Um estudo filosófico interdisciplinar do conceito de corpo
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Data
2009-02-09
Autores
Frastrone, Maria Guiomar Benuto [UNESP]
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Editor
Universidade Estadual Paulista (Unesp)
Resumo
Este trabalho tem por objetivo investigar alguns pressupostos e implicações filosóficas da noção cartesiana de corpo e contrapor esta concepção ao entendimento de que o corpo dos organismos é uma estrutura biológica com capacidades cognitivas que se atualiza evolutivamente de modo auto-organizado. Apoiados na teoria de sistemas complexos, tal como proposto por Souza (2000, 2004, 2007), Souza e Daminelli (2008), Guimarães (2000, 2004), Pereira Júnior (2004), caracterizamos o corpo como instância auto-organizada que se atualiza nas relações com o meio e entre suas estruturas constituintes. Defendemos também a hipótese, apoiados em Haselager (2004, 2007, Gonzalez (2004) e Broens (2004, 2007), que a estrutura corpórea, em contraste com os postulados dualistas – mais proeminente o cartesiano -, corresponde à atualização de padrões disposicionais cuja interação com o meio é de importância central para a cognição. Assim, entendemos que o corpo não pode ser reduzido a uma substância extensa sem nenhum papel cognitivo, como entendiam Descartes e muitos dualistas, ou, como parecem pressupor alguns cognitivistas tradicionais, a desempenhar, quando muito, um papel cognitivo secundário. Procuraremos ressaltar que, adotada uma perspectiva evolucionária, (1) o corpo deve ser entendido simultaneamente como produto e produtor de processos cognitivos na dinâmica auto-organizativa própria da vida e (2) a adoção desta perspectiva têm implicações importantes para a Filosofia da Mente
This work aims at inquiring into some of the philosophical assumptions and implications of the Cartesian concept of body, seeking to contrast such view to the understanding that the body of organisms is a biological structure with cognitive capacities actualizing itself in an evolutive self-organized way. We rely on the theories of complex systems, such as those argued for by Souza (2000, 2004, 2007), Souza and Daminelli (2008), Guimarães (2000, 2004), Pereira Júnior (2004), and we seek to identify the body as a self-organized instance actualizing itself in the relations with the environment and in between its constitutive structures. Based on the works of Haselager (2004, 2007), Gonzales (2004) and Broens (2004, 2007), and in contrast to dualistic assumptions, mainly of a Cartesian character, we also defend the hypothesis that corporal structure corresponds to the actualization of dispositional patterns, of which the interaction with the environment is chiefly significant to cognition. So, we understand that the body cannot be reduced to a mere bundle of matter and made to occupy a secondary role, as traditional cognitivists defend. Our account acquires consistency when the body is seen as a source of knowledge grounded on a fluid and continuous evolutive history, being not only a mere result reached from logical processes coordinated by knowledge representations, as Haselager points out (2004). We stress the central role of the body in processes of acquisition of knowledge. Finally, we conclude that the body cannot be resumed to an extended substance with no cognitive role at all, as Descartes and many other dualistic thinkers assumed; or, as many traditional cognitivists seem to assume, that it has only a secondary role in cognition. We seek to reinforce that once an evolutive standpoint is taken, (1) the body must be understood at the same time both as producer ... (Complete abstract click electronic access below)
This work aims at inquiring into some of the philosophical assumptions and implications of the Cartesian concept of body, seeking to contrast such view to the understanding that the body of organisms is a biological structure with cognitive capacities actualizing itself in an evolutive self-organized way. We rely on the theories of complex systems, such as those argued for by Souza (2000, 2004, 2007), Souza and Daminelli (2008), Guimarães (2000, 2004), Pereira Júnior (2004), and we seek to identify the body as a self-organized instance actualizing itself in the relations with the environment and in between its constitutive structures. Based on the works of Haselager (2004, 2007), Gonzales (2004) and Broens (2004, 2007), and in contrast to dualistic assumptions, mainly of a Cartesian character, we also defend the hypothesis that corporal structure corresponds to the actualization of dispositional patterns, of which the interaction with the environment is chiefly significant to cognition. So, we understand that the body cannot be reduced to a mere bundle of matter and made to occupy a secondary role, as traditional cognitivists defend. Our account acquires consistency when the body is seen as a source of knowledge grounded on a fluid and continuous evolutive history, being not only a mere result reached from logical processes coordinated by knowledge representations, as Haselager points out (2004). We stress the central role of the body in processes of acquisition of knowledge. Finally, we conclude that the body cannot be resumed to an extended substance with no cognitive role at all, as Descartes and many other dualistic thinkers assumed; or, as many traditional cognitivists seem to assume, that it has only a secondary role in cognition. We seek to reinforce that once an evolutive standpoint is taken, (1) the body must be understood at the same time both as producer ... (Complete abstract click electronic access below)
Descrição
Palavras-chave
Sistemas auto-organizadores, Corpo e mente, Evolução, Cognição, Filosofia da mente, Body, Self-organization, Habit, Cognition
Como citar
FRASTRONE, Maria Guiomar Benuto. Um estudo filosófico interdisciplinar do conceito de corpo. 2009. 110 f. Dissertação (metrado) - Universidade Estadual Paulista, Faculdade de Filosofia e Ciências de Marília, 2009.