THE ENFORCED SELF-REGULATION MODEL AND THE THEORY OF CAPTURE: OBSTACLES TO THE EFFECTIVENESS IN MONEY LAUNDERING COMBAT IN BRAZIL
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Data
2017-01-01
Autores
Carlos de Oliveira, Jose [UNESP]
Agapito, Leonardo Simoes [UNESP]
Miranda, Matheus de Alencar e
Título da Revista
ISSN da Revista
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Editor
Univ Estado Rio Janeiro
Resumo
This article aims to point out how the enforced self-regulationsystem in the fight against money laundering in Brazil, by means of compliance incentive, leads to the so-called phenomenon of the regulatory agencies' capture, avoiding that the prevention and the fight against the referred crime are really effective. To achieve it, the structure of the prevention and fighting this crime system was described, with special attention to the enforced selfregulation and the duties imposed to private agents of prevention by means of compliance and informing to the regulatory agencies with preventive goals. After that, the data from this particular structure was analyzed, finally finding out that regulatory agencies are dependent of the regulated agents, what turns the system inefficient, creating the capture of the regulators. In the conclusions, some probable causes and possible solutions to the problem are pointed.
Descrição
Palavras-chave
Money Laundering, Compliance, Enforced Self-Regulation, Capture Theory, Regulatory Agencies, Prevention and Fighting Crime, Effectiveness, Criminal Law, Public Law
Como citar
Quaestio Iuris. Rio De Janeiro Rj: Univ Estado Rio Janeiro, v. 10, n. 1, p. 365-388, 2017.