A relação mente-corpo e o problema da consciência em Searle
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Data
2017-08-22
Autores
Marques, Luana Camila [UNESP]
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Editor
Universidade Estadual Paulista (Unesp)
Resumo
Nesta Dissertação tratamos da relação mente-corpo e, em particular, do problema da consciência segundo o filósofo estadunidense John Searle, a partir de sua abordagem, conhecida como Naturalismo Biológico. De acordo com Searle (2006), o problema da relação mente-corpo possui uma solução simples. Os fenômenos mentais são causados por processos que tem lugar no cérebro, mas não podem ser reduzidos a ele. Os fenômenos mentais têm algumas características que tornaram difícil o tratamento da relação mente-corpo, dentre elas a consciência, intencionalidade, subjetividade e causação mental. Searle (2006) julga ser a consciência o elemento principal para a existência de nossa vida mental, a partir da qual surgem as demais noções mentais. Por isso, além de abordarmos o problema da relação mente-corpo, também analisamos tal característica, averiguando a sua relevância para a resolução do problema mente-corpo. Para alcançar nosso objetivo, dividimos o trabalho em três capítulos. No primeiro deles mostramos a perspectiva do autor em questão no tocante à relação mentecorpo. Expomos o que ele julga estar errado na filosofia da mente e qual seria a solução mais adequada a tal questão. Explicitamos em que medida a relação mente-corpo pode ser considerada um problema na concepção naturalista biológica. No segundo capítulo enfocamos, especificamente, os fenômenos mentais e suas características, dando ênfase especial à consciência. Na perspectiva searleana, entender a consciência e algumas de suas características é uma tarefa de suma importância, pois são essenciais para a existência do mental. Searle defende ser a consciência, de um modo, redutível aos processos cerebrais e, de outro modo, irredutível, devido ao seu caráter subjetivo. No terceiro e último capítulo discutimos e analisamos essa possível incoerência em sua alternativa à relação mente-corpo no tocante à consciência. Com isso, visamos investigar se sua concepção pode ser considerada uma boa e satisfatória alternativa de solução ao problema da consciência e da relação mente-corpo.
In this dissertation we deal with the mind-body relationship, and in particular the problem of consciousness according to the American philosopher John Searle, from his approach, known as Biological Naturalism. According to Searle (2006), the problem of the mind-body relationship has a simple solution. Mental phenomena are caused by processes that take place in the brain but can not be reduced to it. Mental phenomena have some characteristics that make it difficult to treat the mindbody problem, among them consciousness, intentionality, subjectivity and mental causation. Among these characteristics, Searle (2006) thinks that consciousness is the main element for the existence of our mental life. Therefore, in addition to addressing the problem of the mind-body relationship, we also carefully examine this characteristic. In Searle's conception, it is considered the central notion of our mental life, from which arise the other mental notions. To reach our goal, we divided the work into three chapters. In the first chapter we show the author's perspective on the mind-body problem, exposing what he thinks is wrong in the philosophy of mind and what would be the most appropriate solution to that question. We explain to what extent the mind-body relationship can be considered a problem in the naturalistic biological conception. In the second chapter we focus specifically on mental phenomena and their characteristics, with special emphasis on consciousness. From the perspective of the thinker in question, understanding consciousness and some of its characteristics is a task of paramount importance, for they are essential to the existence of the mental. Searle argues that consciousness is, in a way, reducible to brain processes and otherwise irreducible because of its subjective character. In the third and final chapter we discuss and analyze this possible inconsistency in its alternative to the mind-body problem in regard to consciousness, in order to investigate whether its conception can be considered a good and satisfactory alternative solution to the problem of consciousness.
In this dissertation we deal with the mind-body relationship, and in particular the problem of consciousness according to the American philosopher John Searle, from his approach, known as Biological Naturalism. According to Searle (2006), the problem of the mind-body relationship has a simple solution. Mental phenomena are caused by processes that take place in the brain but can not be reduced to it. Mental phenomena have some characteristics that make it difficult to treat the mindbody problem, among them consciousness, intentionality, subjectivity and mental causation. Among these characteristics, Searle (2006) thinks that consciousness is the main element for the existence of our mental life. Therefore, in addition to addressing the problem of the mind-body relationship, we also carefully examine this characteristic. In Searle's conception, it is considered the central notion of our mental life, from which arise the other mental notions. To reach our goal, we divided the work into three chapters. In the first chapter we show the author's perspective on the mind-body problem, exposing what he thinks is wrong in the philosophy of mind and what would be the most appropriate solution to that question. We explain to what extent the mind-body relationship can be considered a problem in the naturalistic biological conception. In the second chapter we focus specifically on mental phenomena and their characteristics, with special emphasis on consciousness. From the perspective of the thinker in question, understanding consciousness and some of its characteristics is a task of paramount importance, for they are essential to the existence of the mental. Searle argues that consciousness is, in a way, reducible to brain processes and otherwise irreducible because of its subjective character. In the third and final chapter we discuss and analyze this possible inconsistency in its alternative to the mind-body problem in regard to consciousness, in order to investigate whether its conception can be considered a good and satisfactory alternative solution to the problem of consciousness.
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Palavras-chave
Relação mente-corpo, Naturalismo biológico, Fenômenos mentais, Processos cerebrais, Consciência, Mind-body relationship, Biological naturalism, Mental phenomena, Brain, Consciousness