the situation in which a citizen has the possibility to act without being hindered, or not to act without being obliged by other citizens” (BOBBIO, 1996, p. 48), a notion of liberty identified in both the Constitution and in the Bill of Rights. In the first, third, fourth and ninth amendments of the Bill of Rights, for instance, they all intend to protect individual liberty/freedom from unreasonable government intrusion. In the notion of positive liberty, the non-complete coverage of the metropolitan power on the territorial extension of the colony, and the possibility of displacement further inland, provided to individuals, to a certain extent, the sensation of an independent and self-determined freedom. Thus, although during this long historical process these liberties, mainly the negative liberty, have been advanced with the consolidation of the political and legal apparatus of the American society, the perception of the existence of a freedom of action and a freedom of will in colonial times may have contributed to inaugurate, at the moments of national foundation, the concern and esteem for the guarantee of the individual freedoms²⁴.

In this sense, these two extreme meanings regarding the anchor point of freedom/liberty are, in fact, complementary in US identity formation. The idea of liberty/freedom in the US is the constant resulting process of confluence between the new and the old, and it could only have been developed in the US due to the combination of a foreign intellectual body of knowledge with the concrete historical American experiences. The idea of freedom in the United States is, therefore, the result of the *experience of freedom* in European countries and their political transformations, while also coming from the *freedom for experience* lived in the colony. Both conformations contributed to highlight the centrality of the individual in society and one’s ability to always seek new conditions and opportunities. By extension, these two processes were important to lay the foundations that produced an American doxa based on perceptions of uniqueness and superiority of its historical process.

The idea of the exceptionalism is majorly noticeable in the perspective of the *freedom for experience* since it classifies the United States as the first and only nation that, in its birth, was free

²⁴ The very creation of the Bill of Rights (written in 1789, and ratified in 1791) stems from an initiative aimed at safeguarding basic individual rights for citizens, such as freedom of expression, religion, the press, among others, restraining a central government that could intervene too much in the sphere of individual freedom. According to Banning (1995), the addition of the Bill of Rights as an attachment to the American Constitution created a certain “liberal republicanism”, in which the influence of Locke’s liberalism is incorporated into the republican thought of the Founding Fathers.

from the creative historical process of restrictions to freedom present in other places. Although Tocqueville (2005a, p.60) states that “the English colonies, and this was one of the main causes of their prosperity, have always had more inner freedom and political independence compared to other nations” and, therefore, “in no part, however, the principle of liberty was more completely applied than in New England States”, no nation, under no historical context, was totally free from contexts that raised restrictions to freedom. The very meaning of the construction of democracy in the United States, as we will discuss later, took place with the objective of favoring certain private and individual freedoms (of expression, religion, the press, among others) to the detriment of the reduction of the public freedoms of individuals in relation to the community. Thus, the American discourse on the status of its liberty/freedom - a freedom that is above the other historical development of liberty/freedom available in other countries - when faced with the reality of political choices concerning the prioritization of certain freedoms, shows a picture of overestimation of this idea in the American imaginary, with the objective of *exceptionalizing* the United States’ historical experience. In addition, this discourse also aims at *exceptionalizing* and valuing one face of freedom, the freedom in its individualistic meaning, and then present it to the world as a model of the best and unique freedom to be cultivated and disseminated. In factual terms, the debate on the development of liberty/freedom *for* and *in* the American political scene can be translated into the opposition among those that highlight it as a consequence of a libertarian experience, and others that face such process as proceeding from a freedom for the experience.

According to Foley (2007), the root of all the discussion about the role of freedom for the American society is in a circular process of mutual definition. In it, freedom is both identified as a condition and a point of origin. While with the former freedom/liberty is perceived as a necessary condition for the development of the US experience, with the latter it is used to present a ‘state of things’ found in the US inception and in the constructions and reconstructions of the reaffirmation of an exceptional point of origin that helps legitimizing any development of and for freedom/liberty in terms of a natural and evolutive continuity of US foundation. Besides the descriptive notion of liberty/freedom, either describing US historical development or the kinds of liberty/freedom available in the US (freedom of speech, worship, of the press, etc), this anchor point has also normative and value-driven components. It is in the Protestant ethic installed throughout the US formation in conjunction with a capitalist spirit, to borrow Weber’s words, that one can find the focal location of this anchor point. Correlating the anchor point of liberty/freedom with the one of

democracy and with the idea of religion in the US, Tocqueville (2005) affirms that it is in the heart of a still uncertain democracy that the individuals can find a way to liberty if they observe and comply with the divine laws. In his words:

Far from being harmed, these two trends, so opposing in appearance, are concordant and seem to provide mutual support. Religion sees in civil liberty a noble exercise of man's faculties; in the political world, a field given by the Creator to the efforts of intelligence. Free and powerful in its sphere, satisfied with the place reserved for it, it knows that its empire is even better established because it reigns only due to its own strength and dominates hearts with no other support. Liberty sees in religion its friend of fights and triumphs, the cradle of its infancy, the divine source of its rights. It considers religion a safeguard for its habits; the habits as the guarantee of the laws and restraint of its proper duration (...) (TOCQUEVILLE, 2005a, P. 64).

Though the anchor point of liberty/freedom can expand away from its inner center to considerations of liberty/freedom of a communal welfare society in which, in a greater or lesser extent, "the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all" (ENGELS; MARX, 1997, p.59), the individualistic meaning of freedom/liberty is the minimum non-negotiable shared meaning²⁵ of this anchor point in the national field. As we shall see in the foreign policy subfield with the empirical cases, although this anchor point has latitude to incorporate understandings of liberty/freedom as the common well being of the international community, more oriented by measures of positive liberty, when it comes to extreme moments of identity reaffirmation through foreign policy interventions, the non-negotiable connotation to this anchor point is the 'go-alone', individual, and negative sense of liberty/freedom.

This warp of sometimes contradictory meanings to the anchor point of liberty permeate in greater or lesser extent the whole intellectual Western tradition on political science, philosophy and, International Relations. However, due to the prominence conceded to this anchor point in the US foundation (and the foundational narratives of the US construction) plus its common deployment not only in the national field but mainly on the foreign policy subfield to legitimate an outcome, the notion of liberty/freedom have even more weight when one talks identity. Liberty/freedom can be linked to multiple connotations and they can be portrayed simultaneously as a cultural reference point, a foundational ethics, a controlling principle, a defining idea, an

²⁵ I thank Diego Lopes for this remark. If those ideas are in fact anchor points, the range in meaning they might assume in specific contexts need to be informed by a non-negotiable shared meaning. In the case of liberty/freedom anchor point, it does not mean that those variations need exactly to be in the individualistic sense of this idea. They can have more or less community-, welfare-components that push this anchor point away from its core. The bare understanding of it, though, reinforces the individual liberties/freedoms.

illustration of social reality²⁶, a mobilizing source of inspiration, and even as a historical-political device that offers explanations. The very contradictions and complementarities around liberty/freedom become crucial, especially in the US, to maintain this anchor point with enough flexibility and elasticity so it can be deployed to legitimize, for instance, foreign policy decisions.

2.2.2 Equality

Just as the notion of liberty, the anchor point of equality can assume multiple meanings, depending on the context, in which field it is deployed and on the habitus disposition of the agents that utter it. According to Bobbio (1996), if liberty is a state of the individual, equality is to some extent a desirable relation among individuals. Due to its relational component, for the notion of equality not to be emptied of meaning, it is necessary that one specifies ‘on what’ and ‘between whom’ it is established. Despite their complexities, both liberty/freedom and equality are crucial anchor points in the US identity construction. First, they are pivotal constitutive elements of the liberal tradition, and hence fundamental values within the idea of democracy in Western countries. In the US is no different especially if one identifies it as the leader of Western civilization. Second, on the perspective of experience, this leads to the question of how, regardless of its correlation with the ‘reality’ of historical facts, has the centrality of equality been conceived and expressed throughout the history of the United States.

²⁶ Regarding the adjectives of liberty as an illustration of the social reality, some remarks are in order. It presents only the perspective of the foreign white settler about the nation construction, since the slaves did not have the same social treatment. On this point, the excerpt by Caldeira (2011), although extensive in length, could not be more precise about the reality of the slave: “the idea of the natural right to freedom coexisted with slave institution in the United States because no American slave owner confused the ‘inalienable right to freedom’ with the need to end slavery immediately, for the simple reason that none of them (...) imagined that freedom and slavery were realities coming from the same source of power and, therefore, deserving the same political treatment. Freedom came from reason; the slavery, from force. The former was a source of moral power; the latter, immoral power. Because they come from different sources, there would be a complete mismatch between slavery and rights”. Still regarding this subject, we will later see that the perception of a racial hierarchy is important not only to understand the internal context of the United States, but also to evaluate their foreign policy decisions, since the same logic was often extrapolated to the international context. In the same way as the US used the justification of ‘tutelage’ to comport the slave institution within a State oriented by Liberal thoughts, one can expand this logic to the US perception of international system and its relations with other States. If in the domestic environment slavery was justified by paternalist narratives that presented the slave as a child and, hence, always in need to be ‘controlled’ by other individuals with force and knowledge, in the hierarchical international environment proposed by the US through its hegemony, all other States, in a greater or lesser extent, need to be guided.

As narratives of US history present the anchor point of equality, it emerged with the revolutionary process towards US independence. The famous passage from the American Declaration of Independence, “(...) all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness (...)”, put the principle of equality - along with that of liberty, and with the religious perspective - as one central component for the national field about its origin and its meaning in the US.

In the perspective of narratives of experience, the existence of an abundance of lands that go beyond the original Thirteen Colonies has allowed the colonist to live, in a daily basis, an atmosphere of equality of opportunities and conditions²⁷. Therefore, the march to the West was responsible for conforming a national mentality about the understanding of equality in two aspects. First, in the formation of small communities in the countryside where the inexistence of class differentiation, and the availability of lands, promoted an initial sense of equality among all individuals. Second, as settlers had the opportunity to dislocate geographically towards new places, either escaping from the exhaustion of previously occupied lands or from the expansion of the industrial capitalism that produced inequalities, they could have a fresh start in an environment that, supposedly, provided them an equality of conditions (TURNER, 2008). According to Turner (2008), it is an error to understand the march to the West as a mere materialistic experience. More than that, the author states, it was a historical event that defined either correct or wrong ideas about equality, praising of the common man, and national expansion²⁸. Above specific religious definitions, and despite the existence of different religious branches, such as Catholicism²⁹,

²⁷ For Locke (2005), the pre-politic state (state of nature) experienced by individuals was the perfect situation to promote liberty/freedom and equality among them. The right of ownership, understood by Locke as one's right towards oneself, its work, and the goods produced/acquired, was anterior to the establishment of a civil society and, therefore, not subjected to violations by the State. The US historical formation, either romanticized or not by its historiography, is usually narrated as the empirical concretization of this passage from the state of nature to a political society based on the preservation of liberty/freedom and equality.

²⁸ As we will better discuss in the next section, although the march to the West was an important factor for the definition and construction of some ideas in the American imaginary, Turner's proposal when highlighting only the positive aspects of this geographic movement, forgetting to problematize the question of the extermination of the native people, for example, includes this narrative as part of the American historiographic body that was erected in speeches that contributed to reaffirm the existence of some originality and superiority in US past, a basic notion for the idea of exceptionalism as we perceive it today.

²⁹ According to Weber (1999), the differences in the comprehension of the relation between society and religion for Catholicism and Protestantism are essential for us to understand how and why the American society gained specific contours, mainly when compared to the other colonial experiences in the Americas. For Catholicism, the relation with work and the economic resources is established by means of a *contemplative life*, that is, of a greater indifference regarding the wealth of the material world, condemning, for this reason, the protestant secularization as excessively materialistic. On the other hand, the relation with the economic life in Protestantism is defined through the perspective

Baptism, Methodism, among others, the morality installed in the US by the development of a Protestant ethic not only influenced all sectors of society but also the shared understandings on the anchor points of liberty/freedom, the role of the individual and of equality. According to Denis W. Brogan,

“Religion became substance of behavior, good actions, of work, with only a slight notion of faith. It became highly functional, highly pragmatic; it became a guarantee of moral and material success (...) The theological schools replaced Theology with a form of Anthropology - a moralist and optimistical form, but Anthropology, anyway. That ‘the adequate study of humanity is the man’ was the evasion through which many shepherds avoided the need to think about God” (apud LIPSET, 1966, p. 177)

In terms of the anchor point of equality, it does not matter whether this experience of moral and material success was real, or whether it was only a matter of material experience and not a moral one. What matters is the narrative constructions around this anchor point and how understandings of it were (and are) sedimented in individual habitus within the national field.

Some authors state that the moral and emotional enthusiasm generated by the principle of equality in the American society is sometimes faced as a characteristic that distinguishes the United States from the other countries. For Gordon Wood (1993), the American Revolution³⁰ was crucial to ensure the emergence of the idea of equality in the daily imaginary (or using Bourdieu’s concept, habitus) of the American citizen, and hence to guarantee its subsequent spreading and development within the American society. Likewise, J. R. Pole (1978) highlights that, when compared to other contemporary societies, equality reached a higher vitality in the United States to the extent in which it was connected with the public and explicit discourse of justice. In both Wood and Pole affirmations, the anchor point of equality is presented as a unique trace in the US formation. While other countries might be attentive to or built around the notion of equality, the US experience in the development of equality is totally extraordinary³¹. This perspective places the US on a different

that the search for the individual state of grace lies on strenuous work, under the rationale that “if you see a man that is diligent in his business, he shall stand before Kings” (WEBER, 1999, p.33).

³⁰ Some authors, such as Seymour Martin Lipset, support the thesis that the American Revolution was the greatest event in American history, because it was through this movement that the United States was able to be established as a nation among the others. The question of equality, for example, is only one of the multiple questions brought to support the thesis of the United States as an exceptional nation.

³¹ It is interesting to observe that in this exceptionalist discourse, the inequalities of gender, and mainly of ethnicity, are disregarded. Although republicanism recommends the valorization of human rights and equality, slavery did not enter into this rhetorical account, since it was seen not only as an economic necessity but also as a social tradition. In addition, due to their racial inferiority, slaves were not identified as worthy of an egalitarian treatment from the colonists.

level compared to other States. Since the American formation provided the experience of equality in its fullest, as the narrative goes, the US has a hierarchically higher historical development and a greater social conformation.

In historical terms, as the land supply in the west ended and with the advance of corporate industrial capitalism, the nation had to rethink the means of expressing its foundational sense of equality. The equality of conditions previously (re)worked through experience, was then translated into a pre-given, implicit notion within the doxic experience in the national field. Besides, as the possibility of equating an equality of opportunities with an equality of results became increasingly more distant from the nineteenth century onwards (LIPSET; MARKS, 2000), the individualistic notion of meritocracy and the self-made man were emphasized - that is, despite the adverse conditions, one managed to achieve an outcome. Although it is not contradictory to imagine a society of free and equal people, in practice it is impossible to have a society where everyone is equally free and freely equal (BOBBIO, 1996). Apart from the question of the advance of capitalism and the consequent increase of inequalities, in the US the scale between equality and freedom usually had a tendency to privilege the latter. The efforts of the Founding Fathers to create a political organization in which the direct popular participation was filtered through a system of indirect representation in order to calm what they understood to be the vices of a classic democracy, originated from an elitist evaluation of the society that assumed a perception that “the social order should respect rather than abolish inequalities among men or, at least, those inequalities that are considered socially and politically useful to social progress” (BOBBIO, 1996, p.41).

The common non-negotiable understanding of equality follows the one on liberty/freedom. In the same way, as the latter has its inner center located on an individualist, rather than community-based, notion of liberty/freedom, so it happens with the anchor point of equality. In general terms, equality can be understood following the characteristics of distribution and in the distribution itself. On the margins of equality meanings, one can think of a proportional equality, i.e an equality that proposes ‘to each according to one’s needs’, instead of an equality that is based on ‘to each according to its work’, and of the divergent propositions of equality of results *versus* an equality of opportunities. Besides, regarding the distribution itself, there is also the sense of a processual

equality, one that presents all individuals as equals towards the law³². (BOBBIO, 1998). In the US, although the anchor point of equality can assume meanings that propose levelling and proportionality among individuals towards lesser social inequalities, the non-negotiable understanding of this anchor point is situated in the individual - all individuals are *par excellence* capable of achieving the same outcomes, and if opportunities are given and available to everyone, the individual voluntarism, through hard work, can turn them into satisfactory rates of economic and social development. Plus, still focused on the individualist sense of this anchor point, the non-negotiable common meaning of equality is also presented as equal status of all individuals before the law. This shared understanding in the national field will influence the US perceptions of the international environment. All states were equally capable of developing those ideas, but the US had an exceptional experience as the country that worked harder to keep its freedoms and equality, and all countries are equally represented by the international law³³.

2.2.3 Individualism

Tocqueville was the first who observed the United States to bring the notion of individualism to describe the American experience. According to him, individualism was a milder form of egoism or, in his own words, “a calm and considered feeling which disposes each citizen to isolate himself from the mass of his fellows and withdraw into the circle of family and friends” so that “after having formed a little society for his taste and coexistence, one gladly leaves the greater society to look after itself”³⁴ (TOCQUEVILLE, 2005b, p.119).

Individualism also derived from the influence of liberalism in American political and social life, especially through the impact of Locke’s work, as in the Lockean version of liberalism the philosopher adopted the individual, rather than the State, as a starting point for his theory. The US

³² The debate between theories on equality and liberal theory in political science is very vast. Briefly, the former ones have the construction of a harmonic society to the detriment of larger individual freedoms as their purpose, whereas the latter privileges the freedoms and the individual plurality to the detriment of a totalizing society (BOBBIO, 1996).

³³ As we shall see in the empirical cases, when the sense of ‘equality before the law’ is disadvantageous to the US, it does not appear in the minimal spanning set of the winning narrative that legitimates an intervention. The balance usually tilts to the anchor point of liberty/freedom in its individualistic sense.

³⁴ For Tocqueville the idea of individualism was politically interesting, but with some reticence. His fear was that from the perspective of individual freedoms new forms of despotism could emerge. In the case of the United States, the author perceived the idea of a community responsibility as a scale, maybe fragile, between the individual and the community, which was capable to moderate individualism (TOCQUEVILLE, 2004b, P. 418)

Declaration of Independence, of 1776, is illustrative of this influence of Locke's thought on the type of power relations established between the individual and the State, since the bottom-up power relations, that is, from the individual agents towards the State, were privileged in relation to a more centralized top-down form of relationship.

(...) Governments are instituted among men, with their just powers deriving from the consent of the governed; which, whenever any form of government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the right of the people to alter or to abolish it, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their safety and happiness (DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, 1776).

The emphasis on the natural rights of the individual that converged to the elaboration of the idea of individualism in the US can also be identified in foundational documents, such as the preamble of the Constitution and in the Bill of Rights. Regarding the latter, for instance, this presence is more evident when related to the notion of negative freedom³⁵, where the performance of the State would have to be restricted to preserve citizens' individual rights, and to guarantee enough autonomy for the individuals to decide and to be responsible for their actions (WALLS, 2015; BOBBIO, 1996). Besides, the emphasis on the individual also came from the notion of equality presented in Protestantism which, in its turn, contributed for delimiting the idea of individualism and this, consequently, provided for the rise of the capitalist rationale. The emphasis on the personal accomplishment through arduous work, and the rejection of hereditary values placed the individual as the only person capable of defining his/her salvation or ruin, of being individually responsible for the collective maintenance of the moral values in society, and to be his/her own discipline agent for the welfare of the community. All these factors strengthen the idea of the self-made man that exists on the basis of individualism and capitalism in the United States. In this regard, the denomination of the United States as a nation that has a civic religion follows as a support of this interrelation between religious morality and other identity traits, which promotes some kind of catechization of the society by the creation, adaptation and diffusion of public beliefs

³⁵ Benjamin Constant (1985) signals for this debate in his speech "The liberty of ancients compared with that of moderns". For him, this modern conception of liberty, based on a negative liberty, is different from the liberty of ancients exactly because of its legal and individual character; on the other hand, the liberty of the ancients emphasized collective aspects, promoting "the complete submission of the individual to the authority of the whole". This way, negative liberty is based on an individualistic conception of society, and aims to ensure the guarantee and security to individuals in the benefit of their private liberties. Although not considering one form of liberty as better than another, Constant points that, as each one fits into a specific historical context, the application of a liberty *à la* liberty of the ancients is extremely complex at the historical moment of the nineteenth century.

(WEBER, 1999; TOCQUEVILLE, 2005). About this close relation between religion and politics in the United States, in the form of a civic religion before the nation, Tocqueville (2005a, p.59) points that Puritanism was “almost as much a political theory as a religious doctrine”, and that immediately after immigrants arrived at the colony “their first care is, just because of this, to get organized into a society. [And] they immediately subscribed an Act that says:

(...) do by these presents solemnly and mutually, in the presence of God and one another, covenant and combine ourselves together into a civil body politic, for our better ordering and preservation, and furtherance of the ends aforesaid: and by virtue hereof do enact, constitute, and frame, such just and equal laws, ordinances, acts, constitutions, and officers, from time to time, as shall be thought most meet and convenient for the general good of the colony: unto which we promise all due submission and obedience (...) (TOCQUEVILLE, 2005a, p.59)

In all Western political systems of liberal orientation, liberty/freedom and individualism develop a process of shifting balances and a relationship of mutually co-dependency, especially when liberty/freedom is identified as an essential individual component. In the US formation, the presence of an organic balance between these two anchor points is pivotal to the construction of a unique American narrative. While for the national imaginary the question of liberty/freedom can only be achieved if guided by actions and thoughts of independent individuals, the individualism can only be understood when there is space for the individual liberties to act preserving and stimulating the potentialities of each individual. The origin of the correlation between these two identity anchor points can be assigned, in the historical narratives constructed around the US inception, to: (i) the autonomous and voluntarist impulse that emerged from a culture consisting of immigrants; (ii) the perception of the importance of the individual in the Protestant tradition; (iii) the geographic dispersion that made the individual the only one with the capacity and freedom to act in his/her own interest; (iv) and even to the decentralization generated by the great distances between the center of the American colony and the European imperial hierarchies.

As this individualism was ingrained in the doxic dispositions among individual's habitus and the national field, its range in meaning assumes two possible 'extreme' (using the sense of what lies in the margins) connotations: either as a pragmatic and functional value that aims at specific objectives, or as an emancipatory value that aims at justifying the need for personal experience and self-realization (FOLEY, 2007). According to Edward Grabb, Douglas Baer, and James Curtis (1999), recent historiographic studies on the formation of the United States point that

the interpretation of the US anchor point of individualism used by Lipset (1996; 1966) to base his theses of the “American creed” and the “exceptional nation”, are in fact fruit of a mistaken interpretation of ‘individualism’ when dislocated from its historical context. In addition, according to the authors, one of Lipset’s sociological failures (1996; 1966) in his interpretation of individualism is his incapacity to distinguish the multiple forms of individualism extant within the American identity.

This way, Walls (2015) suggests the existence of three forms of individualism: as a form of political ideal, social ideal, and economic ideal, each one, respectively, being representative of a historical moment of the United States. Each individualism, according to the author, was transformed and substituted by the subsequent one, with individualism as a political ideal being the most foundational meaning of this identity anchor point. Even though agreeing with the multiplicity in meaning of individualism, I propose an overlapping approach rather than the substitutive proposal developed by the author. In terms of a cultural and sociological point of view, the sedimentation of these layers of different and complementary meanings is the very process that contributed (and still contributes) to ingrain this anchor point in the national habitus-field relations. According to Walls (2015), from the point of view of the political ideal, individualism lag behind the construction of a liberal society, as I already pointed out. Regarding the economic and social ideals, the association of a protestant ethics focused on elevating the individual through work with a context, at that time, of the emergence of the bases of capitalism due to the advent of the Industrial Revolution, contributed to insert on the anchor point of individualism a valorization of an individualistic, self-made man, behavior in the US formation.

Thus, the thesis of substitution offers us a fragmented perspective on the development of individualism in the national habitus-field interrelation. For a holistic understanding of this identity anchor point in the US identity, it is necessary to consider that each dimension of this individualism is important in the construction of the nation. Only when viewed together can we analyze how and to what extent individualism was worked and adapted in the national field and, therefore, specify this general spectrum of meaning to the (re)constructions of individualism in the foreign policy subfield. Despite the different interpretations and debates about individualism, what is important to evaluate is its capacity to be deployed, still today, as a driving force in the American imaginary and as a recurrent anchor point in discursive practices.

2.2.4 Democracy

Similar to other US identity anchor points, the idea of democracy has also latitude to assume different interpretations. In general terms, democracy is a system of government that through its democratic institutions, in the balance between individual freedoms and equality, aims at guaranteeing conditions to its citizens to be as free and as equal as possible. Compared to other forms of political and bureaucratic arrangements, democracy might be understood as the system that most preserves individual liberty/freedoms and equality, although either in democratic regimes or not, the conquest of total liberty and total equality is a utopic and unattainable ideal (BOBBIO, 1996).

In the US formation, the perception of the idea of democracy was narrated as the product of the interaction between a force that came from the westward expansion, based on the constant contact with the primitive conditions and with the notion of spatial magnitude, and a force that came from the institutions on the eastern coast, based on a highly complex and specialized industrial society (TURNER, 2008). Moreover, as the narrative goes, the very evolution of the right to vote in the United States is an example of the construction of this democratic atmosphere. Although the political franchise was defined by the evidence of property ownership, the great availability of public lands for the settlement of colonists made the census suffrage redundant in some locations. By the 1830's almost all white men had access to vote for local, state and national elections, a fact that is presented as an example of the existence of a sense of equality among the active members of the nation's political life, hence generating the perception of a democratic environment within this sector of US society (TURNER, 2008).

Regarding the construction of a democratic system of government, the moral platform constructed from a Protestant ethic contributed to the separation between the State and the Church in the US in the beginning of the 19th century. The dispute between conservatives and Democrats, personified, in the early years of the republic, in Hamilton and Jefferson, respectively, on the role of religion, and the state's performance in this matter was important to structure a bipartisan system and, consequently, for strengthening the democratic process in the United States. In addition, with the separation of Church and State, the reduction of the support of the latter on religious institutions led to a *suis generis* transformation: the United States was the first country where the Churches

started being treated as mere voluntary associations, a fact that, on the other hand, guaranteed high political relevance to them as they needed to fight for support to get new members (LIPSET, 1966).

Another connection between the Puritan approach and its effects on the construction of the idea of democracy was in the overflow of the religious perception of hierarchy to the political sphere - the same way that puritans tried to extinguish what they understood as an extreme structure of intermediations between God and man, they also faced certain hierarchies and conventions with distrust. According to Lipset (1966), the exceptional character of the performance of religion in the United States is due to three factors: first, the fact that puritanism has certain ascetic values embedded in Protestantism, standardizing the Protestant ethics in the United States as a notion above doctrinal differences; secondly, institutional reforms from the American Revolution enabled the construction of ecclesiastical organizations as institutions that had popular support; and third, the existence of an ever unstable territory border led to a lack of control and support from the central government to religious institutions, so that they were always reflecting local needs in search for popular adherence.

The strength of Puritan fear of hierarchy resulted in other developments in the construction of the American society. Tocqueville identified that only an egalitarian democracy could stop despotism of the majority - while in Europe this despotism was avoided through the work of an aristocratic elite, in the United States this action was unfolded by means of a common system of beliefs from a puritan morality. The type of representative democracy developed in the US, one might consider, was only possible due to the Founding Fathers distrust of models of pure democracy. This reticence, present in several passages of the Federalist Papers, was justified either in the lack of guarantee that the existence of a public liberty/freedom could be translated into a private one, and in the suspicion that the government could not count on the presence of a civic virtue³⁶ (FOLEY, 2007; SAVELLE, 1948; WOOD, 1969). According to Madison:

(...) it is that such democracies have ever been spectacles of turbulence and contention; have ever been found incompatible with personal security or the rights of property; and have in general been as short in their lives as they have been violent in their deaths. Theoretic politicians, who have patronized this species of government, have erroneously supposed that by reducing mankind to a perfect equality in to their political rights, they would, at the same time, be perfectly equalized and assimilated in their possessions, their opinions, and their passions (MADISON, 1787a)

³⁶ As indicated in a previous note, the questioning by Madison concerning the human behavior and its consequent incredulity on the possibility of a certain civic virtue to arise in common men lies on his Calvinist perception of the world, which saw the individual as necessarily inclined to a bad nature (SHELDON, 2001)

In this regard, the Founding Fathers established a very clear difference between what they understood for pure democracy and republicanism. As for the former, the Founding Fathers related it to the classic sense of the concept of democracy, that is, to the understanding of classical antiquity where the citizens decided personally about policies of interest to the society through public meetings, with no need of representatives. Republicanism, on the other hand, was perceived as an emanated construction of the people that allowed the creation of a constitutional framework with central powers, disaggregated institutions, and a system of checks and balances, but overall a system that kept an illustrated minority elite as representative of the majority.

The error which limits republican government to a narrow district has been unfolded and refuted in preceding papers. I remark here only that it seems to owe its rise and prevalence chiefly to the confounding of republic with a democracy, applying to former reasonings drawn from the nature of the latter. The true distinction between these forms was also adverted to on a former occasion. It is, that in a democracy, the people meet and exercise the government in person; in a republic, they assemble and administer it by their representatives and agents. A democracy, consequently, will be confined to a small spot. A republic may be extended over a large region (MADISON, 1787b).

The countenance of the government may become more democratic, but the soul that animates it will be more oligarchic. The machine will be enlarged, but the fewer, and often the more secret, will be the springs by which its motions are directed (MADISON, s/d).

The inspiration for republicanism with a system of indirect democracy appeared, among other reasons, from the fear that direct democracy could favor popular passions in detriment of reason and civic virtue, promoting a kind of social anarchy and political chaos. The establishment of controls over what was understood as the vices of pure democracy would also enable minorities' rights³⁷ and would avoid that mutual oppression among individuals hindered the search for a common welfare since the differences of interests would be mediated.

These questions regarding the American democracy elicit an intense historical debate on whether the birth of the republic can be considered a rupture of preexisting republican traditions, or if it is simply a continuation of these traditions adapted to the context of the United States³⁸.

³⁷ It is important to remember that these minorities did not refer to the minorities of indigenous peoples, slaves and women in the American society at all. Also, the very sense behind the construction of an indirect democracy was also guided by the exclusion of these groups that, for being seen as a mass that does not have rights and duties, threatened the State and its set of legitimate political beings.

³⁸ Regarding the pioneerism of the federalist configuration of the republic, this conformation at first seems to be more a consequence of contingent issues than of a consensus between the Founding Parents, as Madison himself defended the construction of a central and powerful national government. Thus, the federalism in the United States was not a courageous and unusual decision for the autonomy of the States, but a conservative proposal - to keep the political-

Despite the relevance of this debate, what interests this research is the developments to the national field and foreign policy subfield of US claims as the nation with the most exceptional experience on democracy and the one that is authentically dedicated to democratic principles and practices. Moments as the American Civil War are usually narrated as an example of an extraordinary event of consolidation of democracy in the US. As stated in the Gettysburg Address pronounced by Lincoln (1863), “(...) this nation, under God, shall have a new birth of freedom — and that government of the people, by the people, for the people, shall not perish from the earth”. From the idea that the end of the war allowed the victory of the popular sovereignty³⁹, Lincoln could forge a speech that contributed to unfold a historical process that allowed the establishment of democracy as a motivational force and central objective in the United States (FOLEY, 2007), to the point of the nation taking it as a motto, and identifying itself as exceptional. The American anchor point of democracy is rooted in an exceptional evaluation precisely because of the perception that the United States was able to create an original and genuinely American political thought, with this democratic experience thus being unique and special. Robert Dahl summarizes this relation between democracy, Americanism, and exceptionalism well; in his words:

Most citizens assume that the American political system is consistent with the democratic creed. Indeed, the common view seems to be that our system is not only democratic but perhaps the most perfect expression of democracy that exists anywhere. (...) To reject the creed is to reject one's society and one's chances of full acceptance in it—in short, to be an outcast. (...) To reject the democratic creed is in effect to refuse to be an American (1961, p. 316-17)

As presented above, the anchor point of democracy can encompass the meanings of a system of government and of a form of liberal ideology that, besides the form of government, advocates for understandings of liberty/freedom, equality, and justice. The minimum non-negotiable meaning of this anchor point in US identity is related to a form of national political and juridical organization that establishes a set of rules for the constitution of a government. As we shall see in empirical cases, the anchor point of democracy might assume these meanings but the minimum common meaning, when it comes to the foreign policy subfield and the US actions on the international environment, is especially identifiable when the US has tolerance with

institutional apparatus already established - so that, by modifying to the minimum the condition of autonomy of the states it was possible to keep the national cohesion.

³⁹ To take a historical perspective and not to present the argument of popular sovereignty in a decontextualized way, such sovereignty still excluded women from its characterization, because female suffrage would only be achieved in 1920 by the 19th Constitutional Amendment.

governments that might not advance the whole idea behind democracy (understandings of individual freedoms, equality and etc) but have a democratic organization of government. The general idea is that once democratic institutions are in place, other liberal ideas will follow.

2.3 The American exceptionalism

The origin of the term exceptionalism to portray the United States' perception of itself and the relationship it establishes with the world can be traced back to Tocqueville's work, *Democracy in America*, although the author himself does not use this expression *ipsis litteris*. Throughout the text, Tocqueville only uses the word "exceptional" to qualify the American experience, but we cannot necessarily identify the hierarchical connotation that exceptionalism assumes in contemporaneity. Thus, national narratives, together with an Americanist bibliography that later interprets Tocqueville's texts for the American experience, transformed the expression "exceptional" into an evaluative category of the of the US experience. As historian Dorothy Ross (1991, 1995) points out, the "exceptional" in *Democracy in America* was intended to describe the US position as the fruit of a series of historical-geographical conditions and contexts contingent to the times, without endowing it with ideological qualifications about democracy as a unique and essentially American value, since Tocqueville was unable, in his analysis, to completely separate the American from the European experience. Regarding Tocqueville's report, what we can say, however, is that the author sometimes adopts an overly enthusiastic tone about the US foundational experience, as in the following excerpt, and this may have contributed to the exceptionalist readings of his work. In Tocqueville's words:

The other colonies had been founded by adventurers without a family; the New England's emigrants brought admirable elements of order and morality with them; they went into the desert with their wife and children. But what distinguished them from the others was mainly their business' goal. It was not need that forced them to leave their country, where they left a beloved social position and guaranteed means of subsistence; also, they did not move to the new world in order to improve their situation or increase their wealth. They tore themselves from the sweetness of the fatherland to obey a purely intellectual need; by exposing themselves to the inevitable miseries of exile, they wanted to make triumph **an idea** (2005a, p. 40, emphasis added).

If Tocqueville researched and experienced the American reality at the time in depth, maybe it is precisely for this reason he presented the other American colonialist experiences with such a degree of underestimation (and those from the United States in relative overestimation), as he

lacked the same experience and observation of other cases rather than the American one. Adventurers, emigrants with families in search of new lands to start over, and representatives of the colonial industry of agrarian exploitation were present both in the north and south of America continent, and it is, therefore, idyllic to state that, unlike the other settlements, New England emigrants “tore themselves from the sweetness of the fatherland to obey a purely intellectual need,” as the author does. Explanations based on the differentiation between settlement colonies *versus* exploitation colonies, as Tocqueville’s narrative points out are, in this sense, simplistic and generalizing, since they present both experiences as dichotomic and exclusive, each one, of geographical locations. Yet, although Tocqueville does not clarify what was this idea that emigrants wanted to triumph, one can stress, *a posteriori*, that puritanism may be understood as a possible competing belief for the category of great catechizing idea that was able to establish a common morality and an exceptionalizing American perception of its experience. Based on the expression used by Weber (1999), English puritanism became a type of American Hebraism in the United States.

Plus, the Messianic understanding of Protestants as a chosen people, in conjunction with the achievement of an economic system of world proportions, favored the inclusion of notions of uniqueness and superiority in American nationalism. The capitalist development, in its turn, when determining “the extension of the relations of production and exchange, as well as of all aspects of social life that are directly or indirectly connected with these relations, until the formation of a market and a society of national dimensions” (BOBBIO, 1998, P. 801), favored the construction, in the United States, of an identity trace that put the American experience in a hierarchical order. Because the United States is perhaps the country that most advanced the production and reproduction of a capitalist political, social and economic model, its identity, at the very beginning of the nation’s inception, has been able to incorporate capitalism in the construction of an imaginary and of notions of belonging. In the same way, as capitalism also contributed to advance nationally and internationally a sense of US nationalism based on a Protestant ethic and morality.

The development of comparative history in the United States (in themes such as the history of labor and women’s rights), the question of socialism in the United States, and even the configuration of the US foreign policy (LIPSET, 2000; 1996; 1966, KENNEDY, 1987; SHAFER, 1991) favored the advancement of the logic of exceptionalism by establishing differences between the American society and the rest of the world, especially of the European world. Although

sometimes not literally using the expression “exceptionalism”, part of the American historiography puts US’ singularities, compared to other societies, in such evidence, highlighting its values, ideas and experiences as uniquely American, that it indirectly reaffirms the existence of this exceptionalism. Thus, this historiography indicates the US development as a special case, out of the standards and normal laws of history, as it was the only one, for example, to avoid class conflicts, authoritarian governments, and to guarantee an orderly process of revolution for independence, presenting a model of freedom to be emulated to the world (TYRELL, 1991).

From Tocqueville to modern times, the notion of exceptionalism changed. Like the proposed anchor points, exceptionalism cannot be regarded as a monolithic and invariable idea. In this sense, exceptionalism is the focal point where all anchor points converge. In other words, it is the main vector that brings them together and gives organicity to this ideational whole. Regardless if democracy is emphasized only as a form of government or as a liberal ‘ideology’, if equality meanings pend to a community or an individual perspective, and if liberty is understood as a social form of liberty or one assented on individualist connotations, they all are informed by exceptionalist perspectives of US formation and, hence, US identity. Despite their presence in other Western countries, when those anchor points are put together in the light of American exceptionalism they assume a specificity that one recognizes as characteristic of US identity. Perhaps, it is possible to consider that American exceptionalism is the very idea that defines the anchor point’s latitude in meaning. Exceptionalism has, then, the ability to organize distinct, even contradictory, perceptions encompassed in US identity’s anchor points and present them, domestically and externally, in the form of a cohesive whole. In addition, it allows the US to present itself as the most successful experience, able to solve peacefully world paradigms and problems, thus being unique and an example to be followed.

After the effort to individually unveil the ideational layers of US anchor points, it is necessary to correlate to what extent each of these ideas is submitted to the logic of exceptionalism. The binomial equality and liberty, as foundational ideas to the national field, is usually presented based on the American democratic experience. By being identified as the only nation genuinely dedicated to democratic principles and practices, the United States sees itself, by extension, as the country that values and offers individuals the conditions to live in liberty and equality. However, in the concrete experience of the American democracy, individual liberties were privileged in detriment of community liberties, under the Founding Fathers’ justification of promoting a

governmental framework that is based on reason and civic virtue, thus preventing popular passions from installing chaos and anarchy. That way, the idea of liberty is usually exceptionalized when the US does not defend 'a' form of liberty/freedom, but 'the' liberty/freedom, as if, in the light of its development, other understandings of liberty had no value. That is, the public belief that there are no restrictions to freedom in the United States is established from the understanding that all forms of freedom that matter are nationally guaranteed, and should, therefore, be expanded beyond the national territory. Based on this, other possible dimensions in the notion of liberty are seen as secondary, or even irrelevant. The connection between exceptionalism and the idea of liberty/freedom resides precisely on the affirmation that a political-economic system that prefers a model of liberty, that of individual liberties, is better than others.

Regarding equality, a certain nationally shared moral and emotional enthusiasm identifies the presence of an egalitarian system in the United States as a distinguishing characteristic from other countries. Just as with the anchor of liberty, the American narrative regarding equality attributes a specific meaning to it - the sense of Protestant individualism that values equality of opportunities. Thus, since opportunities are available to everyone, the existence of deep socioeconomic inequalities in the United States would not be the result of a capitalist system that survives from the production of national and international inequalities, but from the degree of individual voluntarism for hard work. Based on this understanding, exceptionalism and equality are present in the American shared understanding that the expansion of free market is necessarily beneficial to other nations, because the deepening and widening of capitalism elsewhere allow the increase of opportunities and social growth in other countries. American exceptionalism based on the idea of equality is, therefore, located at the intersection between the spread of an economic understanding, *via* capitalism, and a political understanding, through the dissemination of democracy.

Due to the organicity of these anchor points, the US' democratic superiority embedded in the logic of exceptionalism is often used as a justification for exceptional measures aimed at guaranteeing other peoples' conditions of liberty and equal opportunities for political and economic development. The circularity of this discourse lies on the possibility of opting for any idea, be it democracy, liberty or equality, to legitimize actions aimed at transplanting the other two remaining ideas to other localities, with the idea of democracy usually being the most invoked discursive practice mechanism.

As previously indicated, the idea of religion in the United States is one of the identity ideas that helped in giving specific overtones to the anchor points of liberty/freedom, equality, individualism, and democracy. The consolidation of a Protestant morality in all segments of national life allowed politics and religion to assume an intertwined relationship in the United States, to the point that both acted in a mutually reinforcing connection. The roots of American exceptionalism can be traced to the core of Protestantism, as Puritans and their followers, since the colonial times, have seen each other as a unique social and religious experiment (WEBER, 1999). The feeling of superiority contained in the interrelation between exceptionalism and Protestantism is the result not only of the identification of material capacities but mainly of the perspective that God has a special plan (and treatment) for “America.” In addition, the correlation between exceptionalism and religion is also found in the meanings of American foreign policy, because both perceptions of the United States, either as a messianic nation that has the obligation to take higher moral values to other countries, or as a reference to be admired and copied, are based on a Puritan ethic. The contemporary context of the emergence of terrorist groups with religious bases, especially Islamic ones, takes the participation of religion in the American political scene and its verbalization in national narratives to new levels - it begins to translate even more hierarchical contours into exceptionalism, and to delimitate who the other to whom the use of exceptionality is directed is.

Regarding the idea of individualism, its connection with exceptionalism is mainly present in the participation that this anchor has in the issue of liberty, equality, democracy, and religion. The American individual experience, highlighted as singular, also helps to push forward the exceptionalist notion that the United States has all the capacities (in terms of values and materials) to lead and, precisely because it leads, it should be free from constraints from other countries, and/or from the international system, even because, at the extreme of the exceptionalist perception, to be constrained means to prevent the diffusion of democratic values and the construction of a more egalitarian and peaceful international order.

