Valores: um estudo sobre a não-neutralidade da ciência
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Data
2004-12-22
Autores
Soares, Paulo Sérgio Gomes [UNESP]
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Universidade Estadual Paulista (Unesp)
Resumo
Este trabalho apresenta a contribuição de Hugh Lacey para a tradição analítica na filosofia da ciência no que tange ao processo racional de escolha entre teorias rivais de uma perspectiva que envolve os valores, e fornece as bases para uma nova forma de ciência voltada para a resolução dos problemas sociais. Para o autor, a ciência se desenvolve de acordo com “estratégias de restrição e seleção” cujo papel é restringir as teorias a serem consideradas e selecionar os dados empíricos relevantes para o teste de teorias. A partir daí, dentro de cada estratégia, a seleção de teorias se dá em função dos valores cognitivos, tais como adequação empírica, simplicidade, poder explicativo, etc., de maneira tal que não permite interpretações relativistas. Uma estratégia é adotada pela comunidade científica com base em valores morais e sociais e a sua função é sintetizar as possibilidades dos fenômenos a fim de atender às perspectivas de alguma estrutura de valor. Segundo Lacey, a ciência moderna adota uma única estratégia, a estratégia materialista, responsável pela produção de teorias que representam o mundo em termos de leis, estruturas e processos subjacentes, sem levar em conta os contextos social, cultural e ambiental, isto é, gerando teorias pretensamente neutras que informam práticas tecnológicas, aplicáveis em princípio a quaisquer estruturas de valor. Esse ideal de racionalidade concebe a ciência como um empreendimento livre de valores morais e sociais, sendo aceito pela tradição analítica na filosofia da ciência como uma forma universalmente válida de produção científica. Porém, para Lacey, a ciência moderna não está livre de valores, uma vez que a estratégia materialista mantém uma relação de reforço mútuo com a supervalorização do controle da natureza (um valor social), dando origem...
This work presents Hugh Lacey's contribution to the analytical tradition in the philosophy of science as regards the process of rational choice between rival theories from a perspective which involves values, and provides the bases for a new form of science concerned with the solution of social problems. In the author's view, science develops according to constraint and selection strategies, whose role is to constrain the theories to be considered and select the empirical data relevant for the testing of theories. Then, inside each strategy, the choice of theories is made according to cognitive values, such as empirical adequacy, simplicity, explanatory power, etc., in a way that prevents relativistic interpretations. A strategy is adopted by the scientific community on the basis of moral and social values, and its function is to synthesise the possibilities of phenomena to satisfy the perspectives of some value structure. According to Lacey, modern science adopts only one strategy, the materialist strategy, responsible for the production of theories which represent the world in terms of underlying laws, structures and processes, without regard to social, cultural and environmental contexts, that is, generating supposedly neutral theories which inform technological practices, applicable in principle to any value structure. This ideal of rationality conceives science as an enterprise free from moral and social values, being accepted by the analytical tradition in the philosophy of science as a universally valid form of scientific production. However, for Lacey, modern science is not value free, since the materialist strategy has a mutually reinforcing relationship with the overestimation of the control of nature (a social value), giving rise to theories which are successful in technological practices...(Complete abstract, access undermentioned electronic address)
This work presents Hugh Lacey's contribution to the analytical tradition in the philosophy of science as regards the process of rational choice between rival theories from a perspective which involves values, and provides the bases for a new form of science concerned with the solution of social problems. In the author's view, science develops according to constraint and selection strategies, whose role is to constrain the theories to be considered and select the empirical data relevant for the testing of theories. Then, inside each strategy, the choice of theories is made according to cognitive values, such as empirical adequacy, simplicity, explanatory power, etc., in a way that prevents relativistic interpretations. A strategy is adopted by the scientific community on the basis of moral and social values, and its function is to synthesise the possibilities of phenomena to satisfy the perspectives of some value structure. According to Lacey, modern science adopts only one strategy, the materialist strategy, responsible for the production of theories which represent the world in terms of underlying laws, structures and processes, without regard to social, cultural and environmental contexts, that is, generating supposedly neutral theories which inform technological practices, applicable in principle to any value structure. This ideal of rationality conceives science as an enterprise free from moral and social values, being accepted by the analytical tradition in the philosophy of science as a universally valid form of scientific production. However, for Lacey, modern science is not value free, since the materialist strategy has a mutually reinforcing relationship with the overestimation of the control of nature (a social value), giving rise to theories which are successful in technological practices...(Complete abstract, access undermentioned electronic address)
Descrição
Palavras-chave
Valores, Ciencia - Filosofia, Capitalismo, Biotecnologia, Philosophy of science, Capitalism, Biotechnology, Values, Science
Como citar
SOARES, Paulo Sérgio Gomes. Valores: um estudo sobre a não-neutralidade da ciência. 2004. 143 f. Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual Paulista, Faculdade de Filosofia e Ciências, 2004.