O conceito de virtude no Emílio de Rousseau
Data
2021-02-25
Autores
Fernandes, Rômulo Barreto [UNESP]
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Editor
Universidade Estadual Paulista (Unesp)
Resumo
O objetivo desta dissertação é analisar e discutir o conceito de Virtude como apresentado por Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778), em especial segundo as formulações feitas em Emílio ou Da educação (1762), de acordo com o ambiente filosófico do período iluminista. Para tanto, valemo-nos de um breve estudo sobre o conceito em questão em uma visão geral, a partir dos estudos realizados por Newton Bignotto em seu livro As aventuras da virtude: As ideias republicanas na França do século XVIII (2010), no qual o comentador brasileiro expõe a relação do pensamento ético-político do filósofo de Genebra e as suas repercussões no movimento republicano que culminou na Revolução Francesa e consequente queda do Ancient Régime. A partir do panorama apresentado, tentaremos compreender as posições aparentemente conflitantes do pensamento de Rousseau acerca da virtude, especialmente no que concerne ao embate entre a virtude ética e a virtude cívica para, com suporte nas leituras do Emílio, observar como esta obra sustenta uma possível mediação entre as duas especificações do conceito. Fala-se em Rousseau da virtude pois, segundo o filósofo, a sociedade provocava um desvio, que de início surge com o estabelecimento de uma opinião divergente da ordem estabelecida pelas disposições naturais do homem para conhecer e formular uma ideia, se perpetua por meio do hábito social; dessa forma, as paixões humanas originarias, que visam a sua manutenção enquanto indivíduo e também como espécie, sofrem perversos acréscimos e apartam-se da organização natural, dando origem à gama de vícios que observa-se na ordem civil. Para o pensador, porém, é possível uma recuperação das condições naturais por meio de uma firme determinação da ação segundo os sentimentos originários, a despeito dos costumes desviados em que o homem civil vive; para tanto, não apenas se exige um conhecimento das disposições da natureza, que se apresentam como um dictamen da consciência, mas também a imposição de um esforço constante do ser humano para colocar-se conforme estas disposições e ordenar-se segundo estes preceitos naturais. Aquilo que ao ser humano em estado de natureza não exigia qualquer esforço, pois o equilíbrio entre o amor-de-si (amour-de-soi), instinto de auto conservação, e a piedade natural, virtude natural de preservação da espécie e do mundo como um todo, se da mecanicamente segundo a ordem natural, do homem civil exige não apenas conhecimento como um esforço; a força que permite ao homem romper os grilhões do hábito do mau costume e harmonizar-se com a ordem da natureza é, para Rousseau, a virtude, que serve, portanto, de força contrapontual ao impulso do egoísmo. Com este movimento em questão pretendemos compreender, primeiro, como ocorre a desnaturação do impulso de auto conservação do indivíduo (amor-de-si), decorrente dos vis efeitos do mecanismo dual de hábito e opiniões, como, à seguir, buscamos no sentimento natural da piedade e na fonte de seu conhecimento em sociedade, que é a consciência, os elementos necessários para que o homem civil, mediante a força da virtude, possa rearmonizar-se com suas disposições naturais e fazer-se, por fim, uno em sua existência.