The notion of national greatness developed with the help of the diffusion of Protestantism both allowed nationalism to be seen as a kind of civic religion, and religion to become part of the expression of this same nationalism. Because the consolidation and reassertion of American nationalism have always taken place through expansionist movements - both territorially and ideologically - the relationship between it and exceptionalism lies on the overvaluation of the

national experience as the foundation of a foreign policy that not only aims to transform other world societies into the image of the United States but also believes that this initiative is for the common good. More contemporary perspectives on the formation of the United States indicate that, although it was born against the English empire, the country already in its birth assumes imperial policies⁴⁰ (territorial expansion, oppression of the indigenous populations, and violent expropriation), so that the construction of American nationalism can be presented as a fundamental link for the correlation between exceptionalism and the structuring of an imperial identity. Once this identity is consolidated, exceptionalism and the anchor points synthesized in it are reworked as a discursive apparatus that legitimizes imperial policies. The ontological need of a constant enemy is part of the impetus of the empire to stimulate fears and anxieties internally and externally, and become indispensable, thus assuming an exceptional position of international police. “In other words, the Empire presents its order as something permanent, eternal and necessary” (HARDT, NEGRI, 2002, p. 29) and, in this exceptionalist syndrome, it acts at the limit of exceptionality when it defines for itself, if not the absence of rules, the existence of different rules.

Thus, because exceptionalism is the organizing idea that synthesizes and groups the other ideational anchor points of American identity, our objective when considering the empirical cases⁴¹ of this thesis is to use it as an analytical category to evaluate, based on the ideas discursively invoked to justify the external military actions, to what extent such exceptionalism is, on a case-by-case basis, worked and adjectivized.

⁴⁰ Part of the literature on the American formation considers that the country, up to the end of the 19th century, has a largely isolationist foreign policy, and therefore clear indications of a policy of imperial dimensions could not be identified in this period. Restad (2015) points out that this historical perspective, currently questioned, derives from understandings and documentation that classify the pre-1898 expansionist acts as acts of domestic policy and not as foreign policy incursions.

⁴¹ The evaluation of the empirical cases of this thesis (Gulf War in 1991, intervention in Kosovo in 1998, invasions of Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003, and the intervention in Libya in 2011) will be carried out both through consideration of the specialized bibliography, and mainly through the analysis of US foreign policy documents and interviews in the United States.

3 THE US INTERVENTION IN KOSOVO: KEEPING THE INTERNATIONAL ORDER

The magic of America is that we're a free and open society with a mixed population. Part of our security is our freedom.
(Madeleine Albright).

3.1 Brief history of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia

It is not possible to talk about the U.S./NATO intervention in Kosovo without first understanding the historical context that created the conditions for the ethnic disputes in the former Yugoslavia. The Serb-Kosovar conflict is dated well before the Balkanic disagreements that initiated the I World War. During the communist regime, this internal dispute - at that time within the Yugoslavia umbrella - was dealt cautiously by Tito so neither side would feel alienated. Under Tito's leadership, the status of Kosovo kept being adapted according to conjunctural political necessities (BRUNE, 2000, p. 26). When Yugoslavia was constructed, for example, the state was designed as a federation of six republics with the status of Kosovo, Vojvodina, and other similar regions not totally defined, albeit Tito's in 1944 affirmed they would gain more autonomy, "and the question of which federal unit they are joined will depend on the people themselves, through their representatives, when the issue is decided by a definitive ruling after the war" (SALIU apud MALCOM, 1998, p. 315).

Almost one year after that arrangement, the Autonomous Region of Kosovo-Metohija was established by a decision of the Presidency of the People's Assembly of Serbia, making the region constituent part of Serbia. Among other technicalities, Kosovo was then able to have its own budget, run its economic and cultural development and defend the rights of its citizens (MALCOM, 1998, p. 316). During the 1950s and 60s, the economic and social conditions of the region were comparatively lower than other parts of Yugoslavia, not only because it had received fewer investments from the Yugoslav government but also due to its economic conformation, highly dependent on capital-intensive but not labor-intensive primary industries. On top of these, in 1963 Kosovo had its autonomy reduced by the new Yugoslav constitution, which removed Kosovo's constitutional status from the federal sphere and subsumed it under the internal juridical arrangement of Serbia (MALCOM, 1998, p. 324).

In 1974 the Albanian interests gained more space within the Yugoslav government, changing again the Kosovo situation. As a new constitution took place, some concessions were made to the Kosovars and the region received a partial political independence with Kosovo and Vojvodina earning the status of political autonomous provinces of the Serb Republic. This meant Kosovo was able to elect its own assembly and be represented in all federal bodies of Yugoslavia as the provinces were accredited equal status to the republics and the Presidency of Yugoslavia would be constituted of two representatives of each republic and one of each province (BRUNE, 2000, p. 26; MALCOM, 1998, p.327). The 1974 constitution and this juridical arrangement remained in force until the break-up of Yugoslavia. The concessions and the repression of dissidents kept the internal disputes in check, though still dormant.

After Tito's death in 1980, the country started to fall apart, even though it is a little simplifying to understand his death as the sole motive responsible for the resurgence of nationalism in Yugoslavia. Either way, it is important to understand the multiple aspects present in the Yugoslav deterioration process, not merely for the sake of demonstrating the complexity of this case, but mainly to grasp the American narrative construction towards the Kosovo intervention. How was the conflict presented to the American public? What were the choices made throughout the image-construction process - what elements were highlighted, what were muted and why? What was the relation between the discursive choices and America's self-image in the international arena? What were the effects on the domestic public towards accepting or not the intervention? Those questions will inevitably appear throughout the analysis of this chapter and, therefore, a historical contextualization is essential.

The end of the East-West balancing removed the most powerful bargaining instrument that Tito and his successors had to develop Yugoslavia's independent socialism. As the Cold War waned, it became each time more difficult for the central government to play the non-aligned card in order to convince the Western countries to finance the national economy's integrity and Yugoslavia's distance from the USSR zone of influence. Plus, when Poland in 1981 defaulted its international debts the Western creditors perceived East European communist governments as potential non-reliable borrowers. Overall, the economic factor was an important igniting component for the Republic's nationalist grievances.

Regarding the domestic changes, the rotation within the party leadership brought to power a younger generation that had a different relationship with the central government. The attachment

to the motto “after Tito, Tito”, demonstrating loyalty not only to the man himself but to the whole idea behind the formation of Yugoslavia, was loosened up as the new generation had their power rooted more in their respective native republics than in the federal sphere. Besides, after his death, Tito’s image in Yugoslavia suffered some attacks. His reputation was placed under scrutiny by Yugoslav academic works that investigated possible negotiations between Tito and Germany in an effort to support the Allies in World War II and by an official investigation on his second wife, Jovanka Broz, charged of illicit enrichment (BENSON, 2001, p. 146). In general, the inability of the subsequent politicians to keep the country together plus the ability of others to capitalize on these disagreements created an ebullient environment that later was *sine qua non* for Milosevic’s quest for power.

Being already a member of the League of Communists during the 80’s, Milosevic’s rise to power was a combination of chance and political appropriation of Serbian dissatisfactions. The turning point of his political career came in 1987 when Ivan Stambolic, his university friend and the new Communist Party leader dispatched him, at that time the Chairman of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the League of Communists, to dialogue with Serbian leaders in Kosovo. As the meeting unfolded, the police began confronting the crowd and beating people with no apparent reason, which caused the crowd to defend itself by throwing rocks back at the police. In an attempt to appease the situation, Milosevic addressed the ones around him by saying, the later well-known and famous phrase, “nobody should dare beat you, no one has the right to beat you” (BENSON, 2001, p.149). Apparently on impulse, the phrase was a catch-on motto that calmed down the situation and ignited the crowd cheering Milosevic with chants of “Slobo, Slobo”. From this moment forward, Milosevic emerged from a work life in obscurity within the Communist League and one year later gained full control over the League of Communists in Serbia, by removing Stambolic and replacing party leaders in Serbia, Vojvodina, and Kosovo with his own supporters.

Disagreements from the past, plus a declining economic situation and an intellectual environment that imprinted some sort of academic authority for the Serbian government were the main driving forces for the crisis between Serbia and Kosovo. Like with many other Serbian nationals, the 1986 memorandum from the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts was one of the documents that inspired the general critiques towards the Serbian position within the Yugoslav configuration. The memorandum was never fully released, but instead, a first and incomplete part was leaked to the media in 1986. Among general opinions of the current situation in Yugoslavia,

the memorandum criticized the provinces' status pointing out that "the excessively broad and institutionally well-established autonomy of the provinces has created two new fissures within the Serbian nation" (SANU, 1986). Besides the claim that the Serbian community was being "exposed to physical extermination, to forced assimilation, to religious conversion, to cultural genocide, to ideological indoctrination" and also "to the denigration and renunciation of their own traditions beneath an imposed guilt complex, and thereby disarmed intellectually and politically" (SANU, 1986) not only in Kosovo and Metohija, but also in other Yugoslav republics, as in Croatia, the memorandum stressed a sentiment of inferiority from the Serbs towards the whole bureaucratic apparatus of Yugoslavia. As presented in the memorandum⁴²:

The position of equality that Serbia must strive for presupposes the same initiative in deciding on key political and economic issues as enjoyed by others. Four decades of Serbian passivity have been bad for Yugoslavia as a whole by failing to contribute ideas and critical appraisals based on her longer state tradition, enhanced feeling for national independence, and rich experience in struggling against home-grown usurpers of political freedom. Unless the Serbian nation within Serbia participate on an equal footing in the entire process of decision making and implementation, Yugoslavia cannot be strong--and Yugoslavia's very existence as a democratic, socialist community will be called into question. (SANU, 1986).

The Serbian feeling of inferiority was intensified by the whole disastrous economic situation experienced in Yugoslavia that reverberated differently in each Republic. Although the Yugoslav economy declined drastically during the 80's and the 90's, it is important to note that there were already serious economic problems even before Tito's death. The western recession after two oil crises (1973 and 1979) in conjunction with contractionary monetary policies turned it into a worldwide economic crisis, hitting harder underdeveloped and developing countries. With loans to countries like Yugoslavia growing scarce as the 1970's gave place to the 1980's, the country had even more difficulty in paying its foreign debt. In 1971 Yugoslavia owed US\$4 billion and by 1983 it owed US\$20,5 billion with the debt still rising in the subsequent years (BENSON, 2001, p.133). In 1982 the International Monetary Fund (IMF) allowed Yugoslavia to obtain a "three-year standby loan" which was basically a set of established rules the country should follow

⁴² Even though some criticisms were made on the link between the memorandum and its influence over Milosevic's political decisions towards the provinces, especially Kosovo, Dobrica Cosic, one of the most influential members of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts and the one credited with the writing of the Memorandum, endorsed in 1989 the leadership of Milosevic and supported the Serbian effort in the war in Bosnia. So if there is not exactly a direct link between the Memorandum and Milosevic's decisions, there was nevertheless an ideological affinity and shared consensus over the dissatisfaction on how Kosovo Serbians were treated in the Serbian intellectual environment that was part of Milosevic socialization *milieu* as President of Serbia.

to sanitize its domestic economic apparatus. In general, it required “an anti-inflationary macroeconomic stabilization policy of radical austerity, trade and price liberalization and institutional reforms to impose on firms and governments monetary discipline and real price incentives” (WOODWARD, 1995, p.49).

Throughout the 90's, the military spending effort in combination with UN sanctions⁴³, which started in May of 1992, worsened the overall economic situation. Focusing on the Serbian region, it opened space for illegal activities and a criminalized economy that helped to deepen the gap between one's income and its purchasing power as the prices for heating fuel, petrol, transportation and food skyrocket. Spending on food items could easily hit the mark of two-thirds of many household budgets (BENSON, 2001, p.134). The increase in Serbia's military budget was a contributing factor for deteriorating the living conditions in Serbia and its provinces. Rising from 1.7 billion to 4.5 billion in 1996, the military effort had severe effects on peoples' daily lives since the budget destined for public services and food subsidies were reallocated for weapons and ammunition. The hyperinflation, with its peak in January 1994, plus the lack of job security and salaries insufficient for basic needs propitiated an increase in poverty and social inequality. The individuals who were able to profit from the black market, either by trumping the sanctioned items or offering scarce and valuable products, accounted for the richest 10 percent of the population and had at their disposal 37 percent of the national economy, while the poorest 10 percent had 1.6 percent of it. (NIKOLIC, 2002, p. 88).

When the economy got out of control and the standards of living decreased, the Republican leadership fought for their own local power bases at the expenses of a central unit. Besides the lack of interest within the League of Communists in a structural economic reform, privileging only minor adjustments, the Republics were not willing to take actions that could, although with positive prospects for the Federation, hurt the Republican economies individually and, therefore, shake the local leaderships power bases. If after Tito's death it was difficult to get the Republics to compromise,

“in the past, consensus had been bought by giving everyone a bit more, with the federation footing the bill by borrowing abroad. The dire situation in which Yugoslavia now found itself required re-centralization, a strong federal authority able to enforce the fiscal and

⁴³ It is important to note that we do not share the opinion that puts some or all the responsibility over the political deterioration that culminated in the Kosovo crisis to the UN (see LAYNE, SCHWARZ, 1993). However, the whole economic situation, in its multiple variables, being the UN sanctions in the Yugoslav case one of them, is usually one important factor to understand how nationalist grievances escalate into war.

monetary discipline necessary to reassure western creditors, and to redistribute the social costs of economic collapse in order to keep the federation together". (BENSON, 2001, p.134).

Even with the ability to overrule dissent granted by the 1974's Constitution mechanism to reinforce the party machine and centralize the Republics, the League of Communists were not able to gather, either by political bargain or by force, the constitutional units in one policy-orientation. Gradually, the Party became without force as attempts to restore its centrality were defeated. Albeit still extant, it became a mere spectator of the economic crisis without the capacity to control or orientate the country's actions. The situation among the republics deteriorated to the point that in 1990 Slovenia declared its independence followed later by Croatia and, while the clash between Slovenia and Serbia was considerably brief, the Serbia-Croatia dispute took longer to come to a closure, demanding fourteen cease-fire agreements. With the first republics to have their independence officially in 1991, Macedonia became independent in 1992 and, experiencing the troubled independence process, Bosnia-Herzegovina achieved its independent status in 1994 while Kosovo fought until 1999. Albeit the purpose of this chapter is to evaluate the United States domestic construction to legitimate the NATO/US intervention in Kosovo, it is first necessary to understand how the peace process on the Bosnian case evolved as many of the American attitudes or omissions over the situation in Kosovo were based on the lessons they learned from previous war either by understanding the nationalists claims or by plunging into Milosevic's *psique*.

The conflict in Bosnia started in 1992 and endured until 1995. The starting point was the Bosnian Serbs boycott of the referendum for the Bosnia-Herzegovina independence passed in February 1992. Composed of more than 40 percent of Bosniaks (Muslim Bosnians), around 30 percent of Bosnian Serbs and 17 percent of Catholic Croats, the Muslim majority allowed Bosnia-Herzegovina to issue a declaration of independence, which gained international recognition. The Bosnian Serbs, led by Radovan Karadžić and supported by the Serbian government, in the figure of Milosevic, mobilized their military force to secure the Serbian territories. At some point, the Serbian superiority lost momentum and the conflict arrived at a stalemate, with the ethnic cleansing events growing in proportion and cruelty, as the Srebrenica massacre, which became an iconic event of the conflict. In 1995, NATO intervenes with the Operation Deliberate Force targeting critical positions of the Army of the Republika Srpska. The intervention was crucial to bring both parties to the negotiation table, bringing the conflict to an end with the Dayton Accords.

Even though the tensions between the Albanian Kosovars and the Serbs existed long before the war, the practices that led to the 1998-1999 conflict in Kosovo began around 1992. From 1992 until 1996 the Serbian government engaged in alienation policies to exclude Albanians from the political and social life in Kosovo, including the non-acceptance of Ibrahim Rugova presidential election to the self-proclaimed Kosovar republic. Progressively Albanians were removed from political occupations, prevented to attend public schools and universities and had their private properties taken by the Serbian government, to which they reacted, at first, with a strategy of pacific resistance. The Albanian dissatisfaction with their situation in Kosovo plus the perception that Rugova's pacific resistance with the establishment of a "parallel government" strategy would not achieve any results prompted the creation of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), an Albanian armed militia. The timing of the KLA creation is no coincidence. The non-discussion of Kosovo situation in the Dayton Accords left a sense that the West would not act to rescue the Albanian Kosovars. Even worse for the Albanians, after Dayton the "EU unconditionally recognized the FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] while Germany decided to begin to "repatriate" 130,000 Kosovo Albanian émigrés to Serbia" (TROEBST, 1998) and were reestablished the "full membership of the FRY in international organizations like UN and OSCE and in international financial institutions like the World Bank and the IMF as well as to the release of contested assets to the FRY" (TROEBST, 1998).

As the tensions between the KLA and the FRY mounted, the Contact Group, which oversaw the peace process in Bosnia, reconvened to help both parts in Kosovo to negotiate. The Contact Group was created in April 1994 as a four-power (U.S., UK, France, and Russia) institution that was developed almost exclusively to deal with Bosnia-Herzegovina. "Only after its enlargement by Italy and Germany, in May 1996, did it touch upon the Kosovo issue: in response to the escalation caused by Serbian police actions (...), the Contact Group demanded extended autonomy for the region inside the FRY" and first issued a detailed statement on Kosovo in 1997 (TROEBST, 1998). The negotiations attempt followed with back and forth moves of NATO and U.S. threats and/or proposition of sanctions lift with the objective to achieve any progress with the Serbian government. After the Racak Massacre, the Contact Group issued an ultimatum, asking both parties to meet in what was dubbed the Rambouillet Conference. At Rambouillet, in the beginning of 1999, the KLA accepted the agreement while the Serbian part refused it and reengaged in military actions against the Albanian population right after the refusal. In the United States, with the Rambouillet

failure the Clinton administration pushed for a NATO intervention. The debates and the narrative construction towards the (des)legitimation of the intervention in Kosovo will be the focus of the next section of this chapter.

3.2 The American narratives for the Kosovo intervention

The conception of this analysis was designed in layers, from the discourses with the widest audience reach to the ones more concentric within the government boundaries: the State of the Union addresses, specific presidential speeches on Kosovo, other administration member's op-eds and speeches, Clinton speeches to Congress on the Kosovo situation, and finally the Congress Records. We do not intend, for that matter, to attribute any precedence of one type of discourse over another. This choice was only for organizational purposes, since the number of discourses and documents was substantial. We thought, at first, this dynamic would be helpful in grasping the narratives construction as the discourses that have the widest reach could have more resonance in the national debate and, therefore, establish the framework for the intervention (des)legitimation process. In this chapter, each layer was added in a chronological fashion with the intention to observe, first, the evolution on the Kosovo case discourses and, second, the interrelation of those discourses and the wider debate of the U.S. international role. As the situation on the ground deteriorated and the discourses on the necessity of a military intervention intensified, the dynamic character of the narrative construction becomes even more apparent. The particular functions that are usually statically defined for some actors, as for example the President, the Secretary of State, members of Congress and etc., become blurred in the back and forth moves to establish a winning narrative.

Following the analysis of Clinton's intervention on Kosovo, the State of the Union (SoU) is an important rhetorical moment for every administration. As stated in the Constitution, Article 2, Section 3, the president "shall from time to time give to the Congress information of the State of the Union, and recommend to their consideration such measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient". More than an informative speech, the State of the Union is a performative one⁴⁴. It is

⁴⁴ Although we consider that every speech has a performative force towards the speaker and its audiences, some speech-genres have a stronger performative capacity than others, either intensified consciously or unconsciously by its proponent. The State of the Union is usually a speech-genre in the American political spectrum that has its performative

through this annual message that presidents reaffirm their role as public servants and, by establishing bridges between America's historical past and its present status in the world, they can tap into the national pride and sense of purpose. Once this emotional link is rhetorically developed, a more policy-oriented narrative has the necessary ideational foundations to flourish and gather the public's attention.

The SoU is directed not only to all Americans but also to other international actors. When it comes to the domestic audience, the president speaks through the State of the Union to the remaining branches of U.S. government, especially the legislative, and to the "conventional" American audience; and by "conventional" I mean all American citizens, the media, think tanks, and etc. The legitimization narrative to a foreign U.S. intervention usually contains the White House and Congress as important actors, and the legitimization of the NATO/U.S. intervention in Kosovo is no different⁴⁵. Including the media as a separate actor is a possibility, although not one considered in this case. A research that intends to study how identity is (re)produced and to what extent the (re)productions of this same identity are operationalized to legitimate a specific policy, thus influencing political actions, might lack some interesting aspects of this process when it does not consider the media as an actor apart from the general American public. However, the choice of including the media under the non-specific umbrella of "conventional American audience" was twofold. First, the sense that the U.S. media, although it might disagree with either/or the administration and Congress intended policies, it usually does so within the narrative boundaries established by the interlocution between the executive and the legislative⁴⁶. Second, some of the

force intensified not only by its content, but mostly because it is a uniquely presidential speech, thus carrying with it all the authoritative force embedded in the presidency.

⁴⁵ One of the most important critiques to researches that intend to evaluate the decision-making process of any political decision (either through securitization theory or post-positivist theories that use a sociological approach) is the fixation of actors in categories and the rigid definition of those same categories. For example, following the securitization theory in its inception, there is always a securitizing actor that advances an issue as a security issue and always an audience that approves this classification or not, and thus the measures to abate the constructed threat. This is not what I am advocating when I fix that Congress and White House will usually be important actors when deciding a foreign intervention. There is no predisposition whatsoever of which actor would be the one that initiates the narrative or the one that accepts it or not. To stress these two actors is an inescapable move towards acknowledging the American democratic process; however, how they will perform and how relevant they will be is a matter to be judged only in a case by case basis.

⁴⁶ To this reflection I thank Sean Aday. During my interview with him, he pointed that the news organizations usually follow the terms of the debate previously set by Congress and the administration, especially in terms of foreign policy decisions. As the foreign policy news in the US is foreign policy apparatus centric and mainly reactive to what this subfield proposes, including the media would not, necessarily, help understanding the legitimization processes in the case studies

media considerations will be nonetheless included as they are used by Congress members to back their own arguments, and therefore, mentioned or transcribed in full in the Congress Records.

In general terms, the State of the Union can be characterized by three performative moments: (i) public meditations on values; (ii) assessments of information and issues; (iii) and policy recommendations (CAMPBELL; JAMIESON, 1990). Each combines a set of characteristics that exerts a specific rhetorical function and, while one does not do without the others, there is nevertheless a rhetorical hierarchy among them. For instance, a State of the Union heavily assented on policy orientations without some form of assessment of information and issues regarding the U.S. present moment in the world (its challenges, enemies, objectives, etc.) is a void message. By not preparing the audience with a narrative that places the Union in a defined historical moment, presidents will not be able to clearly convey the message as how specific conditions and contingent issues can be understood as potential problems to the U.S. and what could be the best recommending solutions to abate them. On the other hand, a State of the Union address with extensive meditations on public values and references to great political American minds (usually either the Founding Fathers or important former presidents) but with no orientation as where the Union - domestically and internationally - stands and what may be the administration's intended policies is an emotional albeit aimless narrative.

In terms of hierarchy, the meditation on public values is the most important part within a State of the Union address. Values and ideas are crucial in their ability to reconnect the audience with the national past while conferring meaning to present situations by the establishment of analogies with similar situations in U.S. history. When presidents mention decisive moments of America's trajectory and/or reference emblematic speeches of former presidents, they are alluding to those values in the search for legitimacy to their perceptions on best policies for the United States.

Therefore, by invoking identity's anchor points such as "democracy", "freedom", "justice", among others, presidents can, regardless of what their policy-orientation might be, bring the narrative to an organically stable and recognizable foundation that form the bedrock of American society and is thus accessible to all its citizenry. Assessments of information and issues are an intermediary level within the State of the Union construction. They can put values and ideas in perspective of U.S. current affairs and give a sense of the administration top priorities in the domestic and foreign policy fronts. Once the meditation on public values is well-developed and the

assessments of information and issues lay down, the narrative constructed throughout the State of the Union has a structure that travels the audience from the ideational and practical reflections to empirical propositions as to what are the policies designed by the administration for the country. In other words, the meditation on public values is the widest narrative umbrella. It refers to U.S. ideational anchor points in a non-specific fashion, (re)producing an American *ethos* and gathering all the citizenry as one cohesive entity. The assessment of information and issues can be used as a specification moment, through which identity's general anchor points are presented within a framework contingently developed by the administration following its interpretation of that time's domestic and international reality. The policy recommendations are, therefore, the result of this narrowing discursive strategy and represent the most adequate actions to address the issues mentioned in the SoU.

An analysis regarding the State of the Union and its implications to U.S. foreign policy is even more relevant when evaluating the Clinton years and its strategy towards the Balkans. The first State of the Union from the Clinton presidency, in 1994, stands out negatively when considered the three main structures necessary for a well-rounded annual speech. First, there is an expressive lack of ideational background or attempt to connect the executive with its audiences by referring to the national anchor points. When the idea of democracy is invoked, it is nonetheless mentioned only in an instrumental way and not in a general and "emotional" fashion. When Clinton states, "the best strategy to ensure our security and to build a durable peace is to support the advance of democracy elsewhere" and complements by saying that "democracies don't attack each other. They make better trading partners and partners in diplomacy. That is why we have supported (...) the democratic reformers in Russia and in the other states of the former Soviet bloc" (CLINTON, 1994), the idea of democracy is embedded in a foreign policy recommendation logic. And although this is not necessarily wrong, the president does not back this statement with a meditation on the value of democracy to the United States or assesses why this value is even more important after the Cold War for American security and stability. He parts from the idea of the democratic peace theory without further explaining it to his American audience⁴⁷.

⁴⁷ When Clinton mentions that democracies don't attack each other, he brings with this narrative the theoretical apparatus of the democratic peace theory. However, it is difficult to grasp in what extent the general public has a sense of the meditation on the value of democracy established by this theory and the unfolding inferences generated from and by this understanding. Our sense is that the general public usually take the affirmative "democracies don't fight each other" for granted without asking themselves why this phenomenon happens. Still, even if the American audience

In terms of constructing the narrative, the absence of a link pointing why and how (in a historical perspective) democracy is an important value for America might weaken the policy-orientation that puts the U.S. in the center of democracy promotion abroad. Questions as “why democracies don’t fight each other?”, “how the democratic value came to be so powerful an idea in the U.S.?” or “why the U.S. leadership in the 21st century is connected to the idea of spreading democracy?” might linger in the American public imaginary. Even if the American public might have a sense on the possible answers to these questions because of previously socialization on the value of democracy, the open narrative proposed in Clinton’s State of the Union might weaken the administration further moves towards acceptance from the legislative and the general public on matters of foreign policy that uses the objective of spreading democracy as a justification. Although keeping the anchor point of democracy underdeveloped might have been done on purpose, when Clinton does not close the narrative’s meaning with considerations that could serve as answers to the questions proposed above, two processes - in general and specifically in the Balkans case - become costly for his administration in its attempts to sell American foreign interventions. First, the specification process through which the administration, and especially the president, travel the audience from a wide and embracing idea of democracy, for instance, to a narrower understanding of how this value is best perceived in that administration’s historical moment. Second, the operationalization process, with which the administration uses the previous specification process and the subsequent narrower versions of U.S. values to read and justify its decision on foreign policy grounds.

In his 1994 SoU, Clinton mentions the Balkans as a mere example to express that “nothing is more important to our [U.S.] security than our [U.S.] Nation’s Armed Forces”, because of their work in foreign places like in the “longest humanitarian air lift in history in Bosnia” (CLINTON, 1994). And although Clinton is not extremely vocal about the situation in the Balkans, other members of his administration had an active voice on this subject. Madeleine Albright, until 1996 U.S. permanent representative to the United Nations and a member of the president’s National Security Council, was one of them. In her commencement address at Harvard University in 1994, Albright placed the Balkans as one of four international issues that, “if not well-managed, could pose threats to the innermost circle of American concerns” since the U.S. interests in those places

buys this motto with no reservations, this cannot be translated into a specific foreign policy orientation, since the democratic peace idea can be used both ways: either to justify or to discredit an interventionist foreign policy.

“are especially compelling and the risks especially high. In each case, our [U.S.] goal is to shape events so that our [U.S.] most vital interests are secure” and “in each, American leadership -and the support and engagement of the American people- is required” (ALBRIGHT, 1994). She presents two major U.S. interests in the region. First, the geopolitical interest. Expressing the intricate regional geopolitics, she acknowledges that a “wider conflagration could threaten us [the U.S.] strategically by undermining new democracies in Eastern Europe, dividing our NATO allies, and straining our relationship with Russia” and also preventing a sovereign state of self-determination. Second, the moral interest. Through a humanitarian justification, she asserts the U.S. interest “in opposing the brutal violence -including acts of genocide- that has outraged the conscience and uprooted hundreds of thousands from their homes” (ALBRIGHT, 1994). Even though in 1994 she is talking mostly about the conflict in Bosnia, Albright develops a general argument that has the potential to attract the U.S. audience and bring it closer to the subject in her article by linking the American *ethos* and the Balkan situation. She encompasses both worlds affirming the “Americans have an important stake in the viability of that state [Bosnian state], for we derive our own identity from the conviction that those of different races, creeds, and ethnic origins can live together productively, freely, and in peace” (ALBRIGHT, 1994). Despite the U.S. foreign policy orientation was not exactly the same for Bosnia and for Kosovo, being the U.S. reticent with Kosovo’s independence, the emotional link established by Albright can be expanded to the whole Balkan crisis and translated to legitimate American active participation in Kosovo.

The whole Clinton State of the Union in 1994 follows this logic of establishing a narrative that is basically a presentation of already *en route* or intended domestic and foreign policies. And even this presentation privileges the domestic realm over the foreign one, often setting the U.S. international strategy as an instrumental necessity towards a sustained national well-being. The sense of American “obligation to renew [its] leadership abroad” is tempered by the perception that this obligation has the ultimate goal to think of “how much more secure and more prosperous our own people will be if democratic and market reforms succeed all across [for example] the former Communist bloc. Our policy has been to support that move, and that has been the policy of the Congress” (CLINTON, 1994).

Differently from other presidential narratives, the missionary narrative within which the U.S. reason of existence is exactly the construction of a safer, more peaceful and democratic order - not only for itself but also for the benefit of others - is downsized in Clinton’s foreign policy

discourses. In general terms, when it comes to the foreign policy section in the 1994's SoU, Clinton keeps a concise narrative focusing on enumerating the "dangers in the world: rampant arms proliferation, bitter regional conflicts, ethnic and nationalist tensions in many new democracies, severe environmental degradation the world over, and fanatics who seek to cripple the world's cities with terror" and the policies to mitigate them. As for these policies, Clinton emphasizes that "because of our work together," "(...) keeping our military strong and prepared, supporting democracy abroad, we have reaffirmed America's leadership, America's engagement. And as a result, the American people are more secure than they were before" (CLINTON, 1994). When Clinton exemplifies the strategy to foster democracy abroad, however, it is interesting to note that he does not stress the two cases that at that time had an American military engagement. As stated above, Clinton only mentions Bosnia (and also Somalia) to commend U.S. forces, without engaging in a debate over why an active American participation to promote democracy in those specific countries was important to the U.S. At that moment, even if Clinton is not the first president after the end of the Cold War⁴⁸, the address misses the opportunity of locating spatially and historically the administration's strategy.

The address of 1995 is better elaborated as it dedicates enough space to present a narrative that follows all the three performative moments. When emphasizing the meditation on public values, Clinton opens and closes his speech with references to great names that inhabit the American imaginary. Right in the beginning, he focuses on one of U.S. identity's anchor points: the idea of equality. From the Founders to Reagan, he demonstrates why equality is a constant and relevant trace in American history and exemplifies it by highlighting key moments in history when former presidents acted with this value in mind. Following the 1995 Clinton's State of the Union:

our Founders changed the entire course of human history by joining together to create a new country based on a single powerful idea: "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, . . . endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, and among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness." (...) It has fallen to every generation since then to preserve that idea, the American idea, and to deepen and expand its meaning in new and different times: to Lincoln and to his Congress to preserve the Union and to end slavery; to Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson to restrain the abuses and excesses of the industrial revolution and to assert our leadership in the world; to Franklin Roosevelt to fight the failure and pain of the Great Depression and to win our country's great struggle against fascism; and to all our Presidents since to fight the cold war. Especially, I recall two who struggled to fight that cold war in partnership with Congresses where the majority was of a different party: to Harry Truman, who summoned us to unparalleled prosperity at home and who built the architecture of the cold war; and

⁴⁸ The first to be elected, but not the first to experience the post-Cold War moment.

to Ronald Reagan, whom we wish well tonight and who exhorted us to carry on until the twilight struggle against communism was won (CLINTON, 1995).

This reflection on the idea of equality will be crucial to support the 1995's State of the Union. Since Clinton is worried about the rehabilitation of U.S. economy and its economic leadership, to stress the idea of equality is one possible way to construct an image of 'something bigger than each individual' and an emotional narrative that prepares the audience for the subsequent policy recommendations. From the above mentioned historical genealogy of equality as a crucial value that anchors U.S. sense of itself and its position in the world, Clinton uses his State of the Union to translate this reflection to America's present post-Cold War time mainly to underline the importance of an economic reform. In his words, "I had the honor to be the first President to be elected in the post-cold-war era, an era marked by the global economy, the information revolution, unparalleled change and opportunity and insecurity for the American people" and I have the "(...) mission to restore the American dream for all our people and to make sure that we move into the 21st century still the strongest force for freedom and democracy in the entire world". "(...) So tonight we must forge a new social compact to meet the challenges of this time" and "the most important job of our Government in this new era is to empower the American people to succeed in the global economy" because "America has always been a land of opportunity, a land where, if you work hard, you can get ahead" (CLINTON, 1995).

With this link between a stable foundation and the moment where the Union stands, Clinton not only bridges the gap between U.S. past, present and its aspirations to the future but also uses this same past to legitimate his interpretation (and subsequent specification) of equality and its materialization on specific policies. As the State of the Union is heavily concentrated on economic issues, the narrative on international security matters is: (i) either subsumed under the economic background, especially when Clinton establishes a link between peace, freedom, and democracy with economic development, such as when he states that "record numbers of Americans are succeeding in the new global economy. We are at peace, and we are a force for peace and freedom throughout the world" or when he mentions the defense budget reform and the commitment to maintain the "best equipped, best trained, and best prepared military on Earth" while managing to cut expenses and downsize the American forces; (ii) or treated in a policy-oriented narrative that,

first, is not backed by the meditation on the public value of equality⁴⁹ and, second, does not have the anchor points of ‘democracy’ and ‘freedom’ previously well-elaborated. When those values are mentioned, Clinton does not link them to U.S. past or define what is his administration’s perceptions on freedom and democracy, rendering fragile and loose the connection between them and the recommended policies. He simply states “our security still depends upon our continued world leadership for peace and freedom and democracy. We still can’t be strong at home unless we’re strong abroad”, and connects this assessment with the exemplification of U.S.-Russia negotiations over the START II.

When it comes to the Balkan case, Clinton does not explicitly mention either the situation in Bosnia or in Kosovo. He briefly asserts that the U.S. has “proudly supported peace and prosperity and freedom from South Africa to Northern Ireland, from Central and Eastern Europe to Asia, from Latin America to the Middle East” (CLINTON, 1995) and includes the Balkans under this general foreign policy statement. Other members of his administration were more assertive in their declarations. Madeleine Albright in an article for the Washington Post, in November 1995, stress the role of the War Crimes Tribunal for former Yugoslavia pointing that “all civilized people want the tribunal to succeed”. Although she does not mention a forceful action in the region, she establishes a division between the common population and those responsible for committing crimes and emphasizes the capacity of the Tribunal to bring justice and a stable peace. Following her words, “true reconciliation will not be possible in these societies until the perception of collective guilt is expunged and personal responsibility is assigned” and by doing this, the Tribunal as “a precedent that will deter future atrocities must be established” so “a basis for lasting reconciliation within the region must be built” (ALBRIGHT, 1995).

With a different narrative than the one established by Clinton in his SoU, Albright sets up an argumentative rhetoric that links U.S. anchor point of justice and its interest in addressing the Balkan situation. Rather than following the economic rationale under which Clinton justifies

⁴⁹ However, when security intersects economy in the State of the Union, the meditation on equality can be stretched, for the sake of the argument, to back the administration’s policy recommendations. For example, when Clinton advocates for a cut on defense budget and reduction on U.S. military forces this can be interpreted in the following logic: as the security international environment has changed, with minor security conflicts (compared to the one between U.S. and the USSR) and those conflicts being also part of a logic of poverty and economic insecurity, the reallocation of resources within the U.S. from the military sector to strengthen American economy can contribute to reinvigorate the whole global economy, thus helping countries with security issues to solve their problems by themselves through their reinsertion on the capitalist context. However, if this link was intended, it is not clear.

certain foreign policy actions, Albright defines the humanitarian and moral arguments as the focal point of U.S. concerns in the Balkans. The anchor point of justice plays a double role in Albright's narrative: whereas it is used as a general value that legitimates not only the U.S. but the whole Western action, it is also used to define the objective of American engagement. In Albright's (1995) words, "the effort to extract a measure of justice from the tangled and profoundly tragic morass of the Balkan war is, for the international community, a profound legal and moral test. There will be no absolute victories, and few quick ones" while, paraphrasing Clinton, she affirms "there must be peace for justice to prevail, but there must be justice when peace prevails" (ALBRIGHT, 1995). She even increases the tone of her narrative and its moral component when, by underlining the cruelty of what was happening in the Balkans, she compares it to the Holocaust.

The murders in the Balkans (...) cannot simply be shrugged off as the inevitable side-effects of ethnic conflict. To do so would be to forget that Adolf Hitler once defended his plan to kill Jews by asking the rhetorical question: "Who, after all, remembers the Armenians?" (...) Today, 50 years after the end of World War II, we and others still pursue those who attacked humanity in the name of the Nazis. For us, there has been no final closure of the wounds opened by their crimes. But because we have been persistent, there has also been no closure for the perpetrators, no certain relief from the possibility they would be held accountable. So, too, in the Balkans, the murderers, rapists, torturers and pillagers should have no closure. We should pursue them, through the efforts of the War Crimes Tribunal, this year, next year and, if necessary, well into the next century (ALBRIGHT, 1995).

Even if the Holocaust has nothing to do with U.S. national formation *per se*, the comparison established by Albright is a powerful one. First, both the Holocaust and the ethnic cleansing in the Balkans are the antithesis of what the American *ethos* preaches, that is, the respectfully and peacefully coexistence of differences or to put it more bluntly, the melting pot narrative. In this sense, it is urged for the United States to have the moral obligation to help others follow the path of justice and tolerance. Second, the World War II brings to the domestic audience the reminiscence of U.S. victory and indispensability in a moment of great danger to Europe, a moment that if it was not for the American participation Europe could have succumbed to authoritarianism. By mentioning this event, therefore, Albright indicates to the national audience that the Balkan crisis already is (or at least could become) as severe as the Holocaust and that the U.S. should not turn its back to Europe.

Back to Clinton's SoU, the absence of performative stages one and two (meditations on public values and assessments of information and issues) regarding security issues that escapes the economic logic leaves the narrative uncertain as why, for example, as stated in Clinton's 1995's

State of the Union, to destroy missiles and bombers that carry 9.000 nuclear warheads has something to do with freedom, democracy and its spread around the world. With these loose ends in the State of the Union's narrative on security, questions regarding in what extent the U.S. is freer and has more capacity to build a democratic order without its material capacities, and specifically without its nuclear deterrence apparatus, might arise. In our reflection, we do not mean that a well-rounded narrative can eliminate dissent; divergent opinions will surely exist even with the most convincing and embellished narrative. The difference, however, is the political cost the dissonant voices will have to pay to advance their critiques and the smaller capacity of adherence their alternative recommending policies will have among American political and public sectors when embedded in a context which the administration had already developed its own narrative.

The debate in Congress about the Kosovo situation has a timid start in 1995. The narrative is established around the acknowledgment that this issue needs U.S. attention especially when is introduced in the House the bipartisan resolution 1360, sponsored by the Republican representative Benjamin Gilman and cosponsored by representatives Eliot Engel [D-NY], Susan Molinari [R-NY], Dana Rohrabacher [R-CA], Peter King [R-NY], and Smith Christopher [R-NJ]⁵⁰. In this resolution, dubbed "The Kosova Peace, Democracy, and Human Rights Act of 1995" there is no mention of a forceful U.S. reaction in case of conflict aggravation. The main concern is with the human rights situation, as the resolution clearly demands improvement of the human rights conditions for the Albanian population (as reopening of the education system and reinstatement of individuals that had lost their jobs because of their ethnicity), the return of human rights observers (expelled by the Serbian authorities in 1993), the presence of U.S. officials in Kosova, and the installation of an United States Information Agency cultural center in Prishtina.

