A crise econômica no Japão após os anos 90
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Data
2011-02-08
Autores
Fraga, Jefferson Souza [UNESP]
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Editor
Universidade Estadual Paulista (Unesp)
Resumo
O presente trabalho tem como objetivo analisar a experiência do Japão após os colapsos das bolhas especulativas dos ativos na década de 1990. Aceitando que o pior já passou, ou seja, que a crise financeira japonesa foi finalmente resolvida, uma coisa é certa; não antes de uma “década perdida” caracterizada por um longo período, de baixo crescimento, aumento das taxas de desemprego, deflação nos preços dos ativos, falências bancárias e persistência dos no-performing loans. Nesse contexto, as principais respostas obtidas por este trabalho foram: a crença que a recuperação econômica viria com o passar do tempo e a falta de entendimento sobre o tamanho do problema que a morosidade de atuação levaria ao sistema, explica em certo ponto a tolerância inicial do governo japonês frente à crise econômica. A política fiscal expansionista foi eficaz, mas, não utilizada de forma consistente, a natureza “stop-start” dos estímulos realizados, e em particular as prematuras reversões fiscais diminuíram a sua eficácia, outros fatores prováveis para a baixa eficácia durante os anos 90 foram: os estímulos fiscais podem ter sido prejudicados pela queda dos multiplicadores fiscais; os efetivos investimentos públicos foram menores que os anunciados e ao invés de se dar ênfase a obras públicas, priorizou-se cortes em impostos. De outra forma, um caminho fundamental de maximizar os estímulos fiscais é através da restauração do crédito do setor bancário, caso a recapitalização e as restaurações do setor fossem realizas em uma fase inicial, os efeitos dos estímulos poderiam ser de curta duração, se o sistema financeiro estivesse em boa saúde. No Japão, as injeções nos bancos “em grande escala” ocorreram apenas em 1999. Por outro lado, a política monetária, com base em uma versão alternativa da armadilha da liquidez levou o BOJ a tomar algumas medidas...
This dissertation intend to analyze the experience of Japan after the collapse of speculative bubbles in assets in the 1990s. Accepting that the worst is over, that is to say, that the Japanese financial crisis was finally resolved, one thing is certain; not before a “lost decade” characterized by a long period of low growth, increasing rates of unemployment, deflation in asset prices, bank failures and persistence of no-performing loans. In this context, the main responses received for this work were: the belief that economic recovery would come with the passage of time and lack of understanding about the size of the problem that the slowness of action would lead to the system; this explains in some degree the initial tolerance of the Japanese government by the economic crisis. The expansionary fiscal was effective, but not consistently used, the nature of “stop-start” of the stimuli made, and in particular the early tax reversals decreased its effectiveness, other likely factors for the low efficiency during the year 1990 were: the fiscal stimuli may have been harmed by falling tax multipliers; the effective public investments were lower than those advertised instead of giving emphasis to public works, the priority was tax cuts. On the other hand, a fundamental way to maximize the tax incentives is through the restoration of credit from the banking sector, if the recapitalization and the restorations of the sector were held in an early stage, the effects of stimuli could be short term, if the financial system was in good health. In Japan, the injections in banks “large scale” occurred only in 1999. Moreover, monetary policy, based on an alternative version of the liquidity trap led the BOJ to take some innovative measures since 2001. Centered on a strategy to ensure liquidity and extend the warranties on direct purchases of assets, quantitative easing was implanted... (Complete abstract click electronic access below)
This dissertation intend to analyze the experience of Japan after the collapse of speculative bubbles in assets in the 1990s. Accepting that the worst is over, that is to say, that the Japanese financial crisis was finally resolved, one thing is certain; not before a “lost decade” characterized by a long period of low growth, increasing rates of unemployment, deflation in asset prices, bank failures and persistence of no-performing loans. In this context, the main responses received for this work were: the belief that economic recovery would come with the passage of time and lack of understanding about the size of the problem that the slowness of action would lead to the system; this explains in some degree the initial tolerance of the Japanese government by the economic crisis. The expansionary fiscal was effective, but not consistently used, the nature of “stop-start” of the stimuli made, and in particular the early tax reversals decreased its effectiveness, other likely factors for the low efficiency during the year 1990 were: the fiscal stimuli may have been harmed by falling tax multipliers; the effective public investments were lower than those advertised instead of giving emphasis to public works, the priority was tax cuts. On the other hand, a fundamental way to maximize the tax incentives is through the restoration of credit from the banking sector, if the recapitalization and the restorations of the sector were held in an early stage, the effects of stimuli could be short term, if the financial system was in good health. In Japan, the injections in banks “large scale” occurred only in 1999. Moreover, monetary policy, based on an alternative version of the liquidity trap led the BOJ to take some innovative measures since 2001. Centered on a strategy to ensure liquidity and extend the warranties on direct purchases of assets, quantitative easing was implanted... (Complete abstract click electronic access below)
Descrição
Palavras-chave
Economia, Crise financeira, Colapsos das bolhas especulativas, Collapse of speculative bubbles, Financial crisis, No-performing loans, Quantitative easing
Como citar
FRAGA, Jefferson Souza. A crise econômica no Japão após os anos 90. 2011. 100 f. Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual Paulista, Faculdade de Ciências e Letras de Araraquara, 2011.