O conceito de Diferença em Gilles Deleuze como um projeto de subversão do platonismo
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2021-05-31
Autores
Silva, Aline Kelly Ferreira da
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Universidade Estadual Paulista (Unesp)
Resumo
Esta pesquisa tem como foco realizar uma análise da crítica deleuziana, que rompe com o primado da identidade e da representação através do conceito de “simulacro” tal como aparece no pensamento de Platão, onde os conceitos de modelo e cópia, sensível e inteligível são superados em favor da “diferença” absoluta, gerando uma nova ontologia, uma ontologia afundamentada. Para tanto, partiremos da refutação que o filósofo grego faz da tese de Parmênides, afirmando que o não-ser é, e é algo diferente do ser, concluindo que, no âmbito discursivo, o simulacro remete ao discurso falso. Deste modo, em Platão, o simulacro deve ser identificado e anulado, pois só é verdadeiro o que participa do ser, o que do ser se aproxima por meio da semelhança. Assim, Deleuze compreende que Platão considera como falsidade é, de fato, algo diferente, que subsiste e é verdadeiro em si mesmo. O simulacro é pura potência e positividade, não havendo necessidade de participar de algo paradigmático. Com isso, esperamos demonstrar que a teoria do simulacro, tal como aparece em Deleuze, tem força suficiente para subverter o platonismo.
This research focuses on conducting an analysis of the Deleuzian critique, in which there is a rupture with the primacy of identity and the representation through the concept of “simulacrum” as it appears in Plato's philosophy, where the concepts of model and copy, sensible and intelligible, are surpassed in favor of the absolute "difference", generating a new ontology, an unfunded ontology. In order to achieve this, we start with the refutation from the Greek philosopher of Parmenides' thesis, stating that non-being is, and it is something different from being - concluding that, in the discursive realm, simulacrum refers to false discourse. Thus, in Plato, the simulacrum must be identified and annulled, for it is only truthful that which participates of being, which approaches of being through resemblance. Therefore, Deleuze understands that Plato regards as falsehood is in fact something different, which subsists and is true in itself. Simulacrum is pure power and positivity, there being no reason to participate in something paradigmatic. By this, we hope to demonstrate that the theory of simulacrum, as it appears in Deleuze, is powerful enough to overturn Platonism.
This research focuses on conducting an analysis of the Deleuzian critique, in which there is a rupture with the primacy of identity and the representation through the concept of “simulacrum” as it appears in Plato's philosophy, where the concepts of model and copy, sensible and intelligible, are surpassed in favor of the absolute "difference", generating a new ontology, an unfunded ontology. In order to achieve this, we start with the refutation from the Greek philosopher of Parmenides' thesis, stating that non-being is, and it is something different from being - concluding that, in the discursive realm, simulacrum refers to false discourse. Thus, in Plato, the simulacrum must be identified and annulled, for it is only truthful that which participates of being, which approaches of being through resemblance. Therefore, Deleuze understands that Plato regards as falsehood is in fact something different, which subsists and is true in itself. Simulacrum is pure power and positivity, there being no reason to participate in something paradigmatic. By this, we hope to demonstrate that the theory of simulacrum, as it appears in Deleuze, is powerful enough to overturn Platonism.
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Deleuze, Diferença, Platão, Simulacro, Difference, Plato, Simulacrum