Through the statement of representative Engel the day after this resolution was introduced in the House, March 31st, the debate between Congress and the presidency was around the condemnation by some members of the legislative over Clinton's intention to drop all sanctions if Serbia meets a list of conditions, without placing in these conditions one regarding Kosovo⁵¹. The criticism is enhanced when Engel asks unanimous consent that a copy of President Clinton's letter to him be printed in the Record. In the letter, Clinton affirm that "while the United States does not

⁵⁰ This resolution was introduced in March 1995. Later, in May 1995, two cosponsors were added to this resolution: Nita Lowey [D-NY] and David Bonior [D-MI]

⁵¹ The sanctions lift debate is part of the international community move towards appeasing the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia after Milosevic's acceptance of the Dayton Accords, mentioned in the previous section.

support independence for Kosovo, we are committed to restoring human and political rights to the people of Kosovo” and that although the U.S. has seen “the utility of using limited sanctions suspension in return for helpful steps”, he thinks “there are a large number of issues, including Kosovo, that I believe must be addressed before Belgrade should be freed of UN sanctions and able to return to the international community”. In Engel’s narrative, he stresses the content of Clinton’s letter to show a policy change by the administration, from considering Kosovo as a condition to drop the sanctions to disregarding it in the list of conditions. And because the administration had changed its policy, the resolution 1360 cosponsored by him is presented merely as a matter to bring the U.S. policy towards Kosovo back to its prior standards

The 1996 State of the Union falls in line with the narrative construction of the 1994 address. It is basically an enumeration of seven challenges to which the administration present policy recommendations. The subjects of foreign policy in general and of foreign policy related to security issues are mentioned as part of the sixth challenge: “our sixth challenge is to maintain America's leadership in the fight for freedom and peace throughout the world. Because of American leadership, more people than ever before live free and at peace” (CLINTON, 1996). After a list of what were the threats to the U.S., “terrorism, the spread of weapons of mass destruction, organized crime, drug trafficking, ethnic and religious hatred, aggression by rogue states, environmental degradation”, Clinton affirms the U.S. can't be everywhere” and “can't do everything. But where our interests and our values are at stake, and where we can make a difference, America must lead. (...) We must not be the world's policeman. But we can and should be the world's very best peacemaker”. However, this narrative is sterile (or at least less powerful) without the definition of what these values might be and how they are connected with a ‘peacemaker’ foreign policy, and even what would be the difference between a policeman *versus* a peacemaker behavior in international affairs. While, in a superficial evaluation, from a ‘policeman’ behavior we could interpret an interventionist foreign policy and from a ‘peacemaker’ attitude we could understand a preference for diplomacy and the United States’ attitude as an international honest broker, in practical terms, the ‘peacemaker’ foreign policy can be as interventionist as a ‘policeman’ one.

The Balkan case is an example of the blurred lines between the division proposed by Clinton in his State of the Union since the peacemaker foreign policy was heavily backed by the use of military force. In terms of constructing the Bosnian case, in his 1996 SoU address, Clinton refers to the intervention only in its results but not in its conception, missing an opportunity to

strengthen the arguments and the values that would support his justification for the decision to use force in the Balkans. The case of Bosnia could have been used also as a metonymy for the administration general foreign policy strategy. By empirically demonstrating to the American audience how U.S. values are important and especially how they are important in cases as the Bosnian one, Clinton could have established a common narrative at hand for other international security issues. Instead, following the State of the Union, the Bosnia intervention is mentioned only with accountability purposes:

And we stood up for peace in Bosnia. Remember the skeletal prisoners, the mass graves, the campaign to rape and torture, the endless lines of refugees, the threat of a spreading war. All these threats, all these horrors have now begun to give way to the promise of peace. Now our troops and a strong NATO, together with our new partners from central Europe and elsewhere, are helping that peace to take hold. (CLINTON, 1996)

Still in 1996, there is no heated debate in Congress on the Balkan issue, maybe because after the Dayton Accords the International Community and the United States experienced a moment of relaxation towards the Balkans. However, one of the reasons for the tensions aggravation in Kosovo with the emergence of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) in 1996 was exactly the non-inclusion of Kosovo in Dayton. Although the debates in Congress warmed-up from 1998 until 1999, the hearing of July 1996, about the Resolution 155, can present us a sense of how the future debates in Congress will be structured around. The 155 Resolution is similar in content to the 1995 resolution 1360 and it is also a bipartisan resolution, being sponsored and cosponsored by several Congress representatives⁵². Even though both resolutions have an almost equal bipartisan division among Democrats and Republicans, the 1996 had twenty endorsements while the 1995 had only eight.

Similarly to the resolution 1360, the most vocal representative was the Democrat House representative Eliot Engel. In his speech about the Resolution, he focuses on three major points and uses external documents (printed in the record) to endorse his narrative. The three points are sanctions, the American presence in the Serbian Republic, and the necessity of a U.S. engagement. On the issue of sanctions, the debate is pretty much the same as the one established in resolution 1360: to lift or not to lift the sanctions towards Serbia and what conditions should be met by the

⁵² Sponsored by Eliot Engel [D-NY] and cosponsored by all the 1360 cosponsors (Benjamin Gilman [R-NY], Susan Molinari [R-NY], Dana Rohrabacher [R-CA], Peter King [R-NY], except Smith Christopher [R-NJ]) and by representatives Tom Lantos [D-CA], John Edward Porter [R-IL], Sander Levin [D-MI], Robert Torricelli [D-NJ], James Moran [D-VA], Kelly Sue [R-NY], David Bonior [D-MI], George Miller [D-CA], Donald Payne [D-NJ], Eva Calyton [D-NC], Nita Lowey [D-NY], Stephen Horn [R-CA], Edolphus Towns [D-NY], and Ronald Dellums [D-CA].

Republic so the U.S. would advocate in its favor. In comparison with the 1995 resolution, the sanctions' narrative is elevated to show a sense of urgency and the deleterious consequences it would bring to the region and to the U.S. if the sanctions were lifted without considering conditions over the human rights abuses in Kosovo. In Engel's (1996) words, "if we allow the incidents in Kosova to remain unchecked, Bosnia would be a tea party compared with what might happen to the people in Kosova, because the nationalism there is just as terrible as it was in Bosnia" and "with the repression of the Albanian majority, I shudder to think what might happen if the United States might turn the other way". That is why the Resolution states "the outer wall of sanctions shall remain in place against Serbia until there are improvements in the human rights situation in Kosova. The outer wall of sanctions prevents Serbia from joining certain international organizations, including monetary organizations, which they are eager to join".

In order to complement his narrative, Engel (1996) present to the record a document directed to him from the State Department. The document asserts that "a key requirement for lifting the "Outer Wall" of sanctions is progress towards resolving the situation in Kosovo" and "these sanctions apply to membership in the United Nations and other international organizations; normalization of our bilateral relations; and membership in the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and other International Financial Institutions". The document also infers that "Milosevic is very eager to overcome these sanctions and we have left him with no doubts how to do so". Although it is difficult to grasp intentions, including this document might produce a double effect on the congressional audience. First, by reaffirming the State Department narrative of not lifting the sanctions without improvement of the human rights crisis in Kosovo, Engel plays the State Department and the president against each other. Second, he uses the State Department document as an authoritative argument to reinforce his policy-orientation and to gather all congress representatives under this same policy for Serbia and Kosovo. With this strategy, Engel subtly stresses the differences in opinion among members of the Clinton administration and by privileging the State Department position and advocating for it, he increases the political cost for Clinton to follow its prior proposal on the Balkan situation and constraints the presidency to move forward with the sanctions lift without placing Kosovo on the conditions list.

Engel's (1996) second major argument is about the U.S. presence in Serbia and Kosovo. He commends the president⁵³ for establishing the USIA office in Prishtina and for establishing "high level diplomatic meeting with President Ibrahim Rugova" as these actions are a sign of the steps Clinton's "administration has taken to encourage an equitable resolution to the crisis in Kosova". Since the Albanians felt "increasingly slighted because the United States and the international community did not place their very legitimate claims on the agenda during the talks in Dayton and have not yet appeared to make Kosova a priority", those initial steps are meaningful because they send a message both to the Albanian population and to Milosevic. To the Albanians, it "tells them this United States has not abandoned them, that the United States stands by them, that the United States will continue to monitor the situation and that we will not tolerate lack of human rights for all peoples in Kosova". Besides, "it also sends a very important message to the Serb Government, particularly Serb President Milosevic", because "it says to him again that the United States is engaged; the United States is watching; that the United States will not tolerate the abuses, human rights abuses of the majority in Kosova".

The most emotional narrative is developed in the intersection between two subjects of Engel's narrative: the U.S. already presence in Serbia and the question as why the U.S. should actively engage in the Balkan conflict. Following Engel's account on his trip to Kosovo, where he "had the honor of cutting the ribbon and hoisting the American flag at the opening of the new USIA office in Prishtina", he emphasizes that "as we hoisted the American flag in our new office, there were throngs of people across the street chanting USA, USA, and free Kosova, free Kosova" "(...)They were waving American flags and handing me and other members of our delegation flowers. It was really something to behold". Connected to this idea of the U.S. being praised by Albanians, Engel advances his narrative stressing the good things "American dollars are doing so that mothers who have never had any kind of health care whatsoever can go to these clinics, helped in large part by American funds and governmental funds" so that "these women can have their babies in clean surroundings for the first time attended to by medical doctors". The good reception of U.S. presence and aid, plus the emphasis on the improvement of local conditions done

⁵³ The letter printed on record is also signed by Members of Congress Tom Lantos, Susan Molinari, John E. Porter, Sander M. Levin, Eva M. Clayton, Sue Kelly, James P. Moran, David E. Bonior, Peter T. King, Martin R. Hoke, Nita M. Lowey, Donald M. Payne, George Miller, Edolphus Towns, Jose E. Serrano, Robert G. Torricelli, Dana Rohrabacher, John W. Olver, Charles E. Schumer, almost all the sponsors of resolution 155.

with American money, leads the narrative to the conclusion of American indispensability to the Balkan stabilization.

As Engel (1996) talked specifically about Kosovo, he concludes that “the United States again is looked upon as a champion of freedom by so many people in the world, but certainly by the ethnic Albanians in Kosova. They know that the United States is the champion of freedom.” and U.S. actions can be seen as a “little small effort [that] says to them we have not abandoned you, we will not forget you, we will be there until all human and political rights are restored in Kosova”. The narrative developed by Engel is even reinforced with the Washington Post article he asks to be printed in the record. In the last paragraphs of the article, it states:

In their isolation, many Albanians have come to look upon the United States as a mythic great power that will come to their aid. Rugovo described the U.S. information center as “a direct link with the United States”—U.S. diplomats point out that it is actually only an adjunct of the embassy in Belgrade—and said that today was “a historic day for Kosovo.” Albanian-language newspapers rarely mention that Washington does not recognize Rugovo as president of Kosovo and is opposed to the region’s secession from Yugoslavia. “The Albanians think that America is their only hope for getting a republic, for getting independence,” said Lisa Adams, an American physician who has spent the past two years in Kosovo running a medical assistance program. “People want to see this information center as a mini-embassy.” Jokic, the Serb provincial governor, sees things very differently. He blames the West for Kosovo’s economic plight, arguing that sanctions have deprived the region of investment. As for the chants of “Free Kosovo,” he shrugged his shoulders. “Kosovo is already free,” he said. “They are saying what already exists. (WASHINGTON POST apud ENGEL, 1996)

As 1997 starts, the situation in Kosovo has no considerable sign of improvement. Clinton’s State of the Union is even more important as it is the first State of the Union after his reelection. It stands in-between, on the one hand, the address of 1994 and 1996 and, on the other hand, the address of 1995. With the former, the 1997’s SoU is similar in its little meditations on public values and assessment of information and issues, and densely constructed on policy recommendations, while with the latter it shares a well-divided structure that gives room to all three performative moments.

In similar terms as the 1995 SoU, the 1997 address falls into two main argumentative axes when talking about security and foreign policy. The first and the strongest one is established by the correlation between the liberalization of international market and freedom and democracy - as free trade expands, also expands the conditions for democratic and free societies. Although the anchor point of equality is not openly mentioned (differently from the 1995 SoU, in which it is well-explored), Clinton attempts to bridge past and present when he quotes the former president Truman

about America's international role: "this was his warning; he said, 'If we falter, we may endanger the peace of the world, and we shall surely endanger the welfare of this Nation'" (CLINTON, 1997). Clinton further uses in his speech the Truman quotation to develop a narrative on economic prosperity and its repercussion in constructing a more democratic society with equal treatment of differences. Even if Clinton is talking mainly to the domestic public, especially when he says "America has always been a nation of immigrants. From the start, a steady stream of people in search of freedom and opportunity have left their own lands to make this land their home. We started as an experiment in democracy fueled by Europeans" and "we are the world's most diverse democracy, and the world looks to us to show that it is possible to live and advance together across those kinds of differences" (CLINTON, 1997), he is advancing the exemplarist trait in U.S. foreign policy. In other words, he constructs a narrative that strengthens the Union and its moral, economic and political qualities, so it can be presented as worth being followed by other countries.

Clinton's arguments over U.S.-Asia relations are illustrative of this narrative axis that links economic development to international security. According to him, engaging the United States with North Korea and China, for instance, not only enhances the American economy but also foster cooperation on sensitive issues like these countries' possession of nuclear weapons. The economic argument assumes that as North Korea and China open themselves to capitalism, they will have more economic incentives to dismantle their nuclear programs and even in the long run think more alike the West on matters of Human Rights and other Westerns values. In Clinton's words:

"America must look to the East no less than to the West. Our security demands it. Americans fought three wars in Asia in this century. Our prosperity requires it. More than 2 million American jobs depend upon trade with Asia. There, too, we are helping to shape an Asia-Pacific community of cooperation, not conflict. Let our progress there not mask the peril that remains. Together with South Korea, we must advance peace talks with North Korea and bridge the cold war's last divide. And I call on Congress to fund our share of the agreement under which North Korea must continue to freeze and then dismantle its nuclear weapons program. (...) We must pursue a deeper dialog with China for the sake of our interests and our ideals. An isolated China is not good for America; a China playing its proper role in the world is. I will go to China, and I have invited China's President to come here, not because we agree on everything but because engaging China is the best way to work on our common challenges like ending nuclear testing and to deal frankly with our fundamental differences like human rights. (...) But this is about more than economics. By expanding trade, we can advance the cause of freedom and democracy around the world." (CLINTON, 1997).

The second argumentative axis is established on the connection between democracy and security. And although the first axis also focuses on those two issues, they are presented under the

logic of advancing free trade and capitalist institutions, while in this second axis the economic rationale is put aside. Democracy and security are not presented as a consequence of a liberal market, but rather a more secure international environment is subsumed to the active American action of spreading democracy. In this axis, Europe is the main subject. Clinton links European stability, prosperity, and peace with American security when he affirms that “now we stand at another moment of change and choice and another time to be farsighted, to bring America 50 more years of security and prosperity. In this endeavor, our first task is to help to build, for the very first time, an undivided, democratic Europe” and, for that matter, “when Europe is stable, prosperous, and at peace, America is more secure” (CLINTON, 1997). However, this narrative does not meditate upon why Europe is so important to the U.S. (one possibility would have been to make the argument that Europe shares American values or to present it under the Western umbrella) and in what way a disruption in European peace would be harmful to the U.S., or even in what way not advancing democracy in Europe could affect the U.S.⁵⁴

Following the assumption that a stable Europe meant a secure America, Clinton’s narrative jumps to policy proposals advancing the administration’s foreign policy objective to expand NATO so that “countries that were once our adversaries can become our [U.S.] allies” (CLINTON, 1997). When Clinton mentions a common historical past between the U.S. and Europe by saying his country “started as an experiment in democracy fueled by Europeans. We have grown into an experiment in democratic diversity fueled by openness and promise”, he touches on the issue of domestic cohesion and sense of community. He could have used this moment to develop, within American audience, an emotional connection with the post-Cold War Europe’s situation, especially the one with former communist countries. The intervention in Bosnia is briefly mentioned when the president states “America must continue to be an unrelenting force for peace from the Middle East to Haiti, from Northern Ireland to Africa. Taking reasonable risks for peace keeps us from being drawn into far more costly conflicts later” (CLINTON, 1997) and it is used as an example of

⁵⁴ The answers to those considerations might be obvious for some individuals, but not for every American and the non-specification has its costs. First, as the reasons why the United States should worry about Europe and have an active engagement in its problems are not clear, the legitimization arguments for this foreign policy strategy is not accessible to all audiences (even if we are only considering the U.S. domestic audiences). Second, thinking about the construction of a broader narrative that helps the administration sell specific foreign actions, although Kosovo will be vocally acknowledged as a major concern for the U.S. from 1998 onwards, the Bosnian case was on the table since 1993, and when Clinton does specify his narrative, he allows others to fill in the blanks and confer either similar or different meaning to what he intended with his SoU speech. He then loses one opportunity to settle the boundaries of the U.S. foreign policy to Europe narrative, making it more difficult to legitimate the American-NATO intervention in Kosovo.

successful American leadership since with NATO's action "the killing has stopped in Bosnia. Now the habits of peace must take hold. The new NATO force will allow reconstruction and reconciliation to accelerate." and as a way to "ask Congress to continue its strong support of our [U.S.] troops. They are doing a remarkable job there for America, and America must do right by them". (CLINTON, 1997). Even though the Bosnian case is one of the most important foreign policy actions during the Clinton years, it cannot be fully legitimated under the logic of more trade equals more freedom and democracy - the best developed axis in Clinton's foreign policy narrative strategy - because the capitalist insertion of the Balkans would be a second-step concern, only possible after a long period of stabilization and reconstruction. The economic argument, if chosen, could be only marginal. While the intervention in Bosnia could not be legitimated properly by Clinton's strongest narrative axis, by the one it could be understood and better justified (a democratic Balkan society could resolve dissent through its institutions, and not by violent actions; therefore, a stable Europe is crucial to international security, which is a significant part of U.S. international concerns) Clinton was not strongly engaged with it when presenting the situation in the Balkans.

Clinton ends his address invoking the common narrative that "America is far more than a place. It is an idea, the most powerful idea in the history of nations. And all of us in this Chamber, we are now the bearers of that idea, leading a great people into a new world" (CLINTON, 1997). Usually this motto is invoked by presidents (or important American public figures in general) to further advance what this "powerful idea" is and what values orbit around it with the objective to either advocate for policies that converge with the definition of this idea or to condemn behaviors that fall outside a rhetorically established sense of what it is to be American. Clinton simply summons this motto without giving it a specific purpose or specifying what this idea might encompass. In general, there is a background and loose commonsense of what Clinton is talking about when he says "America is an idea". And although this is not a socially shared value that needs *per se* an explanation, it does require speakers to set in their discourses the boundaries of this idea so they can properly give this value enough representational force to back intended policies. So, when Clinton does not further develop in his 1997 SoU the motto of "America as an idea", he misses the opportunity to invoke this value in its full potential - the potential to be shaped in order to direct the narrative to legitimate certain strategies and advance the administration's objectives.

The 1998 State of the Union does not bring any new issues or reflections when compared with the ones of 1995, 1996, and 1997 annual addresses. When meditating on public values, Clinton maintains his focus on the anchor point of equality, especially when he affirms that “community means living by the defining American value, the ideal heard 'round the world, that we are all created equal” (CLINTON, 1998) and confronts it with American history stating the United States “haven't always honored that ideal and we've never fully lived up to it. Often it's easier to believe that our differences matter more than what we have in common. It may be easier, but it's wrong” (CLINTON, 1998). However, this reflection is majorly used to advance domestic policies, as the ones on education and healthcare. This narrative in some extent intersects with Clinton’s strategy to link national economic prosperity with international free trade and stability, because “whether we like it or not, in ways that are mostly positive, the world's economies are more and more interconnected and interdependent. Today, an economic crisis anywhere can affect economies everywhere” (CLINTON, 1998). To the rhetorical question “why should Americans be concerned about this?” (1998) Clinton justifies this abovementioned link to his foreign and domestic policies strategy with the following arguments:

If they sink into recession, they won't be able to buy the goods we'd like to sell them. Second, they're also our competitors. So if their currencies lose their value and go down, then the price of their goods will drop, flooding our market and others with much cheaper goods, which makes it a lot tougher for our people to compete. And finally, they are our strategic partners. Their stability bolsters our security (CLINTON, 1998).

Even with this intersection, when Clinton reflects over the idea of equality he is addressing his domestic audience and concerned mainly with U.S. integrity, while the international stability is a by-product of this domestic-centered narrative. In terms of foreign policy, the 1998 SoU’s narrative is no different from the one established in the previous State of the Union addresses, in which Clinton focuses on making the American public accountable of his government’s actions abroad rather than looking for acceptance, legitimation or producing strong ex-post explanations that support them. The case of Bosnia is mentioned as part of what Clinton states as U.S. responsibility to “build a new era of peace and security”⁵⁵ and to “stand against the poisoned

⁵⁵ When remarking on the U.S. responsibility to “confront the new hazards of chemical and biological weapons and the outlaw states, terrorists, and organized criminals seeking to acquire them” (CLINTON, 1998), Saddam Hussein and the case of Iraq as a concern to the U.S. is already on the horizon of possible situation that could require America’s closer attention. Following Clinton’s words to Saddam, “you cannot defy the will of the world,” and “you have used weapons of mass destruction before. We are determined to deny you the capacity to use them again” (CLINTON, 1998).

appeals of extreme nationalism” (CLINTON, 1998). Moreover, the success of U.S.-NATO intervention in Bosnia is mentioned in this SoU as an argument to ask Congress to maintain its support to American troops because either in Bosnia or around the world the U.S. “mission must be to keep them [U.S. military] welltrained and ready (...) and to provide the 21st century weapons they need to defeat any enemy”. It is interesting to note, however, that although at that time (January 1998) the Kosovo crisis was not at its apex, there was already a tension between the Serbia government and the KLA, and this was not mentioned in Clinton’s 1998 SoU. The absence of Kosovo could be interpreted as a political strategy, though. Either Clinton was still not sure whether the U.S. intervention was a probable outcome, and then chose not to generate a false start debate over this policy, or considered the intervention a possible foreign action but decided not to politicize this issue referring to it to the American public.

Congress begins to be more engaged in the Kosovo situation in 1998 with Republican representatives preeminence in the debates. The narratives were constructed around the arguments in favor and against a possible U.S./NATO intervention, in which the former were better developed than the latter. Although it was not necessarily consciously done, the Congress narrative in favor of the intervention slowly began to take shape by clearly defining what was the problem, why was it in the U.S. interest to intervene, who was the enemy and how the U.S. should act. Throughout 1998, the Congress narrative against the intervention remained incipient and the strategy to strengthen it, initiated late 1998, was to develop the arguments in reaction to the ones advanced by those in favor of U.S. engagement. This precedence can be explained by the already available considerations favorable to an intervention in Kosovo; and even if Clinton was not really vocal about U.S. participation and was not one of its main advocates, other members of his administration, as Secretary Albright, for example, had developed in their past speeches some of the arguments that will compose the pro-intervention narrative⁵⁶.

The Congress debates of 1998 were divided into two sections: one from February to July and the other from August to December. Throughout the months of the first section, most of

⁵⁶ During my interview with James Goldgeier, he emphasized that more than any agent of the Clinton administration, Tony Blair was the one that first and more importantly laid out the narrative and did a better job making the case for Kosovo. As we shall see, this is interesting when confronted with the narrative constructions within the US in favor and against the US intervention in Kosovo, mainly because the pro-narrative was constructed following the ‘Western link’ and, therefore, US historical relation with Europe, while the against narrative will be centered in US relation with itself. In this sense, Blair engagement can be a possible important contributing external factor for the pro-narrative to gain momentum.

Congress representatives agreed on the basic narrative that something needed to be done to address the human rights crisis in Kosovo. The question put forward to debate in Congress was not anymore whether or not to lift the sanctions, but to actively come up with strategies to deal with the Balkan situation. In general, Democrats were more engaged in discussions than Republicans. On the one extreme of this narrative spectrum, Engel's speech in May 1998 is representative of the input that an intervention was necessary. Engel advances the argument that the U.S. "must strike with NATO air strikes" and "must declare a no-fly zone over Kosova" and back it with a Washington Post editorial that points "sanctions are in any case mostly beside the point". "Only the credible threat of force and the use of force, if necessary, can deter Mr. Milosevic. The U.S. can intervene now, as it has said it would, or, as in Bosnia, it can be forced to intervene later, after much damage has been done and any solution is far more difficult" (ENGEL, 1998). To conclude, Engel presents to the record a letter he and twenty-five other representatives sent to Clinton to express their opinion that "the time for diplomatic niceties is over. We must act now". On the other extreme of the intervention/not intervention narrative the democrat representative Hamilton develops the arguments the U.S. should not threaten to use force because, first, this threat is not credible and, second, airstrikes would not change the situation on the ground and could even make it worse. In his words:

I would suggest that U.S. policy on Kosovo be adjusted to give Milosevic both the incentive and the confidence to compromise: First, the Administration should not make implied or direct public threats of military action in Kosovo. The use of military force against Serbia has no support among our allies. We are already committed in Bosnia with 8,000 troops on the ground. We need Serbia's cooperation to make Dayton work. Threats to use force lack credibility, and air strikes alone are unlikely to change Serbia's policies on an issue as crucial to it as Kosovo. U.S. threats to use force will also encourage the Kosovo Liberation Army and others to provoke Serbia, thereby enlisting the U.S. on the side of their separatist agenda. (HAMILTON, 1998).

A subsidiary argument that added up to the debate over a possible intervention was about the character of the KLA. Representatives that were in favor of the use of force usually had a condescending view of the KLA violent activities and/or put their extreme actions as a consequence of Western neglect of the Albanian cause. When addressing the urgency of the crisis in Kosovo, Biden in June 1998 stresses the consequential aspect on the KLA emergence because "if Milosevic had not robbed Kosovo of its legal autonomy, had not closed its schools and other institutions, and had not summarily brutalized and fired thousands of Kosovars, the armed resistance never would have materialized". Answering Milosevic's statement that there was "no reason to conduct

negotiations with terrorists” (MILOSEVIC apud BIDEN, 1998), meaning by terrorists the KLA, Biden directs himself to the Serbian leader to “respond to Milosevic’s comment by saying that acting just as he did in Croatia and Bosnia, as he is acting in Kosovo, I ask the rhetorical question: Who is the terrorist⁵⁷? Milosevic is a terrorist and a war criminal” and “he has demonstrated that over the past 5 to 6 years in Bosnia, and he is revealing it again in Kosovo”. Engel had already developed this narrative one step further in his Congress speech in July 1997, when he affirms that because of Western and especially U.S. lack of meaningful actions, although he was opposed to terror (talking about the KLA actions) he thought “despair breeds terror, and right now the Albanian population is in despair. They are in despair because there is no hope for the future with the situation just the way it is” (ENGEL, 1997).

The narrative in favor of a more active U.S. engagement with possible military participation was built around three main axes: (i) the human right argument as a basilar and well-consolidated international standard; (ii) the geopolitical argument; (iii) and the moral argument. The human rights argument stresses the poor living conditions and repression the Albanians were submitted, emphasizing mostly that Milosevic’s “behavior is worthy of the Dark Ages, not the end of the twentieth century” and that “once again, the civilized world is faced with a deadly serious challenge” (BIDEN, 1998). This narrative places the conflict not only as something not acceptable anymore but also because it is not acceptable it falls into the realm of uncivilized behavior and marginalizes Milosevic and its followers. The second narrative axis developed in Congress is shared by the State Department and its Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright. The sense of urgency was basically built around the Balkan’s complicated historical past and the possibility of a spill-over. In representative Dodd’s [D-CT] words, the U.S. “would also be running the risk that

⁵⁷ The narrative on terrorism is an interesting one that was not advanced in national debates. It could have helped in the legitimization process as, first, the U.S. had already suffered a terrorist attack (the first attack on the World Trade Center) and, second, it was a palpable narrative as why international terrorist threats might endanger the U.S., and, therefore, why it is on U.S. interest to intervene. One possible explanation as why this narrative was not advanced is on the Clinton international security strategy. In matters of security, his doctrine was more focused on international humanitarian crisis and development. While human rights and development usually come side by side in the American debate, the narrative on terrorism, even before 9/11, was rarely established under the international economic development umbrella. In this sense, we can infer that the word ‘terrorism’ was not used to qualify Milosevic’s actions because it did not fit the administration’s specification of democracy, freedom, justice and equality at its present time and, therefore, it was not in sync with its assessments of information and issues and its policy orientations. For Congress representatives to advance a sense of urgency on Kosovo using the narrative on terrorism would have a greater political cost. Without questions over whether this narrative strategy was intentional or not, to adapt it and work it within the administration’s already established borders was easier than constructing a new path.

the current conflict would spill over into other countries and pose serious threats to regional peace and security. That must not happen” (DODD, 1998).

The third argument embraces both the human rights and geopolitical components. The moral narrative taps into America’s sense of itself and its international role to strengthen the two first axes. Biden’s critique of the idea of a “fortress America” is a good example of this moral argument. When outlining the principles that should guide U.S. decision to act in Kosovo, he stated “first, I believe that, except for those who prefer to withdraw to a ‘Fortress America’ posture, no one doubts the strategic importance of the south Balkans to the United States” (BIDEN, 1998). While playing the anti-isolationist card, giving it a ‘bad-foreign policy’ connotation, Biden advanced the geopolitical argument of Kosovo’s strategic importance to the U.S. The moral component was already developed before but without the geopolitical component. Congressman Lieberman in his speech in March 1998 stated that if the U.S. “let the Serbian minority continue to suppress the Albanian majority, we will not only have been untrue to our own American principles of freedom and self-determination but that we will have turned our back on a situation that is bound to explode”. Although he does not develop further the idea of freedom, Lieberman uses it to bridge the national audience through the sentiment of empathy and responsibility of sharing with others the American values. Congressman Dodd in this same meeting develops further the moral aspect of U.S. engagement in Kosovo, focusing on the importance of the debates in Congress and the link between U.S. citizens and their compassion for the suffering of non-Americans.

I remember, Mr. President, very vividly one of my first days in the Congress of the United States and I had a chance to meet with some refuseniks from the Soviet Union. They were courageously trying to achieve religious freedom for themselves and democracy in the Soviet Union, a very repressive regime. I remember raising the question to a couple of these people, does this have any real value when we speak out with resolutions, and people were wearing bracelets and so forth with the names of refuseniks. And there were those who questioned the wisdom of it, “Wasn’t it more sort of a lot of rhetoric without having much influence?” I will never forget the response of these people. They said, “You have no idea how closely the world watches what you say in America. When you speak our names on the floor of the U.S. Senate, when you talk about us, you give us hope beyond belief. We live, we exist.” People try to suppress the rights of others or, worse, try to suppress the rights of others by engaging in the worst kinds of atrocities, as we have seen in Bosnia and now Kosovo. They need to know there are people who understand what is happening to them. So it is entirely appropriate and proper, Mr. President, that we take out an hour today. There may not be many who come here to address this issue, but I am very confident that there will be unanimous support for this resolution. There will be a vote on it in which we will be heard expressing, I think, the outrage of our constituents across this country, regardless of where we live, letting those who are suffering know that their voices are being heard, letting those who perpetrate this violence and outrage know that we know what is going on and we will not forget it. (DODD, 1998).

From August to December 1998, the two poles of pro and against narratives become more evident, though the against side still less developed than the one in favor. Every narrative has a simplification component. To shield the narrative from possible critiques and make it clean and straightforward, this simplification process is crucial. The narrative towards acting in Kosovo first simplification was on who the enemy was. If the pro-intervention discourses in the first 1998 sector acknowledged the KLA violent actions but had a condescending tone towards it, either justifying it as an inevitable consequence of the Serbian oppression or as a consequence of U.S. unwillingness to act, the pro-intervention discourses of the second sector refrained from placing the KLA as a guilty part in the Kosovo crisis. As Congressman Gilman [R-NY] (1998) states, “the war in Kosovo has many of the worst characteristics of the war in Bosnia. The primary victims of Serbian attacks are civilians” and “once again the victims are being asked to negotiate with those who are attacking them. In addition, there is an active attempt to impose a moral equivalence between Serbian forces and the small band of Albanians who have taken up arms against them”. This simplified argument that identifies one side as guilty and the other as innocent will be an important part of this narrative. Congressman Smith [R-OR] (1998) underlines that “one person is solely and directly responsible for the catastrophe unfolding before our eyes, and that is President Milosevic of Serbia”.

Defining what was the problem was a logic derivation from the establishment of enemy/victim argument. If there is one blameless side being oppressed by another stronger side, than “Kosovo is a humanitarian and human rights catastrophe” (DOLE, 1998; WELLSTONE, 1998) and “Bosnia taught us the hard lesson that delayed action results in the loss of more and more lives”. The comparison with Bosnia will be another trait of the pro-intervention narrative. It serves not only to stress the human rights component, bringing back to the public imaginary the atrocities of Srebrenica, for example, but also to underline the international lack of readiness in engaging in military actions and Milosevic’s character. Bosnia, in this narrative, establishes the link between who is the enemy and what is the problem. As in Bosnia, we have an ongoing ethnic cleansing, “as we saw in Bosnia, the only thing Milosevic responds to is force” (HOYER, 1998), as in Bosnia, we cannot wait years to act. The “what” question has a second component, the geopolitical component. Considerations of the regional importance and vulnerability were already advanced by Albright in 1994 and 1995 when discussing the Bosnia intervention. The argument focused on the possibility of a conflict spill-over to neighboring European countries since “the

likelihood is that the conflict will grow and spread” (LEVIN, 1998) and it “threatens the stability of Europe, as the prospects are quite real that it may eventually embroil other countries in the region in a larger war” (MCCAIN, 1998).

The question “why was in the U.S. interest to intervene in Kosovo” was a difficult argument to settle in the pro-intervention. It was based on what I will name the “Western connection”: first, the U.S. perception of its role towards Europe and the West and, second, the perception of its values and the relation among them, the European formation and the situation in Kosovo. The Europe-United States link was better developed in the congressional debates of 1999, though. There was, nevertheless, the initial argumentative moves to settle a sense that “what is urgently needed now is American leadership and a firm commitment to a genuine and just peace” (GILMAN, 1998) because “America’s survival depends on presenting a strong, united front to the world” (BIDEN, 1998) and “if we do not act in this case, knowing—as we do know—that many more people will die as a result, we share some responsibility for what does happen. We become, in effect, a partner in the crime” (SMITH, 1998). This wider international responsibility will be narrowed down to the responsibility with Europe in further Congressional debates.

The argument that connects US values and its foreign policy was early on mentioned by Albright when she develops the moral component of her argumentation. The difference is, one, she advanced this argument in 1994 and 1995, when the Kosovo situation was overshadowed by the Bosnia case, and, two, she used the American anchor point of justice to set up the link between this American idea and the necessity for the U.S. to care about the Balkan situation. The value-laden argument developed in Congress has the same purpose - legitimate the U.S. intervention in the Balkans, specifically in Kosovo - but uses different American anchor points to develop the argument, the anchor points of democracy and freedom. The discursive strategy is to stress that with the non-resolution of the crisis in Kosovo, what was in danger was, ultimately, the values of democracy, “freedom and liberty - the principles that America stands for (...). American credibility and European stability are on the line” (DOLE, 1998). Plus,

a peace based on democratic principles and the creation of democratic institutions would also serve to strengthen the position of the fledgling democratic opposition in Serbia—especially by depriving Milosevic of the opportunity to distract Serb citizens from their deteriorating economy and near-pariah position in Europe. Such a deal would provide significant momentum to the democratization process, momentum which the IRI [International Republican Institute] could capitalize on by expanding its programs there (DOLE, 1998).

The ultimate piece of this narrative, after assessing the problem, who is the threat and why does it matter for the U.S., is to answer the ‘how’ question. The answer needs to define not only in what way should the United States deal with the Kosovo crisis but also with what instrument (via UN, NATO, or a go it alone policy). The pro-intervention narrative in Congress usually did not separate means from instrument. When mentioning a possible intervention, Congress representatives established it through the NATO coordination. As stated by representative Smith [R-NJ] (1998), “decisive outside intervention is what is needed, and NATO is the most likely organization to do this”. A subsidiary component links the U.S. interest in intervening and the instrument chosen: NATO’s credibility in the post-Cold War environment. To choose NATO and to strengthen it in this new environment, following this argument, was vital to keep U.S. leadership abroad.

The credibility of NATO, still our most important alliance, hangs in the balance. For nearly 50 years, NATO has been the organization most responsible for keeping the peace in Europe. NATO had great success in the years after World War II and the Cold War. Its post-Cold War utility was proven earlier this decade in Bosnia. What NATO does in Kosovo will go a long way toward determining this crucial alliance’s role in the 21st century. A strong, unified NATO is still the best insurance policy we have against large scale conflict in Europe (DASCHLE, 1998).

A well-elaborated narrative usually has all its components interconnected with each other. It does not prevent this narrative to face another disputing narrative, but it nonetheless elevates the level of complexity the disputing one needs to attain in order to equally compete. The narrative against the intervention was only fully shaped in 1999, although some of its arguments were already developed in 1998. Since the pro-intervention narrative in Congresses was established before the one against it, this precedence orientated how the ‘against’ narrative was advanced. Still in 1998, the ones advocating contra the intervention engaged in a strategy of questioning the arguments set up by the competing narrative. As representative Roberts [R-KS] (1998) pointed, “why is it in our national interest? You can argue it both ways. You can say we are into another Bosnia, another \$10 billion, and year after year of presence; or you can say that the future of NATO is in danger”. In addition, they started asking Clinton “to come to the Congress now and not after a military action and the commitment of U.S. credibility and fully discuss what the plans are, what is the objective, how many troops, what is the cost, what is the national interest for military action in Kosovo” (ROBERTS, 1998) and to question the presidential legal authority to authorize U.S. engagement

without Congress approval. At that moment, the narrative against the intervention still did not have its own arguments, but only question the ones developed by the pro-intervention narrative.

In 1999, the SoU address is no surprise when compared to the previous Clinton's State of the Union addresses. And although it should be the most important SoU to evaluate the narrative construction to legitimate the U.S. intervention in Kosovo, once again the foreign policy narrative orbits around the economic rationale. The State of the Union is heavily assented on acknowledgments over domestic policies and issues, leaving the foreign policy realm to a lower status within the discourse. To have a better sense, over thirteen pages, the assessment on foreign policy issues is confined to three pages only. Quantifying the pages does not give us a good indicator over the quality of Clinton's narrative in advancing foreign policy strategies; however, it does give us an indicator that throughout the speech the domestic dimension is privileged in detriment of the foreign one.

Similar to the 1997 SoU, the 1999 one touches the anchor point of equality without expressly mentioning it and producing further meditations on this specific value. When Clinton introduces the speech section on foreign policy, he initiates it by the economic argument. Following the exemplarist logic of American foreign policy, Clinton states the U.S. "ought to tear down barriers, open markets, and expand trade. But at the same time, we must ensure that ordinary citizens in all countries actually benefit from trade, a trade that promotes the dignity of work and the rights of workers and protects the environment" (CLINTON, 1999) while linking the domestic and international environments when stressing that the "world economy is becoming more and more integrated" and because of it the U.S. "have to do in the world what we spent the better part of this century doing here at home. We have got to put a human face on the global economy" (CLINTON, 1999). The exemplarist logic whilst having a focus on the international audience, have at the same time the objective to reach the domestic public. Following Clinton's narrative, the U.S. willingness to "invest in our people, our communities, our technology" but also to "lead in the global economy" will permit it "to meet our historic responsibility to build a 21st century prosperity for America" (CLINTON, 1999).

When Clinton mentions foreign policy issues that fall outside the economic logic, he introduces this topic by repeating the ideas of leadership and responsibility already advanced with the link between international free trade and domestic prosperity. To the narrative that the U.S. must lead in the economic realm and have a responsibility towards its domestic audience, Clinton

adds that “no nation in history has had the opportunity and the responsibility we now have to shape a world that is more peaceful, more secure, more free” (CLINTON, 1999). And although Clinton does not meditate on the public value of freedom and does not specify what he means by it, he uses it along with the idea of peace as a measure to define U.S. success abroad. Clinton then affirms not only American “leadership helped to bring peace in Northern Ireland”, but also “all Americans can be proud that our leadership has put Bosnia on the path to peace” and “with our NATO allies, we are pressing the Serbian Government to stop its brutal repression in Kosovo, to bring those responsible to justice, and to give the people of Kosovo the self-government they deserve” (CLINTON, 1999).


From the exemplification of U.S. “work for peace”, Clinton jumps to the assessment of the “threats to our Nation’s security, including increased dangers from outlaw nations and terrorism”. Without any specification or contextualization as why the U.S. should deal with these threats the way the administration proposes, Clinton engages in a policy-oriented narrative that acknowledges past and future foreign policy decisions, as, for example, when he mentions the U.S will “defend our security wherever we are threatened, as we did this summer when we struck at Usama bin Ladin’s network of terror. The bombing of our Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania reminds us again of the risks faced every day by those who represent America to the world. So let’s give them the support they need, the safest possible workplaces, and the resources they must have so America can continue to lead” (CLINTON, 1999).

When talking about Iraq, Clinton justifies international action against this country saying that “Iraq has defied its obligations to destroy its weapons of terror and the missiles to deliver them”, but when he affirms “America will continue to contain Saddam, and we will work for the day when Iraq has a Government worthy of its people” (CLINTON, 1999) he doesn’t explain why the United States should care about Iraq or why this is a matter that concerns U.S. security. Maybe because the Desert Fox operation was already in place Clinton does not feel the need to advance a narrative that sells the need of the intervention to the American public. The U.S. action in Iraq is mentioned in complimentary terms when Clinton states that “in our action over Iraq, our troops were superb. Their mission was so flawlessly executed that we risk taking for granted the bravery and the skill it required” (CLINTON, 1999).

The debates in Congress of 1999 will be definitive to shape the two narratives. Because Clinton did not explore the bully pulpit to advance his own arguments to legitimate the intervention,

the responsibility to conform the pro-intervention narrative fell in the hands of other actors. I do not want to necessarily attribute more force to the presidential argumentation in relation to other arguments from actors with different positions in the American democratic process. In the narrative construction process, the arguments developed by the president will not inevitably be the winning arguments. However, there is a considerable position of authority vested in the figure of the president, even when his authority is questioned - either because of impeachment processes, as happened with Clinton at the same time of the discussions over Kosovo, or because part of Congress questioned the president's authority to engage the US in a foreign intervention without Congressional approval. Although it is not possible to affirm whether Clinton's rhetorical absence in the Kosovo case was intentional or not - or a consequence of the domestic political moment - this vacuum was filled by other actors that took for themselves the prominence in the (des) legitimization process, and Congress was a vital one.

The arguments pro-intervention were well-developed in the Congressional sessions of 1998, so this narrative general framework was maintained, with certain arguments strengthened. It is first important to stress that in 1999 the Congress formation is different from 1998, as in the passage from the 105th to the 106th Congress some representatives were not reelected. Senator Biden [D-DE] and House Presentative Steny Hoyer [D-MD] are elements of continuity in Congress debates on Kosovo, especially helping to advance the pro-intervention narrative. The spanning set of this narrative, after 1999, will have this conformation.



Model inspired in Jackson (2006) spanning set for the U.S. debates after WWII.

