A Monist View of Quantum Theory and Neuroscience
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In this commentary to Henry Stapp’s target paper, I defend a view alternative to both von Neumann’s methodological Dualism, and Stapp’s choice of Idealist metaphysics. I argue for a Monist metaphysical thesis, claiming that the observed physical systems and the observers who study them originate from a common “neutral” source (neither material nor mental). Scientifically, I argue for an epistemological view of the neurosciences in which the brain/mind system has a circular topology, affording conscious experiences. In this Monist view of the brain/mind, the decoherence process is not fully completed, as in the “mental collapse” view: there is a “recoherence” process in living tissue that generates conscious episodes experienced by the organisms.
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Monist view, Neuroscience, Neutral monism, Quantum theory, Recoherence
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Inglês
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Activitas Nervosa Superior, v. 61, n. 1-2, p. 121-125, 2019.
