The theoretical and scientific problems of damasio’s conceptual model of consciousness

dc.contributor.authorRosa, Luiz Augusto [UNESP]
dc.contributor.institutionUniversidade Estadual Paulista (Unesp)
dc.date.accessioned2018-12-11T16:55:01Z
dc.date.available2018-12-11T16:55:01Z
dc.date.issued2017-01-01
dc.description.abstractHere I assess Damasio’s conceptual model of consciousness based mainly on the concepts of emotion, feeling, and consciousness by analyzing its conceptual implications and its theoretical and scientific problems. One of the conceptual implications of the direct interaction between the concept of “feeling” and the concept of “consciousness” is the concept of consciousness as “feeling a feeling”, which is also recognized by Damasio. The concept “feeling a feeling” directly implies the concept of consciousness as “an emotional perception of an emotional perception”. Each implication has further theoretical implications that form a web of theoretical and scientific problems. I also argue that, since Damasio’s model of consciousness is a neuroscientific model, it should provide a rigorous integration between the high-order concepts and the empirical concepts that underlie them, which, for example, is the case of Dehaene’s model of consciousness. Moreover, at the end of the paper, I suggest some conceptual changes that would minimize the theoretical problems of Damasio’s conceptual model of consciousness.en
dc.description.affiliationSchool of Philosophy and Sciences São Paulo State University (UNESP), Av. Hygino Muzzi Filho, 737
dc.description.affiliationUnespSchool of Philosophy and Sciences São Paulo State University (UNESP), Av. Hygino Muzzi Filho, 737
dc.format.extent83-100
dc.identifier.citationKriterion (Austria), v. 32, n. 2, p. 83-100, 2017.
dc.identifier.issn1019-8288
dc.identifier.scopus2-s2.0-85051854833
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11449/171360
dc.language.isoeng
dc.relation.ispartofKriterion (Austria)
dc.relation.ispartofsjr0,105
dc.rights.accessRightsAcesso restrito
dc.sourceScopus
dc.subjectConceptual model
dc.subjectConsciousness
dc.subjectDamasio
dc.subjectPhilosophy of neuroscience
dc.subjectPhilosophy of Science
dc.subjectTheoretical problems
dc.titleThe theoretical and scientific problems of damasio’s conceptual model of consciousnessen
dc.typeArtigo

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