The “Western connection”, although only strengthened months before the intervention, will be the core of the pro-intervention narrative. If in 1998 this link had still some loose ends, in 1999 it becomes more evident: the United States general international responsibility is downsized in comparison to its responsibility towards Europe. This differentiation strategy happened mainly in response to the contra-intervention argument that the U.S. could not be the world’s “policeman” (DUNCAN. 1998). In this sense, the Kosovo intervention was not because the US “focus on a lot of things”, but the necessity to “focus on the fact that we are the leader. And in that position we have a responsibility to come together with the rest of Europe to make sure that genocide has a consequence” (HOYER, 1999). Biden develops further the “Western connection”. In his words:

(...) We have 7,300 troops there. We have had as many as 365,000 troops in Europe to preserve stability and democracy in Europe for the past 54 years. We have 100,000 troops in Europe right now. We have 100,000 troops who sit there. (...) But the loss of a life in Somalia and the loss of a life in Kosovo have totally different consequences, in a Machiavellian sense, for the United States interests. If there is chaos in Europe, we have a problem. We are a European power. If, as a consequence of this, there is a flood of

refugees into any of the surrounding—let's take Albania. Albania has a Greek population that is a minority population, where there is already a problem. (...) The objectives of the administration are the objectives of the rest of Europe—all 19 other nations as well as the contact group (...) (BIDEN, 1998).

As he advanced the link between Europe and the United States, Biden connects this argument with the definition of what is the problem and the value-laden arguments.

(...) The objectives are these: To stop the genocide, stop the ethnic cleansing, stop the routing, stop the elimination of entire villages in Kosovo, to have some guarantee that the civil rights, civil liberties, life and liberty of the people living in that region, 2 million people, are somewhat secure. Why do we do that? Beyond the humanitarian reasons, why we do that is, we know what happens if it spins out of kilter. We know what the downside is if the entire area is engulfed in this chaos. We also know from experience what happened in Bosnia. When we acted, when we put ourselves on the line, when we demonstrated that we would not allow it to “happen” again, it worked. We decided that democracy tends to bring stability. I, for the life of me, do not understand why you can just cut out an entire—I wish I had a map here—segment of Europe and say it can be in flames and chaos, and it has no impact on us; it will have no impact on the alliance; it will have no impact on our national security. (...) It is about the desire to keep that part of the world from spinning out of control (...). (BIDEN, 1998).

Clinton's discourse in a press conference in March, mentioned in the Congress Records is one of his presidential speeches that addresses the pro-intervention narrative in almost all its components. The “Western connection”, through which the United States presents itself as responsible for Europe's stability and derives its international leadership from this responsibility.

Let me just make one other statement about this. One of the things that I wanted to do when I became president is to take advantage of this moment in history to build an alliance with Europe for the 21st century with a Europe undivided, strong, secure, prosperous and at peace. That's why I have supported the unification of Europe financially, politically, economically. That is why I've supported the expansion of NATO and a redefinition of its missions (CLINTON, 1999).

Although Clinton in this discourse does not explicitly mentions the anchor points of freedom and democracy, they can be understood as part of the arguments that stresses the humanitarian aspect of the crisis and the comparison with the previous situation in Bosnia.

We should remember the horror of the war in Bosnia; the sounds of sniper fire aimed at children; the faces of young men behind barbed wire; the despairing voices of those who thought nothing could be done. It took precious time to achieve allied unity there, but when we did, our firmness ended all that. Bosnia is now at peace (...) We should remember what happened in the village of Racak back in January, innocent men, women and children taken from their homes to a gully, forced to kneel in the dirt, sprayed with gunfire -- not because of anything they had done, but because of who they were (...) In dealing with aggressors in the Balkans, hesitation is a license to kill. But action and resolve can stop armies and save lives. We must also understand our stake in peace in the Balkans and in Kosovo (CLINTON, 1999).

The third component is the use of NATO: it reinforces the US-Europe connection not only in strategic aspects but also in the aspect that they both share the same values and anchors their identities in the ideas of freedom and democracy. In Clinton's words:

Yesterday the Kosovar Albanians signed that agreement. Even though they have not obtained all they seek, even as their people remain under attack (...) Now only President Milosevic stands in the way of peace (...) NATO has warned President Milosevic to end his intransigence and repression or face military action (...) As we prepare to act, we need to remember the lessons we have learned in the Balkans (...) This is a humanitarian crisis, but it is much more. This is a conflict with no natural boundaries, it threatens our national interests (...) If it continues, it will push refugees across borders and draw in neighboring countries. It will undermine the credibility of NATO on which stability in Europe and our own credibility depend. It will likely reignite the historical animosities, including those that could embrace Albania, Macedonia, Greece, even Turkey (CLINTON, 1999).

As stated before, because the pro-intervention narrative was better developed before the contra narrative, the latter will be shaped basically as a reaction to the pro-intervention arguments. The first move, started already in 1998 but intensified in 1999, was to question the President's authority to engage the U.S. in a foreign intervention without Congressional approval and successive calls for "the administration to come to the Congress now and not after a military action and the commitment of US credibility and fully discuss what the plans are, what is the objective, how many troops, what is the cost, what is the national interest for military action in Kosovo" because "none of the questions addressed in my [Senator Roberts] amendment have been answered, but it is clear to me the United States and NATO are very close to a prolonged, costly involvement in another part of the Balkans" (ROBERTS, 1998).

Besides questioning the President's authority, the non-supporters of the intervention also questioned every argument of the pro-intervention narrative, considering them insufficient. They engaged in two rhetorical strategies. First, throughout the second sector of 1998 and in some extent still in 1999, the Congress representatives against U.S. action in Kosovo engaged in an approximation strategy: without completely dismissing the other narrative, they presented questions calling the administration to engage with them in the debate. The administration's low engagement with Congress, plus the absence of a contra narrative per se, with structured arguments, led those Congress representatives to engage in another strategy months before the intervention, in 1999: the mirror (or inversion) strategy. They basically used the pro-narrative arguments and twisted them to fit their narrative. In this sense, the questions that guide the contra-narrative are the

same: what the problem was, why was it in the U.S. interest to intervene, who the enemy was and how the US should act.

While the pro-narrative simplified the conflict complexities and defined Milosevic as the problem to be removed from the conflict's equation, the contra-narrative explored those same complexities in order to question the other narrative's argument. Instead of focusing on the FRY leadership's guilty, it presented both the KLA and Milosevic as equally guilty parts, since "the Albanians have committed atrocities as well, the Kosovar Albanians" (HUTCHINSON, 1999). Some representatives even intensified this argument, taping into the Balkans history of conflicts. As Senate representative Judd Gregg [R-NH] stated, in the Balkans "these folks, these cultures, regrettably, have a historic, almost a genetic, attitude which causes constant conflict and which creates tremendous antagonism which leads to violence between these different cultures" and "this is a country of military-type individuals" (GREGG, 1999).

Because the contra-narrative defined differently who was responsible for the problem (or, who the enemy was) it also established the conflict in a divergent perspective. Although it acknowledged the human rights component, it did not fashion it in an enemy/victim argumentation. "The administration of the province of Kosovo [was] not in accordance with international humanitarian standards" (WILSON, 1999), and "there have been atrocities on both sides. We are picking one side, and we are doing it without a vote of Congress". "There was a way to go into Bosnia, but Kosovo is very different. Kosovo is a civil war in a sovereign nation" (HUTCHINSON, 1999). The argument that Kosovo is a civil war with humanitarian atrocities but not a strictly humanitarian conflict was also used to downsize the urgency aspect developed in the pro-intervention narrative. As Senator Domenici [R-NM] affirmed, "isn't it an invasion of a sovereign country by a military that is more than half American? I believe it is. You can make all kinds of rationalizations that it is not an invasion, but it is. Is it not a civil war? Yes, it is. Is it not a civil war of long lasting? It did not start last week" (1999).

As the conflict in Kosovo was qualified by the intervention non-supporters as a civil war, Senator Nickles (1999) was able to establish a link between U.S. past and the present situation to justify the decision of not using American military forces. Following his argument, the U.S. needed "to be very careful" because they too "had a Civil War (...) 130-some years ago, and 600,000 Americans lost their lives" and he was "glad [the U.S.] didn't have foreign powers intervene in [their] Civil War". In this sense, "the United States should be very wary of setting a precedent for

supporting independence movement within sovereign nations” (COLLINS, 1999), not only due its own historical past but also because if “there are humanitarian reasons to save the victims of this civil war” this is a “justification which will also require us to enter a civil war in Africa, and perhaps in Afghanistan, and in Lord knows how many other places around the world” (GORTON, 1999).

The urgency of Kosovo’s situation was placed by the pro-intervention narrative in its regional component as well, stating at that time that the situation on the ground “might lead to World War III if we let this conflict ensue between Serbia and Kosovo, because she [Secretary Albright] was referring back to World War II and World War I which started in this region of the world” (GREGG, 1999). The contra-narrative questioned this spill-over argument stressing that “the dynamics of the world have changed” because “there are no alliances which are going to cause the domino effect that is going to bring the death of the Archduke of the Austro-Hungarian Empire into play with Germany, with Prussia. There are no such alliances that exist today”. They also rebuffed some comparisons between the Balkan case and the Holocaust stating that “there is no Adolf Hitler who has the capacity to project force throughout Europe as a result of actions occurring in the Sudetenland of Czechoslovakia. In fact, the Balkans have been, for all intents and purposes, strategically bypassed” (GREGG, 1999).

As comparison goes, the correlation with the previous situation in Bosnia was also questioned. If in Kosovo the spill-over threat was not feasible, and the conflict was in fact a civil war, the logical conclusion was that the means to deal with this situation were different than the ones proposed by the competing narrative. Because of these arguments, the Congress representatives were able to introduce and answer the question why it was in the U.S. interest to intervene. Besides the civil war characterization that already put in doubt the U.S. responsibility to intervene, as stressed by House Representative John Duncan [R-TN] using a George Washington quotation of his farewell address in which he warned the U.S. “against entangling ourselves in the affairs of other nations” (DUNCAN, 1999), the contra-narrative also questioned the “Western connection”. Basically, the Congress representatives replaced the idea of US leadership: instead of deriving the US international leadership from its responsibility with Europe’s stability, they self-centered this idea and qualified it as the ability of the US and therefore the president to have restraint in his attempts to engage American forces abroad. While in the pro-intervention narrative the “West” is a relation that needed to be taken care and nurtured principally between the US and Europe, the contra-narrative presented the “West” as a byproduct of U.S. existence and actions.


This argument, therefore, opens space for a dichotomization of Europe's and America's interests. Kosovo, then, represented "a threat primarily to European, rather than American interests" and it was "the nations of Europe, therefore, that should lead the peace effort in Kosovo and that should bear the human and economic costs of any military action" (COLLINS, 1999).

The melting pot metaphor is an interesting one to evaluate the rupture with the "Western connection". As mentioned before, Albright's article to *The Washington Post* in 1995 used the shared common rejection of the Nazis discrimination of Jews during the holocaust to make a case that ethnic cleansing, not matter if in Germany or in the Balkans, are the antithesis of the American *ethos* sense of respectful and peaceful coexistence of differences. And because it goes against many of US core values - and, therefore, its identity's anchor points - as, for example, the values of freedom, justice, and democracy (if not in the state structure sense, but at least in the democratic principles of freedom of speech, of association, movement, and etc.), it is part of America's moral obligation to help others build and share those same values. As Congress representatives of the pro-narrative stated many times, in Kosovo the principles the U.S. stands for - the principles of democracy, freedom and justice - were at stake. The contra-narrative, on the other hand, used the same metaphor to justify America's non-action. In Senator Gregg's words:

We cannot understand it as Americans because we are a melting pot, and we do not have that type of hatred in our Nation. A lot of people came to the United States, however, to get away from it and immigrated here for that purpose. They knew it as a culture. So what arrogance do we have as a nation, sitting here across the ocean, that we think we can project arms into a region, putting American lives at risk, and stabilize that region which has not been able to settle things out for hundreds of years—hundreds of years. I think it is foolish for us to presume that (GREGG, 1999).

Both narratives advance the melting pot metaphor in an exceptionalist fashion and picture the US as a superior country. The difference between them it is not in the isolationist/internationalist dichotomy, to avoid the simplifications once made in debates about U.S. foreign policy, because the preference to lead by example does not exempt the US of international interventions, while the preference of an active international engagement, on the other hand, does to preclude policies at home that intend to develop US institutions and values. The difference, however, must be placed, at least in the Kosovo case, in America's relation to Europe. In the pro-narrative there is a superiority component but at the same time this perception coexists with the understanding that both US and Europe share the same roots and are part of a common whole. In the contra-narrative, it acknowledges the US came from a European descendance but US

development made it something different from Europe, superior and distinct. Because of this differentiation, the spanning set of the contra-narrative could be drawn as the following:



(Developed by the author)

The core of this narrative is not the US relation with Europe, but the US relation with itself. The connection with Europe is loosely established by institutional arrangements, as NATO. As the narrative characterizes the situation in Kosovo as a civil war, with both guilty parts and no similarities with Bosnia, and as a European problem, to complete its arguments it questions how the problem should be addressed and presents a different solution. Instead of placing NATO's credibility in its action in Kosovo, the representatives against the intervention affirm NATO's credibility might be damaged not if does not act, but if it acts in Kosovo. Because its engagement was perceived as an "extraordinary departure from what was envisioned in the NATO charter" (WILSON, 1999), Congress representatives were suspicious that Kosovo not only might set a "dangerous precedent for NATO" (COLLINS, 1999) but also that it "which was a defense alliance" could be turned into "an aggressive, perhaps, declare-of-war [alliance] on a country that is not in NATO" (HUTCHINSON, 1999). Besides, this narrative also proposed that NATO did not have the conditions to deal with Kosovo and "instead of bringing stability, it may bring instability" as "it may be forcing, as a resulting of this bombing, Mr. Milosevic instead of his response being to

move back into greater Serbia and away from Kosovo, he may be more assertive and aggressive and he may want to strike out against the United States” (NICKLES, 1999).

As this narrative is self-centered in the United States, the anchor points of liberty⁵⁸ (freedom) and democracy will be developed thinking not about America’s international role, but on its domestic dimension. In this sense, instead of placing freedom as something to be exported, it is advanced as a national value that must be strengthened so democracy could be maintained in the US. As House Representative Ron Paul [R-TX] affirms, “the Founders of this great Nation abhorred tyranny and loved liberty. The power of the king to wage war, tax and abuse the personal rights of the American colonists drove them to rebel, win a revolution and codify their convictions in a new Constitution” (PAUL, 1999). Liberty and democracy, although the latter not expressly mentioned, were constructed in opposition to tyranny; and, following this narrative, it would be a tyrant move not only if Clinton engaged U.S. forces without Congress approval, but also if the U.S. projected arms against Kosovo in its arrogance to stabilize the region.

The final component of the contra-narrative is its proposed solution for the crisis in Kosovo. “Instead of us just bombing, why don’t we just give them some support? Why don’t we give them some munitions and help them defend themselves?”. “Instead of sending troops, we wanted to take the arms embargo off and allow them to defend themselves” (NICKLES, 1999). As the non-supporters of the intervention were mainly Republicans, the comparison with previous Republican governments is no surprise. As Senator Hutchinson [R-AR] affirms “the difference between the Clinton doctrine and the Reagan doctrine is that President Reagan would support freedom fighters with arms, with monetary contributions, with intelligence (...) but he would never put a U.S. military person in the middle of a civil war” (1999).

In March 24th, 1999 the NATO bombing started. This same day Clinton addressed the nation about the airstrikes on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. In his speech he responded two Congress contra- intervention arguments. First, to argument of the intrinsic violent character of the Balkans, Clinton affirmed:

At the time, many people believed nothing could be done to end the bloodshed in Bosnia. They said, "Well, that's just the way those people in the Balkans are." But when we and our allies joined with courageous Bosnians to stand up to the aggressors, we helped to end

⁵⁸ The contra-narrative spanning set used the word liberty instead of freedom in an attempt to faithfully convey the rhetorical dispositions used by Congress representatives. However, in terms of meaning, the ideas of freedom and liberty are understood as synonyms in this thesis.

the war. We learned that in the Balkans, inaction in the face of brutality simply invites more brutality, but firmness can stop armies and save lives. We must apply that lesson in Kosovo before what happened in Bosnia happens there, too (CLINTON, 1999).

Second, with the rhetorical question whether U.S. “interests in Kosovo justify the dangers to our Armed Forces?”, Clinton answered he was convinced “that the dangers of acting are far outweighed by the dangers of not acting—dangers to defenseless people and to our national interests” because “if we and our allies were to allow this war to continue with no response, President Milosevic would read our hesitation as a license to kill” and “there would be many more massacres, tens of thousands more refugees, more victims crying out for revenge” (CLINTON, 1999).

With these two responses to Congress, Clinton contributes to strengthen the pro-narrative arguments by filling the some of the gaps explored by the competing narrative. Also, as he reinforced the already developed arguments of NATO’s role and the “Western connection”, Clinton uses his authority position to consolidate those arguments and legitimate the intervention. However, more important than the responses to Congress and the consolidation of those two arguments was Clinton’s development of the anchor points of freedom and democracy in his 24th March discourse. Instead of subsuming those anchor points to the economic logic, as he usually had done in his SoU addresses, Clinton established them as individually important values in the U.S. decision to intervene in Kosovo. And although he does not meditate on those anchor point’s importance to the U.S. and presents them in a policy-oriented fashion, at least this presentation exists and is focused on Kosovo case, and not set in general policy terms. In his words:

I have a responsibility as President to deal with problems such as this before they do permanent harm to our national interests. America has a responsibility to stand with our allies when they are trying to save innocent lives and preserve peace, freedom, and stability in Europe. That is what we are doing in Kosovo. (...) Ending this tragedy is a moral imperative. It is also important to America's national interest. Take a look at this map. Kosovo is a small place, but it sits on a major fault line between Europe, Asia, and the Middle East, at the meeting place of Islam and both the Western and Orthodox branches of Christianity. To the south are our allies Greece and Turkey; to the north, our new democratic allies in central Europe. All the ingredients for a major war are there: ancient grievances; struggling democracies; and in the center of it all, a dictator in Serbia who has done nothing since the cold war ended but start new wars and pour gasoline on the flames of ethnic and religious division. (...) Already, this movement is threatening the young democracy in Macedonia, which has its own Albanian minority and a Turkish minority. (CLINTON, 1999).

Both democracy and freedom, as the pro-intervention spanning set tries to illustrate, were consolidated by Clinton, and also by some Congress representatives and other members of his

administration, as common anchor points between Europe and America. Freedom and democracy must be defended and defending those values is part of why the U.S. has a responsibility to Europe. In this sense, differently from the contra-narrative that advanced the anchor points of liberty/freedom and democracy as part of both Europe and the U.S. formation, but as a superior quality of the American *ethos*, the pro-intervention narrative not only plays with the U.S. identity, as it invokes these same anchor points, but specially constructs the shared identity of America and Europe.

Although it is impossible to attribute a positivist causal link which states that because of this narrative the Senate approved the resolution authorizing the President to conduct military air operations and missile strikes against the FRY, we can infer nonetheless that throughout this legitimation process, the pro-intervention narrative constructed the necessary conditions (JACKSON, 2006) for the Senate authorization and the U.S./NATO military engagement in Kosovo.

4. THE US INTERVENTION IN THE GULF: SHOWING US HEGEMONY

Thou, too, sail on, O Ship of State!
 Sail on, O Union, strong and great!
 Humanity with all its fears,
 With all the hopes of future years,
 Is hanging breathless on thy fate! (...)
 Sail on, nor fear to breast the sea!
 Our hearts, our hopes, are all with thee,
 Our hearts, our hopes, our prayers, our tears,
 Our faith triumphant o'er our fears,
 Are all with thee, — are all with thee!
 (The Building of the Ship - Henry W. Longfellow)

4.1 Brief history of the action of the United States in the Persian Gulf

The 1990-1991 Gulf War was marked by the post-Cold War changes. In this context, the conflict was both agent and patient in this process of international reconfiguration. The distension in US-USSR relations minimized the antagonisms in their respective foreign policy positions and allowed, albeit with divergences as to the speed in the use of force, that both converged to a position of condemnation of the Iraqi invasion in Kuwait. The condition of patient occurred due to the relativization of the Iraqi-Soviet partnership, as the Soviet Union prioritized the establishment of closer relations with the United States. On the other hand, the Gulf War was used by H. W. Bush as a symbolic event of the new international order in which, after the end of the East-West conflict, the United States would affirm itself as the only power with capacity to establish an international leadership. Besides being used as an example of this new order, the success of the Gulf War, from both a political and military standpoint, as we shall see, produced developments that will serve as parameters throughout the 21st century for US foreign policy - regarding the military aspect, it introduced a new strategic approach based on the massive use of aerial bombardments prior to a ground-based offensive, while on the political aspect it enabled the US to downsize the emotional weight of the Vietnam syndrome, as the Gulf War elevated the military via as a more 'deployable' means of pursuing American objectives.

Although the Iraqi case - either at the time of the Gulf War or the 2003 intervention - is an emblematic event for US foreign policy in the passage of the 20th to the 21st century, the active presence of the United States in the region has, however, a previous history. In 1947, President

Truman already formally committed the US to Saudi Arabia by entering into an agreement that would guarantee full US mobilization, under the auspices of the United Nations, in case of threat or actual aggression against the partner. Until 1968, however, the United Kingdom was the great actor who handled the security issues in the region, with the United States being only a secondary agent. As the US gained prominence and Great Britain relatively declined in importance, the power spaces in the Gulf were occupied by the United States, although the latter preferred, at first, to keep an indirect relationship towards the region, as in the case of the Nixon Doctrine twin pillars policy (YETIV, 2008, TRIPP, 2007).

This policy emerged mainly because of concerns about the signing of the Iraq-Soviet Union Cooperation and Friendship Agreement in 1972, the reason why Nixon and his national security adviser, Henry Kissinger, on a visit to Iran, sought an agreement that would counterbalance the Soviets' action in the Gulf. The negotiations involved advantages in the purchase of US armaments, including those with state-of-the-art technology and related technical support, in exchange for the sale of oil at reasonable prices and maintaining regional security. Some of these advantages were also granted to Saudi Arabia, under the same logic of restraining the Soviet Union's advancement in the region. With these two regional pillars, instead of directly taking responsibility for the stability in the Gulf, Nixon delegated that function first to Iran, which had a greater capacity to equate forces with Iraq, and second to Saudi Arabia. Although this strategy improved US-Iran relations, it has proved to be short-lived when, from the mid-1970s onward, the relationship between the countries began to deteriorate not only because Iran tried to sustain its defense policy by elevating the oil prices, but also due to increased internal tensions with the opposition to Shah Reza Pahlavi. The ultimate moment of rupture in the twin pillars policy took place mainly because of the Iranian Revolution of 1979, which replaced a monarchy of pro-American bases by an Islamic government with anti-American characteristics.

If previously the US foreign policy assigned the Gulf security to its two pillars, since the 1980s the new domestic and regional configurations permitted the United States a direct commitment. In this sense, the Carter Doctrine replaced the previous strategy with a new approach that sought to increase the capacity of the United States not only of discouraging external pressures on the Gulf, but also of dealing with its internal regional tensions. With Reagan's government, and the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war, the US position assumed a more interventionist tone, accelerating efforts to prepare for any contingency. During the first year of the Iran-Iraq war, however, the

United States assumed a position of “benign neglect”; in other words, insofar as the governments of both countries presented themselves as anti-American, an approximation would hardly bring advantages to the US; in addition, the United States considered that the conflict itself would be convenient as it could weaken both States.

In 1982, with the war favoring Iran, Washington tried to counterbalance it by helping Iraq; not only the country was removed from the list of states that supported terrorism⁵⁹, but also received American intelligence about enemy positions, which enabled the transfer of weapons by land, and strengthened Iraqi defenses in sensitive areas, especially in the city of Basra. The following year, with the war still pending to Iran’s possible victory, the United States intensified high-level conversations with Iraq, also sending the presidential emissary and CEO of the multinational company G. D. Searle & Company, at the time Donald Rumsfeld⁶⁰, to Baghdad, where he met with Saddam Hussein and affirmed that both Iraq and the United States had common interests in restraining Syrian and Iranian advances.

The domestic perception of Reagan’s assertiveness as an example of a successful conduction of American foreign policy was put in check sixteen years later because of the scandal of the Iran-Contra affair. The revelation that Washington agreed to sell weapons to Iran in exchange for it exerting influence over Hezbollah for the release of seven American hostages in Lebanon, as well as directing part of the revenue from these sales to finance the anti-communist group Contra in Nicaragua, greatly impaired the United States image with the Arab countries. They came to perceive US foreign policy for the Gulf as cynical and unreliable for a number of reasons: first, not only had Washington established a weapons embargo against Iran, but also Rumsfeld, in his meeting with Saddam, had asserted that the United States was encouraging other countries to assume a similar position (YETIV, 2008); in addition, the Iran-Contra affair was against the emphatic US position of not negotiating with terrorists, either directly or indirectly.

⁵⁹ Iraq was placed on the list of countries that support terrorism after nationalizing its oil industry in 1972. When it was removed from the list, under Reagan’s government, the country received dual-use weapons from the United States, as well as credits from the US Department of Agriculture, which illegally financed most of these war purchases (CLARK, 2002).

⁶⁰ As we will see in this chapter, Donald Rumsfeld’s visit to Iraq in the 1980s is an interesting example of our approach that the 1990 Gulf War and the 2003 Iraq War are two events that have a history *continuum*, and one can hypothesize that they configure the same intervention in the process of which there are two peaks in the enhancement of tensions. After September 11, Donald Rumsfeld becomes George W. Bush’s government defense secretary, and one of the main voices in the administration favoring a military intervention in Iraq to remove Saddam Hussein.

Even after the agreement became public, Reagan maintained the arms-for-hostages strategy with the justification that it served American national interests. Thus, weapons sales allowed Iran to gain strategic victories in the Iran-Iraq war, such as the conquest of the Al-Faw peninsula, without which Iraqi access to the sea would be blocked, and Basra would become more vulnerable to a possible Iranian advance. Although this victory was not immediately counterbalanced by the United States, Iran's continued strength in the conflict, and its refusal to accept a ceasefire with Iraq, led Washington to reshape American foreign policy in favor of Baghdad. One of the triggers for such a change was Iran's attacks on Kuwaiti oil tankers, in retaliation to Kuwait's aid to Iraq.

The conflict spill-over triggered by Iran to other Gulf countries, which directly or indirectly helped Iraq, created in the United States the perception that the Iranian objective was not only to defeat its opponent but, above all, to consolidate itself as the only regional power. Although United States and Iran had undertaken circumstantial approximations during the war, Khomeini's government was verbally against the presence of the United States in the region, and thus the American fear was based on the possibility of the entrapment of the Gulf to Washington's interests in case of Iranian prevalence after the conflict. Thus, Reagan acceded to Kuwait's request for the replacement of the Kuwaiti tankers' flag by North American flags, in order to contain Iran and prevent its possible hegemonic pretensions in the region, as well as to redeem the United States with the other Arab countries after the Iran-Contra affair (YETIV, 2004; 2008).

Broadly speaking, the US foreign policy fluctuated between the two opponents of the Iran-Iraq war, assisting both at the same time in certain periods of the conflict. The inexistence of a pro-American partner made the weakness of both Iran and Iraq the most favorable outcome for the United States. Henry Kissinger himself claimed at the time that "unfortunately both countries could not lose the war" and that "he hoped that both would kill each other" in the conflict (CHUBIN; TRIPP, 1988). Washington, however, did not trust Saddam and even feared his intentions for the Gulf, but the strengthening of revolutionary Iran put Iraq as a lesser evil, especially one with capabilities to contain Iranian spreading. With the cessation of hostilities, Iraq left the conflict economically devastated, and with no way out to the sea. The invasion of Kuwait two years later will be part of this Iraqi sentiment still in relation to the previous war.

4.2 The political-military escalation of the Gulf War

With Iraq's poor financial situation after the Iran-Iraq war, and having incurred in large debts with Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, the country could only rely on oil export revenues - the most important product of its economy - to restructure itself. The driving force behind Iraq's invasion of Kuwait was Saddam's accusation, during the 1990's Arab League meeting, that the Kuwaiti government was not respecting the oil production quotas, pumping more than what was agreed and, therefore, lowering the gallon price in the international market. According to Salinger and Laurent (1991), the beginning of this Kuwaiti policy of increasing oil production began on August 8, 1988, that is, one day after the ceasefire between Iran and Iraq, exactly when these countries would need even more of their export earnings to sustain the reconstruction processes. This attitude, which would go against OPEC's guidelines, pushed the barrel of crude oil down from \$21 to \$11, generating an estimated loss of \$14 billion a year to Iraq. In March 1989, Kuwait would demand a fifty percent increase in its OPEC's quotas, an order that was rejected in June of that same year. Because of this refusal, the Kuwaiti government oil minister stated that his country would no longer be restricted to any quota (SALINGER; LAURENT, 1991 apud CLARK, 2002).

Later, in addition to the justification of the quotas, Saddam would incorporate the complaint that Kuwait was using the oil from the Iraqi part of the field of Rumaila, located near the border between the countries⁶¹. Apart from this factor, Saddam also accused Kuwait of not forgiving Iraqi's war debt incurred due to the Iran-Iraq war, and of refusing to assist it with new post-war reconstruction credits. From Saddam's point of view, his country had sacrificed infrastructure, men, and finances to restrain the Islamic fundamentalist threat of Iran, a restraint that was of interest to other Arab countries, especially the Gulf states, since one of Khomeini's goals was to use political means to remove the monarchies of the region. In this sense, Saddam believed that if Iraq had financial debts with some countries, especially with Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, these latter had a moral debt with Iraq, therefore owing loyalty to it (YETIV, 2004). A territorial component was also considered in the disputes between Iraq and Kuwait: according to Saddam, Iraq's formation consisted of three provinces - Mosul, Baghdad and Basra - and the Kuwaiti territory was part of

⁶¹ Saddam's accusation stemmed from the fear that, in possession of high technology for drilling and oil exploration imported from the United States, Kuwait would be withdrawing, from its territory, Iraqi oil.

the province of Basra when the Ottoman Empire controlled the region⁶² and, therefore, its return to Iraqi control would be legitimate.

In an article for *The New Yorker*, Middle East expert Milton Viorst (1991) interviewed members of the US and Kuwait administrations, including Kuwait's Minister of Foreign Affairs at the time, Sheikh Salem al-Sabah. In his report, al-Sabah stated that General Schwarzkopf - the future commander of the Desert Shield and Desert Storm operations - routinely visited Kuwait before the war to discuss military cooperation matters, so that when Kuwait was invaded by Iraq, its government believed that it could count on the United States. Also, in an interview with Kuwaiti University political scientist Mussama al-Mubarak, Viorst (1991) points out that the professor confessed that he did not understand the position of his government at the time, which made him think that "the decisions were not only by Kuwait (...) [and that the latter] had certainly consulted Saudi Arabia, the United Kingdom, as well as the United States about its policy."

Throughout June 1990, Iraq sent a number of representatives to the Arab states to seek for support in its request for an increase in crude oil prices with OPEC. Besides not accepting the Iraqi request, Kuwait rejected the proposal of a meeting among Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates to discuss the problem. Finally, on July 10, a meeting was held with the oil ministers of the aforementioned States, and they agreed, on this occasion, on the establishment of quotas that would allow an increase in the price of crude oil. Once he returned to Kuwait, after a meeting with Emir Jaber III, the Kuwaiti minister backed out of the agreements that had been established and announced that his government would greatly increase oil production from October that year (CLARK, 2002).

The escalation of tensions between the two countries led to the Iraqi Republican Guard being ordered to move to the south of the country on July 16, 1990, putting a large contingent of troops on the border with Kuwait. Because this was the elite division of Iraq's military, equipped with weapons of Soviet origin, no Arab country, except for Israel, had, individually, material conditions to contain it. The day after the mobilization, Saddam publicly accused Kuwait and the United States of conspiring to destroy his country's economy. In his words, he pointed out that "the

⁶² To build Kuwait, the British government separated a desert area from Iraq, adding it to the Bubiyan and Warba islands, which dominated Iraqi access to the Gulf. Thus, the boundaries of Kuwait, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia were artificially defined by the United Kingdom in 1921 and 1923, respectively, removing from Iraq its historic control over this coastal territory (CLARK, 2002; TRIPP, 2007).

policies of some Arab rulers are American (...) they are inspired by America to undermine Arab interests and security (...) If words fail to protect Iraqis, something effective must be done to return things to their natural course and to return usurped rights to their owners.” (IBRAHIM, 1990).

Because of this speech, the President of Egypt, and United States’ great ally in the region, Hosni Mubarak, was sent to Iraq at the request of the Arab countries, especially Kuwait, to track Saddam’s plans. At this meeting, Mubarak affirmed that he had questioned Saddam about his intentions for the region, asking him objectively if there were any intentions on the part of Iraq to attack or invade Kuwait. According to the president of Egypt, Saddam’s response had been very clear: “No, but don't tell the Kuwaitis about that”. Mubarak's immediate reaction was to call the White House to communicate Bush Senior that Saddam was only bluffing because of his desperation for financial aid, but that the Arab countries alone would be able to cope with the tensions among their peers. (FRONTLINE, 1997).

The day after this meeting, Saddam requested a meeting with the US ambassador to Iraq, April Glaspie, which took place on the 25th of that month. During the interview, Saddam asked the ambassador what the US position would be if Iraq were to carry out an assault on Kuwait, and the response he obtained was that the United States had no direct interests in Arab disputes in general, including tensions between the Iraqi and Kuwaiti governments. If Saddam was already thinking about attacking Kuwait at that time, the North American response was interpreted, if not as a green light, at least as a guarantee that Washington would hardly be involved in a possible conflict.

According to Rick Atkinson, an award-winning Washington Post international correspondent, and the guest interviewed in the Frontline documentary (1997) on the Gulf War, Glaspie only complied with the directives provided by the US State Department, which after the Iran-Iraq war dealt with Baghdad through the policy of “tough love”, in the words of the reporter. This policy of “constructive engagement” developed by Washington aimed at getting closer to Iraq because, as the latter left the war as the most powerful country in the Gulf, the US administration believed it was more advantageous to keep Saddam closer, especially through the reinforcement of US-Iraq business, to restrain possible attitudes that would be contrary to the interests of the United States in the region. According to the Secretary of State James Baker, the relationship between the United States and Iraq in the period between 1988-1990 was conciliatory, as reflected in the National Security Directive 26. In it, it is stated that “normal relations between the United States and Iraq would serve our [North American] longer-term interests and promote stability in both the

Gulf and the Middle East,” emphasizing that “the United States Government should propose economic and political incentives for Iraq to moderate its behavior and to increase our [US] influence with Iraq”.

Still during the meeting between Glaspie and Saddam, Tariq Aziz, Iraq foreign minister at the time, said that the president had received a call from Mubarak, in which the Egyptian president reported that he had traveled to Kuwait and Saudi Arabia and was able to arrange a meeting between Saddam and emir Jaber III, from Kuwait, in Jeddah, Saudi territory. Glaspie put this information in her memorandum to Washington, saying that she believed there was space for a peaceful resolution between the countries, and the United States should therefore only monitor the situation through diplomatic channels (WIKILEAKS, 1990a; 1990b; 1990c)⁶³. During the meeting in Jeddah, the Iraqi government required four things from Kuwait - to comply with OPEC quotas, to give the southeastern part of the field of Rumaila at the border, to forgive Iraqi war debts, and to grant compensation for the financial losses resulting from the artificial decline of the oil prices - for which Kuwait insisted on a definitive agreement that proposed the elimination of Iraqi debts in exchange for permanent demarcation of borders (EL-NAJJAR, 2001). The negotiations lasted two days, until August 1, 1990, without any final agreement between the parties. In a diplomatic correspondence between Glaspie and Washington, the ambassador said that Saddam had promised Mubarak that no action by Iraq would be taken until the end of the meeting in Jeddah, and also that no action would be taken after the meeting, in case the Kuwaitis finally offered some hope (WIKILEAKS, 1990d)⁶⁴. The movement of troops, which had begun two days earlier, on August 2, 1990, resulted in an effective invasion by Iraq into Kuwait territory.

Following the meeting of the League of Arab States, on August 9 and 10, 1990, the representative of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), Yasser Arafat, told the journalists that a peaceful resolution for the conflict could have taken place in May of that year during a

⁶³ On March 21, 1991, at the end of the Gulf War, April Glaspie denied this version to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, even stating that her position on the time was to have repeatedly warned Saddam Hussein that the United States would not tolerate violence as a means of resolving disputes with Kuwait. The ambassador added that Hussein must have been stupid enough to understand that the United States would not react in case of an attack or invasion of Kuwait. However, in July of the same year, Glaspie's correspondence with Washington was made available to the Commission, confirming that her statement did not correspond to reality and that the version of correspondence provided by Baghdad was, in fact, really true (CLARK, 2002). For more information on Glaspie's case, see Stephen Walt's (2011) article on Foreign Policy, and Glenn Kessler's (2008) article on The Washington Post.

⁶⁴In the original: “‘I told Mubarak,’ Saddam said, that ‘nothing will happen until the meeting and nothing will happen during or after the meeting if the kuwaitis will at last give us some hope’”.

meeting of Arab countries in Baghdad, at the time of Saddam's offer to negotiate a mutually acceptable definition of the Kuwaiti border. Considering that the Iraqi government had never admitted that Kuwait was not part of Iraq, such a position could be considered as a great advance. However, still according to Arafat, Kuwait would have been discouraged from negotiating with the Iraqi government after receiving a message from Washington, which was transmitted by the Secretary General of the League of Arab States, Chadli Klibi.

During the meeting on August 9-10, the Algerian President, Chadli Benjedid, received several guarantees from the head of the Iraqi delegation, Prime Minister Taha Yasin Ramadan, that his country would leave Kuwait if the Arab commission came to a satisfactory compromise. The possibility of establishing an Arab commission was, however, according to Arafat, "torpedoed" by the resolution led by Egypt condemning the invasion and inviting Western forces to stay in Saudi Arabia to help in the liberation of Kuwait (MOFFETT III, 1991). Approaches more critical towards the US position in the conflict (CLARK, 2002; SALINGER; LAURENT, 1991) point out that Mubarak was under great pressure from the United States, which sought a more compelling positioning by the Arab community. According to Salinger and Laurent (apud CLARK, 2002), State Secretary Assistant John Kelly sent a message to the Egyptian Foreign Minister stating:

The West has done its duty, but the Arab nation are doing nothing. The United States has sold a lot of arms to Arab countries, especially Egypt. If they do not act, if they do not take a firm stand on the Kuwait affair, they can be sure that in the future they will no longer be able to count on America (SALINGER, LAURENT, 1991 APUD CLARK, 2002, p. 25).

The resolution proposed by Egypt endorsed United Nations Security Council resolutions 660, 661 and 662 and, although approved, divided the Arab community. Twelve countries voted in favor - Bahrain, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Oman and Qatar (the six countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council⁶⁵), together with Egypt, Syria, Morocco, Lebanon, Somalia and Djibouti - while of the remaining 9, three voted against - Iraq, Libya and the PLO⁶⁶ - two abstained - Algeria and Yemen, three expressed reservations - Jordan, Mauritania and Sudan, and Tunisia expressed its position by the gesture of not attending the meeting (MADDY-WEITZMAN, 1991). Still in his interview to journalists, Arafat revealed that at the time of the August meeting he had approached the representative of Kuwait and asked him if the Kuwaiti government needed a

⁶⁵ The Gulf Cooperation Council, best known as GCC.

⁶⁶ The following day, PLO changed its vote to abstention (MADDY-WEITZMAN, 1991).

resolution or a solution because, through the commission, part of the Arab community was making proposals to solve the conflict. The answer Arafat received was that in some days the Americans would solve the problem⁶⁷ (MOFFETT III, 1991). According to him,

All efforts to establish a dialogue were torpedoed. The United States wanted the meeting to sanction the sending of foreign troops. They wanted support for a military intervention. If the United States had initially supported the negotiations, Saddam probably would not have invaded Kuwait. If Kuwait had not said no to the Iraqi final offer in Jeddah on August 1, 1990, 'the events could have been different', according to Saddam (MOFFETT III, 1991).

Between 1988 and 1990, Baghdad attempted a diplomatic solution to the dispute with Kuwait, receiving repeated denials from its neighbor. Although Saddam is one of the most controversial characters of the 20th century, and while we do not want to present an unrestricted defense of Iraq that could legitimize the invasion of Kuwait, the development of historical facts, and the bilateral and multilateral attacks seem to show us that the use of force was a desperate means to resolve the economic issue in Iraq. Ambassador Glaspie herself (WIKILEAKS, 1990b), in a memorandum to Washington, highlighted this point, stating that Saddam's acceptance of Mubarak's mediation, and the agreement of a meeting of officials in Jeddah reinforces our view that the central issue for Iraq is financial income, not the border"⁶⁸.

4.3 The American narratives for the Gulf War intervention

The immediate international mobilization of the United States about the invasion was to call the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) for an emergency meeting, in which it issued Resolution 660 of August 2, 1990, the first condemning Iraq's attitude. The resolution demanded the immediate withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait and urged both States to establish direct negotiations. The vote had 14 votes in favor and one abstention, coming from the Yemeni delegation, putting an end to the atmosphere of UNSC's paralyzation established in the Cold War (UNSC, 1990a). On the same day, President Bush signed two executive orders to freeze assets of Iraq and Kuwait in the United States - the former was to prohibit economic transactions between US and Iraqi banks, restricting Iraq's access to capital outside the country, while the latter tried to

⁶⁷ In the original: "They said that in a matter of days the Americans will solve the problem".

⁶⁸ In the original: "That Saddam accepted Mubarak's mediation and agreed with a meeting of officials in Jeddah reinforces our view that the central issue for Iraq is revenue, not the border".

keep Kuwaiti assets intact and inaccessible to the illegitimate authority that assumed its government (BUSH, 1990a; BUSH 1990b).

US military conjectures also began only hours after the invasion of Kuwait began. On August 3, 1990, the Commander-in-Chief of the United States Central Command (USCINCCENT), Norman Schwarzkopf, informed the US Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Colin Powell, about the military options available⁶⁹. The order for troop mobilization was issued four days after the occupation, on August 6, 1990, using as a strategic basis the operational plan 1002-90. On this plan, it is interesting to note that Iraq was already considered by the United States a possible threat to the region, even before the escalating tensions of the Gulf War. From late 1988 on, the entry of Norman Schwarzkopf as Commander-in-Chief of the US Central Command, and the easing of US-USSR relations contributed to the reformulation of the operational plan 1002 - the assessment of a scenario involving confrontation with Soviet Union in Iran was replaced by the possible threat by Iraq to its Gulf neighbors, especially to Kuwait and Saudi Arabia (CRAFT, 1992).

