Controle do quê e para quem? Uma análise dos planos estratégicos dos Tribunais de Contas e de seu papel no desenvolvimento nacional
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Data
2017-12-15
Autores
Parra, Osmar Henrique Costa
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Universidade Estadual Paulista (Unesp)
Resumo
Este estudo se propõe a uma análise de como os Tribunais de Contas brasilei-ros são influenciados por interesses internacionais, utilizando-se de uma abor-dagem funcionalista à qual se agregam elementos históricos, para compreen-são da construção dos vínculos que sustentam essa influência. Os sistemas de controle surgem da necessidade das classes dominantes. O apartamento das estruturas de dominação política (Estado) e econômica (capital), no capita-lismo, originou um tipo de controle focado em aprimorar a gestão (auditorias) e outro em conter irregularidades (Tribunais de Contas), modelo francês, que se apresenta como defensor dos interesses sociais pela garantia da apreensão liberal de limitação do Executivo. No Brasil, que adota esse modelo, os TCs, fortalecidos pela Constituição e pela ascensão neoliberal que se seguiu ao “consenso de Washington” (1989), foram estruturados para implantar a LRF (2000) e um rígido modelo de governança, supostamente como condição para o desenvolvimento, mas que propositalmente dificulta atingi-lo, com a constru-ção de obstáculos institucionais. Submetidos a um processo de planejamento estratégico financiado pelo BID, os TCs se unificam em torno da concepção de que o combate à corrupção, que precede quaisquer outras questões, lhes ga-rantiria reconhecimento social e poder institucional. Caracterizado como “negócio”, o controle externo, submetido à mídia, passa à exposição sistemática de casos de corrupção, enfraquecendo o Estado. Produz-se um consenso que obstrui a percepção da burocracia do controle e da sociedade, tornando invisíveis as questões sociais, contendo o desenvolvimento e garantindo que a maior parcela da arrecadação seja destinada a credores. A ineficácia social desse modelo tende a esgotá-lo, levando a uma inflexão da mídia no sentido de expor também a corrupção dos Tribunais de Contas, cuja intervenção torna-se desnecessária ao neoliberalismo inclusive em razão do novo contexto de alinhamento ideológico direto do Poder Executivo, com provável enfraquecimento do sistema de controle externo.
This study proposes an analysis of how the Brazilian Audit Courts are influ-enced by international interests, using a functionalist approach to which historical elements are added, in order to understand the construction of the bonds that underpin this influence. Control systems arise from the need of the ruling class. The separation of the structures of political (state) and economic (capitalist) domination, in capitalism, originated a type of control focused on improving management (audits) and another on containing irregularities (Courts of Accounts), French model, which presents as defender of the social interests by the guarantee of the liberal apprehension of limitation of the Executive. In Brazil, which adopts this model, the TCs, strengthened by the Constitution and the neoliberal ascension that followed the "Washington Consensus" (1989), were structured to implement the LRF (2000) and a rigid model of government supposedly as a condition for development, but which purposely makes it difficult to achieve it, through the construction of institutional obstacles. Submitted to a strategic planning process financed by the IDB, the TCs unite around the idea that the fight against corruption, which precedes any other issues, would guarantee them social recognition and institutional power. Characterized as a "business", external control, submitted to the media, goes to the systematic exposure of cases of corruption, weakening the state. There is a consensus that obstructs the perception of the bureaucracy of control and society, making social issues invisible, concomitant with development and ensuring that the largest portion of the collection goes to creditors. The social inefficiency of this model tends to exhaust it, leading to an inflection of the media in order to expose also the corruption of the Courts of Accounts, whose intervention becomes unnecessary to neoliberalism even in view of the new context of direct ideological alignment of the Executive Power , probably weakening the external control system.
This study proposes an analysis of how the Brazilian Audit Courts are influ-enced by international interests, using a functionalist approach to which historical elements are added, in order to understand the construction of the bonds that underpin this influence. Control systems arise from the need of the ruling class. The separation of the structures of political (state) and economic (capitalist) domination, in capitalism, originated a type of control focused on improving management (audits) and another on containing irregularities (Courts of Accounts), French model, which presents as defender of the social interests by the guarantee of the liberal apprehension of limitation of the Executive. In Brazil, which adopts this model, the TCs, strengthened by the Constitution and the neoliberal ascension that followed the "Washington Consensus" (1989), were structured to implement the LRF (2000) and a rigid model of government supposedly as a condition for development, but which purposely makes it difficult to achieve it, through the construction of institutional obstacles. Submitted to a strategic planning process financed by the IDB, the TCs unite around the idea that the fight against corruption, which precedes any other issues, would guarantee them social recognition and institutional power. Characterized as a "business", external control, submitted to the media, goes to the systematic exposure of cases of corruption, weakening the state. There is a consensus that obstructs the perception of the bureaucracy of control and society, making social issues invisible, concomitant with development and ensuring that the largest portion of the collection goes to creditors. The social inefficiency of this model tends to exhaust it, leading to an inflection of the media in order to expose also the corruption of the Courts of Accounts, whose intervention becomes unnecessary to neoliberalism even in view of the new context of direct ideological alignment of the Executive Power , probably weakening the external control system.
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Palavras-chave
Consenso de Washington, Controle externo, Corrupção, Desenvolvimento, Neoliberalismo, Planejamento estratégico, Tribunais de Contas, Courts of Accounts, Corruption, Development, External control, Neoliberalism, Strategic planning, Washington consensus