The objective of this dissertation is to analyze and discuss the concept of Virtue as presented by Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778), in particular following the formulations made in Emile, or On Education (1762), according to the philosophical environment of the Enlightenment period. To do so, we made use of a brief study on the concept in question in an overview, from the studies carried out by Newton Bignotto in his book As aventuras da virtude: As ideias republicanas na França do século XVIII (2010), in which the Brazilian commentator exposes the relation of the ethical-political thought of the Geneva philosopher and its repercussions on the republican movement that culminated in the French Revolution and the consequent fall of the Ancient Régime. From the presented panorama, we seek to understand the apparently conflicting positions of Rousseau's thought about virtue, especially with regard to the clash between ethical virtue and civic virtue, with the support of Emile's readings and the work of Pierre Burgelin La philosophie de l’existence de J.-J. Rousseau (1973), to observe how this work sustains a possible mediation between the two specifications of the concept. Virtue is a concept in Rousseau’s philosophy because, according to him, the emergency of society caused a deviation, which at first arises with the establishment of an opinion that differs from the order established by the natural dispositions of man to know and formulate an idea, it is perpetuated through of social habit; thus, the original human passions, which aim to maintain them as an individual and also as a species, suffer perverse additions and depart from the natural organization, giving rise to the range of vices that are observed in the civil order. For the mentioned thinker, however, a recovery of natural conditions is possible through a firm determination of the action according to the original passions, despite the deviated customs in which the civilian man lives; for that, it is not only required a knowledge of the dispositions of nature, which present themselves as a dictamen of conscience, but also the imposition of a constant effort of the human being to put himself in accordance with these dispositions and order himself according to these natural precepts. What the human being in a state of nature did not require any effort, because the balance between self love (amour-de-soi), self-preservation instinct, and compassion, a natural virtue for the preservation of the species and the world as a whole, if mechanically according to the natural order, civil man requires not only knowledge but an effort; the force that allows man to break the chains of the habit of bad custom and harmonize with the order of nature is, for Rousseau, virtue, which therefore serves as a counterpoint force to the impulse of egoism. With this movement in question, we intend to understand, first, how the denaturation of the individual's self-preservation impulse (self love) occurs, due to the vile effects of the dual mechanism of habit and opinions, as, below, we seek from the concept of dictamen and its expression in conscience the necessary elements so that the civilian man, through the force of virtue, can rearmonize himself with his natural dispositions and become, finally, one in his existence.
The objective of this dissertation is to analyze and discuss the concept of Virtue as presented by Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778), in particular following the formulations made in Emile, or On Education (1762), according to the philosophical environment of the Enlightenment period. To do so, we made use of a brief study on the concept in question in an overview, from the studies carried out by Newton Bignotto in his book As aventuras da virtude: As ideias republicanas na França do século XVIII (2010), in which the Brazilian commentator exposes the relation of the ethical-political thought of the Geneva philosopher and its repercussions on the republican movement that culminated in the French Revolution and the consequent fall of the Ancient Régime. From the presented panorama, we seek to understand the apparently conflicting positions of Rousseau's thought about virtue, especially with regard to the clash between ethical virtue and civic virtue, with the support of Emile's readings and the work of Pierre Burgelin La philosophie de l’existence de J.-J. Rousseau (1973), to observe how this work sustains a possible mediation between the two specifications of the concept. Virtue is a concept in Rousseau’s philosophy because, according to him, the emergency of society caused a deviation, which at first arises with the establishment of an opinion that differs from the order established by the natural dispositions of man to know and formulate an idea, it is perpetuated through of social habit; thus, the original human passions, which aim to maintain them as an individual and also as a species, suffer perverse additions and depart from the natural organization, giving rise to the range of vices that are observed in the civil order. For the mentioned thinker, however, a recovery of natural conditions is possible through a firm determination of the action according to the original passions, despite the deviated customs in which the civilian man lives; for that, it is not only required a knowledge of the dispositions of nature, which present themselves as a dictamen of conscience, but also the imposition of a constant effort of the human being to put himself in accordance with these dispositions and order himself according to these natural precepts. What the human being in a state of nature did not require any effort, because the balance between self love (amour-de-soi), self-preservation instinct, and compassion, a natural virtue for the preservation of the species and the world as a whole, if mechanically according to the natural order, civil man requires not only knowledge but an effort; the force that allows man to break the chains of the habit of bad custom and harmonize with the order of nature is, for Rousseau, virtue, which therefore serves as a counterpoint force to the impulse of egoism. With this movement in question, we intend to understand, first, how the denaturation of the individual's self-preservation impulse (self love) occurs, due to the vile effects of the dual mechanism of habit and opinions, as, below, we seek from the concept of dictamen and its expression in conscience the necessary elements so that the civilian man, through the force of virtue, can rearmonize himself with his natural dispositions and become, finally, one in his existence.
Descrição
Palavras-chave
Virtude, Força, Disposição, Amor-de-si, Razão, Dictamen, Consciência, Hábitos, Opiniões, Piedade natural, Virtue, Force, Disposition, Self love, Reason, Conscience, Habits, Opinions, Compassion