As early as March 1989, the United States performed a war simulation to test the new operational plan 1002-90. The aim of this simulation was to evaluate the hypotheses of US action for the prevention and/or restraint in case of a regional power to gain control of the share of oil offers or oil supply routes, so that it would compromise the interests of the United States and their allies in the Gulf. The conclusions drawn from the simulation will be relevant to further assessing the intents involved in the pace at which the military mobilizations took place in the Desert Storm operation. It showed that US forces could not make it to the theater of operations in time to resist a possible Iraqi invasion if the troop dislocation was initiated immediately after the hostilities. It was also identified that the military infrastructure allocated in the region was insufficient to achieve any of the hypotheses of action raised by the operational plan 1002-90, and that for an extensive incursion in the Gulf, the logistical support of some regional power would be essential (CRAFT, 1992). At the time of the Gulf War, the United States searched for help in Saudi Arabia.

Analyzes of the development of negotiations on Saudi support are not, however, a matter of common ground in the literature. According to President Bush's speeches, and interviews with

⁶⁹ During the meeting of the National Security Council on this day, Powell questioned whether it was worth going to war to free Kuwait, a question for which he was reprimanded by Cheney. He warned Powell "Look, you just do military options. Don't be the Secretary of State or the Secretary of Defense or the National Security Adviser. You just do military options". (FRONTLINE, 1997).

his main command-line agents, Cheney, Powell and Schwarzkopf, the sending of troops to Saudi Arabia occurred because of their fears about the conflict spill over to a possible Iraqi entry into Saudi territory. After sending satellite images to the Saudi royal family about the moves of ⁷⁰ Iraqi troops towards the border, Cheney, Powell, Robert Gates (the national security agency deputy director at the time), Paul Wolfowitz (an assistant member of the Department of Defense), and Schwarzkopf traveled to Saudi Arabia to negotiate an authorization on the use of the local infrastructure⁷¹. At this meeting, according to Bush's administration, the Saudis would have agreed with the American request, but with the reservation, expressed several times in both the US speeches and in those by Saudi Arabia, about the temporary nature of the presence of US troops.

The truth about the existence of a real threat to Saudi Arabia is an open-ended element: if on the one hand press secretary Marlin Fitzwater's speech points out that "we believe that there is an imminent threat to Saudi Arabia due to the positioning and location of the Iraqi troops in Kuwait", on the other hand Woodward points out that, just before the US delegation arrived in Saudi Arabia, King Fahd had sent men to the Kuwait border to check the position of Iraqi troops, and did not confirm the existence of an immediate threat. Although not being able to state which of the positions is closest to the status of conflict tensions, or whether the send of US troop was a concession or a request from the Saudis⁷², what can be said based on the documents and interviews obtained in Frontline's collection is that the United States did not have the strategic conditions to confront Iraqis in Kuwait without support from Saudi Arabia, and without their permission to allocate US troops. In the words by Schwarzkopf,

"There was absolutely no way in the world we could rapidly deploy our air forces if we couldn't go in and use the Saudi military airfields that were in place. There was no way we could possibly deploy the Marine Corps and bring in the Marine pre-positioned ships

⁷⁰ Regarding these images, the investigative reporter Jean Heller (St. Petersburg Times and Associated Press) said that, in a conversation with the Secretary of Defense, Dick Cheney at the time, she asked him to see the images about the movement of Iraqi troops towards Arabia Saudi, reinforcing that she did not have to take the photos with her, nor copy them. It was enough that she saw them to prove that her opinion was wrong. According to the journalist, the secretary has repeatedly refused to present this material, so that everyone familiar with the issue of the invasion of Kuwait concluded that Bush's administration had lied to the Saudis in order to get their authorization to allocate US troops (HELLER, 2001).

⁷¹ On August 3, 1990, Cheney and Powell held a meeting with the Saudi ambassador to the United States, Prince Bandar bin Sultan, who was more pro-Western than most of the other members of the Saudi royal family, with him even being involved in secret US operations, such as the Iran-Contra affair. It was through the satellite images provided by Cheney and Powell that the ambassador was able to get the acceptance from the Saudi royal family to receive the US delegation.

⁷² According to Yetiv (2004), one of King Fahd's fears about US troop allocation was to displease religious right-wing groups in his country, who did not welcome the presence of the United States on 'holy ground', especially in the country that houses the two most important Islam's sanctuaries, Mecca and Medina.

.. equipment, without using the Saudi ports. So, it was absolutely necessary to have the Saudis' permission to come in because of the sovereignty of the nation of Saudi Arabia and the number of forces we were going to bring into the country and it was absolutely necessary to have their approval because we very, very much needed to use their equipment.” (SCHWARZKOPF, 1997).

Being accused of a possible invasion of Saudi Arabia, Saddam vehemently denied this possibility, explaining that both countries, besides having good bilateral relations, had established a non-aggression pact in 1989. Although the administration could possibly believe, at certain moments, in Saddam Hussein's words about containing the conflict at Kuwaiti borders, two moments in President Bush's speeches established, in our view, a 'point of no return' in which the United States' inaction was no longer an alternative.

The first moment was on August 5, 1990 when, in a speech about the invasion of Kuwait, Bush stated that this aggression would not remain without a response from the United States⁷³. The second moment, and perhaps the most assertive one, was on August 8 of the same year, when the President established, for the first time, at least for the first time publicly in his speech, the metaphor between the situations in the Gulf, and the Sudetenlands in World War II, comparing Saddam's attitudes to those of Hitler⁷⁴. These two statements, especially the second one, were used by Bush's administration to produce, in the American imaginary, a demonized image of Saddam and his attitudes towards Kuwait. While on the one hand such a metaphor helped to get support from public opinion for the 1991 Desert Storm operation, on the other hand it established an expectation, or even a kind of script, for the American action - from it, any other attitude other than a strong and energetic approach towards Iraq would be in dissonance with Bush's speech.

The approximation of these two historical facts came not only from Bush's military experience in World War II, but also from his personal readings of the president at the time of the Gulf War on the WWII subject. According to Scowcroft, the metaphor came from a "book [Martin Gilbert - *The Second World War: The Complete History*] that he was reading, and the parallels between the atrocities that the Nazis perpetrated in Poland and what he heard about what was happening in Kuwait were striking" (FRONTLINE, 1997)⁷⁵. Although strong, the metaphor was

⁷³ In Bush's words (1990a), "this will not stand. This will not stand, this aggression against Kuwait".

⁷⁴ In Bush's words (1990b), "But if history teaches us anything, it is that we must resist aggression or it will destroy our freedoms. Appeasement does not work. As was the case in the 1930's, we see in Saddam Hussein an aggressive dictator threatening his neighbors".

⁷⁵ In the original: "And I remember at this time he was reading a book about World War II, a massive book and he was right in the early part of it about the Nazi invasion of Poland, and that's where all the statements that the President

adopted by other decision makers in the Gulf War, among them Margaret Thatcher who, in her interview to Frontline (1997) pointed out that her experience in the Falkland Islands War, and the experience of her generation and Bush's generation in World War II showed what the consequences are when there is no firm and quick action against aggressors⁷⁶. In addition, while for some members of the administration, such as Scowcroft and Baker⁷⁷, the metaphor did not seem harmful, Powell (2003, p.478) believed that the president should "soften his rhetoric," because it would be "imprudent to raise the [American] public's expectations by making the man [Saddam] the devil incarnate, and then to leave him in the government"⁷⁸.

The approximation of the Gulf and World War II was not the only metaphor that influenced the decision-making process. The reminiscences of Vietnam were also present in the debates, both on the American and Iraqi sides. In the United States, the word "Vietnam" appeared 7,229 times in its newscasts from August 1, 1990 to February 28, 1991, in addition to the fact that one hundred members of Congress at that time had served in Vietnam - twenty-four senators, and sixty-six delegates. The experience of Vietnam was, among other possibilities, used as a means of teaching at least four lessons in the decision-making process for the use of force: first, the public should be kept well informed; second, it should be the soldiers, not the politicians, to coordinate the war; third, regarding the strategic approach to conduct the war, as opposed to Vietnam, the Gulf war should be conducted by a massive and decisive attack; fourth, the military forces should act with determination. From Iraq, the experience of a major war regarding costs, military casualties, and duration of conflict, such as Vietnam, was used as a strategy to frighten the United States (YETIV, 2004).

made equating Saddam with Hitler, that's specifically where they came from--from this book that he was reading, and the parallels seemed so striking that the atrocities that the Nazis perpetrated in Poland and what he was hearing going on in Kuwait".

⁷⁶ In the original: "But then don't forget I'd had all the experience of the Falklands and so I had no doubt what you had to do to deal with an aggressor, and my generation, as indeed, President Bush's, knew a terrible World War which had been caused because we didn't deal firmly enough with Hitler in the early stages, and of course the Japanese came into Pearl Harbor, so we knew the importance of stopping it quickly and then reversing it".

⁷⁷ In an interview to the Frontline documentary (1997), Baker does not seem uncomfortable with the metaphor; on the contrary, he uses it in his argument. In his words: "I think all of the arguments that we really could not sit by and see unprovoked aggression by a large country against a smaller one. That we didn't do anything in the 30's when Hitler started, that this guy had a lot of the same tendencies. At the very least he wanted to be a regional hegemonist, he sought that. That many atrocities had taken place. That it was going to adversely impact our own economy here. That we had a vital national interest at stake".

⁷⁸ In the original: "cool the rhetoric (...) it was unwise to elevate public expectations by making the man out to be the devil incarnate and then leaving him in place".

Within the foreign policy subfield, the metaphors of World War II and the Vietnam War acted at once as antagonistic and complementary. Antagonistic because the fear of a new long-lasting conflict of low acceptance by the public weakened the appeal that the comparison between Hitler and Saddam obtained with the American public, but complementary because the mistakes committed in Vietnam were used to think the question of the Gulf and, furthermore, they were channeled as a driving force to overcome the ghost of that unsuccessful war. The comparison with Hitler, however, seems to have reduced, if not eliminated, the already few channels for a diplomatic resolution of the Iraqi invasion in Kuwait⁷⁹. On the one hand, the construction of this analogy in Bush's imaginary, and its spread to other members of the administration has, to a certain extent, reduced the willingness to believe in an exit through economic sanctions, and possibly conditioned the actors to the use of force, under the fear that, without the containment of Iraq, tensions in the Gulf could gain unsurpassable proportions. On the other hand, the maintenance of an incisive rhetoric by Bush, closing the dialogues for any negotiation that was not the immediate and restricted exit of Iraq, as we will see, produced a more intransigent reaction by Saddam.

Negotiations for the withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait began shortly after the invasion. On August 7, Saddam sent a letter to President Bush stating that he would leave Kuwait and committed himself to keep oil prices at acceptable levels should the United States recognize Iraq's role in the Iran-Iraq war, especially that its participation had indirectly secured US interests in the region by containing revolutionary Iran. Iraq also demanded to keep Bubiyan and Warba islands (which would give him access to the Gulf) and a part of Kuwaiti territory in the north of the Iraqi border, in addition to eliminating their war debts, both with the Western and Arab countries, and guarantee of resources for Iraq's reconstruction (HIRO, 2003). Saddam's proposal was not accepted by Bush's administration, who remained firm in establishing economic sanctions and unrestrictedly following UNSC resolutions.

On August 12 of the same year, following the aforementioned meeting of the League of Arab States, Saddam submitted a new proposal to the international community. This time, the

⁷⁹ About the possibility of resolving the crisis through diplomatic channels, it is interesting to point some considerations that came from two interviews. First, with Dina Khoury, she mentions that, first, the invasion was not inevitable; Saddam was only pushing as much as he could. And second, that after the invasion took place, Saddam's tone had changed to a mode more inclined to deal with the situation through negotiations but, in some extent, what impaired the diplomatic channel was the US posture that wanted Iraq to bow down. From the interview with Robert Entman, he mentions that although the media produced active dissent in relation to the intervention in the Gulf, it did not promote diplomatic solutions.

intention was to relate the withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait with the withdrawal of Israel from the occupied territories of Palestine, and the withdrawal of Syria from Lebanon as well. In the words of Marlin Fitzwater, this was Bush's administration's response to Saddam's proposal:

Regarding Saddam Hussein's proposals announced today, the United States categorically rejects them. We join the rest of the U.N. Security Council in unanimously calling for the immediate, complete, and unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait and the restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government. These latest conditions and threats are another attempt at distracting [the international community] from Iraq's isolation and at imposing a new status quo. Iraq continues to act in defiance of U.N. Resolutions 660, 661, and 662, the basis for resolving Iraq's occupation. The United States will continue to pursue the application of those resolutions in all their parts (FITZWATER, 1990)

After meeting Saddam, one day after the proposal, King Hussein of Jordan requested an audience with President Bush, which took place on the 16th of that month. According to Bush, the King of Jordan asked him to think about a “middle ground” solution, to which Bush replied that there was no possibility of conciliation because the only solution for the conflict was the “withdrawal [of Iraq], and the restoration of the Kuwaiti regime. There cannot be any middle ground, because tomorrow, it will be somebody else's aggression” (BUSH, SCOWCROFT, 1999, p. 378). In his interview to Time magazine (STACKS; FISCHER, 1991), King Hussein gave his impressions of the meeting with the president, stating that Bush had dealt with the conflict in a very personal way, always pushing the countries into a posture “you are either with us or against us”. During the press conference, which took place on the same day, Bush (1990c) made few comments about the meeting with Hussein, only pointing out that he felt that “the differences that possibly existed with Jordan have been narrowed”. When questioned about a possible letter from Saddam to be delivered by King Hussein, Bush did not answer precisely whether or not he had received such a letter, only stating that King Hussein had talked to him about that document⁸⁰. During a press conference on August 22, 1990, the meeting with King Hussein was questioned again by some journalists. According to the transcript of the question and answer section, the following was Bush's reactions:

Question: Mr. President, King Hussein today in Jordan suggested that perhaps you moved too precipitously, in his words, that if there had not been this buildup that we might not be

⁸⁰ In a documentary released in 2001, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Jordan at the time, Marwam al-Kasem, said: “I do not say that what Iraq committed in an invasion of Kuwait is something acceptable to any of the Arab countries. No it is not. But the way and the attitude that preceded the crisis made everyone feel that that must have been other plans to trap Iraq into this situation. It is a trap and unfortunately Iraq fail in it”.

in the situation we're in and that Saddam Hussein might have withdrawn. Was there ever any signal, anything that was suggested that that might have been the case?

President Bush's answer: No. And the King regrettably did not have much support in the Arab world for that position. You recall the vote at the Arab summit. He certainly had no support for that position in the United Nations and as the United Nations moved toward chapter VII. I would simply remind people who hear that allegation that it isn't just the United States, it's the rest of the world. (...) No, there was no message or anything of that nature. As you remember, there was a lot of speculation that the King was coming here bearing a message, and I can tell you unequivocally there was no request on my part for a message to go back -- other than one: our determination to stay joined up with others to see that this aggression is reversed and that the rightful rulers of Kuwait are returned". (BUSH, 1990d)

On September 9, during a meeting with Bush in Finland, Gorbachev made a peace proposal in which Saddam would withdraw his troops from Kuwait in exchange for the reduction in the number of US forces in the Gulf, and the conduction of a peace conference in the Middle East. Considering the attempt to relate the Kuwaiti issue to the conflicts between Lebanon and Syria, and between Israel and Palestine, perhaps such a proposal could have been accepted by Baghdad, because, despite of leaving the dispute with the Kuwaiti government in abeyance, it would raise Saddam, before the Arab world, to the position of a leader capable of advocating for the region's causes with the United States. The US refusal, however, occurred not only because of the fear of Saddam's growing popularity but also because they believed that "any agreement on a plan which left the Kuwait issue open would be a major defeat for the collective action which has gotten us so far" (BUSH, SCOWCROFT, 1999, p. 365).

During the end of September, and October, other proposals were considered by the Soviet Union and France. Their positions, while condemning the invasion of Kuwait, seemed less incisive and more open to dialogue than Bush's and Thatcher's governments. According to Tariq Aziz, Bush's administration was constantly "closing all doors for dialogue and peaceful efforts and obstructing initiatives in order to wage a war to realize its ambitions and impose its hegemony on the region" (apud YETIV, 2004, p. 69). Although assertive, Aziz's speech does not seem totally far from reality when confronted with the progression of the facts to the Gulf War. On September 24, Powell met Bush to present a long-term plan proposing more time for economic sanctions and containment of Iraq as an alternative to the use of force, for which he obtained the following response from the president: "Well Colin, that's all, very very interesting. It's good to consider all options but I just don't think we're going to have time for sanctions to work". (FRONTLINE, 1997). From this moment on, and with an express statement by the President regarding the promptness to

abandon the sanctions as a viable means of resolving the conflict, any subsequent attempt of negotiation or agreement to leave Kuwait would, in this thesis' view, be unsatisfactory to Bush. Although he is reluctant to point expressly to military action in his presidential speeches and press conferences, the unfeasibility of diplomatic means, coupled with the continued progression of the number of military forces in Saudi Arabia would, sooner or later, present the intervention as an inevitable scenario.

On October 31st, Bush's administration decided to double the US military contingent in Saudi Arabia, but kept this information secret until November 8th, 1990, because the disclosure of this information the day before the congressional elections could lead to an unfavorable result for him, especially in a future possible request to the congress for authorization of the use of force. The decision to devise an offensive plan was, however, prior to the increase in US troops, given that on September 18th of that year Schwarzkopf had been instructed to elaborate a plan of action for a possible ground attack against Iraq⁸¹ (FRONTLINE, 1997).

On November 29th, movements in the UNSC, particularly by United States and the United Kingdom, for the adoption of force, were translated into resolution 678, which called for "all necessary means" to end the conflict. The United States action, however, was accused of coercion, blackmail or even bribing of the countries in search of a vote favorable to resolution 678. According to Clark (2002), Ethiopia and Zaire received financial aid packages, loans and new possibilities for agreements with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the Ethiopian government obtained military help to address domestic opponents after the Council vote. In the list of bribes, China had received \$114 million from the World Bank for its abstention, one week after the meeting; the Soviet Union had been awarded \$4 billion in loans and emergency aid from Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates; and Egypt had totaled approximately \$14 billion in forgiven debt - \$7 billion by the United States, \$4 billion by Saudi Arabia, and \$3 billion by other Gulf countries (CLARK, 2002). The countries that voted against the resolution, Cuba and Yemen, were retaliated due to their performance. The Yemeni ambassador, for example, shortly after collecting his hand as a sign of the vote, heard from a representative of the US government that "that will be the most

⁸¹ Regarding the offensive plan, some military staff, such as Powell and Schwarzkopf, and Gates were not comfortable with the option of removing Saddam militarily from Kuwait, leading some members of the administration to question whether Bush's government had the right generals for that mission (FRONTLINE, 1997). According to the profile of Bush's closest associates throughout his term, Cheney and Scowcroft were the most favorable agents for the abandonment of economic sanctions and the use of force, even, in Cheney's view, without necessarily resorting to formal approval by the Congress (YETIV, 2004)

expensive ‘no’ vote you ever cast”, and three days after this meeting the United States cut off its entire program of financial aid to Yemen, even knowing it was one of the poorest countries in the Arab world (BENNIS, 2002).

Following the approval of the resolution on November 30, 1990, Bush, in an attempt to “go the extra mile” (BUSH, 1991a) towards peace, proposed that Secretary of State Baker go to Baghdad to demonstrate “the absolute determination of the coalition that he complies fully with the Security Council resolutions” since “Iraqi aggression cannot be rewarded” (BUSH, 1990f). From then on, an imbroglio was established on the possibility of dates for the meeting, with Bush saying that, as of the fifteen dates made available, the Iraqi government had offered only one, he would no longer be able to be part of Saddam’s manipulations. The impasse was overcome with the agreement that Baker and Aziz would meet on January 9th in Geneva. During the meeting, Baker handed Aziz a letter from President Bush to Saddam in which he pointed out that “what is at stake demands that no opportunity be lost to avoid what would be a certain calamity to the people of Iraq” and “unless [he] withdraws from Kuwait in a complete and unconditional manner, [he] loses more than only Kuwait, concluding with “I write this letter not to threaten, but to inform” (BUSH apud CLARK, 2002, p.34). After reading the letter, Aziz returned it to Baker explaining that he could not accept a threatening message. In the words of the Iraqi foreign minister,

I told my President that that was my anticipation and I told him that if I find that letter not being cordial and objective, I will return it to Baker (...) The President told me you can judge the situation and act (...) I took the letter from him and I read it. I read it very carefully and then when I ended reading it, I told him [Baker] --'look, Mr. Secretary, this is not the kind of correspondence between two heads of State, this is a letter of threat and I cannot receive from you a letter of threat to my President,' and I returned it to him. (FRONTLINE, 1997)

With the consent of the UNSC to use force, Bush’s administration invested efforts to have the military invasion approved by the US Congress.⁸² Although with a largely Democratic Congress, many of its members were not sure whether that was the right time to move beyond economic sanctions, pointing out, in particular, that they needed a period of 12-18 months to take effect. There was, however, intense mobilization of lobbyists in Congress, both by the Kuwaiti government and the US government, to get an authorization. Kuwait has even spent about \$10 million on advertising in the United States (FRONTLINE, 1997), hiring about seven public

⁸² According to some authors, the urgency to launch the Desert Storm operation was also due to the need to avoid hostilities in the month of Ramadan.

relations companies to help build the emergency character of the crisis for the North American public opinion (YETIV, 2004).

The justifications for military intervention directed at the American public were being adapted according to Bush's foreign policy approval ratings. They centered around four argumentative axes: the first and simplest one was based on the discourse that the aggression committed was unacceptable, and that the United States could not allow such an act to remain unpunished; the second pointed to Iraqi capabilities in terms of nuclear weapons and mass destruction; the third related the international conflict to the internal recession situation in the United States, highlighting that changes in the price of oil influenced the US market in terms of a reduction in the number of jobs and an increase in the recession of the economy; the fourth, in terms of US identity's anchor points that served as a frame for the other arguments, was based on the justification that the United States would be the great leader of the new era and therefore should guide the international community towards respect and valorization of certain principles, which have been defended by the United States since its formation, such as freedom, justice and equality. The mention of these anchor points can be identified in some passages of Bush's speeches, as identified in the excerpts below:

“This new era can be full of promise, an age of freedom, a time of peace for all peoples”. (BUSH, 1990b).

A hundred generations have searched for this elusive path to peace, while a thousand wars raged across the span of human endeavor. Today that new world is struggling to be born, a world quite different from the one we've known. A world where the rule of law supplants the rule of the jungle. A world in which nations recognize the shared responsibility for freedom and justice. A world where the strong respect the rights of the weak. (BUSH, 1990e).

“We are Americans, part of something larger than ourselves. For two centuries, we've done the hard work of freedom. And tonight, we lead the world in facing down a threat to decency and humanity”. (BUSH, 1991b).

If the military intervention in the Gulf was not aimed at regaining Bush's domestic popularity, its development allowed the president to put the debates about the US complicated economic situation in the background. Seen by part of the US media as a “coward”, or “indecisive” (DOWD, 1991) in the face of the budget crisis, the firm and stubborn position toward Saddam has contributed to the change of perceptions about the president. The correlation between involvement in external conflicts and increased popular approval of presidents is not, however, uncommon in the United States. Just as Bush rose from 66% to 84% approval, one of the most significant leaps


in American history, with a gain of eighteen percentage points, Kennedy reached thirteen points at the time of the missile crisis in Cuba, and Johnson, eight points at the time of the bombing of Hanoi (CLYMER, 1991).

The narrative constructions in favor of the intervention in the US Congress, denominated here the ‘new order narrative’ followed to some extent the arguments proposed by H. W. Bush and his administration. Similar to the foreign policy subfield debate constructed around the US intervention in Iraq in 2003, as this thesis will further address in a forthcoming chapter, both narratives concurred on the depiction of Saddam Hussein. To both he was perceived as a “dictator” (ROTH, 1991; GILMAN, 1991), a “despotic madman” (ROTH, 1991), and “a vicious thug who has behaved immorally and who must be opposed is virtually universal” (FRANK, 1991); they diverged, however, as to how was the best course of action to deal with the Gulf crisis. To the new order narrative, in Congress, the narrative components of Iraq’s possession of WMDs and the issue regarding the oil prices are important, though not central for the argument. Congress representatives emphasize that with the end of the Cold War, “the fact is that the United States is the leader. We are the one remaining world power.” and because of US position in the international community, if it “retreats from its commitment for a joint effort on the ground that others are not as strong or as firm as we are, all the efforts to seek Security Council resolutions and to consult with other governments will have been an exercise of futility, recognized as such throughout the world” (DANFORTH, 1991). In Congress representative Wylie’s (1990) words, the US “cannot be the country to back off first. As the long-recognized leader of the free world, we have a responsibility to maintain the coalition because this is the first test of the new post-cold war era as to whether or not we are going to allow an unprovoked aggression to stand”⁸³.

When criticized by the ‘against intervention’ narrative, here called the ‘Western narrative’, that “there is nothing free and democratic. There is nothing devoted to human civil rights in the nation of Kuwait. Why, pray tell, should we sacrifice ourselves and our future to restore that?” (MAZZOLI, 1991), the new order narrative presented a new sense of democracy. For its representatives, it did not matter whether Kuwait could not be considered a democracy, what

⁸³ In an interview with Dina Khoury, she presents an interesting remark. To deal with the fact that there was no Cold War anymore and not an equally threatening situation to demonstrate US international indispensability, the intervention in the Gulf needed to be framed in the post-Cold War politics. In this sense, the Gulf War was narrated as a test case for the US politics in this new international environment and, therefore, it became a venue for US projection of power.

mattered was, in fact, a sense of an international democratic and free environment; and here, democracy and freedom come in tandem. Because Saddam broke the international law and invaded a sovereign country, the US had the moral obligation, as the world's leader, to come to Kuwait's rescue, regardless of its governmental national organization. By doing this, the US could then uphold a democratic, free and just (in the 'rule of law' sense) order, even if some of its constituent parts were not necessarily democratic governments. "With the fall of the Berlin Wall, the end of the cold war, and the wondrous expansion of democracy throughout our world, it is Saddam Hussein who is still holding the world hostage" (GILMAN, 1991). The US must "restore freedom to Kuwait and solidify the international community behind a new world order" (SCHULZE, 1991) and provide "its resolve to secure freedom for all the peoples of the world" (SCHULZE, 1991) because "if this unprovoked act of aggression is left to stand, a message will be sent to all the dictators of the world; that it is permissible to invade a smaller country" (GILMAN, 1991). A derivation of this argument was that after invading Kuwait, Saddam's "objective [was] to become the dominant power among the countries in the Middle East, and to use his power against the democracies of the West" (ROTH, 1991) and then he would, if not dealt with, threaten US sense of security (ROTH, 1991). In summary, the spanning set of this narrative would be the following:



In this narrative, the US is put above the international community because it is the very country that upholds the ideas of democracy, liberty and justice not only by example but also by


guaranteeing a free international order. Differently from Kosovo in which freedom is heavily associated with human rights and with US capacity to liberate Kosovo Albanians from Serb oppression, here the human rights component is just used to reinforce Saddam's evil image. Freedom/liberty is associated, therefore, with the idea of sovereignty and territorial integrity while democracy is assumed in a broad sense, serving as a guiding general principle that guides the interrelationship among countries in this new world order. And justice is referred with the rule of law connotation, sustaining the notion that one country's invasion of another without imminent threat or plausible justification was considered a violation of international law.

The Western narrative, on the other hand, will diverge in the means to solve the Gulf crisis. Focusing on the connotation of democracy as a form of governmental organization, it will question whether it was on US interests to sacrifice money and lives to rescue countries that are not even democracies. For these representatives, it was "a bit ironic that the President [was] preparing to spill the blood of thousands of American young people allegedly in defense of those two countries" (PEASE, 1991). Congress representative Mazzoli is even more emphatic:

to buy into the plans that we give the President what some have called, I think with some aptness, a kind of blank check to pursue a war if we adopt that it almost seems to me it requires the deification of Kuwait and its Government and the demonization of Saddam Hussein and his government. It seems like the only way we can achieve this idea of going into Kuwait is by making Kuwait some sort of a remarkably democratic, absolutely pristine example of human rights activity, and in order to carry this thing further, we have to make Saddam Hussein into some kind of a modern-day Hitler who is just lusting after the opportunity of knocking over all the world's powers and controlling not just the Middle East. (MAZZOLI, 1991).

In this sense, the representatives of the Western narrative disagreed with the pro-interventionists that democracy was in danger, as neither Kuwait and Saudi Arabia were democratic governments in the first place. For those representatives, "international economic sanctions against Iraq [were] working - impacting not only the Iraqi economy but that nation's ability to make war" (SANDERS, 1991) and they "over time will be utterly devastating" (MAVROULES, 1991). Following this narrative's logic, freedom/liberty and justice would not be neglected, as Iraq would at some point withdraw from Kuwait, but they would be achieved through different means. It is interesting to note that some representatives that were against the US intervention in Iraq pushed for US stronger engagement in confrontation with Gorbachev's policy towards the Baltic Republics of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Although former USSR republics, the notion conveyed was that they were closer to the Western democratic countries of Europe and, therefore, democracy could

be easily spread to these countries. Hence, a stronger US engagement would only make sense to either defend democratic countries or countries that were near, geographically and in terms of possible governmental change, to the West. The spanning set of this narrative would be the following:



A joint resolution authorizing the use of force was passed in Congress on January 14, 1991. The beginning of hostilities occurred in the early morning hours of January 17, nineteen hours after the deadline for the withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait set out in UNSC resolution 678. In line with the Powell Doctrine, which provided for the immediate use of full force, the United States began the military assault by aerial bombardment, with ground action started on January 26. In just a few hours, 85% of Iraq's entire energy production capacity had been destroyed, and the distribution of vital services was interrupted. On February 15, radio broadcasts in Baghdad suggest that Iraq was willing to withdraw from Kuwait, but Bush rejects this proposal, with the explanation that it would be a Saddam's "cruel scam". Thirteen days after this incident, the cease-fire was officially declared ending US assaults against Iraq (FRONTLINE, 1997).

The containment of the mission beyond Iraqi territory, despite opinions in Bush's administration against this position, was ordered by the president for two apparent reasons. First, because of the location of the Republican Guard in Iraq, rather than in Kuwait, the arrival of US troops in Baghdad could result in casualties for the United States, a fact that would not be well received by public opinion. Powell doctrine was still based on a strategy that emphasized the motto

of zero killed, which perhaps could not be sustained if intervention advanced towards Iraqi territory. Secondly, and from the normative point of view, the mandate of the mission under resolution 678 authorized only the withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait, so that any entry into Iraq would, in the view of the UNSC, be illegal. In an interview on October 2001, Scowcroft stated that the entry into Iraqi lands had never been one of H W Bush's administration goals, and its implementation could have disrupted the coalition then established. In his words:

“You can't find that anywhere as an objective, either in the U.N. mandate for what we did, or in our declarations, that our goal was to get rid of Saddam Hussein. (...) First of all, one of our objectives was not to have Iraq split up into constituent ... parts. It's a fundamental interest of the United States to keep a balance in that area, in Iraq. (...) Had we gone in and occupied Iraq, first of all, the coalition would have split up immediately. As it was, our Arab allies with troops on the ground did not let those troops go into Iraq. They stopped at the border. (FRONTLINE, 2003).

There was, from the government at the time, “high expectations that the military suffering the kind of defeat [in the Kuwaiti case] they had would turn on Saddam” (SCOWCROFT, 1997) and a “belief on the part of many of the experts and others in the region that if you administer a decisive defeat to his [Saddam] military forces that he will not be able to survive politically” (CHENEY, 1997) and perhaps also for these reasons, President Bush preferred leaving Iraq's internal situation to the fate of Iraqis rather than to advance militarily. After the end of hostilities, Iraq was condemned by UNSC resolution 687 to pay compensation to Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, to undergo a scheme of economic sanctions, and to receive inspections for the dismantling of its programs of nuclear and mass destruction weapons.

Therefore, the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) was established, formed by a group of UN experts, whose objectives were, in summary: (i) to inspect facilities that were supposed to have the capacity to produce chemical and biological weapons; (ii) to confiscate the chemical and biological materials in stock, including the components for their production, in order to remove them, destroy them or render them harmless; (iii) to supervise the destruction of all ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150km, as well as the components for their manufacture and maintenance; (iv) to monitor the Iraqi government to prevent it from using, developing or acquiring any of the items listed above. In addition, the Commission should assist the IAEA in developing its activities, similar to those of UNSCOM but restricted to the nuclear area.

UNSCOM was effective from 1991 to 1998, with its last year marked by tensions among Iraq, the United States, and the UNSC. The deterioration of Baghdad-UNSCOM relations has put

an end to Iraqi cooperation with the Commission and, consequently, to the regime of inspections. Also in 1998, the Secretary-General at the time, Kofi Annan, produced a document that provided a comprehensive review of Iraq's efforts towards total disarmament and that, among other factors, proposed to minimize the negative effects of economic sanctions by ending, within a stipulated time limit, restrictions on exports of Iraqi products. With the United Kingdom's and the United States' rejection of the proposal to suspend the Iraqi oil embargo if its government complied with the requirements to eliminate its WMDs (RAI, 2002), the Iraqi government interpreted it as "confirmation of its long-held—and plausible—belief that, even if it did come clean on all its weapons, no American administration would lift the oil embargo so long as Mr. Hussein remained in power". (THE ECONOMIST, 1998).

Following the expulsion by the Iraqi government of the UN inspections commission, the United States and the United Kingdom, in response, stated that there was no other way than the use of force to circumvent Saddam Hussein's obstructionism. On December 16, 1998, the operation Desert Fox began, in which both countries began an air campaign with four days of intense bombing of Iraq with the aim of destroying facilities with the alleged ability to produce WMDs and of forcing it to comply with the demands of the UNSC. Such action would be justifiable, according to President Clinton:

I want to explain why I have decided, with the unanimous recommendation of my national security team, to use force in Iraq (...) Other countries possess weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles. With Saddam, there is one big difference: He has used them. Not once, but repeatedly. The international community had little doubt then, and I have no doubt today, that left unchecked, Saddam Hussein will use these terrible weapons again. Second, if Saddam can crippled the weapons inspection system and get away with it, he would conclude that the international community -- led by the United States -- has simply lost its will. (CLINTON, 1998)

To replace UNSCOM, resolution 1284 of December 1999 implemented the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC). Due to accusations that information collected by UNSCOM in Iraq would have been sent and used by intelligence centers in certain countries, such as the United States, the staff of the new UN mission, unlike the previous one, was composed only by UN officials (UNMOVIC). Yet, due to Baghdad's fears of a new system of inspection on Iraqi soil, since 1998, after UNSCOM was expelled, Iraq no longer received (until later in 2003) any UN mission for inspection and verification.

Even with the reduction of US troops in post-Gulf War Saudi Arabia, repressive policies against the Iraqi government continued throughout the 1990s, and into the early 21st century through draconian economic sanctions that, among other factors, contributed to the maintenance of a demonized image of Saddam, and to the deepening of poverty and social inequalities in the country. Tensions between the United States and Iraq would remain dormant until the time of the attacks on the twin towers in 2001, when George W. Bush exposed, and at that time in a definitive way, the US differences with Saddam Hussein.

5 THE US INTERVENTION IN AFGHANISTAN: THE US/WESTERN INTEGRITY

There is sobbing of the strong,
 And a pall upon the land;
 But the People in their weeping
 Bare the iron hand:
 Beware the People weeping
 When they bare the iron hand.
 (The Martyr - Herman Melville)

Before 9/11 the Al-Qaeda terrorist network had already perpetrated four other terrorist attacks directed to the U.S. - the Yemen Hotel bombings, the first World Trade Center (WTC) attack, the bombings of U.S embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, and the USS Cole bombing. Differently from the other US interventions presented in this thesis, in which the international situation threatened US identity by threatening the international order and, consequently, the US role in it, with the case of Afghanistan (and the Iraq 2003 case, perhaps, in a lesser degree) the focal points is reversed. It threatened US identity by threatening US domestic safety (and some narratives scale that up to the level of threatening the US very existence) and, consequently, the perception of US crucial role in the international order. Regardless of evaluations that put on a degree of importance the “security as survival” *versus* the “security as being” (MCSWEENEY, 1999, p.157) after 9/11 what is interesting to note is that the attacks *per se* but also the winning narrative around it elevated to new extremes the questioning of US ontological existence. With the interventions in Kosovo and in the Gulf, the winning narratives presented these situations as possibly disruptive of the anchor points’ ideas in the international realm. With Afghanistan (and, again, Iraq 2003), if the anchor points can be regarded as ontologies of their own, the notions of liberty/freedom, equality, democracy, justice, and in some extent individualism, were put at stake not only outside the US, but mainly within it. To the international arena, the stable (or always-in-stabilization) understandings of the US as the hegemon, as the source of international order, as the inviolable country, but especially as the stronghold of Western liberal values were questioned.

As several components of US identity were left on shaky grounds, mere interventions that sorted out the situation might not seem sufficient. The narratives around the legitimization process to intervene in Afghanistan, as we shall see, work within the binomial ‘there are a set of enough policies to deal with this’ *versus* “nothing will be sufficient to deal with this” But first, looking from the perpetrators perspective, the justifications for the Al-Qaeda anti-American behavior was first expressed in the Bin Laden’s 1996 fatwa entitled “Declaration of War against the Americans

Occupying the Land of the two Holy Places” or “The Ladanese Epistle”. Behind the extensive amount of religious content, the Epistle presented some pointedly political explanations for why a Muslim violent reaction against the U.S. was not only necessary but also justifiable. And although religion and politics are not seen as two separated things in Bin Laden’s narrative - or to some extent in Bush’s discourses and several Congress representatives’ speeches within the war against terror, as we will see further in this chapter - stressing his most political and economic discourses is important for correlating how the Al-Qaeda threat was profiled by the Bush presidency.

The first and maybe the strongest argument in the Epistle is about the U.S. military and economic presence in Arab countries, especially in Saudi Arabia. According to Bin Laden’s statement, “the crusader forces became the main cause of our disastrous condition, particularly in the economical aspects of it (...)” (LADEN, 1996. p.163), most of all “as a result of the policy imposed on the country⁸⁴, especially in the field of oil industry where production is restricted or expanded and prices are fixed to suit the American economy ignoring the economy of the country” (LADEN, 1996, p.163). About the military presence, the Epistle conflates this argument with the U.S. relationship with Israel as it asserts that “it is out of date and no longer acceptable to claim that the presence of the crusaders is a necessity and only a temporary measure to protect the land of the two Holy Places. Especially when the civil and military infrastructures of Iraq were savagely destroyed showing the depth of the Zionist-Crusaders hatred to the Muslims and their children, and the rejection of the idea of replacing the crusaders forces by an Islamic force composed of the sons of the country and other Muslim people” (LADEN, 1996, p.173).

As a response to those acts, carried out not only by the United States but clearly seen by Al Qaeda as under the American leadership, Bin Laden calls all Muslims to understand that the “boycotting of the American goods is a very effective weapon of hitting and weakening the enemy” (LADEN, 1996, p.177), but mainly to engage in the fight against the United States believing that “terrorizing you [the U.S.], while you are carrying arms on our land, is a legitimate and morally demanded duty. It is a legitimate right well known to all humans and other creatures” (LADEN, 1996, p.184).

⁸⁴ Even though is not completely clear from the translation to which country Bin Laden is commenting, or if he is talking about the Muslim and Arab nations as a whole, the reading of the texts suggests that the “country” in question is Saudi Arabia.

Briefly, the narrative strategy used by Bin Laden is to depict the Muslim faith as an encompassing brotherhood where all Muslims should see each other as an indivisible whole regardless of nationality, and, therefore, refrain themselves from internal disputes. Regarding the construction of “otherness” within the Epistle discourse, the image of the U.S. as an enemy of the Muslim credo is framed under two main arguments that can be generalized from this discourse to others: in the religious front, the United States is accused of corrupting the Islamic religion insomuch it is perceived as the one who divided and still divides the Ummah (the community of Muslims) into small and little countries and pulled them apart; in the political front, Bin Laden’s strategy is to stress the social and economic injustices suffered by the Arab countries from the exploitation headed by the U.S. and to correct the Islamic world situation to its “normal path”. Despite judgments about the validity of Bin Laden’s narrative and the means employed by it, we can nevertheless identify a rationale within it, with direct complaints and demands.

The build-up of Al Qaeda’s international terrorism culminated thus in the 9/11 attacks - the most spectacular moment of its aggression towards the United States. It is revealed now by the 9/11 Report (9/11 COMMISSION, 2004) that the terrorist attacks started to be planned sometime around late 1998 and early 1999, as part of the millennium plot for a series of terrorist actions. The “Planes Operation” was designed to allow 19 terrorists to hijack four commercial airplanes and use them as potential weapons against American targets. The attacks unfolded in about a 40 minutes window in order to impede U.S. authorities to prevent them, though the 9/11 Report also declares that the planes were scheduled to crash at about the same time to elevate the attack’s psychological impact⁸⁵ (9/11 COMMISSION, 2004).

The first plane, the American Airlines flight 11 from Boston to Los Angeles, was declared hijacked at 8:41 A.M. and minutes after crashed into the North Tower of the World Trade Center. In a sequence of further attacks, the second hijacked airplane, United Airlines Flight 175 departing from Los Angeles, hit the South Tower of the World Trade Center at 9.03 A.M., and the third, American Airline flight 77 from Washington Dulles to Los Angeles crashed into the Pentagon at 9:37 A.M. The fourth plane, intended to hit either the White House or the Capitol, had its terrorist

⁸⁵ One interesting remark made by Christopher Kojm, during my interview with him, was that the 9/11 was written in such a simple language that it increased its political impact. Extrapolating from Kojm remark, because some parts of the 9/11 report were written almost as a romance, recurring to a storytelling strategy, it might have helped Bush’s administration to lock the meaning over the 9/11 attacks and, thus, creating the basis for the winning narrative.

attempt frustrated by the passengers and plowed into an empty field in Pennsylvania (9/11 COMMISSION, 2004).

