A consciência segundo Damásio: um enfoque neurofilosófico
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Data
2018-02-02
Autores
Rosa, Luiz Augusto [UNESP]
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Universidade Estadual Paulista (Unesp)
Resumo
Nessa dissertação buscamos fazer uma análise filosófica das teorias sobre a emoção, sentimento, self e consciência de António Damásio frente ao contexto neurobiológico contemporâneo. No primeiro capítulo, nós fizemos uma revisão de literatura sobre os dois paradigmas da consciência vigentes na neurobiologia, no caso, o paradigma cognitivista, onde revisamos os trabalhos de Crick, Baars, Dehaene, Tononi, Koch e LeDoux, e o paradigma afetivista, onde revisamos as ideias centrais de Panksepp. No segundo capítulo, nós revisamos as ideias centrais de Damásio sobre emoção, sentimento, self e consciência, analisando tanto a atualização conceitual e neurobiológica no decorrer de suas obras principais quanto como cada teoria está embasada nas ideias de James sobre os processos emocionais e nos paradigmas discutidos no primeiro capítulo. No terceiro capítulo, nós revisamos as ideias centrais do modelo construtivista da emoção de Russell e Barrett, as posições de Damásio e outros autores sobre a problemática da possibilidade de consciência em animais não-humanos, avaliamos as teorias centrais de Damásio frente ao contexto neurobiológico atual, e analisamos tanto os problemas conceituais inerentes à teoria da consciência de Damásio quanto as posições de Damásio sobre o problema da causação mental e identidade mente-cérebro. Nós esperamos, com essa dissertação, ter contribuído, mesmo que modestamente, com um debate que vem ganhando grande impacto na literatura especializada, que vai muito além do aqui foi apresentado.
In this dissertation we sought to make a philosophical analysis of Antonio Damásio’s theories on emotion, feeling, self, and consciousness in the face of the contemporary neurobiological context. In the first chapter, we reviewed the literature on the two paradigms of consciousness in neurobiology, in this case, the cognitive paradigm, where we reviewed the works of Crick, Baars, Dehaene, Tononi, Koch and LeDoux, and the affectivist paradigm, where we reviewed Panksepp’s core ideas. In the second chapter we review Damasio’s central ideas on emotion, feeling, self, and consciousness, analyzing both the conceptual and neurobiological actualization in the course of his major works, and how each theory is based on James’ ideas on emotional processes and the paradigms discussed in the first chapter. In the third chapter, we reviewed the core ideas of Russell’s and Barrett’s constructivist model of emotions, the stance of Damasio and other authors on the problematic about the possibility of consciousness in nonhuman animals, we assessed Damasio’s central theories in the face of the current neurobiological context, and we analyzed both the conceptual problems inherent in Damasio’s theory of consciousness and Damasio’s stance on the problem of mental causation and mind-brain identity. We hope, with this dissertation, to have contributed, even modestly, to a debate that has been gaining great impact in the specialized literature, which goes far beyond what was presented here.
In this dissertation we sought to make a philosophical analysis of Antonio Damásio’s theories on emotion, feeling, self, and consciousness in the face of the contemporary neurobiological context. In the first chapter, we reviewed the literature on the two paradigms of consciousness in neurobiology, in this case, the cognitive paradigm, where we reviewed the works of Crick, Baars, Dehaene, Tononi, Koch and LeDoux, and the affectivist paradigm, where we reviewed Panksepp’s core ideas. In the second chapter we review Damasio’s central ideas on emotion, feeling, self, and consciousness, analyzing both the conceptual and neurobiological actualization in the course of his major works, and how each theory is based on James’ ideas on emotional processes and the paradigms discussed in the first chapter. In the third chapter, we reviewed the core ideas of Russell’s and Barrett’s constructivist model of emotions, the stance of Damasio and other authors on the problematic about the possibility of consciousness in nonhuman animals, we assessed Damasio’s central theories in the face of the current neurobiological context, and we analyzed both the conceptual problems inherent in Damasio’s theory of consciousness and Damasio’s stance on the problem of mental causation and mind-brain identity. We hope, with this dissertation, to have contributed, even modestly, to a debate that has been gaining great impact in the specialized literature, which goes far beyond what was presented here.
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Palavras-chave
Consciência, Emoção, Sentimento, Damásio, Neurobiologia, Self, Filosofia da mente, Consciousness, Emotion, Feeling, Damasio, Neurobiology, Philosophy of mind