O estatuto científico da ciência cognitiva em sua fase inicial: uma análise baseada na perspectiva epistemológica de Thomas Kuhn
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2019-02-28
Autores
Valente, Alan Rafael [UNESP]
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Universidade Estadual Paulista (Unesp)
Resumo
Nesta Dissertação desenvolvemos uma análise do estatuto científico da ciência cognitiva, em sua fase inicial, mais especificamente no período entre as décadas de 1940 e 1970. Como ponto de partida, utilizamos a abordagem epistemológica de Thomas Kuhn sobre as revoluções científicas. Para alcançar esse objetivo, dividimos a dissertação em três capítulos. No primeiro, expomos alguns dos principais conceitos relacionados à abordagem de Kuhn referentes à estrutura das revoluções científicas. Um dos conceitos-base dessa perspectiva é a noção de paradigma. Um paradigma estabelece e norteia a atividade de uma comunidade científica. Ele é constituído, dentre outras coisas, por teorias empiricamente testáveis, métodos de pesquisa, experimentos, formas de procedimentos, conjuntos de leis e princípios. Indica, ainda, os problemas a serem desenvolvidos pela comunidade científica, determinando uma agenda científica. Via de regra, a fase inicial de uma nova área de pesquisa é marcada por um momento de luta paradigmática, caracterizando-se pela existência de diversos paradigmas rivais. Desde o momento em que um deles passa a ser dominante, a área de pesquisa alcança o estatuto de ciência normal. Uma vez apresentada, de maneira geral, a abordagem de Kuhn, no segundo capítulo passamos a tratar da ciência cognitiva em sua fase inicial. Ainda com raízes na cibernética, esse movimento intelectual, em seus primeiros momentos, almejava instaurar uma ciência dos processos cognitivos. Essa perspectiva adota por princípio metodológico a concepção de que certas máquinas servem de modelo do processamento cognitivo e são fundamentais para o seu entendimento. Buscamos avaliar se, em sua fase inicial, a ciência cognitiva já começa como ciência normal ou se ela começa como pré-ciência. Para isso, analisamos a história da ciência cognitiva, procurando compreender os seus problemas, princípios metodológicos, principais características. Por fim, no terceiro capítulo, retomamos a problemática levantada no decorrer da Dissertação e apresentamos as noções de modelo e representação no começo da ciência cognitiva, expondo dois modelos adotados naquele momento: as Máquinas de Turing e as Redes Neurais Artificiais. Com isso, averiguamos em que medida poderíamos identificar a existência de paradigmas nesta área de pesquisa e se algum deles seria dominante. Por fim, tratamos de duas de suas grandes vertentes, o cognitivismo e o conexionismo, avaliando se elas configurariam paradigmas rivais. Indicamos razões para fundamentar e consolidar a hipótese de que a ciência cognitiva não começa como ciência normal, o que procuramos explicitar em nossas considerações finais.
In this dissertation, we seek to develop an analysis of the scientific status of cognitive science in its initial phase, more specifically the period between the 1940s and 1970s. As a starting point for this analysis, we use Thomas Kuhn's epistemological approach to revolutions scientific research. To achieve this goal, we divided the dissertation into three chapters. In the first, we present some of the main concepts related to Kuhn's approach to the structure of scientific revolutions. One of the basic concepts of this perspective is the notion of paradigm. A paradigm establishes and guides the activity of a scientific community. It is constituted, among other things, by empirically testable theories, methods of research, experiments, forms of procedures, sets of laws and principles. It also indicates the problems to be developed by the scientific community, determining a scientific agenda. As a rule, the initial phase of a new area of research is marked by a moment of paradigmatic struggle, characterized by the existence of several rival paradigms. From the moment one of them becomes dominant, the area of research reaches the status of normal science. Having presented, in general, Kuhn’s approach, in the second chapter we turn to cognitive science in its initial phase. Still rooted in cybernetics, this intellectual movement, in its first moments, aimed to establish a science of cognitive processes. This perspective adopts by methodological principle the conception that certain machines serve as a model of cognitive processing and are fundamental for their understanding. We seek to assess whether, in its initial phase, cognitive science already begins as normal science or whether it begins as a pre-science. For this, we analyze the history of cognitive science, trying to understand its problems and the methodological principles. Finally, in the third chapter, we return to the problematic raised during the course of the Dissertation and present the notions of model and representation at beginning of cognitive science. We discuss the two models adopted at that time, namely Turing Machines and the Artificial Neural Network, and discuss the notion of representation underlying them. With this, we investigate to what extent we could affirm the existence of paradigms in this new emerging area. Finally, we dealt with two of its great strands, cognitivism and connectionism, evaluating whether they could be considered rival paradigms in this area. Reasons are given to substantiate and consolidate the hypothesis that cognitive science does not begin as normal science, which we seek to make explicit in our final considerations.
In this dissertation, we seek to develop an analysis of the scientific status of cognitive science in its initial phase, more specifically the period between the 1940s and 1970s. As a starting point for this analysis, we use Thomas Kuhn's epistemological approach to revolutions scientific research. To achieve this goal, we divided the dissertation into three chapters. In the first, we present some of the main concepts related to Kuhn's approach to the structure of scientific revolutions. One of the basic concepts of this perspective is the notion of paradigm. A paradigm establishes and guides the activity of a scientific community. It is constituted, among other things, by empirically testable theories, methods of research, experiments, forms of procedures, sets of laws and principles. It also indicates the problems to be developed by the scientific community, determining a scientific agenda. As a rule, the initial phase of a new area of research is marked by a moment of paradigmatic struggle, characterized by the existence of several rival paradigms. From the moment one of them becomes dominant, the area of research reaches the status of normal science. Having presented, in general, Kuhn’s approach, in the second chapter we turn to cognitive science in its initial phase. Still rooted in cybernetics, this intellectual movement, in its first moments, aimed to establish a science of cognitive processes. This perspective adopts by methodological principle the conception that certain machines serve as a model of cognitive processing and are fundamental for their understanding. We seek to assess whether, in its initial phase, cognitive science already begins as normal science or whether it begins as a pre-science. For this, we analyze the history of cognitive science, trying to understand its problems and the methodological principles. Finally, in the third chapter, we return to the problematic raised during the course of the Dissertation and present the notions of model and representation at beginning of cognitive science. We discuss the two models adopted at that time, namely Turing Machines and the Artificial Neural Network, and discuss the notion of representation underlying them. With this, we investigate to what extent we could affirm the existence of paradigms in this new emerging area. Finally, we dealt with two of its great strands, cognitivism and connectionism, evaluating whether they could be considered rival paradigms in this area. Reasons are given to substantiate and consolidate the hypothesis that cognitive science does not begin as normal science, which we seek to make explicit in our final considerations.
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Paradigma, Ciência cognitiva, Cognitivismo, Conexionismo, Ciência normal, Paradigm, Cognitive science, Cognitivism, Connectionism, Normal science