A month later the attacks, on October 21st, Bin Laden released a statement claiming Al Qaeda's responsibility for 9/11. In his discourse, Bin Laden maintains the narrative image of the Muslims around the world as an indivisible whole by affirming that the "battle is not between Al Qaeda and the U.S." but it is a "battle of Muslims against the global crusaders" (LADEN, 2001, p. 193). When asked about the killing of innocents in the twin towers, Bin Laden replied that "the twin towers are an economic power⁸⁶ and not a children's school. Those that were there are men that supported the biggest economic power in the world" (LADEN, 2001, p. 200). His discourse, therefore, is consistent with the narrative strategy of justifying Al Qaeda and other Muslim group's terrorist attacks as a response to the U.S. leadership in exploiting Arab countries' economic resources. Plus, regarding the means to achieve their objectives, by ways of inflicting an atmosphere of terror, Bin Laden claims this tactic's legitimacy arguing that "just as they're killing us, we have to kill them so that there will be a balance of terror. This is the first time the balance of terror has been close between the two parties, between Muslims and Americans, in the modern age" (LADEN, 2001, p.197). The image constructed by Bin Laden presents the Muslim neighborhood as victims of U.S. international engagement and the terrorist attacks as a mere righteous response to a terrorist state.

5.1 The American narratives for the intervention in Afghanistan

The president had settled his mind that the terrorist attacks were a declaration of war. In an interview to National Geographic in September 2011, the president recalled that right after 9/11 his thoughts were that "the first plane was an accident, the second an attack, and the third a declaration of war"; "this is how wars are like in the 21st century" and "the war came to us unexpectedly" (BUSH, 2011). From this moment on, two processes ran side by side: first, the diplomatic and military arrangements and, second, the narratives around what was the best course of action. It is impossible to check intentions and evaluate to what extent the whole war narrative was a mere

⁸⁶ Besides the economic symbology attached to the World Trade Center, Ramzi Yousef, one of the 1993 WTC truck bomb terrorists, affirmed that the Towers were a target because the number of deaths its destruction would have caused was approximate to the number of people killed by the atomic bombs dropped by the U.S. on Japan (ANDERSON, 2011, p. 45)

façade, or a necessary procedural justification construction, for a decision that was made on day one. However, what is possible to present is that as the narratives were taking shape and one won more adherence than another, it foreclosed the space for a non-military approach.

One of the first moves was on the diplomatic front. With indications that 9/11 was planned and executed by Al-Qaeda, an organization protected by the Taliban regime and located mostly in Afghanistan but also at some border locations with Pakistan, the administration focused on key regional strategic countries. With India and Bangladesh, the latter a UNSC member at that time, the United States was willing to promote a closer regional cooperation, in order to establish the foundations for future American actions in South Asia. In the Middle East, Saudi Arabia and Egypt were singled out as “key priorities for closer cooperation in all possible tracks”. The Department of State had also looked into Iran’s ability join the American effort against the Taliban and Bin Laden and planned to look for Arafat’s support to U.S. further measures to annihilate Al-Qaeda (U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 2001a). In general, Powell developed what was called the “variable geometry” (WOODWARD, 2002) within the coalition-building, in which there was not a standard expected role for every allied country in the war on terror but instead specific demands for each country that would contribute according to their capabilities and interests (LANSFORD, 2003, p.164). This variation in requirements and roles to play would form what was dubbed the “coalition of coalitions”.

Regarding Pakistan, on September 12th, Richard Armitage, Bush’s deputy Secretary of State, met with Pakistani Intelligence Directorate, Director Mahmud⁸⁷ Ahmed, to inform what part the U.S. expected his country to play in the follow-up of 9/11 terrorist attacks: “Pakistan must either stand with the United States in its fight against terrorism or stand against us” (U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 2001b). The message was complemented with Armitage instructions to the U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan, Wendy Chamberlin, to notify President Musharraf that siding with the United States was “a black-and-white choice, with no grey”. And as “it is quite probable that Al Qaida and Usama Bin Laden would be fingered as our investigation continues”, Pakistani support would be demanded even though “it was still not clear what might be asked of Pakistan by the U.S.” (U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 2001b),

⁸⁷ Although the spelling of the Director’s name vary throughout the documents, often being mentioned as “Mahmud” (usually used on Chamberlin’s memos) or “Mamoud” (usually used on Armitage’s memos), they all refer to the same person, the Intelligence Director of Pakistan. Regardless of who’s memos we are referencing, we standardized the name’s spelling by prioritizing the former use of it.

The day after September 12th, Armitage presented to Mahmud the U.S. demands from Pakistan. They were the following list of seven specific requests for immediate action, which should be conveyed to President Musharraf for his approval: i) “stop Al-Qaida operatives at your border, intercept arms shipments through Pakistan and end all logistical support for Bin Ladin”; ii) “provide the U.S. with blanket overflight and landing rights to conduct all necessary military and intelligence operations”; iii) provide as needed territorial access to the U.S. and allied military intelligence, and other personnel to conduct all necessary operations against the perpetrators of terrorism or those that harbor them, including use of Pakistan's naval ports, air bases and strategic locations on borders”; iv) “provide the U.S. immediately with intelligence, [content sill classified], information, to help prevent and respond to terrorist acts perpetrated against the U.S., its friends and allies”; v) “continue to publicly condemn the terrorist acts of September 11 and any other terrorist acts against the U.S. or its friends and allies, [content sill classified]”; vi) “cut off all shipments of fuel to the Taliban and any other items and recruits, including volunteers *en route* to Afghanistan that can be used in a military offensive capacity or to abet the terrorist threat”; vii) “should the evidence strongly implicate Usama bin Ladin and the al-Qaida network in Afghanistan and should Afghanistan and the Taliban continue to harbor him and this network, Pakistan will break diplomatic relations with the Taliban government, end support for the Taliban and assist us in the aforementioned ways to destroy Usama bin Ladin and his Al Qaida network”. Mahmud responded by stressing that Pakistani allied position to the U.S was clear and that he would promptly send the message to his country (U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 2001c).

Powell expected the last request to be the toughest one to gain Musharraf's approval not only because it would ask the Pakistani government to help to tighten the circle around something that its intelligence service had constructed and maintained throughout the years, the Taliban regime, but also because the alliance with the United States could ignite a fundamentalist uprising within the population and some of the government's more conservative sectors (WOODWARD, 2002). Even though the risks to his presidency were considerable, Musharraf accepted all the U.S. demands (U.S. EMBASSY ISLAMABAD, 2001a). In return, Bush authorized a package of economic support to the country and arranged for other allied nations, such as Japan, to provide aid to Islamabad (LANSFORD, 2003, p.164). One of the possible administration's objective with this strategy was to help Musharraf so he could keep himself in power and prevent the country

from falling apart⁸⁸, plus give the U.S. the guarantee that Islamic fundamentalists would not have access to Pakistani nuclear weapons⁸⁹.

The next diplomatic step was to give the Taliban the chance to cooperate with the United States and end its protection to Al Qaeda and Bin Laden. During the 80's, Afghanistan was one of the principal battlegrounds of the Cold War, through which the United States fought the Soviet Union by proxy, supporting the mujahideen with arms transfers smuggled into the country via Pakistani borders. In the 90's, after the USSR left Afghanistan, the U.S. returned to its pre-soviet invasion foreign policy by keeping only the flow of humanitarian aid. With the radicalization of some extremist groups throughout the national liberation war against the USSR and the increasing instability as the country split into small tribal-controlled regions fighting each other, the Taliban gained support due to its capacity to promote order. Some national unity was then reestablished in the late 90's when the Taliban regime, a fundamentalist political-religious sect, raised to power. By this time, the government became extremely intertwined with the Al Qaeda terrorist network as the latter provided money to the Taliban in exchange for safe haven (LANSFORD, 2003, p.136).

As the U.S. had its diplomatic relations with Afghanistan suspended since the 1980s and had not recognized the Taliban government, the easiest way to reach Mullah Omar, the Taliban leadership, was through Pakistan. General Mahmud's second role in the aftermath of 9/11 was to establish a diplomatic bridge between the U.S. and the Taliban. Through Mahmud, Armitage conveyed the following American demands to the Taliban: i) "they must hand-over UBL [Usama Bin Laden] to the International Court of Justice, or extradite him"; ii) "they must hand-over or extradite the 13⁹⁰ top lieutenants/associates of UBL"; iii) and "they must close all terrorist training

⁸⁸ According to Powell (WOODWARD, 2002), Musharraf had been gradually losing control of Pakistan and could see the American support as an opportunity to modernize the country, with a more secular western orientation, and distance it from an Islamic extremist culture.

⁸⁹ Due to India and Pakistan's rivalry and the U.S. intentions to get India's support in the war on terrorism, president Bush issued a Memorandum giving both countries a waiver of nuclear-related sanctions in September 22nd (BUSH, 2001i).

⁹⁰ In a declassified internal document about the U.S. Political and Military strategies to deal with the Taliban, is expressly mentioned the names of Al Qaeda senior deputies Ayman al-Zawahiri, Mohammed Atef, and Abu Zubaidah. Also, in this document there were two more other demands that are not described in the internal memo approved by Armitage (U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 2001d) about his phone call with Mahmud; they were: "free all SNI [Shelter Now International] workers (Americans, foreigners and Afghans) and allow foreigners to leave the country", and "comply with all relevant UNSCR resolutions". Plus, besides using the Pakistani channel of communication, it was suggested in the document that the U.S. could, simultaneously, have a representative from the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad sending the demands to the Taliban representatives there and, also, have the President reinforcing them via a presidential statement (U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 2001d).

camps”. Mahmud stated to Armitage that he added a fourth demand to the Taliban, affirming that “they must open terrorist training sites from inspection by neutral international observers from the West, including even the United States”. According to the General, Mullah Omar’s answer was not “negative on all these points”. The Islamic Leaders of Afghanistan were undertaking a moment of “deep introspection” and the Grand Council of Elders would soon meet to make a decision (U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 2001e).

In the domestic discursive front, for the American public and within the foreign policy subfield, the narrative constructed around the 9/11 incident is distinct from the one offered by Bin Laden, even though both have resemblances in the way they frame their narratives, mostly by a storytelling rhetorical mode. In this way of presenting a case, the one with authority to narrate - which in the US foreign policy subfield is usually the President, the closer members of the establishment and in some extent the Congress - elaborates to an audience⁹¹ a mental image presenting the characters, their motives and intentions, the context, the conflict, and, therefore, the most appropriate course of action (KREBS, 2015). Throughout September 11th, the narratives around the terrorist attacks were surprisingly not so vast. Although the answers to the specific question of what should be done to address the terrorist threat had clear differences, the narratives on ‘who were the attackers’, ‘what was attacked’, ‘why they did this’ and ‘how was the US after the attacks’ were quite similar.

One of the most recurrent images constructed around 9/11 was its interpretation as a moment of rupture in the U.S. history. Following Bush’s narrative, for the first time the myth of the inviolability of the American territory was shaken, putting under question the common belief that the Pacific and Atlantic oceans were sufficient to protect the country. To reaffirm the characterization of this context, it is interesting to notice that when exemplifying the past terrorist attacks perpetrated by Al Qaeda, Bush’s Address before the Congress does not mention the 1993 bombing⁹² of the World Trade Center. It introduces the September tragedy as a unique moment, an

⁹¹ Here we are mainly considering the general American public as the widest possible national audience. However, throughout the legitimization process, there is no predetermined identification of who, if the President, closer establishment members or the Congress, is either the narrator or the audience. In fact, there is no singular role to be played by the actors. As the process unfolds, the same actor can play different roles at different moments.

⁹² Even though the bombing did not accomplish its aim - destroying the foundations and collapsing one of the World Trade Center buildings - the terrorist attack killed six and injured over a thousand people (ANDERSON, 2011, p.45). Despite its small scale when compared with 9/11 - with in total almost 3000 deaths (CNN, 2016) - the 2001 attacks were not the first on American soil.

occasion that even though “Americans have known wars”, “for the past 136 years, they have been wars on foreign soil, except for one Sunday in 1941.” And still even though “Americans have known the casualties of war” they have not known one “at the center of a great city on a peaceful morning. Americans have known surprise attacks, but never before on thousands of civilians” (BUSH, 2001h). The sense that America would not be the same is also present in Congress, as representatives affirmed the country had “lost [its] our innocence” (ENGEL, 2001; STENHOLM, 2001; COLLINS, 2001) and that 9/11 changed the “nature of freedom in this country and every country forever” forging a “new understanding in a new world of what it means to be free and also secure” (GEPHARDT, 2001)

Minimizing the existence of a previous terrorist attempt in American soil might be illustrative of this rhetorical strategy of creating a sense of urgency and “unprecedentedness” of 9/11. And even though in moments of unsettled narratives the scope for constructing different consensus is generally wider since audiences are more open (KREBS, 2015, p.44), the context created by Bush’s storytelling mode used some pre-9/11 national security discursive practices, specificating and operationalizing U.S. identity anchor points, and hence hooking the narrative onto a familiar way of the American public opinion to see the world. The president’s discourses before the terrorist attacks explained the international environment as in a changed security arrangement, within which the military needed to be adjusted to meet the challenges of the present with a “clear strategy to confront the threats of the 21st century, threats that are more widespread and less certain” (BUSH, 2001a). A security moment where a single threat had been “replaced by new and different threats, sometimes hard to define and defend against, threats such as terrorism, information warfare, the spread of weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them” (BUSH, 2001b), but a world in which “America remains engaged (...), by history and by choice, shaping a balance of power that favors freedom” (BUSH, 2001a). In this new post-Cold War world, democracy gained space to be perceived and lived as more than a mere institutional and political form of governmental organization. Since there was no real competing ‘ideological’ body to the Western liberal values, democracy could flourish in its entirety. If “through much of the last century, America’s faith in freedom and democracy was a rock in a raging sea. Now it is a seed upon the wind, taking root in many nations”. And “our democratic faith is more than the creed of our country. It is the inborn hope of our humanity, an ideal we carry but do not own, a trust we bear and pass along. Even after nearly 225 years, we have a long way yet to travel” (BUSH, 2001a).

Regarding the anchor points of equality and justice, Bush's speeches before 9/11 presented them in combination and mainly directed to the domestic public. They both were specified into the economic (and not security, in a strict sense) logic conveying the notion that the US needed to work hard to restore its economic force because "while many of our citizens prosper, others doubt the promise, even the justice of our own country". "The ambitions of some Americans are limited by failing schools and hidden prejudice and the circumstances of their birth. And sometimes our differences run so deep, it seems we share a continent but not a country. We do not accept this, and we will not allow it" (BUSH, 2001a). Bush affirms that "our unity, our Union, is a serious work of leaders and citizens and every generation" and, hence, "this is my solemn pledge: I will work to build a single nation of justice and opportunity". and "I know this is in our reach because we are guided by a power larger than ourselves, who creates us equal, in His image, and we are confident in principles that unite and lead us onward" (BUSH, 2001a). The 9/11 narratives cannot be fully understood as a substitution of the previous national security specification process of US anchor points. Instead, the foreign policy subfield kept the argument about the existence of new threats that demanded a new logic of action but zoomed in on terrorism as the most critical threat among them. As Bush stated in his Radio Address on September 15th, "this will be a different kind of conflict against a different kind of enemy", a conflict "without battlefields or beachheads" (BUSH, 2001f).

The administration discourses in conjunction with the debates in Congress from September 11th to October 5th shaped two narratives: the war narrative and the criminal narrative. As we shall see, Bush and some of his entourage, as Rumsfeld, Rice and Cheney pended to the war narrative, and Powell, although also on the spectrum of the war narrative, sometimes pitched in the criminal one. The religious component was, to a greater or lesser extent, present in both narratives on the terrorist attacks. Comparing with the specification process promoted by Bush in his previous 9/11 speeches, while the anchor points of democracy and liberty/freedom will follow a similar connotation, the anchor points of equality and justice will be shaped in a different meaning. Besides the clear difference in policy-recommendations, the war and criminal narratives both share points of intersection in other elements of the narrative construction. Perhaps, because of the bully pulpit and the storytelling mode of narrative used by Bush, the space for completely opposite narratives was narrowed down to almost overlaid ones.

The two narratives did not present the conflict as a mere clash between two embodied entities, either individuals, states or organizations, but largely one between good versus evil. The combination of republic values with religious overtones is even more evident when Bush stated that “freedom and fear, justice and cruelty have always been at war, and we know that God is not neutral between them” (BUSH, 2001h). This binary and general way of presenting the conflict, selecting the ones that are with us and leaving to the others the realm of enmity (the ones against us), not only produced a strong narrative image capable of grounding the national security consensus but could also open space for unintended policy implications.

Along with the question “who did this to the US?”, the members of the foreign policy subfield had yet to explain the “why” question. In both narratives, America “was targeted for attack because [it is] the brightest beacon for freedom and opportunity in the world” (BUSH, 2001c; similar DREIER, 2001; CANTOR, 2001). And the main motivation that leaded the terrorists was their hatred for “what we [Americans] see right here in this Chamber, a democratically elected government” because “their leaders are self-appointed. They hate our freedoms—our freedom of religion, our freedom of speech, our freedom to vote and assemble and disagree with each other” (BUSH, 2001h). They wanted to “intimidate our nation and weak our resolve” (CONGRESS, H.J.RES 61, 2001), “to demoralize American people (...) and destabilize American democracy” (HYDE, 2001) because the US is the “greatest contemporary embodiment of human rights and democracy” (HYDE, 2001) and “our liberty is in some way dangerous” (SHAW, 2001). “They do not hate us as individuals, they hate America, they hate our civilization” (COX, 2001), and they “intend to weaken the very core of our national identity” (NAPOLITANO, 2001).

Throughout the narratives development, the “why” question needed to be complemented by the object definition, or in other words the “what was attacked?” question. Here, the narrative strategy presented the object of the attacks as something bigger than the United States, like freedom and democracy themselves. As it expanded the conflict, it also prevented placing the country as a victim. As Karen Hughes, the administration's communications czar and one of the individuals responsible for the president’s speeches, stated “we aren't the victims of anything. We may have been the targets, we may have been attacked, but we are not victims” (WOODWARD, 2002). In this sense, the victims of the 9/11 attacks might have been the innocent lives in the WTC, but what was attacked were, in fact, the abstract concepts of freedom, democracy and the American “way of life”. “They believe they can destroy our values and our freedom by destroying our buildings”

(DUNN, 2001) as the “attacks were directed to the very idea of America itself” (LOWEY, 2001), “the America spirit” (STENHOLM, 2001), “because they do not like to be challenged by our values” (PITTS, 2001). More than the US, 9/11 was directed “against the lovers of freedom across this globe” (ARMEY, 2001), “against civilization” (BUSH, 2001g; GEPHARDT, 2001), “against humanity” (GEPHARDT, 2001; KUCINICH, 2001) and the forthcoming struggle will be one “between civilization and barbarity” (BIDEN, 2001).

As stated above, the 9/11 narrative rarely refers to the enemy with specific denominations, as either the Al Qaeda terrorist cell or Bin Laden. Bush’s Address before the Congress is the first presidential speech to mention directly Al Qaeda and Bin Laden⁹³. The previous discourses depicted the enemy with generalizations such as “uncivilized” (REID, 2001), “faceless cowards” (BUSH, 2001d; SHAW, 2001; SNOWE, 2001), “a cancer” (FROST, 2001), “the very worst of human nature” (BUSH, 2001c), individuals with “no regard for human life” (BUSH, 2001e), and a “frame of mind” that hates “everything that is not them” (WOODWARD, 2002). And despite specifically mentioning Bin Laden and Al Qaeda in his September 20th speech, Bush still compared the terrorist’s logic to the one used by the 20th century totalitarian regimes when he stated that “by sacrificing human life to serve their radical visions, by abandoning every value except the will to power, they follow in the path of Fascism and Nazism and totalitarianism” (BUSH, 2001h). The reference to totalitarian regimes during the first versions of the speech was not supposed to be related to the Nazi-fascist one, but either to use the phrase “imperial communism”. The latter was substituted due to concerns about offending some coalition partners, especially Russia which had shown the willingness to support the war on terrorism (WOODWARD, 2002). The allusion to these controversial regimes can produce some interesting interpretations. Instead of completely dropping the point of comparison, the final statement just used another historical event with a similar symbolical weight to the American public. Following this argument, we can assume that regardless of the chosen example the meaning it conveyed was the important issue for the administration. In this case, the metaphor gave the American public a

⁹³ The name of Bin Laden was mentioned before during a question and answer session after a Remarks in a Meeting with the National Security Team, on September 15th. As a report asked Bush if he was satisfied that “Usama bin Laden is at least a kingpin of this operation”, the president answered: “there is no question he is what we would call a prime suspect. And if he thinks he can hide and run from the United States and our allies, he will be sorely mistaken” (BUSH, 2001g). But because the speech is basically a reaction to a report’s question and not an intended reference to Bin Laden’s name, this moment is not as relevant as the Address Before the Congress speech, which, by this logic, can be considered the first presidential discourse to define the enemy (BUSH, 2001h).


familiar threat image they could relate to and compare with terrorism, creating in their minds a perception of it as equally terrible as the Nazi-fascism. Besides, it accompanied the non-embodiment strategy of defining the threat as an idea. Like Fascism and Communist, terrorism is a new threatening idea and, because so, it can only be defeated by another powerful idea.

However, the decision to mention Bin Laden and Al Qaeda was not a consensus within Bush's national security team. Rumsfeld was the one vocally against the strategy to single out Bin Laden in the president's speech. For him, this could send the wrong message about their objectives, since removing or killing Bin Laden would not solve the problem of terrorism *per se*, and his vilification could instead thwart the United States' chances of framing the conflict as a large war (WOODWARD, 2002). Plus, Rumsfeld raised the concern that alluding to Bin Laden could confer him an unwanted elevated status. On the other hand, Powell advocated for singling out both Bin Laden and Al Qaeda. In his perspective, this narrative strategy would not only give focus to the coalition, by not defining its objectives too broadly but would also allow the American people to understand this new threat and the administration's course of action (WOODWARD, 2002). In the end, Bush opted for the latter so the "average man" could comprehend his message (WOODWARD, 2002). Here, a nuance between the war and the criminal narratives needs to be addressed. Both shares the adjectives to terrorists and both believe in Western liberal ideas to defeat this threat. However, their nuanced divergence on the 'who' question had consequences on the answer to the "what should be done" question.

In synthesis, both narratives share the understandings that US/civilization values were attacked, that the terrorists perpetrated 9/11 attacks out of rage to those values and that terrorism might be an idea. However, these understandings are worked differently to justify each policy recommendation. In the war narrative, since terrorism is an idea "that must be combated each day in the hearts and minds" there is nothing capable of better fighting an idea than another idea, in the case, the American ideas' anchor points. More than acting as an example, the US needs to remove the so-called terrorist idea from other countries by means of military intervention as, at the same time, it has the obligation and necessity to spread democracy, liberty/freedom and equality to other countries, so the ideas propagated by terrorism can be substituted. Civic-religious overtones in this narrative are important to assure the American future success, "because we believe in these values we are certain that you [terrorists] will be found and our values will prevail". The sense of mission and US hierarchy in this civilization is more emphasized in this narrative. The US "understand[s]

what is required of great nations in the service of civilization in this world; and that understanding runs deep in America. It, too, is who we are”, a country that “throughout its entire history loved freedom so much that it risked its peace even to defend the freedoms of others, will defend its own freedom” (ARMEY, 2001).

Following this narrative, the terrorists acted moved by hatred and rage because they do not accept and do not comprehend the kind of values propagated by the US as the greatest representative of Western liberal civilization. And because they do not accept these values, there is no place for them in the kind of international society the US tries to order. By extension, they need to be eliminated. “Because [the US] we follow these values we cannot allow terrorists to exist” and, hence, the military solution is once more reaffirmed as the best course of action. As Congress representative Dreier (2001) quoting John Stuart Mills affirms, “war is an ugly thing but it is not the ugliest of things. The decayed and degraded state of moral and patriotic feeling which thinks nothing is worth a war is worse”. The narrative war goes even further, sometimes, to qualify the war on terrorism as a different war. And although rhetorically other wars were also qualified as different and this might be perceived as a simple turn of phrase, one interesting remark is that, even advocating for itself the higher position in civilization, some discourses present the war on terrorism as a “total war”, “unlike any war we have fought”, “not just our fight, but the Lord’s fight as well”, but especially as a war in which “the US can no longer fight terrorism according to the rules of civilized behavior”. In the war narrative, its spanning set could be developed as the following:



Through this spanning set it is possible to, more than delineate the narrative, interpret how US anchor points are shaped in its attempt to ‘talk identity’ within the foreign policy subfield⁹⁴. First, by Congressman Rehberg (2001) affirmation that “America must not treat yesterday’s tragedy as a criminal case, or simply seek justice (...) through subpoenas and courtrooms” one can infer two possible meanings: first, justice (in general or as a legal case) is not enough, or, second,

⁹⁴ Comparing the war narrative and Bin Laden’s discourses shows us a divergence between them. While the former focuses mostly on a normative discourse, the second mixes the normative discourse with a *quasi*-instrumental one. And since “the more successful storytelling is, the more natural [is] its way of situating events” (KREBS, 2015. p.38), recurring to normative discourses can be, as stated before, a good way to hook the narrative onto a set of stable meanings. In the war narrative, the cost and benefits of the war on terror are subsumed in the storytelling rhetorical mode, within the general discourse construction that “America will endure a new and long war, but we will prevail”; even though why the war is the better course of action and what prevail means are not often defined in Bush’s speeches. In Bin Laden’s narrative, the notion of costs is also subsumed in the storytelling rhetorical mode (the logic that the loss of Muslim lives is a duty and an honor for the *jihad*), but the objectives and benefits are sometimes delineated in a loosely costs and benefits argumentation, such as in the logic that stopping the U.S interference and exploitation of Islamic countries via terrorism is the most effective way for them to thrive again. Instead of following its narrative strategy, the Bush presidency could have made it similar to Bin Laden’s approach and framed the attacks as a revenge response for what is perceived as an unwanted American military and economic presence in Arab countries. Nevertheless, if Bush had followed Bin Laden’s line of argument to explain the terrorist attacks his narrative could have lost adherence, mainly because this strategy would have triggered some questionings about U.S. actions abroad and would have required explanations about the veracity of Bin Laden’s accusations, preventing, therefore, the narrative to have the same appeal.


that justice is equated with revenge (or at least with the feeling that terrorists and countries that harbor them should pay accordingly to the US suffering). Using Congressman Breaux (2001) words, terrorists “are not entitled to a trial by jury of their peers, and they are not entitled to the services of a free attorney. Through their actions “they have themselves, in fact, chosen the field on which they will be judged, and the field that they have selected is clearly the battlefield and not a courtroom”. With this statement, it is clear that terrorists do not deserve justice because the realm of justice is reserved only for some. Democracy assumes not merely the meaning of a form of governmental organization, but it is deployed in its widest ‘ideological’ connotation. Like liberty/freedom, democracy is a civilizational idea bigger than the US; an idea that not only informs internal institutional arrangements but organizes international shared understandings and ways of behavior. Liberty/freedom, in this narrative, is shaped majorly in the senses of liberation and negative freedom. While in former it is presented the US ability and duty to liberate the ones oppressed by the tyrant terrorist regimes and individuals, in the latter it is emphasized as the US freedom to “respond in kind (...) and freedom to act to preempt such acts” (BOND, 2001).

The criminal narrative has different interpretations for these same pillars. The understanding that terrorism is an idea is not dismissed, even though it focusses on the individuals that perpetrated the attacks. Plus, there is no such thing as enforcing one idea, or US ideas’ anchor points, to combat another. Here, the criminal narrative takes the exemplarist version of the US foreign policy grand narrative and advocates for a course of action that defeat terrorism by example: by the example of how countries based on democracy, freedom, equality, and justice values react in these situations, especially by the justification that otherwise the US would end up behaving just like the terrorists. Congressmen Gregg (2001) words are illustrative of this interpretation as he affirms the US “must be careful to use the rule of law so that we do not abandon what has made us great in order to confront this type of evil. We are a nation which is built on openness and law, and it would be a mistake if we abandon it as we attempt to pursue these individuals”. The best way to uphold the same values that were attacked is, hence, to reinforce them at home. More than an act of war to the US, the criminal narrative shapes the attacks as a crime against humanity and, in this sense, to the rhetorical question “what does a democracy do to punish criminals?” the logical answer was “we put them on trial. If found guilty, we imprison them. The U.S. military action should be centered on arresting the responsible parties and the Government placing the suspects on trial” (KUCINICH, 2001)

The possibility of advocating for the criminalization of terrorism is also shaped by this narrative interpretation of why the hijackers perpetrated the 9/11 attacks. Although it concurs that they were moved by rage and hatred, these sentiments come from the lack of access to a democratic government that protects individual liberties, equality, and justice. In this sense, though the hijackers need to be held accountable for what they did, this narrative does not (i) present them as something that needs to be eliminated, but rather removed from society through imprisonment, and (ii) propose one policy that is based on spreading US values, but not via military enforcement. Even concurring with the qualification of terrorists as tyrants, the criminal narrative, in the words of Congressman McKinney (2001), points out that “in the struggle for justice in the face of tyranny, (...) there were those who called for widespread executions of Nazis, Japanese leadership, and their civilians. On the other side were those who urged reason and a return to the rule of law” As “Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson, who led the prosecution at Nuremberg, said it best: ‘That four great nations flushed with victory and stung with the injury, stay the hand of vengeance and voluntarily submit their captive enemies to the judgment of the law, is one of the most significant tributes that power has ever paid to reason’”. One concern expressed in the criminal narrative was the possibility of Congress handing a blank check to the executive, and therefore the President, to conduct whatever means it thought necessary. Though extensive, Congressman Jackson’s speech is representative of the overall logic of the criminal narrative and its reticence with the war narrative.

I’m not willing to give President Bush carte blanche authority to fight terrorism. Another Member asked, “By voting for this resolution, are we granting the President new authority to conduct extra-legal and extra-constitutional assassinations?” If we are, we are becoming like the terrorists we despise. What does killing people already willing to die really accomplish? It will only create martyrs and multiply terrorists. We must not become like those who believe that the end justifies any means in the struggle against terrorism. That is the logic of the terrorists. We must respond to this outrage, but we must not validate this logic. (...) Another Member said we needed to show national unity. A vote to reaffirm the War Powers Act would have given us the national unity we need—and would have given us 60 days to investigate this matter more fully and see more clearly what we are actually looking at. Another Member said she had been in Congress for 19 years, but never had been asked to make a decision and cast a vote with so little information. This is not the kind of war former President Bush fought in the Persian Gulf that ended in just over a month. This is a war that will be fought in public places on our shores and within our borders—in our crowded public buildings, in our subways, in our airports, in our train stations, in our colleges and universities, at our sporting events, and possibly with chemical and biological weapons. But we must resist the temptation to allow ourselves to become like those we today so despise. Terrorist violence must be halted, but the pain behind their rage must be heard and addressed. (JACKSON, 2001).

In general, the criminal narrative downsizes, compared to the war one, the US hierarchization towards the rest of the globe. The spanning set of this narrative could be defined as the following:



By this spanning set, it is possible to infer that the connotation given to justice diverges from the one proposed in the war narrative. Justice is for everyone, is one basic standard that defines humanity. Regardless of the attack's gravity, all humans are equal towards the law and although the attacks are characterized as acts against humanity, terrorism needs to be fought "within traditional constitutional boundaries" (JACKSON, 2001). As justice is one of Western civilization's bedrocks and the US, as part of this civilization, has justice as one of its identity's anchor points, it cannot act otherwise. It needs to follow the due process of investigation and trial so justice is not imperiled. If "President Bush said the United States 'will make no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbored them'", this narrative believes that making distinction is what will prevent "more killing of innocent civilians" and "will only serve to flame the fires of war" (PAUL, 2001). Democracy, though also assumed in its widest

‘ideological’ sense, is operationalized differently. First, it reverses the use of this anchor point to question US/Western civilization countries - what democracies do? In other words, the ones that share not only a form of governmental organization, but Western values need to deal with terrorism by means of democratic policies. To behave in an undemocratically way will only contribute to spreading terrorist ideas. Following this narrative logic, what the US must do is to “respond to this outrage effectively-by eliminating the underlying grievances that are motivating the terrorism in the first place” and to “affirm the principles that came under attack on September 11—respect for innocent life and international law. That is how to rob the terrorists of victory” (JACKSON, 2001). So democracy and liberty/freedom are not ideas that can be enforced. What the US must do is to have a comprehensive approach that eases the “ocean of despair” and “the waves of pain and injustice” from which terrorism can flourish. In this sense, the “most effective anti-terrorist campaign is one that replaces the despair and hopelessness of the terrorist’s supporters with a policy that brings dignity, respect, and justice to every person, neighborhood, community, and nation in the world” (JACKSON, 2001).

The war narrative ended up as the winning narrative. First, from the very moment after 9/11, President Bush’s discourses adopted the war mode discourse. In his first discourse, on September 11th, the president had already established the solution through a war on terrorism. And although the “war” in the “war on terrorism” might not at first be perceived necessarily as a military engagement, the narrative construction from September 11th to its first moment of consolidation, on September 20th, grew into a *de facto* military narrative. Plus, the depiction of the enemy as the evil face of human nature, its comparison with the nazi-fascism totalitarian systems, and the characterization of the victim as being not a state itself, but a set of western values, contributed to elevate the war on terror to the level of an existential conflict in need of a proper response. The urgency narratively constructed around this issue turned the most appropriate course of action into the only possible course of action. And because the storytelling narrative has most of its successes in moments of narrative incertitude, the combination of ontological threats with a rhetorical mode that usually closes the spectrum of policy options (KREBS, 2015, p. 39) can frequently produce fertile environments for the use of violence. The validity of the intervention in Afghanistan is understated because of its legal justification; and although the war might be legit by a juridical perspective, the absence of questioning, plus taking for granted the administration decision to go

to war point to the narrative's success in convincing the American public that the United States needed to pursue this course of action.

Still, the combination of a closed rhetorical mode with the depiction of an existential threat has its pros and cons. While it has the capacity of rallying the American people behind a new conflict, it can definitely expand the scope of action to a point which there can be no limits of how far the government is willing to go in order to assure the country and its citizen's safety. The heavy application of discretionary politics opened the back door for illegal and controversial policies and the narrative construction, although regarded sometimes as mere epiphenomenal, is one of the key factors to understand how the decision-making process unfolded. By defining the situation as exceptional, the U.S. response to it needed as well to be guided by an exceptional mode of politics.

Back to the decision-making and diplomatic fronts, the evaluation of military options started as soon as the national security council was able to gather. Before defining exactly what the American response would be, President Bush had already one certainty: that his administration needed to be different from the previous one and refrain from the "antiseptic notion of launching a cruise missile into some guy's", presenting the United States as a "technologically competent but not very tough country that was willing to launch a cruise missile out of a submarine and that'd be it" (WOODWARD, 2002). After the narrative around 9/11 had once established the war framework, on September 14th when Congress issued the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Terrorists, the administration lacked only the military strategy to go through with it.

During the first national security council meeting, the night after 9/11, Rumsfeld affirmed that a possible intervention in Afghanistan would take a while, around sixty days to prepare since the United States did not have a specific contingency plan for Afghanistan (HYBEL, 2014, p. 121). The timetable presented by the Pentagon made Bush aware that the administration needed to present a well-defined strategy in order to push its top military personnel to agree with and think creatively about conventional ways to fight a guerilla-style war⁹⁵ (WOODWARD, 2002; HYBEL, 2014, p. 122).

⁹⁵ During the Clinton presidency, after the bombing of U.S. embassies in Tanzania and Kenya, Clinton asked the Pentagon for a military strategy to deploy special forces to Afghanistan. The Pentagon's overall assessment, including the opinion of the commander of the Central Command, General Zinni, who would be the one coordinating the mission, was not in favor of sending American soldiers to Afghanistan. The main argument was the scope and executability of the mission: it would have need tens of thousands of troops and it was extremely difficult to pinpoint the enemies (ANDERSON, 2011, p.50). Bush's evaluation of how to work with the Pentagon might have been derived from this incident during Clinton administration.

On the Camp David meeting, during the weekend of September 15th and 16th, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Henry H. Shelton, was ordered to arrive with all the options the Pentagon could provide. Three strategies were then discussed. The first was a strike with cruise missiles on Al Qaeda's targets. Its overall advantage was speed, as the plan could be executed quickly by the military, and the prevention of casualties. Neither Bush nor Shelton thought using only cruise missile attacks was a good plan since all Al Qaeda's training camps had been already emptied. Hence, this strategy would only produce a small political impact without a tactical one, not being thus completely effective. The second option was a combination of plan one with manned bomber attacks, which could last for three up to ten days. If the President decided to extend the attacks within Afghanistan, some Taliban targets could be included in this course of action; but, like the previous plan, this strategy would only produce little or no tactical gains since there were no high-value targets in Afghanistan, a country not yet recovered from the war against the USSR invasion. The third option was a build-up of military tactics from missile cruise attacks, manned bombers until the deployment of boots on the ground. This plan had the advantage of covering the plans one and two downsides while showing that the United States was willing to engage in a non-risk-free response to terrorism. Its disadvantage was the timetable to establish the on-site intervention: it took more than fifteen days to mobilize troops and, especially, to negotiate overflight rights from Afghanistan neighboring countries in order to place the necessary logistics for search and rescue missions⁹⁶. After consideration of the options presented, Bush on the following Monday after Camp David communicated its national security council his decision of proceeding with the third military plan (WOODWARD, 2002).

On September 28th, Mahmud traveled to Afghanistan to meet a second time with the Taliban leader Mullah Omar. Even though his intentions, as mentioned in Chamberlin's memo, was to stress the American demands and convince Omar that "a negotiated solution would be preferable to [a U.S.] military action", his mission nevertheless "in no way represented a change in Pakistan's commitments to the U.S. on military cooperation" (U.S. EMBASSY ISLAMABAD, 2001b). The reaction of the U.S. Ambassador was to show appreciation for Mahmud's objectives,

⁹⁶ During the days that followed 9/11 and especially at the Camp David meeting, the possibility of including Iraq in the war's first phase was often pushed by some members of the administration. Their main argument was that the 9/11 attacks were "too sophisticated and complicated an operation for a terrorist group to have pulled it off by itself, without a state sponsor" (WOLFOWITZ apud ANDERSON, 2011, p. 70) and that state sponsor might have been Iraq. Even though this is an important factor throughout the war on terror narrative, this case will be approached in details on another chapter.

but at the same time emphasize that “his trip could not delay military planning”, because as they were on “a tight schedule” his efforts could not “impede any of the military planning [they were] engaged”. Mahmud stated that he understood and accepted the American position, but yet “implored” Chamberlin for the U.S. “not to act in anger. Real victory [would] come in negotiations” (U.S. EMBASSY ISLAMABAD, 2001b). Plus, “the Taliban were weak and ill-prepared to face an American onslaught” and it was better to have the “Afghans to this job for us. Reasoning with them to get rid of terrorism will be better than the use of brute force. If the strategic objective is Al Qaida and UBL, it is better for the Afghans to do it. We could avoid the fallout”. Otherwise, “if the Taliban [were] eliminated (...) Afghanistan [would] revert to warlordism” (U.S. EMBASSY ISLAMABAD, 2001b). The Ambassador’s assessment of their conversation was that “Mahmud ha[d] virtually no chance of succeeding but nothing would be gained by pouring cold water on his efforts so long they do not impede [the U.S.] military planning” and, on the other hand, these actions were good for the Pakistani government to show the domestic public they fought for a peaceful solution until the last moment. (U.S. EMBASSY ISLAMABAD, 2001b)

Another aspect of Muhamad’s visit to Afghanistan was its developments. He had brought with him eight Pakistani religious leaders to add weight in seeking a peaceful resolution with the Taliban. At the end of their meeting, they suggested Mullah Omar to accept a delegation of religious leaders, from some prominent Islamic states, to decide what to do with Bin Laden (U.S. EMBASSY ISLAMABAD, 2001c). And because Omar expressed concerns that the leaders could be biased, reflecting their own countries’ politics, the Pakistanis offered to vet the international delegation as to assure their impartiality. Having Omar signed that he would think about it, Mahmud contacted Chamberlin stating that this initiative would not succeed without American support. The Ambassador replied that President Bush was definitive when he averred the U.S. would not negotiate with the Taliban and that Mahmud’s trip to Kandahar “was not conducted at [U.S.] request and was in parallel to international counter-terrorism efforts” (U.S. EMBASSY ISLAMABAD, 2001c). Here, if there was a moment to avoid an American military intervention and settle what could be the first step for an international criminalization of terrorism and hence the trial of Al Qaeda’s leadership, this moment was not seized (or not even considered) because of the military tempo. The narrative constructed by the foreign policy subfield foreclosed the option, even though back channels, of talking to the Taliban. If it was an open conversation between them via Pakistan, the administration could have been seen as weak and unresolved, and a paced

resolution would not have matched the fierce discourses about bringing justice to the American people. On the other hand, if the conversation with the Taliban was done in secret, the perception of strength would have been maintained, even though in the meantime the administration might have appeared as doing nothing to respond to the terrorist attacks, and it would also have dragged the commencement of any overt military action.

The absence of a contingency plan for Afghanistan, rather than the usual strategy of launching cruise missiles, lingered the definition of a battle plan and its operationalization. On October 5th, when asked by Bush if his troops were ready to be deployed, General Tommy Franks answered that they were. The military plan was then built around four phases: the first was designed to connect the CIA with the military special forces in order to create the local conditions for the deployment of conventional forces; the second involved targeting Al Qaeda and Taliban sites via a massive air campaign, while dispatching humanitarian airdrops to the Afghan people; the third phase consisted on inserting American and allied countries ground troops to hunt down remaining Taliban and Al-Qaeda members; and the fourth phase was aimed at stabilizing the country in order to help the Afghans to rebuild the country's political system (HYBEL, 2014, p.128).

It was also at the Camp David encounter that the CIA role in the conflict was defined. George Tenet, Director of CIA, came up with a plan for covert operations in Afghanistan and other countries, in what was dubbed the top secret "Worldwide Attack Matrix" for a broader anti-terrorism campaign. On Afghan territory, Tenet's plan was to enhance U.S. support (in money, firepower, and technology) to the anti-Taliban opposition forces, especially the Northern Alliance, and create a northern local front that could link up with and give political support to the American ground troops (WOODWARD, 2002). On a previous national security council meeting, the director of the CIA's counterterrorism group, Cofer Black, advised the president that, although the Northern Alliance was not completely reliable - many of them had fought alongside the mujahideen during the USSR invasion - the U.S. could approach them in an "escalatory manner" (HYBEL, 2014, p.123). In a general sense, Tenet's proposal was to use the CIA to help to prepare a local uprising against the Taliban, so the Afghan political matters were seen as under local scrutiny, despite the U.S. military presence. One tactical benefit of this strategy was to reduce the number of boots on the ground. The U.S. would need only one-third of the military contingent deployed to the Gulf War and approximately half the combat troops used by the Soviet Union in 1979 (LANSFORD, 2003, p.106)

Operation Enduring freedom started covertly on September 27th with the first CIA team insertion in Afghan territory (ANDERSON, 2011, p. 82) and on October 9th Bush issued a letter to Congress reporting the commencement of combat action in Afghanistan. The first phase of the military intervention unfolded in a successful way, mainly due to the cooperation between the CIA and the Pentagon. According to Rumsfeld, the CIA “had relationships or could develop relationships that would facilitate” the development of the mission on the ground and, therefore, “would be critically important” (WOODWARD, 2002). During the 9/11 context, the CIA had its status and scope of action enormously elevated.

6 THE US INTERVENTION IN IRAQ: AGGRAVATING THE 9/11 WAR RHETORIC

Other nations may deem their flags the best
And cheer them with fervid elation,
But the flag of the North and South and West
Is the flag of flags, the flag of Freedom's nation.
(The stars and the stripes forever)

6.1 The American narratives for the intervention in Iraq

During the period between the beginning of George W. Bush's presidency and the September 11 terrorist attacks, the approach by Bush's administration to Iraq was, at first, one that kept what Clinton's presidency had established until a new strategic plan was produced. This way, the North Surveillance and South Surveillance operations were maintained. While the former demarcated the prohibition of flights in one area at the extreme north of Iraq to protect the Kurdish minority, the second, larger than the first, patrolled almost the entire southern half of Iraq, coming close to the suburbs of Baghdad. The perception of Saddam's Iraq as a regional threat also remained unchanged. In that sense, the concerns about the possibility that the regime still possessed weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), or that it had re-established its nuclear program has directed George W. Bush's administration to develop a new strategy for the country. The elaborated plan, until the days before the 9/11 attacks, was to redirect UN economic sanctions on weapons control, especially those of dual-use, as well as to foment Iraqi opposition in order to create fissures and tensions in Saddam's government to implode it from the inside (WOODWARD, 2004).

In the light of historical facts, it is not possible to know, at first, whether Bush's administration would have raised the tone of its foreign policy towards Iraq if the terrorist acts had not occurred. What one can say is that, since the end of the Gulf War, a group of US intellectuals, later called neoconservatives, was dissatisfied with the United States' foreign policy position regarding Saddam. During Clinton's administration, the think tank Project for a New American Century (PNAC) had expressed, in a letter to the President, its perspective on the urgency of a new, more austere and forceful policy for Iraq. Because the Iraqi and Afghan cases are intertwined in the post-9/11 rhetoric logic, most of the narrative constructions that were developed to legitimize the intervention in Afghanistan will be seized to advance another one in Iraq. If with Afghanistan the US identity anchor points, the notions of liberty/freedom, equality, democracy, justice, and in some extent individualism were put at stake within and outside the US, with Iraq the US is

perceived by some of its representatives as acting in defiance of these same core ideas that it is supposed to uphold. The whole idea of US as the hegemon, as the source of international order and especially as the greatest example of Western liberal values is questioned not only internationally, but by its own citizens within the foreign policy subfield.

Back to the neocons, it is interesting to note that among those who signed the 1998 PNAC letter were Richard Perle, Richard Armitage, Doug Feith, Paul Wolfowitz and Donald Rumsfeld (PNAC, 1998)⁹⁷. In George W. Bush's administration, Perle was the Chairman of the Defense Policy Board Advisory Committee between 2001 and 2003; Armitage had the role of Deputy Secretary of State, number two in the State Department, from 2001 to 2005; Feith, between 2001 and 2005, acted as Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; Wolfowitz, from 2001 to 2005, held the position of Deputy Secretary of Defense, the second most important man in the Department of Defense; and Donald Rumsfeld, from 2001 to 2006, served as Secretary of Defense. If, therefore, before the terrorist attacks, the perspective of this group of politicians was one of scale up the US posture against Iraq, and some of these same intellectuals had important positions within the administration, with the advent of the terrorist act the possibility of changes in US foreign policy has become even more concrete.

Immediately after the attacks, during a meeting the day after September 11, Rumsfeld considered the possibility of an attack against Saddam Hussein in response to the terrorist attacks, questioning to what extent they had not created an opportunity to deal with Iraq. After discussions, most of Bush's advisers did not encourage him to take action against Iraq as a first step in the fight against terrorism; not even Cheney, who criticized George Bush Senior's choice not to advance in the military intervention of the Gulf War, pointed out that perhaps that was not the moment to think about Saddam, but that he would not rule out dealing with this issue at a future time (WOODWARD, 2004). Consciously or not, when Bush addressed the nation on September 20th, he established an open-ended narrative against terrorism, one that could easily be stretched to incorporate new actions. In his words, "our war on terror begins with Al Qaida, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped, and

⁹⁷ In the letter produced by the PNAC and addressed to Bush on September 20, 2001, still advocating a change in the position of the United States against Iraq, the mentioned actors do not appear as subscribers of the document. We believe, however, that this fact is not representative of a change in their political-strategic convictions, but rather an act derived from their importance in the positions they held. In addition, their opinions would better serve to the president if directed personally to him, and not by means of a public letter.

defeated” (BUSH, 2001h). During the meeting, Richard Clarke, the foremost counterterrorism adviser in the National Security Council, and one of the few members of the administration who was kept in his position at the time of the transition from Clinton’s to Bush’s presidency, said he was shocked because instead of hearing discussions on how to fight al-Qaeda, other members presented arguments about how to engage the US against Iraq. In his words:

I realized with almost a sharp physical pain that Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz were going to try to take advantage of this national tragedy to promote their agenda about Iraq. Since the beginning of the administration, indeed well before, they had been pressing for a war with Iraq. My friends in the Pentagon had been telling me that the word was we would be invading Iraq sometime in 2002. (CLARKE, 2004, p.30).

Still, on the afternoon of September 12, Clarke (2004) pointed out that Bush met some of his advisers, including him, and asked for any possible evidence that Saddam had any involvement with Al-Qaeda and September 11. Discussions on the initial plan in response to the bombings, therefore, ended on September 13, with the consensus that the first offensive measure would be directed at Afghanistan and its Taliban government - in addition to other smaller military operations of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in areas susceptible to the presence of terrorist groups - but it was also established that there would be a second offensive phase in the fight against terrorism (CLARKE, 2004). To his inner circle, Bush asked his Vice President Cheney to check the data collected by the intelligence agencies over the past eight years and to analyze the United States’ vulnerabilities to other possible terrorist acts, while to Rumsfeld, Bush asked him to continue working on a war plan for Iraq, but not as a priority (WOODWARD, 2004).

Although subject to the pressures of some of his advisors, such as Wolfowitz who on September 17 sent a memo to Rumsfeld called “Preventing More Events” (9/11 COMMISSION), in which he justified an effective position against Saddam, Bush only really started considering the beginning of the second phase of combat to terrorism, towards Iraq, on November 2001. With the positive results of the mission in Afghanistan - US coalition forces already controlling half of the country's territory, including the capital Kabul, and some training camps used by terrorists occupied, while some of its members arrested - Bush felt comfortable to open a second flank, and to reach a new target.

Rumsfeld and General Franks, Commander of the United States Central Command (CENTCOM), began to work on reviewing the operational plan 1003, concerning Iraq. For Rumsfeld, the plan was not only expensive, but a repetition of the strategy used in the Gulf War -

based on the premise of a possible invasion by Saddam of another neighboring country, it involved a large mobilization of US troops, and a long period to concentrate them on the region, with a schedule of estimated seven months until the start of hostilities. Rumsfeld and Franks started to rethink the operational plan to make it leaner: lower costs; reduction in the number of troops and the time required for the start of military operations following a presidential decision; but, above all, a plan that did not give up the element of surprise. In general terms, pre-conflict planning relied on a series of small and sparse military initiatives to gradually strengthen the US military situation in the region without, however, exposing such mobilizations. The main objective was to disguise them in training procedures so that they did not constitute a provocation to Saddam or an effective American involvement. This included the transfer of pre-positioned equipment in the Gulf to more sensitive regions, investment in locally established bases to transform them into centers of command and control, and a gradual increase in the number of military personnel in the North American task force in Kuwait that existed at the time (WOODWARD, 2004).

On January 29, 2002, with the operational plan for Iraq underway, Bush made his State of the Union speech in which he pointed out that the second goal of the war against terrorism was “to prevent regimes that sponsor terror from threatening America, or our friends and allies, with weapons of mass destruction”, mainly the regimes that formed, in Bush’s words, “the axis of evil” (BUSH, 2002a). It is interesting to note that despite the so-called “axis of evil” being composed of three countries, North Korea, Iran and Iraq, the emphasis on Bush’s speech is not equal for each of these regimes: while North Korea and Iran are described by one sentence each, Iraq has four. Woodward (2004) reports in his book that, at the time this speech was written, only Iraq was directly mentioned as part of the axis of evil, a fact that concerned the National Security Adviser, Condoleezza Rice, and her deputy Stephen Hadley, because, besides aiming at preserving the secrecy of strategic planning already under way in the Gulf, they did not want the speech to pass the image of a possible war declaration to Saddam. This way, they suggested to include North Korea and Iran in the ‘axis of the evil’ narrative, a suggestion that pleased the president.

Woodward’s (2004) record reveals that there was probably no intention by the Bush administration to deal militarily with the other two cases belonging to the “axis of evil”, but only that their mentions were a language resource to shift the attention from that which would be the next target of the war on terror. However, when asked about the logic of the use of force against Iraq, but not against North Korea and Iran, Bush usually responded that these cases were being

dealt differently, and that the Iraqi issue was unique because of the nature of its regime, the possession of WMDs, the disrespect for UN sanctions, and its connection to terrorism and to al-Qaeda (BUSH, 2002d; 2002e).

In addition to the revision of the military plan, Bush's administration tried to coordinate a secret action with the CIA to bring Saddam down. The answer that Cheney - the one entrusted by the president to work with the US intelligence agencies - received from the Agency was that the CIA only would not be enough to trigger a regime change in Iraq, especially because Saddam had survived several blows and his security apparatus was kept organized to avoid new attempts. In addition, according to the CIA, the lack of credibility⁹⁸ of the United States with Iraqi minority groups could only be circumvented if they had the guarantee of future US military commitment. After the presidential authorization was signed, a CIA investigation team secretly entered northern Iraq on February 20, 2002, along the border with Turkey, to organize the development of paramilitary teams, the so-called Northern Iraq Liaison Elements (NILE) (WOODWARD, 2004).

In March 2002, Vice President Cheney went on a trip to the Middle East with the guideline of not necessarily signing military cooperation agreements with the visited countries, but to investigate how they viewed Iraq and, above all, to say that if the United States saw military action as necessary, Bush would not hesitate to act (WOODWARD, 2004). Speaking to the media about the reasons for his trip, Cheney said he went to "consult with them [Middle East countries], seek their advice and counsel, to be able to report back to the President on how we might best proceed to deal with that mutual problem, and that's exactly what I've done". (CHENEY, 2002).

At the end of May, Bush went to Europe to attend meetings with the German and French heads of state, Schroeder and Chirac respectively, to discuss, among other things, the Iraqi threat of WMDs possession. Broadly speaking, Bush told the two governors that

I have no war plans on my desk, which is the truth, and that we've got to use all means at our disposal to deal with Saddam Hussein. Now, I know some would play like they're not real. I'm telling you: They're real. And if you love freedom, it's a threat to freedom. And so we're going to deal with it. (BUSH, 2002b).

⁹⁸ The United States' lack of credibility with opposition groups in Iraq - especially the Kurds and Shiites - stemmed from a US history of selective engagement with regime change initiatives, especially at the time of the Gulf War. At that time, George Bush Senior authorized the financing of the Iraqi opposition, and called on "Iraqi military and the Iraqi people to take matters into their own hands, to force Saddam Hussein, the dictator, to step aside" (BUSH, 1991), but when these groups rebelled against Saddam, Bush did not cancel the use of the US military in support of the opponents, and Saddam eliminated them. In the original: "Iraqi military and the Iraqi people to take matters into their own hands, to force Saddam Hussein, the dictator, to step aside".

In the same week of Bush's statement, General Franks, during a press conference in Tampa, Florida, when asked about the number of men and armaments necessary to intervene in Iraq, and how long it would take for the United States to displace them, replied that "that's a great question and one for which I don't have an answer because my boss has not yet asked me to put together a plan to do that" (FRANKS, 2002), adding that despite the speculation he read in the press about a military takeover in Iraq, Bush had not yet requested him to estimate the numbers of a possible military deployment. Evaluating *a posteriori* the progress of the facts, and the decisions taken towards intervention in Iraq, Bush and Frank's speeches might not correspond to the reality of the ongoing strategic planning. To hide from the press the real movements and resolutions of the administration is neither a new resource nor an exclusive attribute of US governments; it is, in some scenarios, a legitimate procedure to avoid sensationalism. However, what Bush and his administration may not have noticed, to grant the benefit of the doubt, or perhaps have deliberately instrumented, is that the discursive constructions of the Iraqi regime as a more urgent situation of the "axis of evil", regardless of the usual affirmatives on the non-existence of an effective military plan, would create their own impetus for the inevitability of a military action.

In an attempt to halt such impetus, and within a group of counselors that were more prone to the use of force, Powell sometimes felt dislocated when diverging in the construction of consensus about Iraq. As Secretary of State, he believed that he should not refrain from giving Bush his views on a possible incursion into Iraqi territory, even if the president decided to maintain the use of military force. In this sense, Powell requested a private meeting with the president, without the interference of Cheney and Rumsfeld, which took place in August 2002. During the meeting, the Secretary of State contemplated, with the president, the difficulties regarding the uncertainty about the time needed for the mission, the possible negative perception of a US military government in Iraq, and the difficulty in assigning the parameters to establish the success of the mission. When asked by Bush about what the solution to this scenario would be, Powell answered that the United States should consider an action at the UN to internationalize the problem of Iraq, and call upon the international community to deal with the situation (WOODWARD, 2004). He also added that

If you take the matter to the United Nations, you should recognize that they may be able to resolve it. In this case, there will be no war. This could imply a solution that is not as

radical as simply getting in there and taking the person away (POWELL apud WOODWARD, 2004, p.159).

The construction by the administration of a public justification to legitimize a US intervention in Iraq orbited around two axes, one regarding Saddam's psyche and other the material WMD conditions and breaches on Iraq. The first and most immediate one was the emphasis on the Western common sense about Saddam Hussein's character, a shameless dictator in the use of violence against individuals of the Iraqi opposition, with the anti-Americanist aims of terrorist groups, especially Al- Qaeda. Here, the narrative imports some of the vocabularies used to define the 'who is the enemy' question in the Afghan case. From "evil dictator, who terrorizes his own people and shelters those who terrorize others" and "tyrannical regime" (WARNER, 2002) to a "man who trades not in hope but in destruction, to a man who rules not by favor but through fear" (MCHUGH, 2002), Saddam was depicted as the worst and most urgent American, and by extension international, enemy. The second axis dealt with Iraq's possession of weapons of mass destruction, in which the administration affirmed its certainty that Iraq has been developing WMDs and long-range missiles. To it the administration was gradually inserting new justifications for the intervention, be it the necessity of regime change in Iraq or merely new information from US intelligence agencies that aggravated the sense of urgency. If "Saddam Hussein is a homicidal dictator who is addicted to weapons of mass destruction" (BUSH, 2002d), he poses not only a physical threat to other countries, but mainly a threat to the ideas of freedom/liberty, democracy and justice that sustains the international order built by the US after WWII.

Attempts to identify connections between Saddam Hussein and Al Qaeda began shortly after the attacks, but they became more present in the administration's discourses and in the public debate from August 2002 onwards. While the war against Afghanistan received national and international support, the war against Iraq evoked more controversy and disapproval. In addition to Powell's more cautious assessment, Scowcroft, also a Republican and Bush Senior's national security adviser, wrote in an article to the Wall Street Journal that, although Saddam was a threat to the United States and therefore a new regime in Iraq would be better for US interests, "there is scant evidence to tie Saddam to terrorist organizations, and even less to the Sept. 11 attacks", so that "an attack on Iraq at this time would seriously jeopardize, if not destroy, the global counterterrorist campaign we have undertaken". Scowcroft (2002) further states that "while Saddam is thoroughly evil, he is, above all, a power-hungry survivor".

The internal divergencies, however, did not stop the administration from pursuing its goals for Iraq. In September 2002, Bush used his speech to the UN General Assembly to officially address the need to contain the Iraqi threat. First, Bush emphasized the history of UN inspections in Iraq, and the existence of a clear violation of the regime in its commitment to destroy previous WMDs stocks and no longer produce new biological and nuclear-weaponized material. Following this, Bush also highlighted not only that Saddam continued to provide “shelter and support for terrorist organizations targeting acts of violence against Iran, Israel and Western governments” (2002c), but also that terrorists that were in Afghanistan before the US intervention had escaped to Iraq.

The allegations of connection between Saddam and terrorist groups were generally based on two factors: a supposed meeting of Mohamed Atta, leader of the September 2001 attacks, with an Iraqi intelligence officer in April 2001 (PINCUS and MILBANK, 2004); and the testimony of Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi, of Libyan descent and the highest-ranking Al-Qaeda leader under US custody (JEHL, 2005). Bush made reference to the information provided by al-Libi in two speeches in early 2003. On January 28th, he noted that “evidence from intelligence sources, secret communications, and statements by people now in custody reveals that Saddam Hussein aids and protects terrorists, including members of Al Qaeda” (BUSH, 2003a), and on February 8th he stated that “we also know that Iraq is harboring a terrorist network headed by a senior Al Qaeda terrorist planner” and that “this network runs a poison and explosives training camp in northeast Iraq, and many of its leaders are known to be in Baghdad” (BUSH, 2003b).

However, it is interesting to note that this same information had already been at least questioned by the American intelligence community. A June 2002 CIA report states that there were “several critical gaps” in the Iraqi regime's link to Al-Qaeda because of “limited reporting” and “questionable reliability of many of our sources”; it is also pointed out that the “report of the alleged trip of Mohammed Atta to Prague and his meeting with the Iraqi intelligence officer is contradictory” (CIA, 2002). On January 29, 2003, in a new CIA report, the evaluation is that some of the reports are based on “hearsay” and that others are “simple declarative accusations of Iraqi-al-Qaeda complicity with no substantiating detail or other information that might help us corroborate them”. Moreover, it is said that “some reports state that Atta met with... al-Ani [Iraqi intelligence officer], but the most reliable reporting to date casts doubt on this possibility” (CIA, 2003).

It is not known to what extent the President was aware of these reports, and that the information presented in his speeches had already been contested by the United States intelligence community⁹⁹. What one can say, however, is that such information was probably not unknown to some members of Bush's administration, not only because of its sensitive nature but mainly because it is a matter of high interest in the foreign policy formulation. Whether the president knew it or not, presidential declarations, especially speeches like those of January 28th, about the State of the Union, and that of February 8th, the president's message on the radio, are usually discussed by some administration agents besides the president and his editor. Thus, the lack of alert about the contestation of the information presented in the speeches regarding the connection between Saddam and terrorist groups and/or their consequent maintenance in the final text, more than once, might have been a deliberate appeal to construct the Iraqi case as more urgent. Despite the lack of substantive conclusions by the US intelligence, the Iraq-terrorism connection was presented as true.

The second material justification presented by Bush's administration to legitimize an intervention in Iraq was about Saddam's ambition to resume the development of a nuclear program. The accusations against the Iraqi regime developed from two axes: the imbroglio regarding the objective of Iraq when ordering some aluminum tubes; and the suspicion that Saddam had tried to buy significant amounts of uranium from an African country. The discussion about the tubes had already arisen prior to the September 11 terrorist attacks. On April 2001, a division of the CIA called Weapons Intelligence, Nonproliferation and Arms Control (WINPAC) issued a report stating that the tubes "have little use other than for a uranium enrichment program". Alarmed by the CIA statement, the US Department of Energy (DE) analyzed the tubes and came to different conclusions: they were "too narrow, too heavy, too long" to have any practical usefulness in a centrifuge for nuclear purposes. Weeks after this statement, the Department of Energy came to the conclusion that the tubes would probably serve to build small-rocket combustion chambers (BARSTOW; BROAD; GERTH, 2004).

⁹⁹ The link between Iraq and al-Qaeda was justified by the CIA director, George Tenet, through reports that Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, a Palestinian with strong ties to al-Qaeda, would be operating a training center in the northeast of Iraq. Tenet's statement seems to disregard not only the aforementioned reports from his own agency, but also the information previously checked by the CIA that bin Laden had sponsored Kurdish groups opposing Saddam (HYBEL; KAUFAMN, 2006).

On August 17, the DE issued a secret Technical Intelligence Note concluding that the use of such tubes in centrifuges “is credible but unlikely, and a rocket production is the much more likely end use for these tubes”; one of its experts added that “the tubes were so poorly suited for centrifuges (...) that if Iraq truly wanted to use them this way, we should just give them the tubes”. (CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, 2004, p. S10304). Despite the lack of consensus on the purpose of the tubes, on September 2002, Cheney stated in an interview that “he [Saddam] has been seeking to acquire, and we have been able to intercept and prevent him from acquiring (...) the kinds of tubes that are necessary to build a centrifuge (...) which is what you have to have in order to build a bomb”. (NBS NEWS’ MEET THE PRESS, 2002). In line with Cheney's speech and in the same month, Rice - in her famous interview to CNN (2002) - in which she pointed out that “we don't want the smoking gun to be a mushroom cloud” - stressed that “we do know that he is actively pursuing a nuclear weapon” and that “we do know that there have been shipments (...) of aluminum tubes that really are only suited to (...) nuclear weapons programs”.

In a speech before the United Nations on September 12, 2002, Bush tried to develop the image of Iraq as a great international threat. For this, besides exposing the (supposed) American knowledge about the Iraqi connection with terrorism, as already mentioned, he presented the case of the purchase of the aluminum tubes. In his words:

Iraq employs capable nuclear scientists and technicians. It retains physical infrastructure needed to build a nuclear weapon. Iraq has made several attempts to buy high-strength aluminum tubes used to enrich uranium for a nuclear weapon. Should Iraq acquire fissile material, it would be able to build a nuclear weapon within a year. And Iraq's state-controlled media has reported numerous meetings between Saddam Hussein and his nuclear scientists, leaving little doubt about his continued appetite for these weapons. (BUSH, 2002c).

Although some members of the CIA were asked to evaluate the presidential speech regarding the information from the US intelligence about Iraq, no proposal of amendment was sent. The content of the speech, however, pointed, once again, to the existence of failures in administration - either by the Agency, for not having informed, or by Bush's advisers that neither warned the president about the possibility of another version for the use of the tubes, nor were willing to get informed about the debates circulating within the intelligence corridors.

The presentation of questionable information as truth occurred again at the time of the launch on the National Intelligence Estimative (NIE) on October 2, 2002. This document was intended for evaluation by the Senate Intelligence Committee as a body of evidence corroborating

Bush's request to the Congress for authorization of the use of force. With only a comment in which it considered that the State Department agreed that the Iraqi nuclear program was being rebuilt, but disagreed about the use of tubes in this program, the NIE stated that “all agencies agree that about 25,000 centrifuges based on tubes of the size Iraq is trying to acquire would be capable of producing approximately two weapons’ worth of highly enriched uranium per year”. (NIE, 2002, p.6). Although the NIE affirmed that it had no information to prove that Saddam ordered an attack on US territory, Saddam's prospect of producing weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear devices, could be enough to build a sense of urgency.

The discussions in Congress about the US decision to intervene or not in Iraq started long before Bush asked Congress representatives for a joint resolution that authorized the use of force. However, a resolution was introduced in October 2nd for Congress consideration. Besides divergencies on what was the best course of action to deal with Iraq, both foreign policy subfield narratives - pro and against the intervention - converged in their depiction of Saddam. In both Saddam was perceived as a dictator and as a threat that should be addressed, but in each the means to it were presented differently. While the against narrative, called here the equinox narrative, affirmed that “the question is not whether Saddam Hussein should be disarmed; it is how imminent is this threat and how should we deal with it?” (LEAHY, 2002) and questioned ‘why now?’ (ESHOO, 2002), the pro-narrative, called here the polestar narrative, answered that “now is the time to take bold and decisive action in our own self-defense”. And “because we have learned the lessons of complacency, (...) the lessons of not being prepared” (HUTCHINSON, 2002), we know that “sooner or later, we are going to have to act, and we should pass this resolution to give the President every tool at his disposal to prevail in this struggle with evil” (BUNNING, 2002). Both narratives go back to the specification process of US identity’s anchor points established after 9/11 operationalized them in different ways. Democracy was still perceived as more than a mere institutional and political form of governmental organization. In both narratives, democracy was specified as a body of Western liberal values that encompassed the anchor points of equality, liberty/freedom, individualism, and justice. As we shall see, while in the polestar narrative it is conferred to democracy a messianic overtone, in the equinox narrative democracy and the values that it upholds should be preserved at any cost, even preserved from the US hubris.

The logic of the polestar narrative followed the war narrative in the Afghan case: after 9/11 “all of us lost our innocence that day” (HASTERT, 2002) and because it “changed the way that we

and the rest of the world perceive terrorism and weapons of mass destruction” the US “cannot afford to simply sit on [its] hands” (BUNNING, 2002); even though the US “inevitably give people the benefit of the doubt. It is our culture, and it is one of our strengths. Regrettably, in this war, giving people the benefit of the doubt (...) may end up costing us even more lives”. Plus, it was important to confront Iraq at that moment “because of the weapons of mass destruction which they have”. Following this logic, “the problem is, after September 11, we, as a country, cannot take such an isolationist view, for we know there is an enemy out there called al-Qaida that has stated, unequivocally, their purpose is to kill Americans and destroy our society and culture” (GREGG, 2002). And because the international situation was entirely different than the one before 9/11, although the “conflict [in Iraq] is ongoing”, “it has become critical that we take the next step” (HASTERT, 2002). Using Congressman Warner’s words,

The answer is simple. Enough is enough. In this post-9/11 world, we as a nation cannot afford to wait while this evil dictator, who terrorizes his own people and shelters those who terrorize others—just think, al-Qaida elements are now known to be within Iraq—acquires even more destructive capabilities to attack and terrorize our Nation, possibly his neighbors in the region and the entire world. There is a clear example of when forces of freedom gathered against the forces of oppression and were successful. (WARNER, 2002).

Besides the ‘exceptional moment’ rationale, the polestar narrative also followed Bush’s construction of Iraq as part of the war on terror effort. To legitimate the intervention in Iraq, this narrative presented it not as a new intervention but merely as a continuation or a second phase of the policy started with Afghanistan. In this sense, “the war on terrorism did not begin in Afghanistan. For us, it began in the United States of America on September 11th, 2001. It began and it continues in our homeland” and “as we assess the many challenges faced by the United States—and Saddam Hussein is clearly among those challenges—we must ask: What is our greatest responsibility? In my opinion, the answer is easy: Securing the peace and safety of the homeland of our great Nation” (GRAHAM, 2002). Even though there is an evident concern with the international environment, this is a ‘byproduct’ of the national security. As long as the US kept the foreign threats in check, the homeland would be safe from external threats. In summary, the suspicion of Iraq’s possession of WMDs in conjunction with this new international environment and a broad-based narrative against terrorism formed the argumentative foundations of the polestar narrative. The next step was to define how to deal with the Iraqi threat. While some representatives of the equinox narrative concurred that a military engagement would be a possible course of action,

they did not agree with the unilateral preemptive/preventive Bush doctrine. In the polestar narrative, the justification for preemption was, first, the notion that, in fact, a military engagement in Iraq was not preemptive at all. The US engagement in Iraq was an ongoing process that needed only to be scaled up. In Congressman Hastert (2002) words, “this [was] not a new conflict with Iraq. Our planes which have been patrolling the no-fly zone since the end of the Persian Gulf War pursuant to U.N. resolutions have been fired upon by the Iraqi military hundreds of times”. The second argument was based on the feeling that a ‘strike first’ policy would promote a sense of security and impede a possible new terrorist attack from happening, as “President Bush’s doctrine of preemption allows us, where appropriate, to act first against terrorist organizations and states” (KYL, 2002). Even elevating the narrative and recurring to US canonical former president George Washington, Congressman Warner (2002) quoted his words to justify the Bush doctrine, affirming “the best way to avoid war is to show clearly the preparations and the ability and the willingness to fight”.

Preemption, however, still left the possibility of a preemptive attack with the UN authorization if the countries of the UNSC were to approve a resolution in this sense. The reticence of UNSC countries to adopt military measures before exhausting all diplomatic means and giving inspections more time to assess the WMDs situation foreclosed for the US, within the polestar narrative, the possibility of a multilateral action. Representatives of this narrative affirmed “the proponents of ‘multilateralism,’ in addition to willfully ignoring the fecklessness of the U.N. and certain other countries, neglect the special leadership role that our country plays in the world” (KYL, 2002) and that although “the United States is going to the United Nations, and we should go to the United Nations”, “(...) at the end of the day we cannot be bound by some morally opaque decisions made by countries who do not share our values” (KING, 2002). Besides not allowing the UN to limit US freedom of action, the US should, “if the United Nations is to have relevance in the 21st Century”, “(...) must not let it go the way of the League of Nations. We must give the United Nations the backbone it needs to enforce its own resolutions”. However, “if the U.N. refuses to save itself, and more importantly the security of its member states and the cause of peace in this world, we must take all appropriate action to protect ourselves” (HASTERT, 2002).

More than protecting the homeland and bringing terrorists to justice (GRAHAM, 2002), this narrative emphasized US opportunity to spread democracy and human rights not only to Iraq but to the entire region. Differently from Afghanistan, which “[was] moving forward but with a lot

of difficulty” because “they do not have the natural resources to build, (...) a historical basis of democracy with which to work” and “they have a number of warlords in the area, which does not exist in Iraq”, Iraq has “ten percent of the world’s oil supplies are located in Iraq” and “an educated urban population”. So “they will embrace and encourage and move forward with democracy on a rapid basis” and despite not “be completely free of any hitches”, “the potential in developing an active, vibrant, working democracy in Iraq is significantly greater and higher than what we are seeing in the situation in Afghanistan” (BOROWNBACK, 2002). When confronted with the critique that another front in the war on terror would jeopardize rather than strengthen the US effort, the polestar narrative emphasized that democracy, and the Western liberal values that usually follows it, would “prove to be the antidote to Islamic-based terrorism” (KYL, 2002). If the US could remove Saddam’s influence “from the Middle East and free the Iraqi people to determine their own destiny, we will transform the politics of the region. That will only advance the war against terrorism, not set it back” (WARNER, 2002).

The equinox narrative is basically constructed in opposition to the polestar one. Although it concurred with the image constructed around Saddam and, in some extent, to the ‘new’ international environment after 9/11, its first divergence with the polestar narrative is about where, semantically, to locate a possible conflict with Iraq. To this narrative, an engagement against Iraq does not fall under the war on terror logic. Exactly because the imbroglio with Iraq dates even before the Gulf War, to deal with it following the 9/11, especially circumventing the UN, would be “getting the cart before the horse” (BYRD, 2002). In this sense, the already mentioned question “why now” is illustrative of this narrative. Saddam has been a dictator for decades, plus the US knew long before 9/11 that Iraq had expelled UN inspectors and that its destruction process of WMDs was not totally transparent, then why intervene in Iraq now (or in 2003, in this case). The equinox narrative criticizes the administration and the Congress representatives in favor of military actions for being “carried away by all of the war rhetoric” (BYRD, 2002). Pointing that “President has not backed up his case against Iraq with a consistent justification based on clear reason and evidence” (BYRD, 2002), the representatives of this narrative build their case around the strategy of exposing the lack of information and demanding from the president explanations not only about the logic behind the necessity of this intervention but also about the cost, the strategic plan, the

duration and other practical information¹⁰⁰. The lack of information was, then, an important point for building another branch in the critique of the polestar narrative. By, following this narrative, proposing a “resolution [that] leaves the question of war open-ended by both expressing support for diplomacy and authorizing the President to use force when he feels it is the correct course of action” (BECERRA, 2002), Congress representatives felt that the president was asking Congress basically a “blank check” (BYRD, 2002), and, therefore, removing from Congress its constitutionally power to wage war. Quoting Madison, Byrd (2002) affirmed:

Congress ought not turn this fateful determination, this decision, over to any President, any one man, because, as James Madison said, the trust and the temptation are too great for any one man. What are we doing? In my view, if we accept this resolution as it is written, we are saying both of these vital functions would be placed in the hands of one man (BYRD, 2002)


The next critique was in relation to going against the UN and its UNSC decisions. First, in terms of the UN per se, this narrative points that US actions without a clear authorization would not only remove the “credibility and the relevancy of the United Nations”, but would also “enable the members of the Security Council to take a pass on the use of force” and put the “U.N. Security Council off the hook” (LEVIN, 2002). The second aspect of this critique is regarding the US relationship with the international community. The less severe remark was about how the US would sponsor an intervention without the help of international allies. The logic of the argument was that “because the threat is greater than ourselves, we must bring the international community with us, to share the responsibility and the burden of stopping these threats. If Saddam is overthrown—we have to be prepared for what happens next” (MIKULSKI, 2002). In terms of correspondence between the US identity’s anchor points and the Western civilization, the most severe remark against US preemption in Iraq was the notion that i) the US is equally part of the US and therefore should abide to it because “the rule of law matters, and so does a decent respect for opinion of the rest of the world. As President of the United States you are the leader of the free world; you are not its ruler” (REID, 2002), and that ii) unilateral preemptive attacks violate international law and “any leader who flouts the rule of law is a menace to liberty and democracy”

Besides the concern whether the intervention in Iraq would jeopardize the underlying war on terrorism because “a largely unilateral American war [could be] widely perceived in the Muslim

¹⁰⁰ For example, Congress representative Eshoo (2002) posed the following questions: “How many troops will we need to wage this war? What will it cost? How long will we be there? What is the plan to manage the chaos in the aftermath of regime change; and, finally, how will it affect the war on terrorism?”

world as untimely or unjust could worsen, not lessen, the threat of terrorism” (KENNEDY, 2002), Congress representatives of the equinox narrative also stressed that changing US policy, until that moment a policy of deterrence towards Iraq, to a policy of “invad[ing] sovereign countries without direct provocation” (STABENOW, 2002) could provoke two deleterious outcomes: first, “present the face of America as the face of a bully that is ready to go out at high noon with both guns blazing (BYRD, 2002) and second, and consequently, establish a foreign policy practice that went against US values, against “America as a country which believes in justice, the rule of law, freedom and liberty and the rights of all people to work out their ultimate destiny (BYRD, 2002). A unilateral preemptive strike would not only “isolate our Nation internationally and stir up greater hatred of America” (JEFFORDS, 2002), but specially undermine US moral authority (CUMMINGS, 2002; PAYNE, 2002). The critique that points the US as divorcing itself from the same anchor points ideas that compose its identity is also directed to Bush’s actions internally. As mentioned above, by asking an open-ended resolution towards Iraq, the equinox narrative presents the situation as “much about voting to declare war as it is about what kind of country we are and what we want our country to be in the future” (ESHOO, 2002), basically because “this resolution violates every single one of those basic tenets of American democracy” (INSLEE, 2002). In representative Delahunt (2002) words, “that is an unacceptable situation in a democracy, Mr. Speaker. And that is not what the founders had in mind when they gave Congress, not the President, the power to declare war”


The equinox narrative spanning set would be as following:



This narrative construction was dubbed ‘equinox’ because, just like in these moments of the year the day and the night have equal length, it places the US as equally important as the UN and the international system that it orbits around it. The anchor point of justice, here with the connotation of ‘the rule of law’ is what bonds the two extremes of this narrative pole - the UN, representing the international community, and the US. Differently from the Kosovo narrative, the connection is not merely between the US and the West, but between the US and the rest of the world, regardless of whether one country shares or not Western values. The notion here is that the US, being the greatest example of democracy and freedom, cannot be the one to violate the international rule of law that it helped, and leaded, constructing. If it proceeds with unilateral preemptive attacks, it will not only violate its own identity construction and its international place as the one who guarantees the order, but it will open precedent to other countries, like Pakistan, India, China, South and North Korea to strike first without the US having the moral authority to criticize (KLECZKA, 2002; BONIOR, 2002; STABENOW, 2002). It is the common understanding of a legal notion of justice - the one that stresses that no country can invade a foreign nation without a provocation or a just reason, the same argument the US used against Iraq in 199 -

that, with the anchor points of democracy and freedom, within this narrative, that sustain the whole civilization. The equinox narrative does not disregard the spread of democracy, equality and freedom/liberty to Iraq as a potentially good thing for the country and the region. It only stressed that the kind of military action the US was trying to enforce in Iraq - unilateral and preemptive - would not concur to spreading those ideas because the very action put them at stake, both domestically and internationally.

The polestar narrative have two spanning sets - one expressing how it sees itself and other how the equinox narrative sees its counterpart:




The first image is how the polestar narrative sees itself. This narrative was named ‘polestar’ because it perceives the US as something above the international community and the country that guides and attracts others. It is not the Western values per se that guides the international order, but the US interpretation and operationalization of them. In this narrative, the anchor point of justice is still the idea that links the US with the UN and its members, but what counts is the US specific interpretation of it. When criticized by the opposed narrative that the US would be breaking the common notion of the rule of law with the Iraq intervention, the representatives of this narrative stressed the US could not “allow this monster to hide behind the veil of sovereign nation status” (BURNS, 2002). And because the US “not only do we have a right, but a duty to protect ourselves

and freedom-loving people around the world” (BURNS, 2002), it was “dedicating U.S. power and prestige to upholding, not challenging, international law” (LANTOS, 2002). To the legal basis is added a question of morality as “preemption is not [perceived as] immoral. Permitting an attack that we can deter is immoral” (WEINER, 2002). By doing justice, here not only in the ‘rule of law’ connotation but also with the meaning of fairness and accuracy (here, almost in a religious sense of expurgating those that falls outside a set of rules and values and a ‘eye for an eye’ meaning), the US would be automatically creating the right conditions for democracy, equality and freedom/liberty. Liberty/freedom, in this narrative, assumes some connotations. First, regarding the US, the freedom from fear, in the sense that no country, and even the UN, had the authority to impede the US from searching for an environment in which it could live without fear. Second, to the international arena and Iraq, liberty/freedom is narrated not only as part of democratic government and institutions, but specially in a sense of liberating Iraq from evil and protecting liberty/freedom from it. In Congress representative Rohrabacher (2002) words:

There is nothing for us to apologize about in terms of helping those people free themselves from a tyrant who is renowned in the world among all tyrants. We are talking about helping them, liberating them. They will be dancing in the streets, waving American flags, just as people of Afghani-stan still are grateful to us for freeing them and helping them free themselves from the horror of the Taliban and bin Laden, who held them in their tyrannical grip for years. (RHORABACHER, 2002).

The next spanning set is a derivation of the previous one. It is how the representatives of the equinox narrative perceived the US behavior.



There is a rupture in the connection among the US and the anchor points of justice, democracy and freedom. This rupture is not only towards the international community, but also within the US political system. As stated before, by violating the rule of law posed by the UN and the UNSC, the US became a menace to the principles of liberty and democracy and, therefore, could not maintain either the exemplarist or the vindicationist (JACKSON, 2006) images; in other words, its exceptionalism, translated sometimes with the US as the example to be followed or as the one that enforces freedom and democracy was put on shaky grounds. In relation to the domestic environment, by removing from Congress its prerogative to wage war and without evidence of imminent threat or further explanations about the logistics of the intervention, Bush and its administration put in danger the democratic process cemented in the US. Regardless of divergencies, on October 11, with prior approval in the House, the Senate approved the resolution for the use of force by 77 votes in favor and 23 against¹⁰¹.

¹⁰¹ With higher internal rather than external approval, and on the day before midterm elections in the United States, Bush decided to take his father's opposite way: he called for a resolution on the use of force to Congress before going to the United Nations. This was done not only to reinforce the North American cause before the international community - meaning that the United States spoke with only one voice - but also to force Congress candidates to vote in favor of the resolution, arguing that this way American voters could identify the position of their representatives before the next elections (WOODWARD, 2004).

On January 2003, the question of Iraq's attempt to purchase uranium was added to the case of the aluminum tubes. With the inspections back to Iraq, which began on November 2002 through the approval of resolution 1441 in the UNSC, the US discourse might have been raised to a new level of urgency to justify another US attempt at the Security Council to pass a new resolution authorizing the use of force. On the 23rd of that month, Rice (2003) published an article in the New York Times named "Why We Know Iraq Is Lying," in which she addressed the nuclear issue by stating that the declaration presented by Iraq to the UNSC on December 7th, 2002, failed to explain the Iraqi regime's attempts to buy uranium from other countries. Although the International Atomic Energy Agency released a report on January 27 pointing out that the aluminum tubes would not be suitable for uranium enrichment, Bush¹⁰², in his speech on the State of the Union on the following day, reinforces the nuclear argument stating that

The British Government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa. Our intelligence sources tell us that he has attempted to purchase high-strength aluminum tubes suitable for nuclear weapons production. Saddam Hussein has not credibly explained these activities. He clearly has much to hide. (BUSH, 2003a).

Broadly speaking, the report presented by Hans Blix, head of UNMOVIC, the UN mission in Iraq, reported that the Iraqi regime's statement on its WMD programs, although actually being the reprint of earlier documents, also had new material about the period from 1998 onwards, the most significant time for UNMOVIC and the IAEA since it corresponded precisely to the gap in which Iraq was not under the inspections regime. The analysis was that some inconsistencies and violations were detected. With regard to chemical and biological weapons, the Iraqi government claimed to have destroyed their stocks of VX gas and anthrax spontaneously after 1991; however, until the time of UNMOVIC's partial report, the veracity of these statements could not be confirmed, mainly because of the lack of more clarifying official documents. Another concern was about the possession by Baghdad of missiles with a capacity exceeding 150 km, in which two projects were inspected: the Al-Samoud 2 and Al-Fatah missiles. After tests, it was found that the former could reach a distance of 183 km, while the latter could reach 161 km, so that both would, in principle, violate UNSCR's resolution 687. Furthermore, a small obstacle to the performance of

¹⁰² Then when asked if the issue of aluminum tubes would be maintained even after the IAEA's assessment, Bush said the charge was not withdrawn because it was believed that the tubes analyzed had been old models, not those Saddam had tried to buy.

interviews was reported to the Council, because the individuals who had been called by UNMOVIC required the presence of an Iraqi officer during these interviews¹⁰³. After talks with Baghdad, the Iraqi side committed itself to encouraging all respondents to accept private interviews (UNSC, 2003a).

The partial report by ElBaradei, head of the IAEA mission in Iraq, was more favorable to Iraq's position compared to that of Blix. According to him, by the end of 1992 the IAEA had already destroyed or disarmed a large number of nuclear weapons and facilities in Iraq, to the extent that, on December 1998, it believed that it did not neglect any significant component that could be used in a possible reconstruction of the Iraqi nuclear program. Nevertheless, in this new inspection, IAEA collected samples of soil, rivers, canals and lakes to check for the existence of any trace of radioactive material. However, at the time of the report, no prohibited nuclear activity had been detected. Apart from the report, ElBaradei said in his statement to the UNSC that the inspections also had a dissuasive effect. This way, he explained that throughout the inspection process, the presence of international agents in Iraq investigating possible violations could be seen by the international community as a guarantee that Baghdad would not, at least at that time, resume its WMD program.

Bush's administration, however, was not satisfied with the direction of the inspections and evaluations published in the reports cited above. Besides believing that the Swedish Blix's peaceful tradition would prevent him from dealing firmly with Iraq, the administration was dissatisfied with the relationship that the head of the mission had established with the CIA: despite accepting information from the intelligence about possible places to be investigated, Blix did not allow that CIA had direct and immediate access to the inspection results, except through the final report. In addition, some US intelligence reports pointed out that Blix was not informing everything he was inspecting in Iraq, and was not carrying out all the activities he reported, leading to the conclusion that inspections would take months, and would probably be doomed to failure (WOODWARD, 2004).

In a rare moment during Bush's administration, Powell and Cheney agreed that if the president wanted to move forward with the use of force, demanding a new resolution from the

¹⁰³ The fear of the presence of Iraqi officials in interviews was due to past experiences, notably in the post-Gulf War; it was believed that they could coerce or at least negatively influence the interviewees in their responses, a fact that would harm the progress of inspections.

UNSC would be even more exhausting and costly, since the first one had required seven weeks of negotiations. The decision to return to the UN took place mainly as a result of the position of the American allies in the coalition, especially Great Britain, since Blair had promised a second resolution to his party, rather than because Bush understood it was necessary (WOODWARD, 2004). On February 5, Powell was tougher in his speech at the Security Council and proposed that a new resolution expressly authorizing the use of force was voted. In general, his speech was about satellite images of supposed sites of WMDs, recordings between military officials, and Saddam's connections with terrorist groups, often extrapolating interpretations of the content of the evidence presented to justify the use of force.

The continued denial of the permanent members, France and Russia, as well as Germany, led the United States to withdraw the resolution on March 17, 2003, fearing the document would be vetted if it was voted. During this period, a proposal for Saddam's exile was presented by Saudi Arabia, and it was favorably received by some members of the UNSC, especially by France, as it would be a way of avoiding war. Although some members of the administration¹⁰⁴ expressed that this solution was possible, Bush, in a meeting with Aznar, Prime Minister of Spain, said that even if Saddam chose exile, the United States could not guarantee his safety¹⁰⁵. On the same day that the UNSC resolution was withdrawn, Bush gave Saddam a 48-hour ultimatum before closing the diplomatic channel. On March 19, 2003, the military hostilities began.

The presence of the anchor points that form the US identity - equality, freedom/liberty, individualism, democracy and justice - are present in both narrative constructions against Iraq, either at the time of the entry in Kuwait, or at the time following 9/11, although with more emphasis on the second case. If on 1991 intervention the speech of "we, the free people, recognize our responsibility towards liberty, justice and the guarantee of rights to the weak" (BUSH, 1990e) was already used to justify coercive measures against Iraq, in 2003 the use of the words and the tone of the statements gained new contours: perhaps because in the Gulf war there was a traditional *casus belli* - the invasion of one State by another - it was not necessary to take so much of the elevate the

¹⁰⁴ Rice (2003) told, in a press conference on February 24, 2003 states that "if he [Saddam] wanted to leave and give his people a chance to build a better life, I think that is something that the world would applaud at this point".

¹⁰⁵ When he asked the president if exile was possible, Aznar received a positive answer, but that "it was also possible that he [Saddam] was assassinated, complementing that there would be no guarantees because he was a "thief, a terrorist, and a war criminal. Compared with Saddam, Milosevic would be Mother Teresa" (DEYOUNG; ABRAMOWITZ, 2007).

narratives on US identity's anchor points to generate persuasion; on the contrary, in 2003, the existence of dubious material justifications, along with a new approach of international relations imposed by Bush's administration, based on an offensive rather than defensive behavior, required a 'superlativization' of US anchor points to reinforce the sense of an American mission in the world¹⁰⁶. As George W. Bush himself pointed out in his speech about the State of the Union on January 29, 2002 (a), "history has called America and our allies to action, and it is both our responsibility and our privilege to fight freedom's fight".

As the United States contributed, possibly in a pioneering way, for the construction of the liberal ideational set that makes up the West, its understanding of liberty, associated with equality and democracy, goes beyond national boundaries and needs to be internationally disseminated through example or by imposition. Not infrequently, the speeches are the ones to draw a parallel between the United States and the world at the promotion of these anchor points. As George W. Bush puts it (2001), the fight against terrorism "is not, however, just America's fight, and what is at stake is not just America's freedom. This is the world's fight. This is civilization's fight. This is the fight of all who believe in progress and pluralism, tolerance and freedom".

In addition, the notion of the role of the individual, and the individualism by extension, which, at the time of the Gulf War, was more subsumed to the notion of freedom - in the context of freedom as a right and an essentially individual good - gains at the time of the war in Iraq a complementary meaning: the proposal of change of regime gives individualism an emancipatory meaning. It was up to the United States to remove the great impediment to freedom in Iraq, the government of Saddam Hussein, so that the Iraqis could assume with their own hands the future of their country, electing a democratic government that promoted individual liberties and equality.

The importance of religion, because of obvious factors since the Iraq war have occurred following terrorist attacks that are said to be Muslim affiliation, may at first sight be attributed more to the context of 2003 than that of 1991. However, the most central point to the role of religion is not on the "crusade" aspect of the Iraq war, it lies on the civic religion notion that we presented in the first chapter; religion is the subtle link that builds a sense of US morality and behavior, and

¹⁰⁶ Throughout the case studies we will try to show that, although ideational traits are present before and after September 11, their use to justify post-attack interventions gains a stronger resonance in North American discourses: the ideational set that guides and moves the language remains the same, but after 2001 it is superlativized.

for that reason is one interesting element that organize the other ideas. This morality which “obliges” (or at least discursively is said to oblige) the United States to action is present in both interventions. The difference in the war in Iraq, as we have already pointed out, is in the tone in which such a “moral” discourse is constructed: the existence of something greater than the United States is asserted, such as “History”, in the words of George W. Bush, to raise the notion of an American duty to new levels.

6.2 A case within two cases: when words fail or ‘oversucceed’

The tortures conducted in prisons and off-site places for interrogation in both Afghanistan and Iraq were first denounced in 2003 by media coverage. Besides the forthcoming evaluation on the documents that either established an open-ended narrative or that expressly authorized the use of torture, the war narrative presented above can help producing some insights as how language can open space for policies that otherwise would have been condemned. First, the construction of the threat as an idea. Hand-picking individuals was not enough and, although with individuals there is, in principle, clear limits as to how humans must be treated, with an idea these limits get fuzzy. Second, the abovementioned discourse that “the US can no longer fight terrorism according to the rules of civilized behavior”. And if by civilized behavior one means the shared liberal Western values of human rights, the *jus in bello*, and the way prisoners must be treated, this narrative is one of the first steps to dehumanizing the enemy. Third, and perhaps more significant, the idea of justice. To portrait terrorists and states that harbor them as not entitled to a treatment based on criteria of justice, is another step to their dehumanization. Combined, these elements contribute to (i) regarding everyone within a cultural-geographic-religious milieu as a potential terrorist, and (ii) perceiving them as a thing rather than a person.

Evaluating the documents that culminated in the use of torture, one might locate the strengthen of the CIA as a crucial moment. Regarding the worldwide campaign against terrorism, Tenet’s asked Bush “exceptional authorities for the CIA”, with which it could have one full presidential authorization for all CIA covert operations in the war on terror effort without the necessity of each operation’s formal assessment. The Memorandum of Notification (MON), signed on September 17th, was one the most controversial documents of the Bush administration after 9/11. With it, the CIA gained a far-reaching and almost unchecked power to capture, interrogate

and keep custody of whoever the Agency thought might have not only a linkage with Al Qaeda and the Taliban regime, but also general suspicions of any terrorist activity (U.S. SENATE, 2012, p. 11). The decision to elevate the CIA's part on the intelligence front was backed by Bush's narrative about how the war on terrorism would unfold. In his September 15th "Remarks in a Meeting with the National Security Team", during the question and answer session, the president affirmed his administration would "not talk about how we gather intelligence, how we know what we're going to do, nor what our plans are. When we move, we will communicate with you in an appropriate manner". The upfront discourses about this "invisible" facet of the war, in which "there would be parts of the campaign" that could not be "talk[ed] about", helped to create a secret mode of politics that would support a number of questionable measures, including torture.

The whole legal apparatus for the war on terror was grounded on the broad presidential request to his lawyers "not to give him the best view of the law, but instead, to push the envelope." The metaphor they used was to "get chalk on one's spikes", meaning that the objective was to "go as close to the legal line as possible without going over [it]" (TORTURING DEMOCRACY, 2008). Through David Addington, Cheney's legal adviser, the White House surrounded itself of political appointees that would in the aftermath of 9/11 be responsible for some of the most contended juridical opinions regarding U.S. international legal responsibilities. They were Alberto Gonzales, White House Counsel, Gonzales' White House deputy Tim Flanigan, William Haynes, the Pentagon General Counsel, Jay Bybee, Assistant Attorney General for the Office of Legal Counsel, and John Yoo, Deputy Assistant U.S. Attorney General in the Office of Legal Counsel. The questions addressed for legal counseling regarded generally two themes: (i) where to keep the detainees; (ii) and how to legally classify and treat them.

The first question started to be assessed in September 14th, three days before the MON was signed, when the chief of the Counterterrorism Center (CTC), Cofer Black, emailed some CIA stations for input on possible locations to install further CIA detention facilities. On early November, in a Memorandum to the Office of United States Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), Cofer Black advised that because "any foreign country poses uncontrollable risks that could create incidents, vulnerability to the security of the facility, bilateral problems, and uncertainty over maintaining the facility", the best solution was to "[p]ress DOD and the US military, at highest levels, to have the US Military agree to host a long-term facility, and have them identify an agreeable location", suggesting that the DCI should "[s]eek to have the US Naval Base at

Guantanamo Bay designated as a long-term detention facility” (U.S. SENATE, 2012, p. 12). As the war on terror unfolded, the Bush administration requested the Office of Legal Council (OLC) counseling on the effect of international treaties and federal laws to individuals detained by the U.S. Armed Forces during the intervention in Afghanistan. The general conclusions of the memos written by John Yoo, Jay Bybee and Alberto Gonzales (the latter to President Bush) affirmed that both Al Qaeda and Taliban members were “unlawful combatants” (PHILBIN, 2001) and, therefore, they could not be regarded under the Geneva Prisoners of War (GPW) agreement.

In brief terms, the Al Qaeda terrorists were a non-state actor and then ineligible to claim the protection of the treaties specified by the U.S. War Crimes Act¹⁰⁷ (WCA). The legal status of Taliban, on the other hand, required first the resolution of three assumptions: (i) whether or not they constituted *de facto* government in Afghanistan; (ii) if Afghanistan “continued to have the essential attributes of statehood”; (iii) and if it “continued in good standing as a party to the treaties that its previous governments had signed” (YOO, 2002, p. 14). By concluding in his January 9th, 2002 memorandum to Jim Haynes that Afghanistan was, even before 9/11, a failed state, John Yoo affirmed the country was without the status of a “State for purposes of treaty law, and the Taliban militia could not have qualified as the *de facto* government of Afghanistan. Rather, the Taliban militia would have had the status only of a violent fraction or movement contending with other factions for control of that country” (YOO, 2002, p.17). The legal opinion was that failed states, once without a central and reliable authority, ceased to be part of international treaties, as Afghanistan was heretofore no longer part of the Geneva Conventions.

In conjunction with the aforementioned arguments, Jay Bybee memo to Jim Haynes, on January 22nd, reaffirmed the interpretation regarding the Taliban as non-POW. According to him, the conflict between U.S. armed forces and the Taliban could not be considered under the Geneva umbrella of military conflicts: its article 2, common to all four Geneva Conventions, mentioned only the conflict “between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by one of them” (GENEVA CONVENTION, 1949), while its article 3 was described as restricted exclusively to “armed conflicts of not an international character” (BYBEE,

¹⁰⁷ The War Crimes Act incorporates the four Geneva Conventions: The Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field (Geneva Convention I); The Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea (Geneva Convention II); The Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (Geneva Convention III); and The Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (Geneva Convention IV) (YOO, 2002).

2002a). In this sense, the nature of the conflict precluded the application of both articles 2 and 3. The former because even though the conflict was an international one, the Taliban could not be considered as the Afghanistan's government, plus its relations with Al Qaida rendered it "subject to the domination and control" of the terrorist organization. And the latter could not be understood as a "catch-all that establishes standards for any and all armed conflicts not included in common article 2" (YOO, 2002, p. 9), but instead it simply referred to "large-scale civil war within a Nation State" (YOO, 2002, p. 8). Not giving the POW status to both groups enabled the U.S. military not to be prosecuted under the U.S. War Crime Act since "war crime for these purposes is defined to include any grave breach of GPW¹⁰⁸ or any violation of common article 3 thereof (such as outrages against personal dignities) (GONZALES, 2002, p.2).

Even if the President had not the intention to declare Afghanistan as a failed state, the memo from Jay Bybee to Jim Hayes argued that under the domestic law, the President has the "executive power to suspend treaty obligations of the U.S. at any time and for any reason" without congressional authorization, rendering possible the suspension of U.S. participation in the Geneva Convention (BYBEE, 2002a, p.12). The aforementioned Yoo memo also defends this interpretation by adding that the Geneva Convention does not have "any textual provision (...) that clearly prohibits temporarily suspension" (YOO, 2002, p.32). And even though the Bybee legal opinion considers that the suspension did not "apply to provisions relating to the protection of the human person contained in treaties of a humanitarian character" (BYBEE, 2002a, p. 23), the memo in some sense contradicts itself and it is one of the first to justify U.S. breaches of the Geneva Convention. Bybee affirms the "War Crimes Act and the Geneva Conventions would not apply to the detention conditions of Al Qaeda prisoners" (BYBEE, 2002a, p.37) and therefore any Geneva III obligations "may be legally adjusted to take into account the needs of force protection"

¹⁰⁸ Grave breaches under the article 130 of the GPW is stated as follows: "Grave breaches to which the preceding Article relates shall be those involving any of the following acts, if committed against persons or property protected by the Convention: wilful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments, wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health, compelling a prisoner of war to serve in the forces of the hostile Power, or wilfully depriving a prisoner of war of the rights of fair and regular trial prescribed in this Convention" (GENEVA CONVENTION, 1949). The common article 3 affirms that to the "persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms" (...) the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever": (a) "violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture"; (b) "taking of hostages"; (c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment"; (d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples" (GENEVA CONVENTION, 1949).

(BYBEE, 2002a, p.29) because “no treaty can override a nation's inherent right to self-defense” (BYBEE, 2002a, p.28).

According to the memo from Bush to the close members of his administration, on February 7th, 2002 - Cheney, Rumsfeld, Powell, John Ashcroft, his Attorney General, the Chief of Staff Andrew Card, George Tenet, Condoleezza Rice, and Richard Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff - the legal counseling resulted in the following decisions: accept the conclusion from the Department of Justice that none of the provisions of Geneva apply to the conflict against Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan; accept the legal conclusion that he has the authority to suspend Geneva but decline to do so at that time; accept that common article 3 of Geneva does not apply either to Al-Qaeda or Taliban detainees; determine the Taliban detainees as ‘unlawful combatants’, therefore not qualifying as prisoners of war under article 4 of Geneva and assert the Al-Qaeda detainees also not to be regarded as prisoners of war (BUSH, 2002).

Despite the numerous memos converging on the legal opinions that came to constitute most of the decisions stated in the aforementioned Bush memo, there was some dissonance within the administration. William Taft, legal counsel to the Secretary of State Powell, addressed a memo, on January 11th, 2002, to John Yoo in hopes to counter Yoo’s conclusions. By Taft’s argument, the characterization of a “failed State has been developed as a historical and political analytic tool, not as a legal concept” (TAFT, 2002, p.6) and in this sense the recognition of the Taliban government “and its effectiveness in performing governmental functions is entirely separate from the question of statehood and whether a state remains a treaty partner” (TAFT, 2002, p.3). Plus, following this logic, if Afghanistan ceased to be member of the Geneva Conventions, it would also no longer be part of any other treaty that was open only to States; therefore, it bore no obligations to the U.S. under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty; would not be a member of the World Bank, IMF, and the United Nations, among other repercussions (TAFT, 2002, p.5).

In this same effort, Powell wrote a comment to the draft memo from Gonzales to Bush pointing his concerns that it did not “present to the President the options that are available to him”, nor the “significant pros and cons of each option” (POWELL, 2002, p.1), stressing that to state the Geneva Conventions as non-applicable to the conflict had more cons than pros. One interesting aspect of Taft’s memo, though, was his perception of what the suspension of the Geneva Conventions could produce. In his words, “the conclusion that the Geneva Conventions do not

apply could presumably be the basis for actions that otherwise would violate the Convention, including conduct that would constitute a grave breach” (TAFT, 2002, p.4)

The assessment of these legal questions - where to keep the detainees and how to legally classify and treat them - became intertwined with the intelligence community first and foremost purpose: how to gather information from the individuals captured by the U.S. Although there is no way to retrace the exact date when the “enhanced techniques” of interrogation started, the memos exchanged between these legal counsel and the Senate Study of the CIA converge on the time period when the legal maneuvers to justify harsher methods towards the detainees were introduced. According to the Senate Committee on Intelligence Study of the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program, there was no evidence in the MON that the CIA was planning on requesting the use of “enhanced techniques” for its interrogation processes. In fact, in an attachment to the aforementioned memorandum the CIA’s policy was to comply with its Directorate of Operations Handbook, which stated the Agency does not engage in “torture, cruel, inhuman, degrading treatment or punishment, or prolonged detention without charges or trial”¹⁰⁹ (U.S. SENATE, 2012, p. 18).

But by August 1st, 2002, the two memos from Jay Bybee to Alberto Gonzales and to the CIA provided interpretations of the sections 2340-2340A¹¹⁰ of title 18 of the United States Code. The sections define torture as an act “intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering (other than pain or suffering incidental to lawful sanctions) upon another person within his custody or physical control” (UNITED STATES, 1926). In Bybee’s interpretation, he affirms “those acts must be of an extreme nature to rise to the level of torture within the meaning of section 2340A” and although “certain acts may be cruel, inhuman, or degrading”, they “still not produce pain and suffering of the requisite intensity to fall within Section 2340A’s proscription against torture” (BYBEE, 2002b, p.1). He adds, qualifying his interpretation, that to characterize torture the physical pain “must be equivalent in intensity to the pain accompanying serious physical injury, such as organ failure, impairment of bodily inaction, or even death”, while the mental pain “must

¹⁰⁹ The statement in the CIA Directorate of Operations Handbook that the Agency does not engage in human rights violations does not *per se* guarantee that such violations had not occurred after the first detentions in the war on terror. As it is now historically documented and also presented in the Senate Committee on Intelligence Study of the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program, the Agency had already a vast and previous experience using coercive means of interrogation, not only by applying them but also by teaching these techniques to other countries.

¹¹⁰ These sections present the definition of torture as a crime regarding American citizens and acts perpetrated within the U.S.

result in significant psychological harm of significant duration, e.g., lasting for months or even years” (BYBEE, 2002b, p.1).

The CIA was then tasked to develop an interrogation program to enhance its capability of extracting information from the detainees. The agency consulted its counterparts in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Israel, among others, to develop a list of techniques that could be effective in ‘breaking’ Arab and Muslim prisoners and reverse-engineered the Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape (SERE) military program methods that teach U.S. military personnel to survive capture, evade, and resist torture, in order to come up with an interrogation manual (SHANE; MAZZETTI, 2007) that would be used in Guantanamo, Abu Ghraib and other overt and covert facilities in Afghanistan and Iraq. While some accounts of the “torture memos” state that the CIA did not have an interrogation program before 9/11, others assert the “enhanced techniques” were also copied from a CIA Vietnam-era interrogation handbook, the Kubark Counterintelligence Interrogation¹¹¹ (SHANE; MAZZETTI, 2007; TORTURING DEMOCRACY, 2008).

By the end of November and beginning of December 2002, the legal apparatus to justify torture became even more robust. In a memo from Haynes to Rumsfeld, the legal counsel advised the Secretary of Defense to authorize the commander of USSOUTHCOM¹¹² to employ, in his discretion, some of the interrogation techniques, but allow all the harsher ones to be legally available. The discretionary techniques included the use of stress positions for a maximum of 4 hours, removal of all clothing, use of individual phobias to induce stress, while the ones in need of approval were exposure to cold weather, waterboarding, and the threat of death (HAYNES, 2002; FBI, 2002). One curious thing about the memo in which Rumsfeld concedes his approval for the use of these techniques is his handwriting questioning one of them, affirming: “however, I stand for 8-10 hours a day; why is stand, limited to 4 hours?”¹¹³ (HAYNES, 2002, p.1).

Sometimes the connection between the legal argumentation and its consequential actions, with the foreign policy subfield in the aftermath of 9/11 might not seem clear, especially because each of them is usually addressed by different academic fields, as if they were not necessarily related events. As I already developed this point, not only the trauma itself of the 9/11 attacks but

¹¹¹ Among other things, the handbook teaches techniques like deprivation of sensori stimuli, ways to inflict pain and fear, the use of drugs to induce the prisoner to divulge information, and etc. (CIA, 1963).

¹¹² Responsible for the region of Central, South America and the Caribbean.

¹¹³ The “GTMO SERE Interrogation Standard Operation Procedure” also includes degradation tactics as shoulder slap, stomach slap, manhandling and walling to be used in detainees at Guantanamo facility.

the war narrative construction around it and how some US identity's anchor points were operationalized developed an atmosphere where the boundaries of government action could be pushed. The war narrative as it was constructed produced the necessary conditions within which the legitimization (JACKSON, 2006) of these questionable practices became possible. By defining the enemy not as a figure *per se*, but as a set of adjectivizations - "evil", "uncivilized", "the worst of human nature", etc -, the narrative contributed to the "dehumanization" of the detainees and, in this sense, to their inhuman treatments. And even after being attacked in its own territory, the place of the victim was not attributed to the U.S.; the symbols that are so fundamental to the American identity (freedom, democracy, and equality) were the ones victimized. It is impossible to give a counter-factual and affirm that with the criminal narrative none of this process of legitimizing torture would have happened. However, what can be stressed is that the elements for dehumanizing terrorists and prisoners either were not there or the preoccupation with fair trial, addressing the conditions that propitiate terrorism through development and less through military force, and not going against democratic values might have put torture in check.

As the narrative serves to convince targeted audiences of the rightness of the adopted course of action, it also exerts influence on the same individuals of which it is part of. The members of the Bush administration created an image of the world post-9/11 from which they could not liberate themselves to adopt other available options to deal with the terrorist threat, and especially to judge the limits of how far the government could go in order to justify the country's self-defense. To show that the narrative has not only an effect on its audiences but also on its authors is to reinforce the argument that its character is not epiphenomenal but has deep causally implications. It is interesting to note that more than the narratives from this thesis previous cases, the present war and crime narratives to a possible intervention against terrorism share a core of connotations regarding US identity's anchor points. More than the position of authority seized by Bush to advance the war narrative, the stronger the feeling (and the discursive constructions of this feeling in the national habitus) that the ontological security of the state, in this case the US, is in danger, the narrower is the space for legitimating other courses of action that prescind from violent measures. If with other less 'ontologically' threatening cases it already makes sense to shape the narrative using identity's anchor points (to bring the audience to a familiar set of shared beliefs while at the same time reinforcing those beliefs and grounding identity again), with extreme cases like the one with Afghanistan it not only creates a sense of purpose and an almost sentimental relationship with the

adopted policy, but it fixes identity back in place by invoking its anchor points. Extrapolating from this case to further cases, if the narratives do not quite overlap, fixing identity becomes more challenging. It is the common shared connotations over the anchor points, though proposing different policies, that (re)establishes and (re)situate identity's foundation.

While in the power politics of the Gulf War the U.S. identity could be seen on shaky grounds due to the absence of an existential threat, the war on terror is the opposite. It presents the danger to identity exactly because the narratives elevating terrorism to the category of an existential threat. By going against the very ideas that anchors US identity in the struggle to fight terrorism the U.S. identity might have achieved to impose order upon disorder (BIALLY MATTERN, 2005, p. 10) in the domestic field, but might not on the international one.

7 CONCLUSION

I mean by plastic power the capacity to develop out of oneself in one's own way, to transform and incorporate into oneself what is past and foreign, to heal wounds, to replace what has been lost, to recreate broken moulds. There are people who possess so little of this power that they can perish from a single experience, from a single painful event, often and especially from a single subtle piece of injustice, like a man bleeding to death from a scratch (Nietzsche - *Untimely Meditations*)

They pretended, perhaps they even believed, that they had seized power unwillingly and for a limited time, and that just around the corner there lay a paradise where human beings would be free and equal. (...) We know that no one ever seizes power with the intention of relinquishing it. Power is not a means; it is an end. One does not establish a dictatorship in order to safeguard a revolution; one makes the revolution in order to establish the dictatorship. The object of persecution is persecution. The object of torture is torture. The object of power is power. Now you begin to understand me (George Orwell - 1984)

As a general framework, the overall objective of this thesis is to propose a model to evaluate how identities' dispositions can be deployed in political contexts, here specifically in foreign policy decision making processes. Once the fundamental anchor points of any identity are identified, the researcher can proceed with their genealogical account; in other words, bringing Bourdieu's vocabulary, the researcher can present what is the latitude of these anchor points within the national field. In this sense, after exposing the doxic relations present in the national level of analysis, that is, the national common sense assented in the fundamental presuppositions that comes from the immediate adherence between habitus and the field to which it is attuned, one can locate what is the range in meaning of those anchor points. From this moment on, and throughout a specific decision making process, one can follow the selected anchor points in the discursive practices that bring them from these widest connotations to specific operationalized meanings. In this process of narrowing down the anchor point's understanding, one can picture how identity ideational components are deployed to legitimate one political option rather another. In the first chapter, the intention was to present the anchor points of "equality", "liberty/freedom", "individualism", and "democracy" in what lies in their margins of constructed shared understanding for the American perception of itself in the world. In the chapters dedicated to the empirical cases, the intention was to develop step two, the specification step, and step three, the operationalization step, of the identity-in-play model to evaluate how identity's anchor points were deployed within the foreign policy subfield.

Although this selection can be disputed, as to remove or include other possible anchor points, what is undisputed is their importance in the domestic discursive practices that constructs a sense of ‘what is the United States’, and that is exactly why they were denominated ‘anchor points’. As exposed before, the objective was to locate the most central set of ideas that can bring narratives to a ‘homological’ (homogeneous, though diverse) ground and hook US identity back to a familiar place, thus discursively sustaining it, reinforcing, evolving, emerging or fixing it when it's breaking down. By recurring to Bourdieu's sociological contribution, and his notions of habitus, field, capital and doxa, this thesis tried to interpret how articulations of identity occur and, therefore, what identity does without falling into the trap of some works that try to understand the intersection of ideational components and political decisions either pending to structure-driven or agent-driven explanations. The expression ‘*causality-in-constitution*’ is an attempt to, first, not split language as merely constitutive or causal, and second to propose that each articulation of US identity's anchor points (re)produce a contingent perception of reality and, hence, create the adequate conditions, or the sufficient claims, to bring about an outcome.

With this framework in mind, in each case study chapter I presented a historical account of each conflict, the US domestic narratives that were built around what was the best course of action to deal with the situation, and, more importantly, I tried to explore the anchor points' articulations that were established to legitimate a foreign policy decision. In all cases, the narratives permeated the dual key of against and pro-intervention constructions and in each the articulations of US anchor points have nuances of their own. In the Kosovo case, while the pro-intervention representatives presented the US as a European power and tried to legitimate the US engagement in Kosovo with the notion that, if the crisis was not addressed, the ultimate victim of Milosevic's actions would be the values of democracy and freedom/liberty, the same values the US stands for, the contra-intervention narrative placed the conflict as a civil war and, then, deployed the anchor points of democracy and freedom/liberty as the very values the US would be damaging if it arrogantly meddled in other country's internal affairs. Jumping back to the immediate years after the Cold War, the Gulf war conflict also brought up the question whether the US should militarily engage itself or not. The pro-narrative constructions specified the anchor points of liberty, democracy and justice as a feature of the civilizational conformation after the fall of communism, regardless if some countries were not yet democracies. In this sense, the US was responsible, if it wanted to keep this international environment and its hegemony in it, to build a new world order

based on these same values. The contra-narrative, on the other hand, did not pose the debate in civilizational terms. The US should engage itself in places that shared, or that could potentially share (like the former-USSR countries) the values of liberty/freedom, democracy and justice.

The two other cases have an interesting component. They both share the post-9/11 context. If before 9/11 the pro-intervention narratives were victorious in an environment of great dissent and discussion, the narratives on the Afghanistan and Iraq interventions had little room for opposition. To use the knowledge from a popular saying, ‘if all you have is a hammer, everything looks like a nail’. In the Afghan case, it is interesting to note that the spanning set of both narratives are almost the same, with the only difference that, by divergent interpretations on the anchor point of ‘justice’, they conclude different courses of action within similar ways of deploying the anchor points of democracy and liberty/freedom. To both narratives, the antidote against terrorism was the spread of Western liberal values and the construction of societies based on the notions of democracy, liberty/freedom and equality. On the one hand, the pro-intervention narrative shapes the anchor point of justice almost within a connotation of revenge or, at least, within a connotation of acting in the same manner as the terrorists did. Hence, if 9/11 was an act of war, the US should bring the war on terror to the terrorists and to the countries that harbor them. On the other hand, the contra-intervention narrative, even though concurred that the aggression on 9/11 might be understood within war frame of mind, waging war on Afghanistan might be of no use. Military force would be well engaged in specific strikes to apprehend the ones responsible for planning 9/11, so the US and the international community could be able to prosecute them. Understanding justice within a ‘rule of law’ meaning, follow the rule of law is what democracies do, as one Congress representative interestingly stated. To deal with terrorism in a broad sense and prevent further actions, other forms of US action, through the improvement of those countries development standards, were the best way to spread Western liberal values and address the terrorist threat.

The case study of Iraq is, perhaps, the most interesting as it aggravates the 9/11 narrative. The equinox narrative tries to set the debate without exacerbating the discursive constructions of the war on terror. It then presents the US as equally important as the other UN countries within the international system. The anchor point of justice, in this narrative with connotation of ‘the rule of law’ is what bonds the US to the international community and, by violating this value, the US would weaken the anchor points of democracy, freedom/liberty and equality (in the sense of one country equal among others). By putting at stake these values, the US would not only be a stranger

to itself, as its identity is grounded by these same anchor points, but it would also impair an international system based on Western liberal values that it helped constructing. The polestar narrative, in favor of the US intervention, exacerbates the exceptionalist trace of American identity and presents the US as completely detached from the international community, even though the representatives of this narrative does not perceive it that way. Despite presenting a concern with the international community, as this narrative deploys the anchor point of justice with a fairness and accuracy connotation and shapes the intervention as a course of action that could automatically create the right conditions for democracy, equality, and freedom/liberty, the central pillar of the polestar narrative is the deployment of ‘freedom/liberty’ in the sense of freedom from fear. As the US was in its right to act in order to create an environment that prevented it from fear, no country, and even the UN, had the authority to impede the US to intervene in Iraq. An international environment in which the US felt secure was, by extension, beneficial to everyone.

The cases were not presented in a chronological manner so a form of gradient could be better visualized. Besides the objective of evaluating identity’s articulations and the outcomes it brought about, thus promoting a sense of ‘the feel for the game’ in US foreign policy decision-making process and an interpretation of the representational force of identity’s vocabulary as a source of order to the US, this thesis had a second, underlying objective to evaluate the capacity of identity’s anchor points as a means of going from moments of ontological insecurity back to ontological security. As one of US identity’s feature is its preponderance and importance in the international system, the empirical chapters were organized from moments in which the US felt that its ontological security was less threatened to moments when American ontological security was felt so threatened to the point in which physical and ontological securities overlapped. The winning narratives were not only the ones which best ‘talked identity’ and could lock the meaning over a specific course of action, but also the ones that proposed recuperate a sense of security. The gradient would be the following:



In Kosovo, the US ontological insecurity was connected to the possibility of a disturbance in Europe's stability and, therefore, in the whole idea of a stable international order. In the Gulf war intervention, to the possibility of an instability in the international order, the US ontological insecurity also derives from the fear of a potential defiant of US hegemony after the Cold War. In Afghanistan, plus the insecurity from a destabilization of the international order and from any agent that could question US hegemony, the 9/11 attacks generated in the US the fear of US/Western integrity. In Iraq, the most extreme case, there is a disjuncture from the winning narrative and US identity's anchor points as the US also feared losing its place as the stronghold of Western liberal values. Although it tries to recuperate a sense of security, the narrative construction that puts at stake the very foundational anchor points of US identity plus its outcomes, as the use of torture and all the legal justifications around it, that were only possible because of this produced a detachment between US actions and US identity and US identity and the international environment, thus perpetuating the sense of ontological insecurity.

The grand motto of this thesis, 'war is peace', is only true in some extent and in some cases. As the US built its identity around the notion of the most important nation and, therefore, exports its perception of ontological security to the maintenance of a specific international configuration, every situation that put US identity on shaky grounds and is narrated as potentially disturbing of US place in the world needs to be addressed, usually by means of military power. However, the use of violence only is not enough to recreate a feeling of security. When the narrative constructions break with the core foundations of the country and question the anchors in which its identity is assented, the ontological insecurity remains. From Afghanistan to Iraq, and in some extent

nowadays with the questionable actions of the Trump administration, the US incapacity to heal the wounds of 9/11 can make it perish, as the quote from Nietzsche affirms, “from a single experience, from a single painful event, often and especially from a single subtle piece of injustice, like a man bleeding to death from a scratch”.

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ANNEX 1 - LIST OF INTERVIEWS

Christopher Preble, vice-president for defense and foreign policy studies at Cato Institute and author of books as *The Power Problem: How American Military Dominance Makes Us Less Safe, Less Prosperous, and Less Free*, *A Dangerous World? Threat Perception and U.S. National Security*, *Terrorizing Ourselves: Why U.S. Counterterrorism Policy Is Failing and How to Fix It*;

Sean Aday, professor at George Washington University, worked with the media coverage during the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, and coordinated a series of surveys about Americans' attitudes about government and media following the September 11th terrorist attacks;

Henry Nau, one of the most influential neoconservatives in the U.S. and professor at George Washington University with a vast research on U.S. foreign policy such as his recent book *Conservative Internationalism: Armed Diplomacy Under Jefferson, Polk, Truman, and Reagan*;

Mark Cancian, professor at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, he served as a military official in Desert Storm Operation (during the 1990's Gulf War) and twice in Iraq after the U.S. intervention in 2003;

Colonel Brian Pearl, who commanded an infantry battalion in Kunar Province and commanded U.S. Army formations at every level from company through brigade in Kandahar Province, both provinces which the U.S. suffered strong reactions against its presence in Afghan soil, and acted as well as a political/military planner on the Joint Staff working on Iraq strategy and policy;

Barak Barfi, researcher focused on Middle East issues who is often invited by the U.S. Congress to give his expertise on Al-Qaida's actions;

Ambassador Barbara Bodine, professor at Georgetown University, she served in Bagdad as Deputy Principal Officer during the first Iran-Iraq War, in Kuwait as Deputy Chief of Mission during the Iraq's invasion in Kuwait, and as the State Department chief official and the first coalition coordinator for reconstruction in Iraq, in 2003.;

Lieutenant Colonel Jason Williams, member of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), he acted as Deputy executive assistant for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and was deployed to Bosnia, Iraq, and Afghanistan;

Mark Moyar, is the director of the Center of Military and Diplomatic History in Washington, DC, member of CSIS, professor on insurgency and terrorism at the Marine Corps University and a senior fellow at the Joint Special Operations University, and has advised the senior leadership of several US military commands;

Daniel Serwer, professor at John Hopkins University, he worked in the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) and led its peacebuilding work in Iraq, Afghanistan, Sudan, and the Balkans and served as Executive Director of the Hamilton/Baker Iraq Study Group, and as a minister-counselor at the U.S. Department of State, he directed the European office of intelligence and research and served as U.S. special envoy and coordinator for the Bosnian Federation, mediating between Croats and Muslims and negotiating the first agreement reached at the Dayton peace talks. From 1990 to 1993, he was deputy chief of mission and chargé d'affaires at the U.S. Embassy in Rome, leading a major diplomatic mission through the end of the Cold War and the first Gulf War;

James Goldgeier, Visiting Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. He is a Professor of International Relations, acted in the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, the Brookings Institution, and the Center for International Security and Cooperation, and is author of books such as *America Between the Wars: From 11/9 to 9/11* (co-authored with Derek Chollet), *Power and Purpose: U.S. Policy toward Russia after the Cold War* (co-authored with Michael McFaul), e *Not Whether But When: The U.S. Decision to Enlarge NATO*;

Jeffrey Eggers, senior fellow in New America's International Security program, he served at the White House for six years under presidents Obama and Bush jr., most recently as special assistant to the president for national security affairs and as Navy SEAL in many interventions to combat terrorism, including some in Iraq;

Charles Kupchan, professor at Georgetown University, he served as Director on the European Affairs no National Security Council during the Clinton administration;

Christopher Kojm, professor at George Washington University, served as Deputy Director on the 9/11 Commission, was president of the 9/11 Public Discourse Project, and served as Senior Advisor at the Iraq Study Group;

Courtney Cooper, member of the Council of Foreign Relations, she acted at the National Security Council as the director to issues related to Afghanistan;

Dina Khoury, professor at George Washington University, she works with issues over war and memory, being her recent book about Iraq, entitled *Iraq in Wartime: Soldiering, Martyrdom and Remembrance*;

Jason Amerine, retired military, he worked side by side with Hamid Karzai, former Afghanistan president, helping him to establish in 2001 an opposition force in the Afghan Pashtun region;

Melani McAlister, professor at George Washington University, she focuses on the ways in which cultural and political history intersect, and on the role of religion and culture in shaping US interests in other parts of the world, especially in the Middle East, as she develops in her book *Epic Encounters: Culture, Media, and U.S. Interests in the Middle East since 1945*;

Paul Hughes, member of USIP, he served as a senior staff officer for the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance and as a Coalition Provisional Authority, both in Iraq, developing a work on disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of the Iraqi army;

Philip Lohaus, researcher at the American Enterprise Institute, he served as an analyst with the Department of Defense and the Multi-National Force - Iraq and was embedded with the U.S. Army in eastern Afghanistan;

Robert Entman, professor at George Washington University, he has a vast research on the relationship between media and foreign policy, having published, among several books and articles about this subject, the book *Projections of Power: Framing News, Public Opinion and US Foreign Policy*;

Ambassador Robert Gelbard, which served during the Clinton administration in the Balkan Crisis, negotiating directly with Slobodan Milosevic and warning the Serbian president on the potential NATO retaliation over Serbia;

Robert Pulver, director of the Justice and Corrections Service within the Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions at the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, he served in the U.S. reconstruction process in Kosovo;

Scott Carlson, lawyer, he worked as an advisor for the Clinton and Bush Jr. administrations over the reconstruction processes in the Balkans and in Iraq;

Shoon Murray, professor at American University, she focuses on U.S. foreign policy issues on counterterrorism and published, among others, the books *The Terror Authorization: The History and Politics of the 2001 AUMF e Mission Creep: The Militarization of US Foreign Policy*;

Stephen Biddle, professor at George Washington University, he worked as an advisor for General Petraeus in Bagdad, for General McChrystal in Kabul and as Senior Advisor for General Petraeus' Central Command Assessment Team in Washington, D.C., besides being constantly called by the U.S. Congress to testify on issues over the Iraq and Afghanistan interventions;

Steve Saideman, professor at Carleton University e specialist on U.S. foreign policy issues;

Steven Livingston, professor at George Washington University, he focuses on media, communication and foreign policy, having published the book *When the Press Fails: Political Power and the News Media from Iraq to Katrina*;

Trevor Thrall, senior member of Cato Institute on issues of defense and foreign policy, he wrote the books *American Foreign Policy and the Politics of Fear: Threat Inflation since 9/11 e Why Did the United States Invade Iraq?*;

Amitai Etzioni, professor at George Washington University, he works with sociological analyses on International Relations and, among others, wrote the books *From Empire to Community: A New Approach to International Relations* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2004); and *How Patriotic is the Patriot Act?*;

Eric Grynawski, professor at George Washington University, researches on international security and U.S. foreign policy from a sociological and ethic perspective;

Ingrid Creppell, professor at George Washington University, she focuses on issues of identity and theories over the construction of perceptions of enmity, and wrote the book *Toleration and Identity: Foundations in Early Modern Thought*;

John Mueller, professor at Ohio State University, he has an extensive academic production on issues over Political Science and International Relations, such as *Chasing Ghosts: The Policing of Terrorism, War, Presidents, and Public Opinion*; *Overblown: How Politicians and the Terrorism Industry Inflate National Security Threats e Why We Believe Them*, *Terrorism since 9/11: The American Cases*;

David Mislan, professor at American University, he researches about identity and U.S. foreign policy, and wrote the book *Enemies of the American Way: Identity and Presidential Foreign Policymaking*;

Jay Winik, a leading American historian, he was invited by presidents as Clinton and Bush to advise on matters of U.S. foreign policy.